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 This dissertation investigates the God-world relationship between Joseph Bracken 
as a process theologian, Philip Clayton as a panentheist, and the open theism. They have 
affinities and differences as conversational partners in their multilayered relations. Their 
common question must be as follows: “What does it mean to believe in God today?” In 
this dissertation I compare their respectively theological perspectives and explore their 
affinities and differences. Many scholars have already noted more affinities than 
untenable differences among Bracken’s theology, Clayton’s panentheism, and the open 
theism. On the one hand, even though theological perspectives of Bracken and Clayton 
are obviously different from each other, they are both influenced in specific ways by 
Whitehead. On the other hand, open theism is a movement that emphasizes “the openness 
of God,” from within evangelical theism. The fact that there is even within classical 
theism the pursuit of new models of God such as revised classical theism or modified 
classical theism might suggest the need for contemporary models of God in philosophical 
theology. 
 This dissertation will thus explore philosophical theologies that are proper both to 
the biblical faith and intellectual earnestness, that is, 居敬窮? (geo (to live) kyeong 
(piety) kung (to acknowledge) li (reason)) in Eastern philosophy, which means 
distinctions but not separation between piety and intelligence, and that stand between 
classical theism and “orthodox” process theism. If there is no consistency among biblical, 
rational and existential descriptions of God, how can we establish philosophical 
theologies? Our theological task is to frame a new constructive theology whose primary 
aspect must synthesize both classical theism and process theology in the hermeneutical 
circle. For example, this new theism admits an infinitely qualitative difference between 
God and the world, as well as a really radical relation between God and the world. 
Aspects and domains do not encroach upon each other. 
 
 
 v  
Acknowledgements  
 
I am really grateful to my doctor father, Philip Clayton, who taught me especially 
panentheism and science and religion and who led me to a way of theology of integration, 
making a balance between liberal theology and conservative theology. I also thank two 
committee members, Anselm Min and Ingolf Dalferth. I give my thanks as well to 
ChulhoYoun who taught me philosophical theology in relational thought and who is a 
professor in Presbyterian College and Theological Seminary in Korea, to a Rev. 
SoonChang Lee who is my mentor and a senior pastor in Yonshin Church in Korea, and 
to Joohyang Church (Rev. Shin Kim) in Los Angeles and to Myungsung Church (Rev. 
Samwhan Kim) in Korea who supported my financial help needs. I really thank my wife, 
Ji-Young Oh. Without her sacrificial help, I could not make this work. I want to thank my 
beloved daughter and son, Eunyou and John. And without the prayer and support of 
family in Korea, I could not finish this study. Finally, thank to God. 
 
“Glory to God in the highest and on earth peace to men!”  
 
 vi  
Preface 
What are the raisons d’etre of theology?  
 It is natural that one lacks something in one’s life. In order to rectify such a lack, 
one may achieve a vicarious pleasure through anyone who does not have the same part 
lacking. For example, someone who does not sing a song well may achieve the ability to 
do so by listening to the song as it is sung by other singers. Someone who does not 
exercise well may achieve the ability to do so by watching the play as it is played by 
other sport players. Such examples can be countless. What, then, is the ultimate lack in 
human beings in general? It is neither money nor fame nor social position. If it were any 
of these, those who are rich, famous, or in high social positions should be happy and 
satisfied with their lives. However, we know that they are not. The ultimate human 
concern lies beyond such mundane phenomena; the ultimate problem for humans, the 
problem we cannot solve, is the problem of salvation, although some religions maintain 
the possibility of human salvation in humanity. To that extent, then, humans may suppose 
“God” in order to satisfy their lack. In that sense, Feuerbach’s thesis, “God is the 
projection of human consciousness,” must be a wonderful insight. Feuerbach deploys this 
thesis in the perspective of atheism, but, if we elaborately develop this argument, we can 
meet a confession of another tone, that is, it is God that is the highest word which we can 
confess in human language. The faith we have, “God exists,” finally supports that it is not 
a fiction. Thus to confess God in a seemingly atheistic time is a more brave and valuable 
confession than not to confess God.  
  
 vii  
In this dissertation I use some methods such as systematic theology, comparative 
theology between different scholars, the authority of the Bible, and various examples of 
human life.1 In order to solve the problem of God, I have chosen three figures: a modified 
process theologian (Joseph Bracken), a panentheist (Philip Clayton), and modified 
classical theists (Open theists). In Chapter I, I begin to explore the problem of God in 
many skeptical elements and attempt to find a possible alternative from philosophical 
theology. In Chapter II-Chapter VI, I investigate theological characteristics of the model 
of God advanced by Bracken, Clayton, and the Open theists in order to show the 
affinities and differences between them. In Chapter VII, I present and defend a 
philosophical theology which synthesizes classical theism and process theism, and which 
I will call Trinitarian Panentheistic Theology (TPT). Giving the Trinity the position as the 
first adjective form in Trinitarian Panentheistic Theology, panentheism in this 
dissertation is based on the Trinity itself. The Trinity and panentheism have common 
grounds, i.e., God’s transcendence and God’s immanence in the relation between God 
and the world. By bridging with divine action four categories from classical theism—
Creatio ex Nihilo, Trinity, Transcendence, and Worship—and one category from process 
theology, Dipolar God, I will depend the model of TPT. Central features of exposition 
include: Kenotic God, Relational God, Suffering God, Knowable God, and Revised 
Power of God (the voluntarily self-limiting God).  
 
 
                                                 
 1 As a matter of fact, many theologians have been ignoring each individual’s life story in theology 
because they consider the individual story not as God’s talk but just as trivial talk. However, we need to 
rethink this in that theology happens between my (human) story and God’s story; each individual story 
already contains its own theological implications. For the believer, that story becomes “the story of God’s 
self-revelation” and is, for the Christian, also “the story of God’s redemptive work in Christ.” Philip 
Clayton, Transforming Christian Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2010), 85, 94, and 137.  
 viii  
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Chapter I: Methodology and Theory of Knowledge 
In chapter one, I begin to point out the problem of God in many skeptical elements, 
explore the possibility of contribution to theology of the skepticism, and attempt to 
suggest a possible alternative from philosophical theology in the midst of the science 
beyond classical theism. 
 
The Problem of God   
“Is Christian theology still possible?”
1
 This question must be in any sense a very sad 
question, since it tells us of a currently despairing address or situation of theology and in 
that it is such a question as cannot be asked if Christian theology is prosperous. We can 
first simply answer to this question in two ways: Yes and No. Then, what would be the 
criterion of Yes and No? We need to answer the question in relation to contemporary 
issues in order to satisfy the criterion, because theology is not always perfect regardless 
of the context and the period. That is, if Christian theology can properly answer to the 
contemporary issues, “yes” can be an answer; if it cannot answer to them, “no” can be an 
answer. Hence the criterion must be dependent upon whether it can answer or not to 
comtemporary issues. However, since this very provocative question requires of our self-
integral struggle with the identity of theology more than a simple “yes” or “no,” we have 
to find alternatives and hope for theology from the above five words within the quotation 
marks. In the sesnse, our step to find an answer from the past alone is not always 
appropriate.  
                                                 
 
1
 John B. Cobb, Jr., God and the World (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1965), 117.  
 2  
 Insofar as the question of theology is that of God, we can reflect upon this 
question with the following phrase: “God is dead; long live God!”2 Cobb’s succinct six 
words interestingly include both skeptical elements (No) and constructive factors (Yes) in 
theology. Following this line of thinking, the most serious and troublesome problem in 
the world, as Schubert Ogden also very properly indicates, may be (paradoxically) neither 
political issues nor economic declination. Rather, I suggest, it is the problem of God, 
which is “the only problem there is.”
3
 Since God, the creator of the world, would be the 
very trouble-maker and the prime cause of the chaos in a contemporary society, in the 
sense, if we may say, the person (subject) who should appear in the court owing to the 
crime of dereliction of duty must be the very God.  
 In this sense, we can further reflect on Friedrich Nietzsche’s challengeable 
question from Thus Spoke Zarathustra which is very appropriate to the people who 
struggle with the problem of God in this world: “Have ye courage, O my brethren? Are 
ye stout-hearted? Not the courage before witnesses, but anchorite and eagle courage, 
which not even a God any longer beholdeth?”
4
 They must be really courageous to the 
extent that they reject the stationary proposition that God still exists today if Nietzsche is 
right. Even if there is no provocative message of Nietzsche, however, many people have 
been doubtful about the existence of God from generation to generation. Why do we feel 
vain or empty when we speak concerning God today? Should people still speak of God if 
many people live well without God? Is the difference of attitude toward life between 
believer and nonbeliever not vague? In these situations, why do we still want to believe in 
God and talk about God in a skeptical period? What does it mean to believe in God 
                                                 
 
2
 Cobb, God and the World, 41. 
 
3
 Schubert M, Ogden, The reality of God, (San Franscisco: Harper and Row, 1963), 1.  
 
4
 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, tr. by Thomas Common (The Pennsylvania State 
University, 1999), 255. (From http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/nietsche/tszarath.pdf) 
 3  
today?
5
 Accordingly, accepting these questions, we need to deal with “self-critical 
treatments of religious belief.”6  
 
Skeptical Elements  
David Griffin summarizes eight doctrines of good news or essence of Christianity:  
1. “Our world has been created by a good, loving, wise, purposive God”; 2. “God, loving 
all of us, desires that we treat each other with justice and compassion”; 3. “Our world is 
essentially good, even though it is now full of evil”; 4. “God continues to act in the world, 
especially through human beings, to foster good and overcome evil”; 5. “God’s love, 
concern for justice, and purpose, having already been expressed through a series of 
prophets and sages, were revealed in a decisive way through Jesus of Nazareth”; 6. “The 
divine purpose, thus revealed, is to overcome evil by bringing about a ‘reign of God’ on 
earth, in which the present subjugation of life to demonic values (lies, ugliness, injustice, 
hate, and indifference) will be replaced by a mode of life based on divine values (truth, 
beauty, goodness, justice, and compassion); 7. “Salvation can be enjoyed here and now, 
at least in a partial way, through direct experience of, and empowerment by, God as Holy 
Spirit, and by the faith that, no mater what, our lives have ultimate meaning, because 
nothing can separate us from the love of God”; 8. “The divine purpose is also to bring 
about an even more complete salvation in a life beyond bodily death”
 7
 (Numbers are 
added). 
 
Then what would be the skeptical elements which seriously increase the consciousness of 
the problem of God and even cause the forgetfulness of God in the world? Francis 
Collins found four vexing questions with regard to the problem of God: “Isn’t the idea of 
God just wish fulfillment?”; “What about all the harm done in the name of religion?”; 
“Why would a loving God allow suffering in the world?”; and “How can a rational 
person believe in miracles?”
8
 The most serious skeptical elements inter alia in respect of 
                                                 
 
5
 John Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1998), 1.  
 6 Philip Clayton and Steven Knapp, The Predicament of Belief (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), viii.  
 
7
 David Griffin, Two Great Truths: A New Synthesis of Scientific Naturalism and Christian Faith 
(Louisville: Westminster John Konx Press, 2004), 29-31. Numbers are added by me. 
 
8
 Francis S. Collins, The Language of God (New York: Free Press, 2006), chapter 2.  
 4  
the idea of God, if we summarize these problems, could be the problem of evil, the 
religious pluralism, success of the sciences, and secular worldviews.9  
 First is the problem of evil. It is the most sensitive factor and kernel of skepticism 
to the classical theism, since the almighty God in a traditional meaning cannot be 
sustained in the midst of the daily evils. Second is the problem of pluralism: how could 
we say that there is no salvation outside church (extra ecclasiam nulla salus)?
10
 The 
existence of diverse religions calls into question the validity of Christian truth-claims. 
Since this requires public vocation of theology, we need to note Alan Race’s observation 
that “the future of Christian theology lies in the encounter between Christianity and other 
faith.”11 Third is the relation between science and religion. According to Ken Wilber, 
they began “a deadly dance” or entered into a “complex war.”12 The debate of religion 
and science seems to be that of creation and evolution, of sacred and secular, of theism 
and atheism, or of believer and non-believer. Whereas for theists science is unholy, for 
atheists religion is absurd. What is then a correct answer?: Either-or, or both-and?
13
 
                                                 
 
9
 Philip Clayton, Adventures in the Spirit: God, World, Divine Action, Ed. by. Zachary Simpson 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008), 23. Clayton argues that “It is troubled by the problem of evil, though 
not completely destroyed by it; it is humbled before other religious traditions, though not ready therefore to 
proclaim the equivalence of all faiths; it is respectful of the power of scientific predictions and explanations, 
though not prepared to reduce the spiritual dimension to what science can grasp of it.” Ibid., 24. 
Karkkainen also suggests three challenges: philosophical and religious challenge, the radical transformation 
of Christianity from the contextual situations, and religious pluralism. Veli-Matti Karkkainen, The Doctrine 
of God: A Global Introduction (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2004), 303.    
 
10
 The radical rejection of pluralism appear as religious war such as Taliban’s killing of members 
of Korean mission team in Afganistan and, as Christian conservative, Anders Behring Breivik’s killing 
people in Norway (2011).  
 
11
 Karkkainen, The Doctrine of God: A Global Introduction, 304. Regarding interreligious 
dialogue, Clayton argues that “Contact across the religions actually allows one to think more deeply about 
what Christian identity means in today's world. (The same applies, of course, for Jews and Muslims.) Each 
person has to find her own answer to that question, which she can then share both within her own 
community and in dialogue with other traditions.” Clayton draws on three resources in Christianity from 
the New Testament “in complex interactions with alternative religious worldviews”; from John Wesley’s 
ministry in relation to outside Christianity; and from emerging Christian communities beyond old dualism. 
Clayton insists that interreligious dialogue does not make Christian identity vague, but more distinctive and 
clear: “The more clearly we learn to hear the music of other traditions, the more beautifully we can sing our 
own song.” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/philip-clayton-phd/can-christians-survive-th_b_841429.html. 
 
12
 Ken Wilber, The Marriage of Sense and Soul (New York: Random House, 1998), 15. 
 
13
 A possible element of skepticism could be the problem of monism in that God (infinite) and 
nature (finite) are one. In the pantheist worldview nature is the ultimate reality, beyond which nothing can 
 5  
Fourth is the public dimension of theology, that is, how can we do theology in a secular 
society? Can Christian theology play a royal role separated from the world? These 
skeptical elements are not interested in any superficial speculation but in the concrete 
reality. 
 Those objections to the doctrine of God do not consist of a simple structure but of 
multilayered complex structures which make people doubt the existence of God and force 
theology to reestablish a new doctrine of God. The skepticism concerning God today is 
not only the exclusive understanding of atheists or liberal theologians but also a general 
opinion or perspective of ordinary people. The problem of God is also omnipresent 
inasmuch as God is omnipresent all over the world. This phenomenon does not come 
from any specific period or occasion but is a product of the long process of human history. 
Although there are several reasons and many elements to make one doubt the existence of 
God, this skepticism might originate from the objection to the transcendental or 
omnipotent God, that is, skeptical responses such as the problem of evil, the religious 
pluralism, science, and secular perspectives come from real issues “from below” in this 
world, so that transcendental, almighty God does not easily solve the problems of lives of 
people. 
 
Theology of the Death of God   
At the culmination of the problem of God there is “theology of death of God.” The 
secular theology and theology of death of God, as Karkkainen sums up, emphasize “the 
immanence of God, the absence of God from the world, or the nonexistence of God (or at 
                                                                                                                                                 
exist. Pantheism has an element of common good insofar as it entails a compassionate mindset for all living 
things. Another element is projection theory, which is that what we call God is nothing else than an outward 
projection of humanity’s directly greatest ideal. This criticizes dualistic attitudes of Christians in life. 
 6  
least the idea[s] of God).” Coining a neologism, “theothanatology” (the death of God), 
theology of death of God has two aspects: “‘soft’ (theistic and panentheistic views) and 
‘hard’ (agnostic and atheistic views).” The former does not believe in God’s death in a 
literal sense but in a transcendent God, which classical theism excessively empahsizes, 
although panentheism believes in the transcendent God. The latter accepts God’s literal 
death (e.g., Thomas J. Altizer and William Hamilton).
14
  
 In The Gay Science, Nietzsche notes, “God is dead. God remains dead. And we 
have killed him…. Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must not we 
ourselves become gods simply to seem worthy of it? There has never been a greater deed; 
and whoever will be born after us—for the sake of this deed he will be part of a higher 
history than all history hitherto.”  Nietzsche appeals to the human being, especially, 
ubermensch (Superhuman) in order to solve the problem of God, because God can be 
trusted no more, and argues that people must agree on “the ungodliness of existence… as 
something given, palpable, indisputable.”
15
 Could we judge the death of God? 
Nietzsche’s “requiem aeternam deo”
16
 refers to the death of God. By the same token, 
William Hamilton, in Radical Theology and the Death of God, argues that “God is dead. 
We are not talking about the absence of the experience of God, but about the experience 
of the absence of God.” 17 We need to make a distinction between “the absence of the 
experience of God” and “the experience of the absence of God.” Whereas the former 
distinction still acknowledges God’s existence, although there are some hard cases in 
which to find God such as the context of suffering, the latter experiences God’s absence 
                                                 
 
14
 Karkkainen, The Doctrine of God, 171-172.  
 
15
 Karkkainen, The Doctrine of God, 175. 
 
16
 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche. The Gay Science: with a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of 
Songs, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1974), 120. 
 
17
 Karkkainen, The Doctrine of God, 178. Veli- Matti Karkkainen, The Trinity: Global 
Perspectives (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), 191. 
 7  
in any situation. In fact, it is a serious problem that we so frequently experience the 
absence of God in our lives.  
 However, in the face of the same phenomenon, Dietrich Bonhoeffer rather 
investigates anew a doctrine of God from modern atheism which enables him to think of 
“the world without God.”
18
 To explain God as a working hypothesis is a “counsel of 
despair,” “a death leap back into the Middle Ages.” However, Bonhoeffer does not assert 
God’s nonexistence, but rather a more paradoxical claim with ultimate honesty; “Before 
God and with God we live without God.” A main point is not the presupposition of the 
absence of God but the removal of the presupposition, i.e., God. We stand continually 
before God who allows us to live in the world without the working hypothesis of God.19 
Even though we live in a godless world, that is, “even if there were no God,” when we 
see Christ who took the cross, we can recognize that “only the suffering God can help.” 
The world without God is more mature than the world with God and it is nearer to God. 
In the sense, for Bonhoeffer, we cannot think God without the world, because God lets 
himself be pushed out of the world and thereby relates himself to the world. God exists 
“in the crucified Christ as the deus coram mundo (‘God who is present in the world’).”
20
 
In this sense, the omnipresence of God must be understood through the concept of the 
death of God.21 However, we have to recognize some criticisms of theology of the death 
                                                 
 
18
 Eberhard Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1983), 57. Jüngel asks a very profound question: “to think God without the 
world which, for its part, is to be thought without God? To what extent does God’s deity imply the world if 
the worldliness of the world excludes God expressly?” Bonhoeffer describes the autonomy of the world: 
“In theology… Herbert of Cherbury, who asserted the sufficiency of reason for religious knowledge…. 
Finally the philosophical bottom line: on one hand we have the deism of Descartes, who holds that the 
world is a mechanism, running by itself with no interference from God; and on the other hand the 
pantheism of Spinoza, who says that God is nature. In the last resort Kant is a deist, and Fichte and Hegel 
are pantheists. Everywhere the thinking is directed towards the autonomy of man and the world.” Ibid., 57-
58.  
 
19
 Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World, 59-60. 
 
20
 Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World, 60-61. Karkkainen, The Doctrine of God, 172. 
 
21
 Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World, 63.  
 8  
of God. Karkkainen notes that it was criticized not only by church members and someone 
who wants to introduce atheism into the Christian circle but also by theological critics 
such as Langdon Gilkey who deals with God outside Christian theology and tradition.22 
Pinnock points out that the rejection of the existence of God has nothing to do with God 
who really is and the God of the Bible, but only with the God of classical theism.
23
  
  
Contribution to Theology of the Skepticism  
What a poor God! Why did God create the world if God knew that there will be so many 
complaints about God? God would regret in a sense to create the world, if God knew the 
future. Does God not complain, “If I knew then what I know now”? If God were a host 
holding a conference concerning the problem of God, what would be God’s answer to the 
skeptical questions? Can God even answer all of these questions? In order to save God 
from these skeptical problems, what should we do? Can we remove all these problems?  
 There are theological crises in the contemporary period in that people doubt the 
existence of God. Nonetheless, can we neglect these kinds of skeptical, real phenomena 
which might be considered symptomatic responses of an age of skepticism? Do these 
skeptical questions and responses concerning God bear only on the negative influence on 
Christian theology? Or, does it mean to deny theism? No! We need to overcome this 
theological crisis honestly and intellectually. What is a good way for theology to 
approach the contemporary intellect? As a Chinese proverb properly says, “We should 
see the moon, not a finger which indicates the moon.” We should listen to and see the 
essence for which skepticism really argues and criticizes. Furthermore, we should not 
                                                 
 
22
 Karkkainen, The Doctrine of God, 178. 
 
23
 Karkkainen, The Doctrine of God, 188.  
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only discover why the problem of God has now become of central importance, but also 
realize how this problem forces us to find a new alternative theism today.  
 The fact that there are many skeptical elements today neither means a denial of 
theism nor accepts skepticism and atheism as the alternative, but rather entails that 
concomitant phenomena in accordance with skepticism enable a theism to frame more 
robust foundations. “Patmos,” Holderlin’s poem, implicitly shows us the above 
argument: “Near is and hard to grasp the god. But where there is danger what saves 
grows, too.”
24
 Just as Zarathustra maintains that “one must still have chaos in one, to give 
birth to a dancing star,”
25
 so theology must have skepticism as chaos in order to give birth 
to a dancing theology. That is, skepticism is not always a negative influence on Christian 
theology, but may become a catalyst to increase theological investigation. The attitude of 
theology responding to skepticism should neither object to it nor be isolated into the dark 
cave of Christianity alone, since, argues Dean Nelson, “living with doubt” enables us to 
discover new things in both science and faith. Rather, a serious problem occurs when 
fundamentalists are blinded by their certainty in both of them.
26
 
 In this context, Christian theology should not be sectarianized in a narrow area in 
a period when other disciplines actively undertake to influence and change the society 
and suggest newly positive alternatives toward a new world. Christianity cannot avoid the 
criticism of theological “laziness,” which Calvin considers as “original sin,” unless 
                                                 
 
24
 Martin Buber, I and Thou (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970), 105. According to 
Ogden, Christianity has always been secular, because in its essence, in the presence in our human history of 
Jesus Christ, it is simply the representation to man and the world of their ultimate significance within the 
encompsssing mystery of God’s love… It is not to be explained historically except as “secularized” 
Christian theology. Ogden, The reality of God, 69. In addition, our age, as Gerhard Ebeling has said, is “the 
age of atheism” –that, if the reality of God is still to be affirmed, this must now be done in a situation in 
which that reality is expressly denied. Ibid., 13. 
 
25
 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 26.  
 
26
 http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/story/2011-08-28/Why-certainty-about-God-is-
overrated/50166464/1?loc=interstitialskip 
 10  
Christianity moves toward public spheres. Christianity needs to recognize that these 
skeptical responses give us the “backdrop,” which causes theology to be more abundant, 
and must be treated as “a live option.”27 That is, insofar as skepticism enables theology to 
avoid the pitfall of irrational dogma in which Christianity in many ways has been caught, 
we need to note Job’s attitude in Job 13:3, “But I desire to speak to the Almighty and to 
argue my case with God,” since it is not an unholy attitude toward God but rather an 
enthusiastic longing for the truth.  
 Facing such many challenges, nonetheless, Christians have been criticizing such 
skepticism in order to defend their own kingdom of dogma. Philip Clayton and Steven 
Knapp, however, argue first, that such a response is a rather “desperate, last-ditch effort 
to save something that cannot be saved in any other way.” Second, such approaches have 
“immunization strategies” from criticism by non-Christians as well as Christians who 
worry about “Christianity’s delusion.”
28
 In this sense, when we construct a theology, we 
should recognize that skepticism is not against Christian faith and that theological work 
with doubt is much better than that without doubt, since it can reject logical 
contradictions in ‘theo-logy.’ Wouldn’t it be an intellectual paranoia to consider skeptical 
thoughts as a heretical doctrine? That is, we cannot establish our faith or theology by 
refusing the skepticism.  
 Clayton explicitly notes, “The context for treating the question of God today must 
be skepticism. Propositional language about God can no longer pass as unproblematic.”
29
 
In other words, one could not and should not neglect the contextual questions for 
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skeptical thought about God. Any theology that is to be accepted naturally in the 
contemporary world must understand why the notion of God is problematic. Self-
preservative, passive attitudes to skepticism hypnotize themselves, not listening to the 
others’ voices. This autism does not contribute to Christianity. Without admitting 
skepticism, we neither fully know God nor answer the questions of skeptics. That is, God 
seems no longer exist in the world when we look around us at our sitz im leben such as 
suffering, evil, and war,
30
 but the dead God is still living, here and now, and will live 
forever insofar as a new theism is ever-changing in accordance with the contemporary 
situation. Thus the problem of God is nothing else than that of theology. 
 
Theology in Contexts 
Theological situations in any period are not only so diverse but also so ambiguous that 
any one crude and naïve theological method, whatever it is, cannot fully deal with these 
manifold skeptical theological spheres. If we ignore the actual diversity, Süskind asserts 
that it is “like cutting off the patient’s injured limb in order to restore the health of the 
whole.”
31
 In other words, people cannot, like Archimedes,
32
 apply one firm and 
immovable hermeneutical point of view to each particular situation in order to shift and 
interpret the entire contexts. Furthermore, such a situation may not respond to any tears, 
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sound of flute, or dirge out of marginal places.
33
 When we consider the relationship 
between theology and contexts, we need to follow Whitehead’s famous metaphor of “the 
flight of an aeroplane”: “It starts from the ground of particular observation; it makes a 
flight in the thin air of imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed 
observation rendered acute by rational interpretation.”
34
 If the ground is our context and 
the thin air is the work of theologizing, we cannot and should not stop this circular 
process.  
 Whenever we revisit the history of theology and Christianity, as we know, on the 
one hand, theology has continuously transformed its own model according to the period
35
 
and, on the other hand, should be open toward a new horizon of understanding, in that, as 
Whitehead maintains, speculation has been “the salvation of the world,” and “to set limits 
to speculation is treason to the future.”
36
 In other words, theology is always contextual 
insofar as theology continually relates to the problem of the period. In this sense, insofar 
as we need to reflect on the relationship between theology and context, or that between 
imagination and action, we can think as follows: imagine, and a new world will be 
opened; act, and a new world will come to you. Whereas to imagine is to be sensitive to 
God’s will, to act is to respond to God’s will in the world. Thus, imagination and action 
will make your life better. Isn’t our life simple? Then, theology must be self-reflective. 
When it loses its self-reflective function, it can no longer be theology, since theology 
must be always human-response to God’s ceaseless self-revelation in a new age. If we do 
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not have this kind of attitude even in theology, we have to remember a warning: 
corruptio optimi pessima (the corruption of the best is the worst of all).37  
   
Theology (Faith and Theological Reflection) in the Midst of the Science  
In spite of several skeptical elements and the theology of death of God, we need to 
defend a form of theology which is proper to both contemporary sciences and the 
tradition of Christian faith38 in order to overcome the “god of the gaps.”39 Since the 
problem of God very intimately relates to the world, we should explain especially “God’s 
presence in a scientific world.”
40
 In fact, as John Haught argues, theology is still stuck in 
a prescientific understanding of cosmology despite “the correctness of an evolutionary 
worldview.” In this sense, contemporary theology needs “a system of concepts” that 
sufficiently and thoroughly explains science, religion, and all other modes of 
experience.
41
 In order to satisfy this theological method, we need rationality in theology. 
Ingolf Dalferth explains the rationality of theology in six ways: what is rational is not 
necessarily proven; what is rational is not necessarily a self-discovery; rationality is not 
the monopolized product of science; rationality depends not on content but on method 
(rule of logic); rational belief has two meanings in the content of belief and the way the 
belief is held; rationality is various. Rationality develops in the field of discussion 
whether it is for or against our beliefs.
42
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 At this point, we can find a clue to approach the acknowledgement of the problem 
of God: The problem of God is that of theology. That is, because of “poor theologies of 
God,” argues Pinnock, God’s name is dishonored.43 Because of this problem of poor 
theology, we need to develop theology itself. Clayton considers Christian theology as 
“level-two discourse concerning level-one beliefs, attitudes, and practices of the Christian 
community.” This type of theology presupposes the “life of faith,” that is, “believing 
reflection,” which is not separated from the profane world.
44
 But perhaps matters have 
become more complex than Clayton admits. Are there no gaps between faith and 
contemporary sciences? Do sciences, without doubt, accept claims that faith accepts? Is 
doubt an unnecessary element in forming a theology in science?45 To these questions, we 
need to speak in a way that affirms that faith without doubt is blind and doubt without 
faith is empty. 
 By the same token, Robert King asserts that today’s context is pluralistic and 
secular: “It is pluralistic in that it includes radically different religious systems…, secular 
in that it admits of the possibility of dispensing with religious systems altogether.”
46
 
Nonetheless, as Jüngel and Karkkainen argue, we need to approach secularism “not as a 
threat but as an opportunity for Christianity,”47 since division between secular and sacred 
is not appropriate. If we make a distinction, are all places except churches secular places? 
If so, in order to make this world sacred, should we establish churches all over the world? 
Are we not also secular people, since we live longer outside churches? A conversation 
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between a Jew (sacred) and a Gentile (secular) in Acts 10 teaches us that what kind of 
theological attitude we should have and that we should not call anything (even humans) 
impure which God has made clean (15, 28). When the secular (Cornelius) falls at the 
sacred’s feet (Peter), the sacred says, “I am only a man myself” (26). Furthermore, the 
sacred must be humble to the secular and we should not make a radical distinction 
between sacred and secular, because “all are in God,” according to the panentheism’s 
definition. Since God has granted even the gentiles “repentance unto life” (Acts 11:18), 
Peter says, “who was I to think that I could oppose God?” (Acts 11:17). To that extent, 
then, can the classical theists think that they could oppose God who really embraces even 
the gentiles (skepticists)? 
 In the relation between sacred ad secular, Clayton calls the person who has both 
faith and doubt the “secular believer,”
48
 one who affirms that doubt is not external to 
religious belief but internal to the dynamical belief, accepting Diderot’s saying: “Doubts 
in the matter of religion, far from being acts of impiety, ought to be seen as good works, 
when they belong to a man who humbly recognizes his ignorance and is motivated by the 
fear of displeasing God by the abuse of reason.” When we can reestablish Christian faith 
or identity in the public area, not refusing the skepticism, its method should be a 
synthesis which is an important element in a constructive theology. The public aspect of a 
theology must doubt “a priori certainty and the accompanying dogmatism.” Any 
openness to science, other religions, and even nihilism is “not the antithesis of believing 
and does not make the life of faith and practice impossible.” We need to construct a 
critical faith and then to advance its appropriate theology. Nonetheless, Clayton does not 
agree with the leading skeptics such as the Dawkinses and the Harrises who abandon 
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belief, but rather maintain that we need “to acknowledge the possibility of the 
impossibility of religious belief,” by keeping “the reason for unbelief” or “the 
controversial nature of religious belief.”49 Clayton vindicates perspectives on Christianity 
from opponents of theology and suggests an open debate with them, asking however, that 
they “Do not commit ‘Straw Man fallacy,’”
50
 that is, those who propose an alternative to 
Christian theology should criticize the same positions that other opponents of Christianity 
criticize. Rob Bell acknowledges that he also does not believe in such a god as the one in 
whom atheists do not believe.
51
 Thus, Clayton seriously suggests a presupposition of 
arguments: “To destroy a straw man rather than to debate our real position is neither 
reasonable nor productive.”52 
 Thus we need to doubt theology’s own truth,53 as Pannenberg accepts, in order to 
affirm “the contested nature of theological truth,” since believers’ inner certainty of the 
truth of their beliefs about God is not same as their inner certainty of their knowledge of 
the empirical world. In fact, Christian debates about God—the end of history, the advent 
of Christ, and the coming kingdom of God—in the midst of science “remain disputable 
(strittig) until they actually occur.”
54
 However, moving beyond Pannenberg’s focus on 
historical facticity, Clayton affirms that “the life of faith is possible even in the absence 
of knowing,” and speaks of “an attitude of ‘hope-plus-faith.” We can find a clue through 
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Charles Sanders Peirce: “truth is the character which… we may justifiably hope will be 
enjoyed by beliefs that survive however long or far inquiry is pursued or prolonged.”55 
Although Peirce notes that theology was essentially exclusive, since it holds a specific 
doctrine, he also accepts the religious life for truth. Like Peirce, Clayton argues that 
religious beliefs can be revised by new scientific results but, unlike Peirce, Clayton notes 
that theology can help believers determine whether revision is justified or not.
56
 Clatyon, 
through Peirce, recognizes two basic assumptions of inquiry: first, instead of private 
claims, “validity claims must be ‘redeemed’ through critical discourse;” second, we must 
presuppose that “inquiry is moving toward a final hoped-for consensus.” Theology, then, 
exists “in the ever-changing realm in which hope, faith, doubt, and skepticism 
intersect.”57  
 How can we put the place of theology in the “causal closure of the physical,” that 
is, in the universe as “a closed system of matter and energy?” If one gives up the closed 
system of a strict naturalism, divine influence or divine lure is possible in the universe.
58
 
Polkinghorne argues that whereas science asks “how things happen,” religion asks 
“why,” that is, religion asks “questions of meaning and value and purpose.” Thus, we 
should ask both scientific and religious questions about the same event. From the 
perspective of this point of view, atheists fail to see the possibility of meaning beyond the 
fact, and they also fail to recognize that they have their own points of faith about any 
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given perspective “similar to religious faith.” Thus people of faith should “welcome truth 
from whatever source it comes,” because God uses any truth which reveals God’s will. 
This may be the reason Polkinghorne likes 1 Thessalonians 5:21: “Test everything. Hold 
on to the good.”
59
  
 So, science and faith, in the best form of each, need one another in order to 
promote the survival of the most appropriate theory. Theology needs to be transformed in 
its own history, in relation to other religious tradition, and in relation to science. We need 
to recognize that theology is science and Christians should use science in order to prove 
the truth of Christian discourse.
60
 Clayton attempts to seek a universal value of theology 
in the midst of science and his position as a “secular believer,” in that he argues that 
“theologians respond positively to scientific and philosophical advances because we 
believe that at the end of the day all means of ascertaining truth are means of the self-
revelation of God. In the end the many shall become one.”
61
 We have to follow not the 
scholastic claim that places theology as the queen of the sciences, but the Jesuanic ethic 
which treats it as a kenotic discipline, and finally we must recognize that scientific claims 
need metaphysical claims. In turn “today’s metaphysics may be part of tomorrow’s 
empirical science.”62 
 Then, how can we preserve theology’s identity if theology has dialogues with 
science and philosophy? Is the truth of theology the same as the truth of science or not? If 
they are same, doesn’t theology belong within science? If they are different, should 
theology “stand outside” the discourse of the scienes?
63
 Roughly speaking, whereas 
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scientific truth is the “truth of correspondence, the adequatio rei et intellectus,” religious 
truth is “subjective, passionate, and intrinsically perspectival” and “inseparable from 
questions of meaning.” The dichotomies such as reason vs. faith, nature vs. grace, natural 
vs. supernatural come from the opposition between science and religion, we find 
ourselves accepting contrasting theories of religious truth, since secular believers 
“presuppose a phenomenology of science as objective knowledge.”
64
 Furthermore, in 
order for theism to be “a live option,” theology should not be isolated from other 
disciplinaries but have an interdisciplinary relation to natural sciences (such as 
sociobiology and evolutionary psychology), to social sciences (such as psychology, 
sociology, economics, and cultural anthropology), to history, literature, and the arts, and 
to metaphysical reflection.65 Thus, theology is the “product of reflection and work in 
other disciplines.”
66
  
 
Integration between Faith and Reason 
Furthermore, skepticism forces us to keep a balance between faith and reason. Whereas 
theologians such as Schleiermacher and Cobb argue that we can understand God by 
means of human reason (natural theology), theologians such as Barth and Cunningham 
assert that we can learn about God only through revelation.67 In such a tension, we need 
to accept such a theological attitude as “faith seeking understanding (Fides Quaerens 
Intellectum),” which starts from skepticism but establishes a balanced theological view, 
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inasmuch as it is not closed in faith but opens toward understanding. Faith and 
understanding can give rise to two different questions as an approach to God: why do we 
believe in God?68 And why are we willing to know God? Whereas the one question is 
about faith, the other is about reason and knowledge, that is, epistemology. Those 
questions can be described simply as faith and reason. What could be our answer to those 
questions? The form of our answers may be something like this: “Because….” However, 
can you give the same answer to two different questions? This argument reminds us of 
Turtulian’s spelling question: “What has indeed Atens to do with Jerusalem?” Faith gives 
rise to thought or philosophy and thought or philosophy returns to the faith. By the same 
token, Aquinas maintains a similar argument: “grace never destroys the nature, but 
fulfills it.” Thus we need to fully “grow in the grace and knowledge of our Lord and 
Savior Jesus Christ” (2 Peter 3:18).
69
 In a sense, it is right to say that since “the faith with 
philosophy is more powerful and persuasive than that which does not have philosophy,” 
we do not have to totally reject Whitehead’s insight, “the final court of appeal is intrinsic 
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reasonableness,”
70
 although it is not the final answer. In the sense, we need to agree with 
Tillich’s perceptivity that “Every creative philosopher is a hidden theologian.”71 
 In order to have the dynamics of faith, there must be “the deep interconnection 
between faith and doubt,”
72
 since doubts and uncertainties are no longer considered as 
“sinful.” Rather, such doubts lead to “a stronger and more enduring form of faith,”
73
 
since “questioning is the piety of thought.”
74
 Rob Bell also maintains that “the discussion 
itself is divine” and “no issue too dangersous”
75
 and Tillich also argues that doubts are 
not the negation or enemy of faith, but the unavoidable act of faith in the spiritual life and 
two poles of the ultimate concern,
76
 since there must be uncertainty in faith.
77
 That is, on 
the one hand, “the skeptic is not completely outside of faith,” since “the skeptic… is not 
without faith,”78 and, on the other hand, “even the theologian is not completely ‘inside’ 
faith,” since every theologian “is always in faith and in doubt.”
79
 Thus, living faith 
includes the courage to take the doubt and even the risk.
80
 
 Tillich properly argues that an “element of doubt is a condition of all spiritual life. 
The threat to spiritual life is not doubt as an elemnt but the total doubt.”
81
 Thus, we need 
to realize the “Protestant Principle” which insists that “its creeds and other traditional 
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beliefs are not absolutes,” since they go “beyond themselves to something that lies behind 
all such formulations.”82 In that sense, dualism is explicitly against Christian faith: 
Sunday and the other days; sacred and secular; faith and reason, church and the world, 
and theology and science. Rather, they must be mutually compatible.  
 In order to develop both faith and reason, anyone without any interruption can and 
should express his or her own theology or faith. If one interrupts others’ theological ideas 
by any existing institutionalized dogma, however, it is similar to what Pharisees did for 
believers. When Jesus had finished speaking, even Jesus left and “hid” himself from them 
(John 12:36) because of Pharisees and although many leaders believed in Jesus, they 
could not confess their faith “for fear they would be put out of the synagogue” (John 
12:42). By the same token, because of the power of massive conservative Christians, if 
many theologians would not expresss their faith and theology, we cannot expect any 
theological development. In this sense, conservative groups of Christian would be same 
as Pharisees who “shut the kingdom of heaven in men’s faces,” neither letting themselves 
nor those who are trying to enter (Matthew 23:13).  
 Then, where can we find such a properly theological model that has a balance 
between faith and reason? In the time of “the crisis of liberalism,” where can we find 
public theologians today? What has happened to liberalism?83 Clayton requests “a new 
integration,” “as the heritage” and “a renewed liberal Christianity,”
84
 between the 
Christian tradition and contemporary culture and science. There can be no integration if 
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we consider contemporary culture and science as enemies to our faith, or if we ignore the 
tradition because of the value of contemporary disciplines. Thus the drive to integrate is 
“an ethical and a deeply religious commitment” in Christian identity.85  
 As the modern new scientific knowledge progresses, theology has to find new 
theological answers to the traditional questions,
86
 thereby beginning “the quest for a new 
integration.”
87
 Clayton wants liberals to study afresh their classic texts such as “those of 
Schleiermacher and Ritschl and Troeltsch, of Rauschenbusch and Bonhoeffer and 
Tillich” and to pursue “new forms of integration that demand our attention today.”
88
 
When the new integration means to integrate “contemporary experience and 
contemporary reason” (the unanswered problems of our own day) with “the inherited 
resources of Christian Scriptures and traditions,” we need to keep the balance between 
two poles within “the Wesleyan quadrilateral.” That is, on the one hand, althought we 
should not consider the inherited traditions as a complete tradition, we should keep 
continually to the scriptures and traditions, even in the comtemporary theological spheres. 
On the other hand, this needs a hermeneutical circle: “[O]nly when the ‘horizon’ of the 
text and tradition is fused with the horizon of our contemporary world is the Christian 
voice complete.”89 
   Then, how can we achieve integration? Suggesting a practical method, we need to 
think along with church, which needs to be continually incarnated, and an incarnational 
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theology needs to call “continual integration”
90
 with “ever-new contexts of knowledge, 
ever-new social contexts, ever-new contexts of ministry.” In this sense, we can ask, 
“What today are the new incarnations of scripture and tradition with reason and 
experience? What tomorrow will be the new fruits of their union?” Integration is an open-
ended task, insofar as revelation is not finished but continues to happen today. Richard 
Niebuhr properly refers to “the mountain of revelation,” which is not only one that we 
climbed once upon a time, but one that needs to be climbed again “in every generation, 
on every new day.” Thus revelation is the “never-ending pilgrim’s progress of the 
reasoning heart”
91
 and “a moving thing” which needs the interpretation and 
reconstruction of ever new human situations in “a single drama of divine and human 
action.” In this sense, continual integration means “not how features in our past are 
repeated in our present, but how our present grows out of our past into our future.”
92
 
 Arguing that a form of the integration of belief and scholarship involves 
“intellectual rigor and academic excellence,” which serves the church and becomes part 
of church mission, Clayton shares Peter Berger’s conviction that a combination of critical 
inquiry and passionate faith makes a balance between skepsis and affirmation “without 
emigrating from modernity,” and believes that this combination is “the new liberalism’s 
greatest strength.”93 As Niebuhr argues, such an integrative theology in the Christian 
church should not criticize all other faiths in order to prove the priority of Christian, but 
should mean a confessional theology which carries on the self-criticism in the church.
94
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Beyond Classical Theism  
From these dynamically multilayered theological perspectives, we need to change some 
aspects of classical theism and to go beyond it. Then we can ask what “classical theism” 
means. Although there are lots of interpretations of classical theism, argues David Griffin, 
classical theism focuses on the following attributes of God: Pure actuality; immutability 
and impassibility; timelessness; simplicity; necessity; omnipotence and omniscience.
95
 In 
fact, since evangelicalism takes its theological justification from “the biblical traditions 
and the early creeds,”
96
 if someone says that classical theology “has consciously 
entertained all the fundamental ideas which are applicable to its experience” and has 
asked and answered all theological questions, it has committed “The Fallcy of the Perfect 
Dictonary,”97 since the comtemporary theological topics remain unanswered.98 When 
classical theisms attempt to apprehend (grab the fist) contemporary issues within 
themselves, there must be something like water which classical theism cannot prehend in 
their fists. In this sense, Tillich’s concern about fundamentalism is appropriate: “the 
theological truth of yesterday is defended as an unchangeable message against the 
theological truth of today and tomorrow.”
99
   
 That is, fundamentalism has a problem, argues Tillich, “not because it speaks 
from beyond every situation, but because it speaks from a situation of the past.”100 
Whitehead also points out that adventures of ideas without constant tension between 
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“novel thought” and “the obtuseness of language” are improper,
101
 and furthermore that 
“A learned orthodoxy suppresses adventure.”102 It is similar to Jesus’ teaching: “You 
have let go of the commands of God and are holding on to the traditions of men” (Mark 
7:8). It does not mean to ignore a traditional line of Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, 
and Barth, however, whether we agree with them or not, but to disagree with those who 
insist that there is only this traditional line in theology, by ignoring other lines of 
theologies. Insofar as the past can also change our current life, to remember the past is a 
great thing and the past is still alive even now. In that sense, a more proper theology does 
not focus only on the past, because the cross connection between the past and the present 
can affect on a proper theology of the future. Furthermore, we need to listen to Anselm 
Min’s argument: theology after postmodernity is not possible in a theoretical theology 
alone (Aquinas), nor in a praxical theology alone (liberation theology), but only in the 
tension between theory and praxis.
103
  
 An analogy would be helpful for understanding this argument. If the Bible is 
God’s love letters for us, traditional doctrines of God are like the love letters for God of 
early church members. After early church members died, when their descendants in the 
belief read the two (or more) love letters, their feeling was likely different from that of 
the earlier church believers. Whenever they read, they may have had new interpretations 
of the original love letters from generation to generation, just as when, upon reading our 
parents’ love letters, not only do we find that the love letters show us our parents’ love, 
feeling, and life for each other, but we also discover our own need for new interpretations 
of our own feelings of love, which are different from the interpretations of the feelings of 
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love of our parents. In the same vein, although “the grass withers and the flowers fall,” 
they endlessly blossom and fall until “the word of the Lord” and the kingdom of God will 
be achieved (1Peter 1:24-25). Just so, our theological task will be in an open-ended road 
and thus theology is ceaselessly in the process of finding cogent answers: “Always be 
prepared to give an answer to everyone who asks you to give the reason for the 
(theological) hope that you have…” (1 Peter 3:15, Added and emphasized by me). Thus 
it must be the genuine purpose of theology to attempt to give universally valid answers to 
others, although there would be no such success in ongong theological history.
104
 
 
Philosophical Theology 
● “As a theological discipline dogmatics is the scientific self-examination of the 
Christian Church with respect to the content of its distinctive talk about God… 
Dogmatics is a theological discipline. But theology is a function of the Church” (Karl 
Barth, Church Dogmatics, 3). 
 
● “Since Dogmatics is a theological discipline, and thus pertains solely to the Christian 
Church, we can only explain what it is when we have become clear as to the conception 
of the Christian Church” (Friedrich Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, 3). 
 
● “The Three Publics of Theology: Society, Academy, and Church… Theology as a 
discipline has many peculiarities… [A]ll theology is public discourse” (David Tracy, The 
Analogical Imagination, 3). 
 
If we see the quotations of “Theology of page three,” which I call, whereas Barth and 
Schleiermacher consider theology as a discipline within the Christian Church, Tracy 
expands its area to society and academy. Admittedly, I prefer Tracy’s perspective to that 
of Barth and Schleiermacher, because the most significant task in this dissertation is to 
develop a model in philosophical theology that is philosophically coherent and 
                                                 
 
104
 To that extent, then, Henri de Lubac appropriately argues that “if ‘classical ontology’ 
disappeared, it was surely because it did not correspond adequately with being. Nor was its idea of God 
adequate for God.” Henry de Lubac, The Discovery of God (Eerdamans, 1996), 177.  
 28  
theologically Christian—one that overcomes skeptical challenges and that goes beyond 
certain limitations that I find in certain varieties of classical theism. Nonetheless, we 
should acknowledge a starting point in order to embark on this project: how current 
theological trends relate to previous theology. On the one hand, is it possible to do 
theology without theological tradition? People cannot do theology in general if they are 
historically illegitimate children who do not know their theological parents. In that sense, 
we should not have an attitude which has “a woeful ignorance of the classical tradition,” 
and “a positive contempt fot the theological past.”
105
 On the other hand, is it possible 
blindly to miss classical theism without today’s God-talk, and to confine today’s doctrine 
of God emanating from the “scandal of the particularity” of each person and any 
particularly concrete context106 within a frame of a “Procrustean bed” of classical theism? 
If someone says yes to these questions, not only must the former be empty, but the latter 
must be arbitrary. In this sense, as Ogden argues, the theologian must understandably 
speak the scriptural witness to contemporary hearers.
107
  
 By the same token, metaphorically speaking, classical theism is to current theism 
what an old big tree is to its individual leaf. Since the latter without the former or the 
former without the latter is without doubt ugly, the “ugly ditch” between both of them 
must be overcome. Just as “the symbolism gives rise to thought”108 and thought always 
returns to the symbol, so the Bible and tradition give rise to current theism and current 
theism should return to the Bible and tradition. This means a hermeneutical circle. 
                                                 
 
105
Min, Paths to the Triune God, 1-2.  
 
106
 Karkkainen sharply points out that existing theology has neglected the theological contexts of 
what is called the third world. “During a time when the majority of Christians lives outside Europe and 
North America, it is scandalous that African, Asian, and Latin American theologies are hardly mentioned in 
textbooks” (emphasis is mine). Veli-Matti Karkkainen, The Doctrine of God: A Global Introduction (Grand 
Rapid: Baker Academic, 2004), 12.  
 
107
 Ogden, The reality of God, 120.  
 
108
 Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), 347. 
 29  
However, the direction and task of theology
109
 should not return to classical theism, or 
simply revisit, repeat, or reproduce the biblical ideas,110 but rather should properly 
overcome the problem or limitation of classical theism and suggest a new, constructive 
alternative “from roots to relevance,” or “from scripture and tradition, by means of reason 
and experience, to application in the contemporary world,”
111
 as classical theism lacks the 
ability to explain various current issues or skeptical challenges today. Nevertheless, it 
does not mean that skepticism, agnosticism, and atheism are the alternatives, because 
they just confirm an affirmation, “there is no God.” However, we have to ask a proper 
question as to how Christianity could survive in this pluralistic society? Gordon 
Kaufman’s main concern can be a proper attitude to answer the question through “the 
ongoing imaginative construction and reconstruction of the basic Christian symbols,”112 
since, as Whitehead maintains, “A new idea introduces a new alternative.”
113
 When 
theology is a work in which we put our imaginations into the diverse, theological sources, 
the theology could be made differently. The only concern we have is not that this kind of 
attempt brings about disorder to theology or shakes the foundation of theology, but rather, 
the opposite side; we constrain theology within the frame of tradition without imaginative 
attempt. Thus a forced binary choice between classical theism and a new, alternative 
theism is meaningless.  
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 Whitehead maintains, by the same token, that religion, like science, cannot retain 
its old power if it faces changes. Although its principles may be eternal, the expression of 
those principles needs to be continually developed.114 This approach is opposite to 
Barth’s particular path which is revelation, rejecting a general way of theological 
thinking.
115
 Whitehead in this way provides us with a good attitude regarding the 
relationship between philosophy and theology. Whereas the task of philosophical 
theology is to “provide a rational understanding of the rise of civilization,” theology has 
failed because of the “notion of the absolute despot.” Insofar as both the “doctrine of 
Grace” and the “doctrines of the Atonement” neglect the task of philosophical theology, 
neither can provide a new direction to civilization;116 we need to listen to Peacocke’s 
acknowledgement that theology is “the investigation of all things in relation to God.”117 
In this sense, in order to develop this philosophical theology, we need to focus on 
Tillich’s theological method called “the method of correlation,”
118
 between faith 
(theology or revelation) and reason (culture or secularism), that is, between Christian 
theology and modern secular philosophy,
119
 because he attempts a method that is both 
faithful to the original “Christian message” and reasonable to the “contemporary culture.” 
In this way, Tillich uses an “apologetic” approach with which even secular people can 
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understand religious symbols and find answers to their questions.
120
 Apologetics as an 
“answering theology” to the “questions implied in human existence”121 is not a special 
section of systematic theology but “an omnipresent element.”122 By the same token, we 
need the spirit of theology as continuing inquiry which is “interrogative rather than 
doctrinaire; it presupposes a readiness to question and to be questioned.”123 
 The method of correlation replaces three inadequate methods in relating the 
Christian faith to human existence. The first method is supernaturalistic and entails 
“docetic-monophysitic traits,” because human beings must become something else than 
human in order to receive supernatural divine oracles, so that human receptivity is 
overlooked. Unfortunately, based on the method of humane asking and divine answering, 
Tillich notes that human beings have no answers to questions they did not ask.124 The 
second method is “naturalistic” or “humanistic,” and derives its answer not from God but 
from human existence. However, asserts Tillich, it does not realize that “human existence 
itself is the question.” In this sense, Tillich criticizes liberal theology, because it is 
“humanistic” and overlooks self-estrangement between our existence and our essence, so 
that our religious self-realization can explain our faith. That is, since everything can be 
said by humans, not to humans, questions and answers can be the products of the same 
level of human creativity. But revelation for Tillich is “‘spoken’ to man, not by man to 
himself.” The third method is “dualistic,” because “it builds a supranatural structure on a 
natural substructure.” This method finds a positive relation between human spirit and 
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God’s spirit through one’s own efforts or “natural revelation.” The arguments for “the 
existence of God” can be true and false, insofar as they analyze finitude and the question, 
and insofar as they find an answer from the form of the question. The method of 
correlation solves this problem of mixture of truth and falsehood “by resolving natural 
theology into the analysis of existence and by resolving supranatural theology into the 
answers given to the questions implied in existence.”
125
 Tillich’s method of correlation 
needs “a genuinely integrative theology” which has an open-ended dialogue between 
contemporary philosophy (science) and the Christian tradition.  
 We need to recognize both that the Christian tradition is not in an untouchable 
holy place and that liberal theology is not the only alternative. Then, is it true to say that 
“tertium non datur—there is no third option?” Is there no via media? Are evangelicals 
and liberals always confronting each other in opposite ways? We may find “progressive 
evangelicals” and “evangelical liberals” as alternatives of “the new networks.” Thus we 
are certain that the theologies of integration are “the natural next step” in theologies of 
mediation and that these integrative theologies will contribute to “the viability of a 
critical religious faith.”
126
 In what follows, I would like to find an alternative as via media 
from the perspective of panentheism.  
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Chapter II: Joseph Bracken’s Neo-Whiteheadian Perspective  
In chapter two, we shall see Bracken’s neo-Whiteheadian view which synthesizes 
between classical theism and orthodox process theology through the concept of 
intersubjectivity in society, that is, a structured field of activity as a new metaphor 
beyond the limitation of substance and soul-body analogy.  
 
Mediation in Process Thought  
In the discussion of the relationship between God and the world, argues Bracken, one 
tends to identify “God with the world” (pancosmism) or “the world with God” 
(pantheism). Whereas the former is pancosmism, since it means that “God is the name for 
the trancendent dimension of the world process as a cosmic whole,” the latter is 
pantheism, because “while they clearly affirm the ontological independence of the world 
from God, nevertheless, the finite components of the world are perpetually perishing, so 
that in the end God is the sole entity (or, for Hartshorne, the only set of actual occasions) 
that survives.” In that sense, Bracken maintains that Whitehead’s thought is in “the 
direction of pantheism.”
127
 In the same vein, whereas Charles Hartshorne returns the 
reality of the world into reality of God, Bernard Meland and Bernard Loomer reduce the 
reality of God into the reality of the world.128 On the one hand, Whiteheadian rationalists 
who follow Hartshorne maintain that “the world is the ‘body’ of God.” Just as the soul is 
“a society of personally ordered actual occasions” that gives unity to the societies of 
actual occasions in the human body, so God gives unity to the societies of occasions in 
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the world. However, Bracken points out a difference between two analogies that whereas 
the human soul disappears with the death of the body, God does not disappear with the 
end of the world, since God procures a new world. Although actual occasions are 
partially incorporated into the next occasions, they are entirely prehended in God. On the 
other hand, Meland and Loomer who are the leaders of Whiteheadian empiricists assert 
that “the world is God,” because the world is the source of meaning, because the creative 
advance of the world is the “supreme cause,” because the world is holy ground, and 
because the world retains the ultimate mystery within itself.
129
 Bracken attempts to 
mediate these two perspectives, i.e., “rationalists” and “empiricists.” With regard to the 
rationalists, the reality of God contains the reality of the world, in that the world as a 
finite cosmic society participates in the three divine persons as the all-comprehensive 
society. With regard to the empiricists, human beings are participated in community of 
the three divine persons who functions as “a principle of creative transformation 
operative within the matrix or field of activity proper to this world.” When human beings 
experience the triune God (the entitative reality of God as three persons) through their 
faith (e.g., prayer), the divine persons are “the subjects of ongoing activities in their 
lives,” in other words, “subsistent relations; that is, subsistent acts of relating to one 
another and to all their creatures” and their being is “their ongoing process of 
becoming.”
130
 Thus a trinitarian understanding of God as a community suggests a 
panentheistic understanding of the God-world relationship. 
 
Limitation of Substance and Soul-Body Analogy  
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Bracken doesn’t simply describe both pantheism (monism) as God’s identification with 
the material universe and classical theism (dualism) as God’s separation from the world, 
since, on the one hand, many scientists consider God not in personalistic terms but as 
“cosmic force or principle of order within the universe” and, on the other hand, in 
Aquinas, although God is more transcendent than immanent, God is the “subsistent act of 
being” as an agent in creatures and the primary cause of creatures. In the relation between 
classical theism and panentheism as an alternative of pantheism, Bracken points out the 
limitations of both the concept of substance in classical metaphysics and the soul-body 
analogy which is one of the most common analogies in panentheism. Classical 
metaphysics, which is grounded in the Aristotelian concept of substance, cannot explicate 
a “nondual” relationship between God and the world, since a substance cannot exist at the 
same time within another substance.
131
 The soul-body analogy as an integral reality, 
which respectively represents God and the world, also restricts both Gd’s ontological 
freedom and creatures’ ontological independence, because God must have a body to exist 
and creatures must be body parts of God.
132
  
 
The Shift to Intersubjectivity  
Mediating these two extreme positions and preserving both God’s transcendence of the 
world and God’s freedom to create or not create a world,
133
 Bracken explains the God-
world relation in a conceptual scheme, say, “a metaphysics of universal 
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intersubjectivity,” wherby subjects of experience co-create a common task in dynamic 
interrelation between God and the world, although there is an ontological distinction 
between the two of them as different centers of activity. Bracken’s main task is to 
reconstruct metaphysics, but he still recognizes “the situatedness and contingency of all 
reflection” such as our social condition and historical location, so that his methodology 
emphasizes “communities, dialogue, and interrelationship” and suggests “a metaphysics 
of community,” or “metaphysics of intersubjectivity.” To that extent, then, Bracken 
criticizes both those who overemphasize substance and Being and those who insist on 
community without subjects in intersubjective dialogue.
134
 Thus we can call Bracken’s 
theology as “we theology” which does not neglect even individual subjects.  
 Bracken explicates a paradigm shift in contemporary Roman Catholic theology 
away from Aquinas’ theological worldview and near to Rahner’s attention to “God’s self-
communication to creatures” (the economic trinity). However, Rahner never solves the 
tension between this new interpersonal approach and the classical Thomistic 
understanding in the God-world relationship. That is, since Rahner’s understanding of 
God is “Ipsum Esse Subsistens or the unchanging ground of being for all creation,” God’s 
relation to the world is not interpersonal, but “the impersonal ‘horizon’” which retains 
“divine immutability.” Bracken makes a distinction “between person and nature within 
God” in order to resolve this tension. Human beings relate to the divine persons “only in 
and through their created participation in the divine nature, the unchanging divine act of 
being.” The divine nature is first “the enabling principle of existence and activity for the 
three divine persons in their mutual interrelation,” and then is “the enabling principle or 
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ground of being for all creatures in their relationships to one another.” However, this 
distinction is rejected by Rahner’s concept of the God-world relationship.135 Rahner and 
Bernard Lonergan as Neo-Thomists starting from the individual human being toward 
transcendence through dynamic relation to both divine and human still follow “the 
individualistic substance-oriented metaphysics of Aquinas and Aristotle.” And Although 
LaCugna substitutes person for substance as the first category of being, Bracken’s “social 
ontology or metaphysics of intersubjectivity” does not begin with an individual person, 
but with multiple persons. Thus Bracken maintains that “metaphysics of 
intersubjectivity” alone can succeed “the all-embracing metaphysics of being” by 
Thomas Aquinas.136  
 Depending on Aristotle, in fact, Thomism maintains that nothing can have its own 
cause in itself, since causes and effects are distinguished from each other, so that 
“whatever is moved is moved by another” (Quidquid movetur movetur ab alio). However, 
God for Aquinas, or the Unmoved Mover for Aristotle, does not have its cause of 
existence from an outside agent, because it is “pure actuality” which does not allow any 
potency, but is always in act. It is neither a self-actualizing reality nor a dynamic subject 
of experience, but a “fixed objects of thought,” and governs all entities in the world, so 
that nothing avoids divine providence. This perspective is a kind of theological 
determinism.
137
 Since actual entities for Whitehead, on the contrary, are not recognized 
as objects of thought, but as momentary subjects of experience, everything ultimately 
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exists by “self-causation,” (“a self-constituting decision”): “Quidquid movetur movetur a 
se, non ab alio (whatever is moved by itself, not by another).”138 And since the individual 
has moral responsibility for evil, although God provides “initial aims,” in this sense, God 
cannot know what will happen in the world until the each individual creature makes a 
decision.
139
  
 Process theologians such as Charles Hartshorne, David Griffin, and Sallie 
McFague have criticized classical theism’s dualism between “God as Pure Spirit” and 
“the world as pure material,” and its sacrifice of the immanence of God to divine 
transcendence. Bracken disagrees with this kind of stereotypical analysis of classical 
theism, however, because it over-simplifies its theory. Take, for example, Aquinas’ 
theory. First, in part one, question eight, article one of the Summa, Aquinas asserts that 
God’s presence in a creature is “not as part of its essence, nor as one of its accidental 
modifications, but as an agent” who acts, since God is “the Subsistent Act of Being” 
(“ongoing cause of being”), by which the creature exists. Second, in article two of 
question eight, Aquinas argues that God is everywhere, not as a physical body but as the 
transcendent cause of physical existence and activity. Third, in article three, Aquinas 
affirms that God is everywhere in creation, “through his essence as the cause of the 
existence and activity of creatures,” “through his presence since all creatures are present 
to his knowledge and love,” and “through his power insofar as all creatures are subject to 
his power.”
140
 
 Nonetheless, Bracken points out the limitation of Aquinas in that whereas God is 
immanent in the world, the world is not immanent in God, since God as the “transcendent 
                                                 
 
138
 Bracken, The One in the Many, 21-22. Nonetheless, this self-causation is confined by its social 
context.
 
 Ibid.      
 
139
 Bracken, The One in the Many, 22-23.  
 
      
 
140
 Joseph A. Bracken, “Creatio ex nihilo: A Field-Oriented Approach,” 247.  
 39  
First Cause” must be different from the world. That is to say that, for Aquinas, the 
relation between God and the world is that between cause and effect, or, activity of 
creating and being created. To that extent, then, Aquinas cannot assert that “we live and 
move and have our being” in God (Acts. 17:28). However, process thinkers maintain that 
“God is present to the world as its ‘soul’ and the world is present to God as God’s 
‘body.’” This position maintains the mutual immanence between God and the world, but, 
at the same time, reduces the transcendence of God to the world, because God must have 
“an intrinsic relation to some world” in order to be God as the “‘soul’ or organizing 
principle for a finite world.” In this case, it could lead classical Christian beliefs into 
problems, because, first, in order to exist, God acts “out of a necessity of nature,” “not 
out of self-giving love” to the world, and, second, a God who is the “soul” of the universe 
is not itself a Trinitarian perichoresis, but a unitary agent within the body. There may be a 
counter argument. Whereas the inner life of God may be Trinitarian, God’s relation to the 
world (God ad extra) is unitary in a single personal agent. However, this is not in 
agreement with “Rahner’s Rule”: identity between the economic Trinity and the 
immanent Trinity.
141
 
  
Society: A Structured Field of Activity as a New Metaphor
142
 
Bracken uses a basic concept to explain this methaphysical task, namely, the category of 
“society,” which is borrowed from Whitehead, but needs more elaborate explanation than 
Whitehead, because Whitehead does not clarify “the ontological basis for the agency of 
societies.” For Bracken, society does not simply mean “aggregates of ‘actual occasions’” 
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but “structured fields of activity” (SFA) that endure as successive actual occasions. That 
is, whereas Whitehead maintains that the ultimate components of society are individual 
actual entities, Bracken emphasizes a “correlative notion of society” which endures over 
time.
143
 Hartshorne’s explanation is proper to this argument, suggesting that “the agency 
of a more complex (‘structured’) society is generally provided by the agency of the 
current actual occasion within a key subsociety or ‘soul,’” and “at any given moment is 
then communicated to all the other actual occasions constitutive of the structured society 
in the following moment.” Making a distinction between “compound individuals” (a 
unitary reality) and “composite individuals” (lower-level animal organisms and plants), 
Hartshorne argues that these composite individuals need to keep “enduring physical 
characteristics over an extended period of time” and even inorganic composites need to 
retain “a minimal cohesiveness over time.” Whereas for Whitehead all societies “exercise 
a type of collective agency,” which needs “the unity of the society as a whole” and 
“belongs solely to actual occasions,” Bracken asserts that there is “a derivative agency” 
appropriate to various societies. For example, stones need the minimal agency which 
sustains a certain pattern of constituent occasions, plants and lower-level organisms need 
the agency which sustains “a democratically organized structured society,” and animal 
organisms need the agency which is “the conjoint activity of all the member societies” 
that produce the unity appropriate to the organism as a whole. However, Bracken points 
out Hartshorne’s weakness in the sense that although the dominant subsociety has the 
agency, “this dominant agency has to be coordinated with all the other subordinate 
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agencies within the organism so as to achieve the unity and collective agency of the 
whole.”144 
 Whiteheadians consider societies as layered, hierarchically structured aggregates 
of actual entities rather than as environments or SFA for actual occasions. However, 
Bracken notices Whitehead’s mention of society as “an environment with some element 
of order in it” and describes the reciprocal relationship “between a society and its 
constituent actual occasions” as SFA for successive generations of occasions. In the sense 
whereas the field retains “the pattern from one generation to the next” and is the 
“enduring reality,” the occasions are “psychic energy-events come and go.” Although the 
field does not make decisions, since it is not a subject of experience, it functions as “a 
collective agency” which “determine[s] the laws for subsequent generations of 
occasions,” and “the field proper to the subsociety is then coterminous with the field 
proper to the organism as a whole.”
145
 
 Since SFA is open to gradual transformation, it has two meanings with regard to a 
classical Aristotelian substance. On the one hand, insofar as Whiteheadian society is “a 
principle of continuity” in a constantly changing world, it has resemblance to substance.
 
On the other hand, insofar as it can undertake “significant transformation” without losing 
ontological identity, it does not have resemblance to substance.146 That is, although 
insofar as societies are aggregates which endure over time, it could be similar to 
substance, lower-level of societies contributes to the higer level of society because the 
one can be within the other. Accepting Whitehead’s concept of “society” as that which is 
transmitted from each previous actual entity to next actual entity, Bracken uses the 
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concept of “field” in explaining a continuum-like substance in classical metaphysics. But 
there are differences between field and substance: First, whereas substance is the active 
organizing principle, SFA is passive in that it is the consequence of the actual occasions. 
Second, agency in SFA is “the collective agency” working in harmony rather than single 
agency. Third, there is in SFA the possibility of change and becoming rather than 
being.
147
 
 Furthermore, societies for Whitehead are the “layers of social order” which 
coexist with the actual occasions in the universe
148
 or “a functioning ontological totality 
with a unified collective agency derived from the interrelated individual agencies of its 
constituent actual occasions from moment to moment.”149 This is what Bracken calls “a 
new social ontology” in which societies or SFA are the units of reality. Although actual 
entities are the basic elements or “the final real things of which the world is made up,” 
actual entities quickly come and go. Therefore, societies, or SFA, are the “‘building 
blocks’ or enduring constituents of reality (both physical and spiritual).” In this sense, 
Bracken accepts “systems philosophy” explicated by Ervin Laszlo.
150
 Laszlo’s natural 
system is analogous to a process in Bracken, in that, first, a natural system is a whole 
(totality) rather than a heap which is the sum of its parts and, second, the parts of a 
natural system are actual entities as well as parts of the broader actual system.151  
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 Following a principle of intersubjectivity, Bracken shifts “from the subjective 
unity of the individual actual occasion” (Whitehead) “to the objective unity of the society 
(societies).” In this neo-Whiteheadian logic, God is a society, not a cosmic soul or 
personally ordered society of conscious actual occasions in Hartshorne, but “a structured 
society, a more complex socity of coexiting subsocieties (the divine persons).” In God-
world relationship, the world as a structured socity is incorporated into the “already 
existing societal reality of God.” And “the net effect” focuses not on the individual actual 
occasion but on the cosmic society.
152
 By the same token, Gorden Kaufman argues that 
God is not a transcendent personal being but “the symbol for ‘the complex of physical, 
biological and historico-cultural conditions” which have created human existence and 
then sustained humn life on the earth.153 In the sense, Bracken’s emphasis on social 
groupings or systems rather than individual being in his metaphysical structure may 
neglect uniqueness or particularity of an existence. However, Bracken argues that the 
particularity (the individual entity) in this mutual relatedness or system is not reduced to 
the universal (the overarching structures of society).
154
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 Bracken’s main point is that the three divine persons “co-constitute an all-
inclusive divine field of activity” which functions as the “matrix or womb of creation.” In 
this matrix creation gradually emerges and lower-level fields exist within higher-order 
fields without any conflict. Thus there is “the ontological independence” between God 
and the world. In this model, Bracken defends two classical Christian beliefs: Trinity and 
Creatio Ex Nihilo, in that creation emerges from the divine matrix at every single 
moment and endlessly integrates into the “communitarian life of the three divine 
persons.”
155
 Despite these arguments, since metaphysical concepts are analogical, 
Bracken honestly acknowledges that this model for God-world relationship is “at best an 
imperfect symbolic representation of what… is humanly incomprehensible.”156  
 
The Trinity and Panentheism 
Considering Whitehead’s society as SFA and understanding God as triune rather than 
unipersonal, Bracken asserts that since each of the three divine persons is “an enduring or 
personally ordered society of fully living, conscious actual occasions,” and three divine 
persons “necessarily occupy the same field of activity,” although each of them has “a 
different subjective focus” in prehending the field, they are one God. How can we 
understand or harmonize between three different or separate centers of activity and one 
and the same field of activity in Trinity in Whiteheadian terms? First, all three divine 
persons “participate in the divine primordial nature, the divine consequent nature, and the 
superjective nature of God.” The Father alone in the primordial nature decides which 
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possibility is more appropriate to their common ground and history. Second, in the divine 
consequent nature, the Son alone decides to actualize the possibility chosen by the Father. 
Third, in the superjective nature, the Spirit alone decides to use “principle of activity” in 
order to sustain the endless “conversion of potentiality into actuality.” This view enables 
us to understand the Trinity as a divine community of three divine persons who “co-
preside over” a single unboundedly infinite field of activity from three relationally 
distinct perspectives. Keeping the ontological independence of God, the world can be 
participated in the community of three divine persons. The Father is the “subsistent 
principle of potentiality for the world of creation,” in that the Father gives an “initial aim” 
to the divine Son and to all finite occasions. In responding to the Father’s offering of the 
initial aim, the Son is the “subsistent principle of provisional or current actuality for the 
world of creation,” in that the Son “actualizes what was merely potential in terms of the 
‘Father’s’ offer.” And the Spirit is “the subsistent principle of ultimate actuality within 
creation,” in that the Spirit prompts the ‘Father’ to offer and the ‘Son’ to respond, so that 
“the joint process of the divine life and of all creation will be sustained.”
157
   
Bracken here vindicates panentheism in that the three divine persons and all 
creatures together share a common life. That is, the world “is structured according to the 
trinitarian pattern of life for the three divine persons” and any process of creatures 
involves three roles of divine persons, i.e., a principle of potentiality, of a current 
actuality, and of ultimate actuality. The Father’s presence in the world is a kind of the 
“lure” for the “achievement of higher ethical and religious values in our lives at any 
given moment.” The Son is current actuality for the world in that all finite occasions “are 
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united with the ‘Son’” in responding to the Father. The Son and the world are “only 
instrumental to the achievement of further goals and values in the light of the ‘Spirit.’”158  
 Insofar as God’s nature is “a principle of creative transformation operative within 
an all-encompassing matrix or field of activity,” Bracken refers to this image as “divine 
matrix,”
159
 which is the “intentional field of activity” by the divine persons and by the 
myriad finite actual occasions from time immemorial. In the sense, this image is similar 
to Whitehead’s “extensive continuum” which is in the form of “the more special societies 
being included in the wider societies,”
160
 that is, of “the all-encompassing ‘relational 
complex’” underlying “the whole world past, present, and future.” Since this field of 
activity or extensive continuum is not itself an ontological actuality but only in the actual 
entities it enables actualities or actual occasions to emerge endlessly, it must primordially 
exist in God. Nonetheless, it is real in that it expresses a fact related to the actual world. 
Thus, it is part of both God’s nature and actual occasion’s nature, since it is “an 
indispensable condition for the existence and activity of every actual occasion, finite and 
infinite alike.”
161
  
 Although the community (person-members) is more than the sum of its members, 
it is not separable from them. Using a new term The Divine Matrix, Bracken explains 
how the One can be simultaneously transcendent as well as immanent in the Many.162 
Constituting their ontological unity, three divine persons share “a common all-inclusive 
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field of activity” as one God. Classical trinitarian theology argues that three divine 
persons share everything in common except their appropriation. By the same token, 
Bracken also develops his theory in trinitarian structure: three divine persons share 
everything in common except their respectively different roles within an infinite field of 
activity.
163
 In dealing with the Trinity, we are usually faced with trinity’s abstractness, 
because it lacks connection with the faith-life of the Christian community. Catherine 
LaCugna and others have pointed out that the classical doctrine of the Trinity has become 
more and more a “museum piece.” However, Bracken does not forget to point out the 
danger of the opposite side. If we move to “a phenomenological understanding of God” 
as exclusively “for us,” there is an equally serious danger that the reality of God will 
eventually be seen as simply “a projection of human wishes and desires.” That is, God 
will become only a function of our human efforts to understand ourselves and the world. 
In that sense, metaphysics, which focuses on the issue of human being and being as such, 
would make God an ontological reality quite independent of the world.
164
  
At this point we should acknowledge how Whitehead’s metaphysically relational 
theory relates to the traditional doctrine of the Trinity. Which of these two forms of 
knowledge ultimately serves as the criterion of truth for the other? If they are in conflict 
in their truth-claims, should each one modify the other’s understanding of the Trinity in 
order either to be consistent with Whitehead’s metaphysical system, or, to remain faithful 
to the classical doctrine of the Trinity?
165
 Bracken argues that Whiteadian process 
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thinkers can accept the doctrine of Trinity of such German theologians as Jürgen 
Moltmann, Heribert Mühlen, and Eberhard Jüngel, who consider God as “an 
interpersonal process or a community of three coequal persons.”166 However, Bracken 
points out some limitations in their perspectives. Although all three have kept a distance 
from the classical doctrine of the Trinity based on Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics, 
they hesitate to say that “the nature of God is to be an interpersonal process and that the 
divine persons exist by reason of their common participation in the process.”
167
 For 
German theologians the inner life of God is “not an ongoing process of interpretation” 
but “a process of self-giving love.”
168
 What Bracken emphasizes is that communities (the 
whole), that is, “structured societies of a particular complexity,” exercise an agency 
which is not reduced to their individual actual entities, but is more than their sum of 
parts.
169
 The unity is not the unity of a substance but the unity of a process, since whereas 
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a substance “reduces its parts to its own subsistent actuality,” a process is only “its parts 
in dynamic interaction,” and “the parts of a process create something bigger than 
themselves as parts.”170  
Bracken maintains that the role of the Spirit as the bond of love within the Trinity 
should not be overemphasized, since “God is by nature community or interpersonal 
process.” Their plurality as separate persons is grounded in their “unity as a community.” 
Thus God can be genuinely triune, “one in three.”
171
 In the sense, Bracken considers the 
doctrine of the Trinity of the German’s theologians as “tritheism, i.e., that the three divine 
persons first exist in their own right as separate beings and that the Spirit somehow exists 
as mediator between the other two.” Instead, Bracken maintains that the interpersonal 
process is the “real bond” (mediator) between the persons.172 Hence, the scheme of the 
Trinity is as follows: The Father is God who is “Primal Cause or Originator”; the Son is 
“the One Originated or the Primal Effect”; the Spirit is the “Primordial Condition for the 
interaction between the Primal Cause and the Primal Effect within the Godhead itself.” 
This can be translated into Whiteheadian terms: the primordial nature of God, the 
consequent nature of God, and the superjective nature. The Father proposes a new 
possibility and “qualifies the presence and activity of Creativity.” The Son says yes to the 
Father’s proposal, so that he converts “possibility into actuality.” The Spirit urges the 
Father toward a new possibility of existence moment by moment and keeps converting 
possibility into actuality.
173
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Furthermore, Bracken relates Whitehead’s “four creative phases in which the 
universe accomplishes its actuality” to three divine persons. The Father initiates the first 
phase of conceptual origination in that the Father proposes initial aim. The Son initiates 
both the second phase of physical origination in that each actual occasion with the Son 
responds to the Father’s initial aim, and the third phase of perfected actuality in that it 
relates “perfectly to the society of all other occasions in union with the Son.” Since the 
fourth phase is the creative action for the world, that is, “the love of God for the world,” 
the Spirit appears in all phases, between God and the world, bringing about the 
movement (reconciliation) from one phase to the four phases.
174
  
However, the divine persons are not three gods, but one God. They are so coequal 
that none of them is first, but “all exist in ‘dependent coorigination’ from moment to 
moment.” Thus all three divine persons are involved in the creation (the primordial), 
redemption (the consequent), and sanctification (the superjective) of the world.
175
 Thus 
God is a society in that He is “three persons who are one God by reason of their intrinsic 
relatedness to one another within the divine being.”
176
 In order to understand and 
articulate the doctrine of the Trinity, we need to emphasize the necessity of “prayer and 
reflection on the Christian Scriptures,” because it is the “starting point for both prayer 
and rational reflection,”177 and to recognize that no single system of Thomistic 
metaphysics, German Idealism, or process-relational metaphysics contains the whole 
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truth about reality, since each possesses its own strong points and weak points. In this 
sense, synthesized insights will produce “a system of thought truly responsive to 
contemporary desires for ultimate meaning and value.”178 
 
Creatio Ex Nihilo   
Based on the field-oriented approach, Bracken accepts and explicates creatio ex nihilo: 
society as a field of activity in the Trinity serves as the ground of being for the world of 
creation within a hierarchically ordered field for actual occasions “from the 
submicroscopic (subatomic particles) to the intergalactic.”
179
 There are four grades of 
actual occasions which coexist in dynamic interrelation here and now in Whitehead’s 
system: “empty space,” “enduring non-living objects,” “enduring living objects,” and 
“enduring objects with conscious knowledge.”
180
 Given this Whitehead’s grades of actual 
entities, Bracken enables us to imagine how they have emerged since the big bang: 
initially, “virtual particles,” “subatomic particles” and “societies of atomic and molecular 
actual occasions,” “plant life” and “animal life,” finally, human species with the 
development of the brain and nervous system. These are all interrelated in the universe.
181
 
Although each field retains its ontological integrity, fields can overlap and interpenetrate 
within one another in such a way that lower-level fields can contribute to the upper-level 
fields and upper-level fields can control the lower-level fields. In this sense fields entail 
“interlocking and hierarchically ordered systems.”
182
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 Although the world is created by God’s free decision in order to share the 
trinitarian life with creatures, Bracken accepts creatio ex nihilo only in a qualified sense, 
namely, creation out of “no-thing,” since creation comes forth from the divine matrix of 
the non-personal or “transpersonal dimension of the divine being.” Since creation cannot 
survive apart from God but enjoys its own ontological integrity as fields of activity in 
God, we “live and move and have our being” within God.
183
 Just as three divine persons 
are endlessly interrelated and prehend their divine life, so all created actual entities share 
“an intersubjective world.” In so doing, all created actual entities also “implicitly” 
prehend the three divine persons and their relation pattern. When created entities respond 
to the divine initial aim, it is similar to the Son who responds to the Father in the Spirit. 
Borrowing from Harold Morowitz a trinitarian structure to the cosmic process, although 
his trinity is purely naturalistic, in which evolution involves immanence (the origin of the 
universe), emergence (the origin of life), and transcendence (the origin of mind), Bracken 
identifies transcendence with the Father who provides initial aims to all creatures, 
immanence with the Son in creation who responds to the Father, and emergence with the 
Holy Spirit as the divine force, in the form of the “creation of new and higher unities 
among lower-level systems,” who mediates and sustains the unity between Father and 
Son. From this scheme, Bracken draws “emergent monism” that “the world somehow 
exists in God and is sustained by the power of God.” When Bracken here considers 
Arthur Peacocke’s argument that “everything can be broken down into fundamental 
physical entities,” it reminds us of Whitehead “atomistic” actual occasions as basic 
constituents. Whereas these foundational entities for Peacocke are matter, for Bracken are 
spiritual entities (momentary subjects of experience), because spirit “is constitutive of 
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physical reality at all levels of existence and activity; matter is a by-product of spiritual 
entities in dynamic interrelation.” It would be awkward, but when we reflect on 
panentheism and the relationship between three divine persons and the world, we can 
recognize that the very nature of spirit is “to objectify itself in what we loosely term 
matter.” That is, in order to keep creatures’ own right, just as three divine persons 
continually and gradually “objectify” their mutual relationship in the field of activity and 
in the continual process of creation, so creatures also have to “objectify” themselves so as 
to achieve their full actuality in their own right.
184
  
 
Divine and Human Creativity   
Bracken relates “the power of being” or “the act of being” to creativity in Whitehead. The 
act of being in Aquinas is “the principle whereby entities, both finite and infinite, exist.” 
Whereas finite beings participate in the act of being in limited ways, God exists without 
limitation. The divine nature enters into the “nature of self-constitution” for all finite 
occasions. Bracken refers to this “a principle of creative transformation,” in that 
“whereby the three divine persons and all finite occasions continuously come into 
existence.” Bracken relates this principle of creative transformation to Whitehead’s 
creativity. In fact, Whitehead does not consider creativity as the principle of the divine 
nature or the nature of all finite occasions, but as “a metaphysical given”:  “that ultimate 
principle by which the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the one actual 
occasion, which is the universe conjunctively.” However, since creativity exists as 
primordial instantiation with God and as derivative instantiations with all finite occasions, 
it can be part of the underlying nature of God and all finite occasions. Thus creativity or 
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the act of being brings about the “unity of the universe and the unification or self-
constitution of each of its member actual entities.”185 Thus insofar as three divine persons 
work in the world without interfering the creatures’s freedom and the laws governing the 
cosmos, Bracken supports a process-oriented panentheism without collapsing the world 
into God or God into the world.
186
 
 Since creativity and the extensive continuum are the ground of the divine being 
and the ground of all finite entities, if human beings experience the ground of their own 
existence, they at the same time experience God not in an entitative sense but in the 
divine nature. That is, insofar as the divine nature is “the indispensable condition for God 
to be God and for all finite entities to be themselves,” it is not personal but an impersonal 
or a “transpersonal reality, the foundation of the intersubjective existence” of the divine 
pesons and all creatures.
187
   
 With regard to the God-world relationship, Bracken notes that because the nature 
of God is “an ongoing process of interpretation,” the process of creation can be contained 
within the divine life and “a partial expression of the exchange of love between the three 
divine persons from all eternity.”
188
 Bracken shows us the God-world relationship with a 
diagram. There are three circles touching one another: two at the base (Father and Son) 
and one (Spirit) between and above the other two. There are three circles within the Son 
circle: from the innermost circle, the Church, the human community, and creation as a 
whole. Whatever happens in these circles influences the Son and through him, it also 
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affects the Father and the Spirit.
189
 Bracken argues his strong point in two ways: His 
God-world relationship, first, “reinforces traditional Christian belief in God as a Trinity 
of three divine persons,” and, second, gives much deeper societal interpretation of reality 
than Whitehead.
190
  
 
God’s Power and the Problem of Evil 
If all creatures are interrelated with the divine communitarian life, how can we 
understand the problem of evil? Where does it come from? Bracken argues that since 
human communities are “a mixture of good and evil,” that is, a grace-filled side and a 
sinful side, we need to investigate “collective” power of good and evil.191 Bracken does 
not accept God’s unilateral power vis-à-vis creation, but through the scheme of universal 
intersubjectivity bilateral power between God and creatures in different ways. Whereas 
God allows creatures to make their own decisions and accept responsibility by efficient 
causality, God leads creatures’s decisions into the ongoing cosmic process and lures for 
further action to the next occasion by final causality.
192
 Thus both good and evil in this 
world are decided “by actual occasions or momentary subjects of experience in their 
process of self-constitution.” Although these decisions are not self-conscious, since 
objective patterns are “recorded” in the SFA, a decision is never deleted. We can see the 
decision diachronically and synchronically. Whereas diachronically the decision of an 
actual occasion is conditioned by the antecedent structure of the field out of which it 
arises, synchronically the decision of an actual occasion is conditioned not only by its 
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own field, but also by the entire cosmic process within the divine matrix or divine 
communitarian life. The divine persons either “confirm” productive decisions or 
“reorient” disruptive decisions not by the coercion but by persuasion. In the sense, since 
human beings are related to themselves, to fellow creatures, and to the triune God “[as a] 
full acceptance into the divine communitarian life,” they may need “a period of 
purgatorial self-reflection” before accepting divine forgiveness and there would be hell 
for thos who do not make that decision, thereby they are “in a state of permanent psychic 
estrangement from God and their fellow creatures.” And although God will save those 
who can be saved, even God cannot interrupt “the power of choice inherent within human 
subjectivity in forcing an individual to accept an objectively greater good.”193 
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Chapter III: Philip Clayton’s Panentheism  
In chapter three, we will recognize Clayton’s generic panentheism as an alternative 
between classical theism and panehtism, illumine Clayton’s self-limiting God who 
created the world from nothing in kenotic tritartian panentheism, and prehend dipolarity 
of divine agency and human agency in God-world relationship.  
 
Generic Panentheism as a Panentheistic Umbrella or a Big Tent 
Clayton has defended panentheism in modern philosophy, in modern science, and in 
Christian systematic theology.
194
 In the eyes of many contemporary philosophical 
theologians, panentheism is considered to be a third way between classical theism and 
pantheism. Panentheism means, simply speaking, that “even though God is more than the 
world, the world is within God.”
195
 Another definition by Clayton is that “there is a 
divine reality that is the ultimate explanation of the existence of our universe. The 
observable or ‘natural’ universe is inseparable from that divine reality, although the 
divine reality itself is not simply identical to that universe.”
196
 Clayton more concretely 
defines the range of panentheism: “panentheism is located as part of continuum that runs 
from classical philosophical theism to pantheism.”197 The expression, “continuum that 
runs from… to,” emphasizes more connection (although they are not fully connected) 
than separation from both sides, seeking to avoid a dualistic logic like “black or white.” 
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With ths perspective, Clayton shows us a generic panentheism.198 If drawn as a picture, it 
would be roughly like the picture below, which I call the panentheistic umbrella or a “big 
tent.”  
 1. God created the world as a distinct substance. It is separate from God in nature and         
        essence, although God is present to the world (classical philosophical theism in the 
West).  
 2. God is radically immanent in the world.  
 3. God is bringing the world to Godself.  
 4. The world is in God–at least metaphorically, and perhaps also in a stronger sense.  
 5. God’s relation to the world is in some sense analogous to the relationship between mind and 
body.  
 6. The world and God are correlated (contingently for some authors, necessarily for others). 
 7. The world and God are “nondual” (Shankara’s “Atman is Brahman”), or there is only one 
substance that          can be called “nature” or “God” (Spinoza’s dues sive natura).  
 
This perspective of Clayton’s is similar to Griffin’s process panentheism: “Panentheism 
brings out the fact that it combines features of both pantheism, which regards God ‘as 
essentially immanent and in no way transcendent,’ and traditional theism, which regards 
God ‘as essentially transcendent and only accidentally immanent.’”
199
  
  
God and the World  
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Panentheism does not demand to choose one side between unity and difference but 
accepts a dialectical answer, namely, “unity-in-difference.”200 Insofar as the world is 
open “from the top” for God’s activity, God can influence the world as a whole, because 
the world is not outside of God, just as our mind influences our body. There are analogies 
and disanalogies between God and the world. The God-world relation is fully compatible 
with the traditional affirmation that “God did not have to create the world.” However, 
after having created a world, God is now dependent on it. The potentials for experience 
within God become actuality only through the God-world interactions. Contrasted to 
classical theism that God is fully actual, panentheism asserts a potentiality in God that is 
actualized in relation to the world. Although it is “a contingent dependence, one that did 
not have to happen,” after a free decision to create the world, God’s dependence is 
necessary. We cannot imagine total identity between God and world, infinite and finite, 
necessity and contingence, and creator and creatures.
201
  
 With regard to the notion of the world, we can say that everything that we know is 
not an abstraction but a component of the world. The world is not a unidimensional 
edifice but a multilayered structure which includes the complexity of all things. To know 
the world is to know a synthesized account through the prism through which diverse 
phenomena are filtered. Clayton explains two notions of the world: “regulative or 
transcendent (Schleiermacher’s term)” and “constitutive notion.” The one is that the 
world is “the anticipated realization of unity in a de facto plurality.” Nevertheless, we 
cannot fully understand the world, since the world entails “an epistemic ideal,” since the 
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world transcends our knowledge, and since the world itself in any sense is “a future and a 
transcendent concept.” Since there is something to which their knowledge refers, “the 
quest to know the world regulates the practice of science.” The other one is the world as 
“a constitutive notion.” The knowledge we possess refers to the world we know. If there 
is an object to which we refer, it is not simply fictional. Thus, “world” gives us at least 
both sides: future and present, transcendent and immanent, and a whole and parts. Thus 
the world is “the epistemic goal toward which science is working, its terminus ad 
quem.”
202
  
 Clayton asks a question concerning “the world as the totality of what would be 
(finally) knowable.” Whereas Peirce emphasizes “‘knowability’ in terms of the activities 
of the ideal community of inquiry,” Schleiermacher emphasizes a “psychological idea of 
the world as the ‘driving force behind knowledge.’” It is not easy to make a balance 
“between present appearances and our epistemic goal,” or “between knowledge as ideal 
and knowledge as actuality.” Refusing to accept both the notion of world as fiction and 
the notion of world which has no further theory, because of the identity between present 
theories with final outcome of science, Clayton follows Schleiermacher’s idea of the 
“world” as the “transcendent ground for all thought about nature, that is, for all 
representational thought (abbildliches Denken), including both physical and ethical 
perspectives, both world order and law.” Even though we have the idea of a highest unity 
in all specific knowledge, “we cannot actualize [this idea] either in thought or in deed.”
203
 
 
Panentheistic Analogy 
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In order to explain panentheism, we need to think of a presupposition, “In.” In etymology, 
the “in” links “all” and “God” in “pan-en-theism=all-in-God.” “In” is not a literal 
meaning but a metaphor, since it applies spatiality to God who essentially cannot be 
spatial. There are double possibilities of “in”: the world in God and God in the world (the 
interdependence of God and the world like mind/body relation). On the one hand, the 
world depends on God, since without God the world cannot exist. On the other hand, God 
depends on the world since God’s actual experience is possible in relation to finite 
creatures.
204
 The “‘embedded systems’ description of the natural world” suggests that the 
emergence concept is a viable means for expressing the relation ‘in’ or ‘is internal to.’ If 
the same structure could be applied to God’s relation to the world, it would comprehend 
the world as internal to God.”205  
 Clayton argues that we need to use an analogy or metaphor to explain the God-
world relationship, although all human alanogies are inadequate to describe the infinite 
God.
206
 What could be the best analogy? An example that “the world exists in the womb 
of God” is very concrete, but it is too specific to be applied to generality.
207
 The God-
world relation is analogous to mind-body relation. Clayton calls it the “panentheistic 
analogy” (PA): “The world is in some sense analogous to the body of God. God is 
analogous to the mind which dwells in the body, though God is also more than the natural 
world taken as a whole.”
208
 We can say that mind is in body and body in mind. However, 
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can we say that body can go beyond mind, although mind can go beyond the body? That 
is, a body is in a specific place, but mind can go all over the world. Just as God is more 
than the world, so mind is more than the body. Clayton explains that although mental 
causation is a part of the natural world, it is more than physical causation (e.g., mind-to 
raise your hand). By the same token, there is the possibility of divine actions, without 
breaking natural law. Thus there would be “no qualitative or ontological difference” 
between natural law and special divine actions.
209
 Panentheists usually contend that the 
world is open “from the top” for God’s activity: God can influence the world as a whole 
because the world does not lie outside of the divine, just as one’s mind or mental self can 
influence one’s body.210  
  According to Cooper, Clayton’s mind-body analogy expresses “the world’s effect 
on God, God’s agency in the world, and God’s transcendence of the world.”
211
 First, the 
world affects God and God respnds to it, because God is present in each physical 
interaction which is a part of the divine being, so that it is “in him [that] we live and 
move and have our being (Acts 17:28).”
212
 In this sense, God depends on the world. 
Second, God also affects the world. Just as mental properties influence both other mental 
properties and the physical world (brain), God also exercises genuine agency in the world 
“without supernatural intervention.” To that extent, then, Clayton’s position is very 
similar to Peacocke’s notion of “God’s ‘top-down’ causality in the world.” Third, there 
are differences between God and the world, for example, God’s transcendence, in that 
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God is a distinct being, preceded the world (creation), and has different attributes such as 
eternity, omnipotence, and moral perfection that humans do not have.213  
 Hence, there are analogies and disanalogies between God and world. On the one 
hand, analogies mean that God’s causality in the world is like mental experience above 
physical functioning. On the other hand, disanologies mean that one cannot find God’s 
central nervous system in the cosmos, since spirit is different from mental properties.
214
 
Considering spirit as “an emergent phenomenon” which is not reduced to the physical 
system,
215
 Clayton explains divine Spirit. Whereas vitalism and pantheism introduce God 
at a lower level, dualism makes a separation between God-language and human spirit. 
Instead of either position, Clayton draws God-language “from below,” that is, theology of 
immanent Spirit216 and “from above” which is the “non-reducibility of emergent levels.” 
Thus the divine agent must be characterized “not only in psychological (human-spirit) 
terms, but also in terms of a level of pure Spirit that transcends the universe as a whole.” 
In this sense, Clayton affirms classical theological concepts: “God is not contingent but 
necessary, not mortal but eternal, not finite but infinite.” The infinite (Spirit) must include 
the finite (personal predicates and qualities) within it as well as transcend it (personal) 
simultaneously.217 We need both “pneumatology from below” and “pneumatology from 
above” so as to establish the concept of divine Spirit.218    
 
Creatio Ex Nihilo 
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Since God freely, not necessarily, created the world, which is not only contingent but also 
“might not have existed,”219 Clayton rejects Michael Brierley’s fifth theme, “God’s 
dependence on the world,” among eight common aspects in panentheism, if it means that 
“God must necessarily create a (contingent) world.” He draws supporting ideas from both 
the Christian theological tradition (God’s free creation) and process traditions (the 
emergence of God).
220
 In the sense, according to Cooper, Clayton’s panentheism is 
unusual in that “it does not entail, even implicitly, the inevitability of the world or a 
compatibilist view of divine freedom.”221 Furthermore, he still emphasizes an ontological 
difference between God and the world and multiple disanalogies between divine and 
human nature.222 What makes Clayton keep creatio ex nihilo, i.e., the radical contingency 
of this world including our being, the disanalogy between God and human beings, and a 
self-limiting God, not a metaphysically powerless God? In a sense, although Clayton 
explains his theological position in terms of logical, coherent, and systematic methods, is 
it not for him the result of a presupposition of faith? His confession would support this 
conjecture: “The creation of both ourselves and the universe, being completely free and 
unconstrained, was a sign of God’s grace, that is, of God’s eternal character.”
223
  
 With regard to the God-world relation, although Clayton depends on Whitehead’s 
cosmology, which must be both “scientifically informed” and “inherently metaphysical,” 
he breaks with Whitehead to endorse creatio ex nihilo which rejects the world’s 
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coeternity with God but accepts “the radical contingency” of our world.
224
 God’s creation 
is free, not constrained by necessity, because such a metaphysical constraint “actually 
decreases the free responsiveness and relatedness.” In the sense, there must be a 
disanalogy between the contingent human agents and the ontological self-sufficient 
divine agents. That is, whereas the divine nature is “pre-given” necessity, human nature is 
“freedom-in-thrownness” (Geworfenheit).
225
 Since the ultimate reality is the ground of 
the universe (“ground-of-being cosmologies”), but this universe does not contain the 
ultimate reality within itself, the universe needs a deeper level of reality as personal. Not 
in the Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, but through the divine dipolarity of Whitehead, 
Clayton reaches for the concept of God both as “the ground of being” and as “an existing 
being” (der Grund des Seins and das höchste Seiende), that is, the antecedent 
(primordial) nature as the “function of eternal grounding” and the consequent nature as 
“person-like interaction with creatures.”
226
 
 Clayon attempts to solve some tension between creatio ex nihilo and God’s 
intrinsic love, tension that if God has unlimited love, God always relates to the world. 
Although Clayton accepts “inter-personal relations within God” and God’s relation to 
creation “as love,” he adds, God’s love can be expressed more deeply in that God created 
a finite world, although God did not have to create the world. God’s love for the world as 
no necessity is deeper than God’s love for the world as necessity. This logic is also in 
Bracken’s process theology. Bracken argues that God has existed eternally “as a 
trinitarian field of forces, as tri-personal identity,” and “as a single unbounded field of 
activity.” Clayton adds here that God “at some point” freely created the world, the finite 
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centers of activity within the space of the divine being to share the divine life. This means 
that the finite created world is different from infinite God in essential nature. Clayton 
emphasizes this difference, because it is vital.227  
 Clayton relates creation to kenosis in the name of “kenotic creation,” that is, 
“creation is itself a kenotic, relational act.” It means that God freely limited God’s 
omnipotence and allowed non-divine creatures. Clayton calls it “open kenotic 
panentheism.” God’s self-limitation as creation entails God’s primordial nature and 
God’s consequent nature in process theology. Once God created the world, two natures 
cannot be separated, so that God invites creatures to work in the divine action and we 
become “created co-creators with God.” Since God experiences all creatures’ experiences 
such as joy and suffering and gives back to creatures continual intial aim “for the 
common good,” God manifests the highest love. Creatio ex nihilo expresses the most 
radical contingency of created beings, because they exist not out of necessity but in the 
relationship with God. In this kenotic creatio ex nihilo, insofar as God freely creates 
centers of activity of others within divine life, creatures are imago Dei, since they are also 
centers of activity. Although we can accept or resist God’s will, we need to remember 
that “we exist contingently and might not have existed at all.”228  
    
Emergentist Panentheism 
Then what is the best analogy to speak of God? Clayton finds a model for the divine 
nature in the “the highest level of emergence,” that is, “the level of human personhood”: 
“the emergence of mind (or mental properties) from the most complicated biological 
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structure yet discovered, the human body and brain.” Emergence is the best means to 
explain God’s immanence in the world, since if God is transcendent and the world is fully 
explained by natural law without God, how can we explain divine place in the world of 
modern science and modern philosophy? Instead of neglecting these phenomena, 
accepting modern science and philosophy, Clayton seeks for “a new conceptual basis” for 
maintaining the immanence of God in panentheism, so that Clayton calls it “emergentist 
panentheism.”
229
  
 Arthur Peacocke describes emergent systems with conceptions of parts and 
wholes: “parts are contained within wholes, which themselves become parts within the 
greater wholes, and so forth.” In the God-world relationship, the world is metaphorically 
internal or belongs to God. Emergence means the “set-inclusion relation, ε, which is read 
‘belongs to,’ ‘is a member of,’ or ‘is an element of.’”
230
 Mentality such as thoughts and 
wishes is, over the history of evolution, influenced by brain and in turn influences bodies 
(brain). Clayton makes a distinction between mind as property and mind as object. Mind 
as object occurs dualism, because it is res cogitans, which is “an object that is 
nonphysical, immaterial, not composed out of parts, and not located in space and time.” 
Thus we have to say, “mental properties: complex, emergent properties predicated of the 
brain as an object.”231 
 Nonetheless, Clayton does not fully agree with Samuel Alexander’s radically 
emergent theism, which asserts that God is the final product of the evolution of the 
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cosmos, that there was one time when God had not existed, and that there is “an 
increasing ‘deification’ of the universe over time,” since God is not only an emergent 
property of the natural world, but also an existing agent or Ground of Being.232 Althought 
we can undersand God who has properties such as reproduction (cell), life (organisms), 
or thought (minds), the properties of divinity—“eternity, perfection, love, justice, and the 
role of Creator and Source of all that is—are different in kind from such intra-mundane 
properties.” Then, how can God be both the source of all things and agent that arises in 
history of the cosmos? Although emergence as a conceptual structure can reach to the 
category of divinity in evolution, Clayton acknowledges that since emergence cannot 
fully explain the emergent property of evolution, we need metaphysics beyond the logic 
of emergence and in turn metaphysical reflection implies panentheism as a theological 
postulate. Thus God is the source and “ultimate culmination of this cosmos, the Alpha 
and Omega, the Force or Presence within which all is located.”
233
  
  
Panentheism and Trinity 
What would be the relation between panentheism and the Trinity? Clayton argues that “a 
‘salvation economy’ (Heilsokonomie)” cannot be reached without grasping some 
characters of the One. We cannot make a sharp distinction between God in the world or 
the economic Trinity and God in its own nature or the immanent Trinity.
234
 What is 
necessary about the three-fold-ness? Clayton finds an answer in panentheism, since “The 
panentheistic structure is inherently trinitarian.” We can think God as the second person 
in the world, but if we identify God with the world, God would lose God’s infinite 
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property and become finite. Thus the infinity of God as the first person is a necessary part 
of God’s nature. God as the third person unifies the first and second persons. Clayton 
asks: “Is the immanent or the economic Trinity prior?” His answer is this: Whereas if we 
mean philosophical or logical priority, then the immanent Trinity is prior, if we mean 
salvifically, then the economic Trinity is. Clayton describes more radically: There is only 
the potential structure in God beyond God’s actions in the world. Since God created the 
world not outside of God but inside the divine by God’s free decision, we can say that 
“all is God” or “all actions are God’s.” Nonetheless, we are also agents who are “free, 
moral, and responsible.” Whereas epestemologically the God-world relation is first, 
ontologically the inner-trinitarian relations are first. The three divine persons have 
separate centers of activity, but together they form “the unity of the trinitarian God.” 
While for traditional Trinity God chose to create a world outside Godself, trinitarian 
panentheists affirm “the participation of the created order in God.”
235
  
 Clayton recognizes three central disanalogies in Trinitarian panentheism. First, 
since there is difference between the divine essence and human essence, our participation 
within God is achieved not by our nature but rather by the grace of God. Second, since 
God is God and humans cannot be God, God existed before the world and will continue 
to exist even after the world exists no more. Our existence within God is “a gift of grace 
from God.” Third, every action of the trinitarian God reflects the “full moral perfection of 
God: giving, accepting, glorifying.” Whereas most classical theists have denied placing 
sinful humans within God, panentheists accept that God can embrace even the darkest of 
human actions within the divinity. Thus we can reach a conclusion that only by divine 
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grace does God allow us to exist within God.
236
 Clayton considers Whitehead’s 
philosophy as “dualistic rather than dialectical,”237 in that he makes a distinction between 
the philosophy of organism and philosopohies of the absolute: “One side makes process 
ultimate; the other side makes fact ultimate.” However, Clayton suggests a third position 
that makes “both fact and process ultimate, both primordial envisagement and resulting 
actuality, both ground and consequent.” Although these pairs are incompatible, we need a 
dialectical third moment: “philosophically speaking, God’s panentheistic appropriation of 
the world as God’s other; theologically speaking, God’s salvific and self-sacrificial love 
for the world.”
238
  
 
Divine Action  
Then, how does God act in the world? There seems to be conflicts or contrasts between 
the presuppositions of science and divine action: a closed physical system of the universe 
vs. openness of the universe; regular and lawlike interactions vs. occasional action by 
God according to particular purposes; all traceable causal histories vs. the divine will as 
the ultimate source of these actions; ultimate possibilities of physical explanations to 
anomalies vs. earthly accounts insufficient to explain God’s intentions.239 This 
symmetrical contrast gives rise to a question: what is the role of divine action in a closed 
system of natural causes? Clayton explains God’s influence and action on creatures 
without breaking nature law.  
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 In order to show the possibility of divine action, Clayton points out the problems 
of “determinism and causal closure” in science. Determinism, according to William 
James, “professes that those parts of the universe already laid down absolutely appoint 
and decree what other parts shall be. The future has no ambiguous possibilities hidden in 
its womb: the part we call the present is compatible with only one totality.”
240
 This theory 
denies that there will be other than one specific future, since there is the “ontological 
thesis” that the physical state of the world at a given time together with efficient causes 
determines the physical state of the world for all future times as a necessary effect.
241
 
Thus, inasmuch as t+1 is determined by t in physical state of the world, proponents of 
this theory argue that there is no plausibility of divine action, and that even divine 
existence is “not just unknowable but physically impossible.” Some Christian biologists 
including Arthur Peacocke insist on God’s initiative in a process of cosmic evolution, but 
that perspective faces a dilemma between necessary results of the Big Bang and God’s 
intervention. Is there any possibility of harmony between evolution and theism or 
evolution and divine providence?
242
 
 Rethinking the issue of divine action alongside the scientific explication, Clayton 
argues that it is not easy to choose one position between two uncomfortable alternatives: 
“God acts as the Divine Architect only” and “God becomes the Divine Repairman.” 
Clayton finds “a new theory of causation” in quantum physics, which “reveals a world 
that is both law-governed and ontologically indeterminate,”
243
 so that he finds a clue to 
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explain “an opening between quantum physics and divine action.” Since physical 
causation cannot determine each individual case, i.e., since all causes are not always 
“physically reconstructable causes,”244 some thinkers find other possibilities in mental 
causation or non-physical types of causation: the “agent causation” of Richard Taylor and 
the “double agency” of Austin Farrer. In these views, since mental or divine causes can 
appear in the physical world, there is a possibility of both human and divine agency.
245
 
 Then, Clayton uses a new theory of causation in order to develop an argument 
that “God acts as a causal force within the world.”
246
 Prior to the argument of the divine 
causal activity, Clayton deals with the phenomenon of emergence in the natural world.
247
 
There are some examples to explain divine causal influence which can be called “future 
causality”: Aristotle’s four causes to explain emergence: material causes, formal causes, 
efficient causes, and final causes; Aquinas’s purpose of God as one of the causal forces in 
every event; Pannenberg’s power of the future as a causal constituent in every event; 
Lewis Ford’s lure of the future. Clayton develops a possibility not from Aristotelian-
Thomist theory but from emanation theology. This emanation model can explain both 
“downward movement of differentiation and causality and an upward movement of 
increasing perfection.”248  
 Quantum physics is not enough to explain causal problems until the theory of 
emergence. There is another cause beyond physical cause, i.e., a psychological cause 
which is the “emergence of consciousness from the human brain.” Clayton shows us the 
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opposite direction or “‘downward’ causal effects” from “psychological causes”
249
 or 
mental phenomena to physical reality. Human beings are a kind of psychosomatic unity: 
“mental and physical attributes are interconnected and exhibit causal influences in both 
directions.”
250
 Thus, personhood cannot be completely transtlated into “‘lower-level’ 
terms,”
251
 since it must be multilayered as physical, biological, psychological, and 
spiritual levels. From this perspective, our behaviors cannot be totally explained by a 
“bottom-up” manner, but need “top-down causal effects.”
252
 
 Clayton maintains that a divine influence in human moral intuitions and religious 
aspirations is different from the divine alternation of purely physical events. As a 
downward mental causation, divine causal influence on the human thought, will, and 
emotions could change an individual’s subjective dispositions without breaking natural 
law in physics and biology.
253
 It is right to say that God cannot interrupt natural law. 
Clayton explains divine causal influence through the “double agency” of Austin Farrer. 
Every action in the world has both a causal role for agents in the world as secondary 
causes and a causal role for God as the primary cause. Kathryn Tanner also defends two 
different orders: a “horizontal’ plane” (an order of created causes and effects) and a 
“vertical plane” (an order of divine agency). If there are two orders, how can the vertical 
plane influence the horizontal plane? Clayton talks about God’s action in the world as 
divine persuasion, by quoting from Tom Tracy: “God’s action goes before our own, 
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preparing us… for the unsurpassably great good that God has promised us.” This 
perspective is different from the most classical views in that the latter needs God’s 
decision alone in explaining an effect in the world, whereas the former explains God’s 
persuasion of the agent to act in a particular way which implies a special role for mental 
causes. In sum, God’s causality for human actions should not be understood as God’s 
command alone, but as divine preparing and persuasion in “luring” humanity. To that 
extent, then, the world has openness, so that we cannot know in advance God’s final 
ends.
254
 This perspective is obviously similar to process theology.  
 In the sense, we can question origination from the perspective of bottom up and 
top down. Is evolution compatible with theism? Clayton suggests “a two-way interaction” 
to explain evolution: top-down and from below through which he finds a possibility to 
reconcile evolution and theism from the “compatibility of evolution and conscious mental 
causation.” Divine influences on psychological process are analogous to mental 
influences on biological processes. Although divine cause is different from natural cause, 
God cannot break any natural laws, since God’s direct intervention would be “a troubling 
miracle.”
255
 Explaining the relation between transcendence and immanence, we have to 
remember that “if God is transcendent and the world is fully explained by natural law, 
there is no place for any divine involvement in the world.”256 If we still insist that God is 
omnipresent, we should not take the position of conservative evangelicals and 
fundamentalists who ignore modern science, but rather accept “the firm results of modern 
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science.”
257
 Although science contributes to the human science, it is not science but 
theology that is a key player for the interpretation of scientific results.258  
  
Emergent Causality  
As we noted, Clayton suggests a new theory of causation, not a linear chain of events 
from the bottom, a new causation which can be found “in quantum mechanics, mental 
causes in psychology, information theory and epigenesist in biology, and the structure of 
emergence.” Emergence shows not only upward propagation of causes but also the whole 
organism’s affection to the particles, so that Clayton does not accept “weak emergence, 
emergence without downward causation,” but “strong emergence,” which has “the notion 
of a downwardly propagating causal influence.”259 With regard to the relation between 
evolution and theism, Clayton asks, “what is the rational response to a problem that 
cannot be solved either from the bottom alone (that is, through genetics and 
biochemistry), or from the top alone (that is, by negating biology and imposing a 
theological answer)?”
260
 Clayton answers this question not in an incompatible or 
contradictory way but in a complementary dialectical or systematic way. There might be 
divine intention to create rational, moral creatures who relate to God consciously in the 
evolutionary process. God could contribute to the process of emergence, first, through the 
introduction of new information (formal causality) and, second, without changing the 
systems of evolution from the bottom (final causality).
261
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 Divine action presupposes a divine agent which must have the same meaning as 
“some of the things.” If it does not, it is impossible to attempt a theology of divine action. 
Since divine action would make human beings “puppets, mere instruments of the divine 
purposes,”
262
 action must be both the one of a finite agent and the one of God. Inasmuch 
as divine action should not neglect the evolution of the cosmos based on the natural law 
in the world,
263
 what is important is how we can find and distinguish divine action from 
natural law. In order to complete this condition, Clayton uses panentheistic-participatory 
theory of agency based on Schleiermacher and Whitehead.
264
   
 
Literally Divine Action? 
What does God do now? Since, as Paul Gwynne argues, God’s continual involvement as 
creator and sustainer of the cosmos and Jesus’ powerful miracles in the Bible show us 
divine action in the world, how can we say that “God exists but never actually does 
anything.”
265
 However, David Hume argues that although the Almighty do miracles, we 
human beings cannot know the attributes or actions of the Almighty, so that a miracle is 
only an exception of the human experience.
266
 Clayton responds to Hume’s challenge. 
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Clayton sees three reasons for theists to be skeptical about divine action in the world. 
First is the problem of evil. God did not prevent widespread suffering of the people. If 
God can prevent evil but neglects it, God must be responsible for this evil. The second 
reason has to do with religious pluralism: “Is God acting to reveal the law through the 
Jewish people, or to reveal the means of salvation through the church, or to reveal the 
divine will for humanity through the five pillars of Islam?” The third reason is the 
confliction between divine action and the scientific explanation. God’s direct 
supernatural intervention in the world raises “the problem of intervention.”
267
 However, 
scientific research does not have evidence of divine action, since the presumption of 
naturalism is that “naturalistic explanation is true, but also that one is justified in so 
thinking.”268     
 What is the liberals’ response to the Humean challenge? Liberals criticizes the 
Thomistic notion of miracles as: “[A] direct special divine act that bypasses natural 
causality.” Since such a notion of miracle is possible only in a belief that God is 
omnipotent, even Karl Rahner rejects the notion of miracle as “an occasional suspension 
of the laws of nature.”
269
 By the same token, Walter Kasper also notes that “divine 
intervention in the sense of a directly visible action of God is theological nonsense.” 
Most modern theologians give metaphorical interpretations with regard to God’s action: 
for Schleiermacher, miracles were later additions; for Bultmann, the essential message is 
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not special divine action but the idea of existential wholeness; and for Tillich, the heart of 
the Christian message is the existential attitude.270   
 However, although this metaphorical manner is appropriate, it seems to agree 
with the critics’ attack, so Clayton asks, is this metaphorical interpretation enough? 
Clayton again questions divine action: Can we still support God’s action; is it not strange 
to believe that “God exists, but never does anything?”
271
  
 
Special Divine Action  
Divine action cannot arbitrarily interrupt the natural law. Then is there not any possibility 
of special divine action (SDA)? Clayton claims that “God (at least occasionally) carries 
out direct actions at specific times and places within the world.” However, God’s initial 
action in creating the world, or God’s intention in history is not properly SDA. Then what 
do we need to complete some conditions of special divine action? Christoph Schwobel 
explains that action needs four criteria in order to satisfy the conditions of being “the 
result of intentional action”: an agent as the necessary condition for the event; particular 
purpose for the action; a conscious choice of purposes of action; and regulation of action 
by conscious choice. Actions are intentional.272 Thus, the following question is this: can 
we explain any event in the world by “God’s intentional action?” 
 Clayton argues that some affirm it “by faith alone,” but that is not enough, since it 
cannot be reconciled with modern science. Others affirm that divine primary cause and 
the human insight of Jesus as secondary cause are together in Jesus, but this is not valid, 
since they coincide. Clayton attempts to find a more appropriate way to explain divine 
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action.
273
 Clayton finds an alternative event where Jesus is said to have a “religious 
genius view” in which Jesus has “a divine power or knowledge that is available to all 
humans.” Jesus knew how to connect to God, so that he knew God’s will. In this view, it 
is not resurrection of the individual Jesus, but the “mind of Christ” that is important and 
that is permeated into his disciples and followers. However, a weak point of this genius 
view is that it does not justify “spiritual truth as God’s act.” That is, we cannot count it as 
an act of divine revelation, since God cannot be responsible for what Jesus did.
 
 Thus we 
cannot find God’s direct role in the Christ event. Then, asks Clayton, what would be the 
necessary conditions in order to relate the life of Jesus to an act of God? First, there must 
be God’s invitation or response to those who seek for divine connection. That is, if God 
allows someone who seeks divine knowledge to have it, it is a divine action. Second, if a 
human agent can act according to divine action, the actions can be called “both human 
and divine.”
274
  
 
Problem of Evil and Self-limiting God 
The problem of evil is in a sense one of the stumbling blocks in explaining divine action. 
Clayton argues that “God’s limiting God’s own interventions into the natural order” can 
explain this problem in that God’s self-limitation (kenosis) allows independent finite 
agents to have their own choice. However, this self-limition can raise a problem of God’s 
inconsistency or God’s moral responsibility for the suffering, as Griffin asks, since this 
God can metaphysically eliminate the suffering. That is, even though God did not have 
any direct responsibility, God must have a moral responsibility, because God can stop the 
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evil. Clayton answers this question from the perspective of open panentheism.
275
 
Clayton’s position is different from Bracken’s and the open theists. He comes perhaps 
closest to Moltmann’ self-limiting God, since neither emphasizes necessity but, rather, 
voluntary limitation and kenosis. God who is “a not-less-than-personal reality” is 
essentially not contingent on the world, although God’s real experience is so because God 
is in the contingent world.
276
  
 Following Schelling, Clayton subordinates God’s nature of love to God’s freedom 
or will: “hence the cosmos represents the preexistent God’s free choice to create, and 
God, who can exist without a cosmos, is only dependent on it after this free decision.” It 
is proper to say logically that the fact that a contingent world must necessarily exist is 
incoherent. Brierley connects necessity and dependence through love: “God, through love, 
needs a world that (by nature) is radically dependent on God.” In other words, “Love 
demands that God and cosmos are both in some way dependent on, and necessary to, the 
other; but the difference in natures demands that they are not dependent on, and 
necessary to, the other in the same way.”
277
   
 Brierley interestingly notes, “Clayton’s position would therefore be more secure if 
his interpretation of freedom followed more Augustinian lines, as for Macquarrie and 
Moltmann, so that God was indeed freely dependent on the cosmos, with no other option 
and without any outside force.”
278
 Is this not a real panentheism which runs from 
classical theism and pantheism? Furthermore, “a freely self-limiting God” is also a 
significant concept. Even though both finite agents and the divine agent are “semi-
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autonomous,” while the former is so by nature, the latter is so “only because of a prior 
decision to self-limit.”279 Thus Clayton’s thesis contrasts with Whitehead’s perspective of 
a limited and powerless God, to the extent that God for process theology is necessarily or 
metaphysically limited by other actual entities or agents, since God has to respond to the 
process of the concrescence of every other actual entity. Thus the world is “a 
metaphysical necessity” for God, and the freedom of creatures has a necessarily 
ontological distinction from God.
280
 Whitehead’s “the reformed subjectivist principle”
281
 
explains the importance of experience of every subject, so that “apart from the 
experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness.”
282
 
 
Kenotic Trinitarin Panentheism as a Synthesis    
In Clayton’s theology, kenosis, Trinity, and panentheism are synthesized. Clayton’s 
perspective at this point contrasts with Whitehead’s view. For Whitehead, since God is 
eternally limited by the world and the world is metaphysically necessary for God, God is 
always already responding to the world. For Clayton, through God’s kenotic act of 
creation and a freely self-limitation, the divine agent causes other agents to have freedom 
of activity.283 God gives every actual entity initial aims at every single moment and every 
actual entity freely chooses his or her responses. That is, God allows creatures to join in 
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God’s own action within the world.
284
 Clayton’s constructive Christian theology has 
some characteristics such as the world of emergence and contingency, the world’s 
continuation within the divine presence, God more than the world (panentheism), and 
relational God.
285
 Even though there are disanalogies between God and world because 
God is necessary but world is contingent, the two of them are really related. Clayton 
explains the relation between God and world from the perspective of Panentheism, 
especially Kenotic Trinitarian Panentheism
286
 (KTP) whose concrete ground could be 
seen through creation as God’s self limitation.  
         Clayton asks an important question: what does it mean to do theology in the form 
of kenosis?287 Clayton finds the most attractive model in kenotic Christology.288 When 
Jesus submits his will to the divine will, he has power, but Jesus died powerlessly in 
God’s silence. How can we explain the Father’s direct action in Jesus’ death?
289
 When 
believers share the kenotic mind, “not my will, but Thine be done,” that is, Jesus’ 
submission to God’s will, they realize that “there are not two actions, but one,” so that 
Jesus manifests the divine power and God acts through Jesus. This manifestation of 
divine power is analogous to divine luring in process theology and to unseparation of the 
act of God and the revelation of God in classical theism, so that God intentionally reveals 
the divine nature through human agents “who really submits themselves to the will of 
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God as the essence of divine action.” In this sense, this divine action is “both specifically 
human and specifically divine.”290  
 This “mind” is not only a philosophical concept in Jesus, but needs God’s 
manifestation “in particular situations through particular persons.” In the case, individual 
agents can participate in the movement of divine self-manifestation and be part of the 
divine action. By an intentional act of self-limitation (Kenosis), God can achieve divine 
prupose in the world through the creatures’ actions.
291
 With regard to Jesus, God does not 
physically cause Jesus to move, but has given “information, guidance, and motivation to 
the mind of Jesus,” so that the man Jesus is “open to the will of God, and the divine will 
fills him.”292 However, we have to recognize that human wills cannot be perfectly 
submitted to the divine will.293 Clayton here explores the divine action as physical 
miracles in Jesus and accepts it; if God could metaphysically intervene in natural laws, 
God could stop the self-limitation if God wished. But Clayton denies it.
294
 Thus the 
human being Jesus’ entire personality, including the body, brain and mind, must respond 
to the divine action. Then, like Clayton, we can ask: “In the kenotic view, can Jesus still 
be the ‘firstborn of all creation’?” The answer is “Yes,” since Jesus uniquely and 
perfectly submitted his individual will to the divine purpose. If someone does as Jesus did, 
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s/he has “the mind of Christ” which refers to “perfect fusion of finite human will and 
divine will.”295  
 We need to reflect Clayton’s question: “what does it mean to do theology in the 
form of kenosis?”
296
 In the last chapter, “The Many Faces of Integration,” he talks about 
“a radically incarnational theology”
297
 as an attempt to integrate based on the “Wesleyan 
quadrilateral.” If this is a “new liberal theology,” I am willing to involve myself in this 
movement. In any sense, his theology is really unusual, because he is a kind of liberal, 
but I would like to add two adjectives, “[evangelical], faithful, and rational liberal,” or, 
more correctly, he has “liberal faith.”
298
 Clayton calls his position “liberal Christian 
faith,” rather than “liberalism” and this is a Christian faith, “not something “after” or 
beyond Christianity.”299 Our faith is not only a given but also a quest to build walls 
against possible falsification.
300
 The quest of liberal theologians is to integrate science 
and religion into “the full harmony between the two without the reduction of the one to 
the other.”
301
 As we confront the pluralism of modern societies, we need to listen to 
Berger’s insight that “we must ‘steer a course between a limitless tolerance which 
passively and yet ‘progressively’ reads the signs of the current age but surrenders to it 
with ‘nothing to say,’ on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a conservative fanaticism 
that denies the current age by writing about it ‘without having ever listened’ to it.’”302 
Keeping the balance in our theological situation and remembering kenotic life, the church 
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also needs to listen to Reinhold Niebuhr’s warning to the church: The gospel needs to 
challenge the pride of our life systems. If the Christian church does not bring down every 
high thing against the knowledge of God, the church becomes “not merely useless but 
dangerous.”
303
 
 
Clayton’s Genealogy of Panentheism  
Whence comes Clatyon’s panentheism? I would like to find panentheistic geneology 
which influences Clayton’s panentheism chronologically: Plotinus  Nicholas of Cusa 
 Spinoza Scheleiermacher  Schelling  Whitehead  Hartshorne  Tillich  
Clayton.  
 First is Plotinus.304 The world for Plotinus emanates from the Good, the divine 
One which is both infinite and transcendent, but includes everything.
305
 It could be a form 
of “monistic pantheism,” because all are extensions of the one God. In this sense the 
world is not necessary but contingent since it relies on the One. Although this seems like 
pantheism, Plotinus’s doctrine of the World-Soul is panentheism, since “it is divine, it 
includes the world, but it is distinct from and transcends the world.” All things are not 
God, but participate in God.306     
 Second is Nicholas of Cusa’s model of God which is theo-phony, that is, self-
giving. God is non-other. God is non-other than us. This must be immanent God, or God 
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is not the other. Clayton finds the intuition of panentheism from “Nicholas of Cusa’s 
understanding of creation occurring ‘within’ God and Descartes’s replacement of the 
scholastic notion of infinitude with a participatory one.”307 For Cusa God is all-inclusive 
infinite being.
308
 In this sense, Cusa is “an early precursor of the theology of 
panentheism.” 
 Third is Spinoza. In fact Spinoza supports theory of substance, arguing that there 
could be only one substance, “God or nature,” that is, “that is in itself and is conceived 
through itself” and all othe things are “modes of one single substance.” Thus, notes 
Spinoza, “Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can either be or be conceived without 
God.” In other words, a personal substance is no more a substance but modes with 
characteristics.309 By influence of Spinoza, Lessing recognizes that “God’s unity” is a 
transcendental unity which includes plurality, and like Spinoza, Mendelssohn suggests 
that the world is internal to God, but, unlike Spinoza, God has “consciousness, 
intentionality, and agency,” since God must be able to represent to “himself (sich 
vorstellen) all finite things, together with their moral qualities, beauty, and order.”  
At this point this suggested a theory of subjectivity that could be applied “both to God 
and to finite subjects,” beyond Spinoza’s pantheism toward panentheism.310  
 Fourth is Scheleiermacher. For Schleiermacher, the infinite can be recognized in 
and through the finite. The finite, the Spirit, moves upward, “seeking to understand the 
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infinite; and religion lives in the ‘infinite nature of the Whole, the One and All.’”
311
 In 
this sense, the one unity of/in the Spirit is prior to the differentiation of individuals.  
 Fifth is Schelling. With regard to divine freeom, Clayton affirms Schelling’s 
personalistic panentheism rather than Hegel’s rational determinism.
312
 Clayton follows 
God’s duality in Schelling in that God has “the potential freely to create or not to create a 
world” in his eternal nature.
313
 Insofar as such eternal power has God’s self-knowledge 
and will, God as the Ground of being is personal. In order for infinite God freely to 
choose to create, God must have the world within himself. Thus God’s personhood will 
be affected and changed by the world’s action. Cooper considers Clayton’s theology as 
“neo-Schellingian emergent personalist panentheism,” since Clayton, like Schelling, 
affirms that God is freely developing himself as a person in his body, when the world 
affects God, although God’s personhood is essentially transcendent. Thus Cooper defends 
Clayton’s Christian mind: “As a Christian, Clayton construes God’s personhood in terms 
of the Trinity and the incarnation of Jesus Christ.”
314
 
 Sixth is Whitehead. Although humans cannot change the essential nature of God, 
our action can affect the responsive nature of God. Since God is the all-embracing 
presence, God continually responds to the world, so that togetherness of our action and 
God’s response of grace is more abundant than either of them. Clayton calls this “the 
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miracle of creation and of history.” In the sense, we can see eschatological hope: “in the 
end, God will be able to say, ‘Behold, it was good, yea it was very good.”315 
 Seventh is Hartshorne. Hartshorne argues that although we are in God, since God 
is the supreme and all-comprehensive person, the essence of God does not contain 
universe, that is, we are outside the divine essence. All panentheism considers God as 
“Eternal-Temporal Consciousness, Knowing and Including the World.”
316
 God’s absolute 
is consistent with creaturely freedom. Without the freedom, God is impersonal or could 
be the cause of evil, and finally the only real being or substance in Spinozian pantheism. 
However, it is different from panentheism which affirms “creaturely self-determination.” 
In the sense, whereas Schleiermacher’s absolute dependence on God is ‘ancient,’ 
Schelling’s notion of divine and human freedom is modern.317 Hartshorne’s concept of 
freedom plays an important role in Clayton’s panentheism. Hartshorne’s “dipolarity” or 
“correlativeness,” like Macquarrie’s “dialectics,” is analogous to Clayton’s 
“identification and the distinction, the inclusion and the separation, of God and 
cosmos.”
318
  
 Eighth is Tillich. Clayton accepts Tillich’s ideas in many ways. In God-world 
relationship, Tillich emphasizes the mutual participation of God and the world, especially 
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“existential participation in God.”
319
 Insofar as God and the world mutually are 
transcendent and mutually immanent, they cannot be outside of each other. Although God 
and the world are not identical, they are intertwined.320 Clayton’s insistency of 
contingency of the world may be from the Tillich’s recognition of finitude that “Man is a 
creature. His being is contingent; by itself it has no necessity, and therefore man realizes 
that he is the prey of nonbeing.”
321
   
 
Evaluation of Clayton’s Panentheism   
1) For Clayton the world is not “a sign of eternal necessity,” but “a consequence of the 
initial free decision.” God’s involvement in history does not change God’s essential 
nature, but shapes God’s own history.322 According to Cooper, Clayton is similar to the 
“voluntarism of the Scotist-Calvinist tradition of classical theism,” when he affirms that 
God’s personal reality is independent of creation.
323
 Although Clayton revises classical 
theism, he does not go to the other extreme by saying that “the more the tradition is 
revised, the less justification one has in continuing to call the resulting beliefs 
‘Christians.’”
324
 In this sense, one can find Clayton’s contact point with Barth: not 
necessity but grace.325 
 2) Clayton tries not only to overcome the limitation of classical theism but also 
illuminate creatio ex nihilo and the omnipotence of God from the perspective of a 
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modified process theology. However, if God freely chooses to limit himself, then God 
should also freely choose his infinite power. In this case, we cannot help asking again, 
“Why does God not stop evil if God could freely choose his unlimited power?” How is 
this different from the way of overcoming evil in process theology? Clayton’s argument 
is similar to process theology’s insufficient answer to the problem of evil even though the 
two are different insofar as God is metaphysically powerless in process theology, and 
God is self-limiting in Clayton.  
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Chapter IV: Open Theism   
In chapter four, we shall examine open theism which attempts to find a new perspective 
of God from the evangelical camp. Open theism denies God’s determinism but accepts 
the openness of the future. In this sense, even God does not have the fixed knowledge of 
the future.  
 
Definion of Open Theism  
Open theism is a kind of movement within the evangelical camp to challenge the essence 
of classical theism and to explain it in contemporary languages.
326
 “Openness of God,” 
which is the main idea of open theology, appeared for the first time in the title of a book, 
The Openness of God.327 Insofar as many ideas of open theology are found in the Bible, 
open theism is called “a biblically oriented theology”
328
 and persues a “conceptually 
sound understanding of God.”
329
 In an attempt to overcome traditional views of God, 
open theism pursues a theology that is “biblically faithful and intellectually 
consistent.”
330
 If we describe God in “biblically flawed, rationally suspect and 
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existentially repugnant ways,”
331
 how can we establish philosophical theologies? On the 
one hand, open theism is contrasted to the Greek metaphysical tradition of classical 
theologies as “a pagan inheritance,”332 which describes God as a wholly transcendent one 
who is unrelated to creation. Instead, it deals with a God who is personal and who is 
deeply involved with the world. On the other hand, open theism is contrasted to atheism. 
When atheists such as Freud and Nietzsche reject God’s existence, their concepts of God 
are ironically very similar to those of the God of classical theisms, which is contradictory 
to the dynamic God of the Bible.
333
  
 Distinguishing “the God of Greek philosophy” from “the God of the Bible,” 
because Greek metaphysics dominates the dynamic biblical view on God, open theists do 
not accept God as “an aloof monarch,” but the God as “a caring parent with qualities of 
love and responsiveness, generosity and sensitivity, openness and vulnerability.” God’s 
openness means that God is open to give and take relationships with us and cares for 
creatures.
334
 Within the same line, emphasizing more scripture, experience, and reason 
than traditions, open theism follows traditions not from St. Augustine, Martin Luther and 
John Calvin, but from James Arminius’s rejection of divine predestination
335
 or of God’s 
“sole final cause of every event,”336 and acceptance of creaturely freedom, which makes 
open theism free will theism, from John Wesley’s emphasis on divine love and on “free 
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creaturely response to prevenient grace,” and from process theology, Feminist and 
Womanist theologies, and Jürgen Moltmann.337  
 
Main Ideas of Open Theism 
Although there are multiple voices in open theism,
338
 their core ideas are follows: 1) 
God’s primary characteristic as love; 2) theology’s humble speculation about God’s 
nature and God’s works; 3) creatures’ genuine freedom to choose their lives; 4) God’s 
similarity with creatures in experiencing others; 5) give and take relationships between 
God and the world; 6) change of God’s experience and unchange of God’s essence; 7) 
God’s creation of all nondivine things; 8) God’s resistence to control everything; 9) 
creatures’ vocation to please God and to make the world better; 10) openess of the future 
which is even fully unknown by God; 11) God’s expectations about the future partly 
dependent upon creaturely actions; 12) God’s experience of time similar to creatures’ 
experience of time.
339
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 Oord extracts three main tendencies from those ideas. First is method. Open 
theology considers the Bible as the primary source rather than reason, experience, and 
tradition, in its methodology. Whereas since open theists do not insist on biblical 
inerrancy, they are different from Fundamentalism, since they give priority to the Bible, 
they are not liberal theologians. Second, social location is in the Evangelical Christian 
tradition. Third, in epistemology, open theists are “realists or critical realists.” Although 
human languages have limitations in knowing God and the world, open theism is 
different from negative theology, because open theism accepts positive arguments about 
God.
340
 With these tendencies, open theism calls for reformation in the doctrine of God, 
reformation that is away from, as Walter Kasper calls it, “the solitary narcissistic God 
who suffers from his own completeness”341  and seeks a more coherent doctrine of God 
in conceptual intelligibility. Thus Pinnock claims God’s unity which is not oneness in 
mathematics, but “a living unity which includes diversity,” God’s dynamic constancy, not 
a dead immutability, God’s power not in omnipotence but in a sovereignty of love, God’s 
grace and righteousness, and God’s omniscience not in all knowledge but in “a deep 
wisdom accompanied by infinite resourcefulness.” In this sense, maintains open theism, 
we can make a difference and change the world.342    
 
Reference of Open Theism in the Bible  
Gregory Boyd explicates examples of Open theism from the Bible.
343
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• God’s regret: Pre-flood humanity (Gen. 6:6); Saul’s kingship (1 Sam. 15:35).  
• God’s questions about the future: Num. 14:11
344
; Hosea 8:5
345
  
• God confronts the unexpected: wild grapes rather than good fruit (Isa. 5:2-4); 
expection but not (Jer. 3:6-7, 19-20).  
• God’s frustration: Exodus 4.  
• God’s tests for people: Genesis 3:22.  
• The future is open: 2 Peter 3:12.  
 
Dinve Love  
In explanation of the open theism, argues Oord, the theo-logic of love, “God is love,” is 
more important affirmation than open theism’s well known ideas such as God’s relation 
to the world or God’s dependence on the world, God’s openness to the future, and 
genuine freedom of creatures, because “love is the central theme of Scripture, the core 
ethic for humans, and God’s reigning attribute.” Insofar as God’s omniscience means that 
the future is settled and God’s omnipotence controls everything, God would be the author 
of evil and those ideas are contradictory to the love of God. However, open theism, 
honestly speaking, also cannot completely answer why a loving God does not prevent 
genuine evils. With regard to the problem of evil, whereas open theism respects God’s 
persuasion in the process thought, it thinks that process thought makes God overly 
limited by creation and contradicts “biblical accounts, the resurrection of Jesus, and 
eschatology.”346  
 The triune God for open theism is obviously relational and interactive and in God-
world relationship, God is not a timeless and unchanging substance in monarchistic 
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attitude, but “personal, relational, and triune” in self-sacrificing love.
347
 Insofar as “God 
is love” is the most significant definition which expresses the divine reality,348 love rather 
than freedom for open theism is the divine essence that discloses God’s inner reality349 
and the leading motif in the doctrine of God. (God as Abba: Mark 14:36, God as Father: 
Luke 15:11-32).
350
 Insofar as love without relationship is impossible, explains Oord, “To 
love is to act intentionally, in response to God and others, to promote overall well-
being.”
351
 In the sense, God’s love is vulnerable, since God is “affected by his creation, 
delighted by its beauty, grieved by its tragic aspects,” so that the life of Jesus for us 
manifests the greatest of God’s love in the world’s suffering.
352
 God as a loving, caring 
parent is a more proper image than God as a king, since God does not just command to 
the world, but is affected by it.353 However, we can see also God’s wrath in the Bible. 
Then how can we harmonize the contrast between God’s wrath (Nahum 1:2) and God’s 
love? Abraham Joshua Heschel properly asserts that whereas “God’s anger is termporary, 
his love is permanent” (Ps. 30:5, Is 54:8, Ex. 34:6, Ps 103:8). Heschel argues that God’s 
normal pathos is love and anger is never an attribute or a quality inherent in the nature of 
God. Thus love incorporates all of God’s attributes. God’s love, agape, means that God 
loves us, “not because we are lovable but because he is loving.”354  
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Power of God  
Divine omnipotence has, holds Hasker, two requirements: logical possibility and 
consistency with God’s perfect nature. First, God’s possible action does not violate 
logical possibility. For example, God cannot create a square circle, not because God is 
not powerful, but because the idea is self-contradictory. Second, God’s actions are 
limited by God’s perfect nature. For example, God cannot climb Mt. Everest, because 
only a physical being can perform this act. This does not mean there is weakness in 
God.
355
 Pinnock argues that although God is superiorly powerful, God does not determine 
everything by Himself but accomplishes His work through creatures, since God 
voluntarily surrenders power and gives creatures their power to live or even rebel against 
God. However, this does not reduce God’s omnipotence, since “If Plan A fails, God is 
ready with Plan B.” God paradoxically expresses God’s condescension of power in the 
form of servanthood, that is, in the cross of Christ. It is not by force but by love (the 
primary perfection of God) that God overcomes evil, in that “love is the mode in which 
God’s power is exercised,” and so that God “combines love and power perfectly.” In the 
sense, Pinnock defines omnipotence not as the power to control everything but as the 
power that “enables God to deal with any situation that arises,” because “total control is 
not a higher view of God’s power but a diminution of it.”356 We need to consider God’s 
power not as coercion but as persuasion. However, if we emphasize persuasion alone, it 
may be “an overreaction against almightiness.”
357
 Thus we need to make a balance or 
tension between love and power.  
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 Although open theism does not deny God’s occasional intervention in human 
freedom and/or the natural order, since it happens quite infrequently, we cannot assure 
that what happens is God’s will. Rather, it could be the result of human decision. Thus, 
we need to make a distinction between God’s will and human choice.
358
 In this 
perspective, unlike either classical theism or process theism, open theism explains the 
problem of evil. Evil in classical theology is necessary in order to accomplish God’s 
preordained will or a greater good, but in process theology it is the result of faulty human 
decision. Unlike process theists, open theists believe that God could have stopped giving 
all actual entities their respective freedom in order to block evil and could sometimes 
allow evil to accomplish some greater good. However, unlike classical theism, open 
theism maintains that God chooses to let individuals possess their freedom, so that 
humans may choose “less than the best option available.” In this sense, open theism 
argues that evil can occur due to human affairs.
359
 That is, if God determines everything, 
God must take responsibility for evil in the world. However, since God gives us freedom, 
we have to accept the problem of evil along with our freedom.
360
 
 
Divine Providence  
Open theism does not accept God’s will, if it is defined as the final explanation for 
everything, as a kind of Amor Fati (love of fate). William Hasker suggests five theories 
in divine providence. First is theological determinism, or Calvinism: God determines 
everything that happens. Second is middle knowledge, or ‘Molinism’: although human 
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beings have freedom, God still controls strongly since God has a special kind of 
knowledge. Third is simple foreknowledge: God has not the special kind of knowledge 
but has complete knowledge of the actual future. Fourth is the openness of God theory, 
‘free will theism”: God has some “logical limitations” in knowing the future. Fifth is 
process theology: God does not know the future and has intrinsic limitations.
361
 
 First, Calvinism’s main idea is that everything is determined by God. 
Nevertheless, there is an idea of free will in the sense of a compatibilist conception that 
people have freedom to choose what God already predetermined, not some other 
possibility. Hence, even when a person rejects God, it is also the achievement of God’s 
will.362 In the sense, the God-human relationship for Calvinists is analogous to “a puppet-
master” relationship, although they do not agree with it. With regard to the problem of 
evil, all the evil in the world is “what God wanted to happen” in the unknowable wisdom 
of God. However, does this not make God the author of evil?
363
  
 Second is middle knowledge or Molinism.
364
 Thomas Flint argues that “middle 
knowledge” is located “between knowledge of what could happen (knowledge of what’s 
possible) and knowledge of what will happen (knowledge of what’s actual).”
365
 It means 
that middle knowledge affirms both “free will in the libertarian sense” and “divine 
providential control” (counterfactuals of freedom). In this situation, we can ask “how 
God can know with certainty the future free actions of his creatures.” The answer is that 
God can know exactly “which choices will be made in each such situation.” Unlike 
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Calvinism, God’s choice in Molinism is constrained by counterfactuals of freedom.
366
 If 
Adam is free to eat the apple, we can say that he might eat the apple or not. If he might 
eat it, it is false to say that he could not eat it, and vise versa. Thus if he is free to eat the 
apple, then “it is true that he might eat it and also true that he might not eat it, but it is not 
true either that he (definitely) would eat it or that he (definitely) would not eat it.” 
However, Hasker points out a weakness: “if he is free in his decision to eat it or not, then 
there is no true counterfactual of freedom,” so that the theory of middle knowledge is not 
proper.
367
 With regard to the problem of evil, if God planned and ordered everything, 
how can God intentionally bring about such evils as the Holocaust and wars? The 
Molinist affirms “meticulous providence” that even some evil is necessary for some 
greater good.368  
 Third is simple foreknowledge.
 
This does not accept middle knowledge but 
accepts libertarian free will of human beings and God’s comprehensive knowledge of the 
future. Then how does God know the future? God has direct vision of the future. If God 
knows already what will happen in the future, the future is also fixed, so that human 
beings cannot change it. It is not proper to say that God has foreknowledge of a free 
action. However, it does not reduce God’s omniscience, since God cannot know what 
logically cannot be known.369 Jonathan Edwards suggests a unified idea that “God knows 
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and shapes our every motivation, so that we act as God wills—yet we act freely, since our 
will guides our action.”370   
 Fourth is the openness of God. God can do anything “that is logically possible and 
consistent with God’s perfect nature.” This perspective is not less than Calvinism in 
God’s power. Hasker asks the Calvinist: Is God unable to create a world in which 
creatures have voluntary relationship with God? Although God knows about us, God 
does not override our actions, but opens himself to the real freedom which can be 
followed by even failure, so that, in the sense, God is a risk-taker. If we voluntarily 
understand and follow God’s will, God rejoices, but if we reject God’s will, God is 
saddened.371 With regard to the problem of evil, although God knows that evil will occur, 
God has not planned the concrete instances of evil, but rather “general strategies” for the 
common good of the world. In this sense, open theism rejects “meticulous providence.” 
However, critics of the open theism ask: “if God does not know everything about the 
future, how can [God] tell us about it?” Open theism has three different ways of 
understanding prophecies: based on the human actions; based on existing tendencies; and 
based on God’s intention.
372
  
 Fifth is process theology which asserts that God and the world are interdependent. 
God is the Creator, not in the sense that he creates out of nothing, but in the sense that he 
“guides the development of the cosmos.” Since human beings have freedom in the 
libertarian sense, the future is inherently unknowable. God’s power is not coercive, but 
persuasive, by presenting creatures his “initial aim” in order for them to follow God’s 
rich and intense values in ultimate harmony. With regard to the problem of evil, evil 
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occurs not because God permits it, but because creatures act differently from God’s plan 
and because God could not prevent the evils.373 However, Hasker points out that God’s 
persuasive power for process theology is a “plus” to understand a concept of God, but 
limiting God’s actions makes another problem, since creatio ex nihilo, partition of the 
Red Sea, and Jesus’ resurrection are impossible for such a kind of God. Just as classical 
theism is overly dependent on Greek philosophy, so process theology does overly rely on 
process philosophy, so that process theology is more damaging to the biblical concept of 
God than neo-Platonism.
374
   
 
Divine Knowledge   
According to David Basinger, with regard to divine omniscience, open theism maintains 
divine knowledge in the following way:  
A: “God can know only what can be known.”  
B: “[W]hat humans will freely do in the future cannot be known beforehand.”  
C: Therefore, “God can never know with certainty what will happen in any context 
involving freedom of choice.”375   
 
One of the most important insistences in open theism is the relationship between free will 
and predestination. Open theists ask this: If God knows and determines everything, how 
can we speak of human freedom? If God totally knows and determines our future, we 
cannot help asking what God is doing now. Why do we pray to God, if everything is 
determined by God? That is, if God determined everything, there is nothing God can do 
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for the world.
376
 Isn’t this, in a sense, a kind of deism? Open theists believe “current 
omniscience or present knowledge” for God, since God is surprised by something, regrets 
or changes God’s mind or shows anger or disappointment, although God has massive 
knowledge of the future. If we really possess libertarian freedom, we cannot assert 
“exhaustive definitive foreknowledge,” since the future does not exist as a reality, 
actuality, or “a fixity of events.”
377
 This means that the future is formed “in part by 
human choices” which even God cannot touch.
378
 Even God learns through a dynamic 
and changing world, since he is open to the world. God does not know the future outcome, 
but is “all-knowing in the sense that he knows all that it is possible to know.”
379
  
 Keith Ward also argues that although God could know the future entirely, God 
rejects such knowledge because of a world of free agents. John Polkinghorne also 
recognizes such an idea with regard to modern science; quantum physics and chaos 
theory assert that the future is open. Although God knows what can happen and what He 
is to do for that, God accomplishes his purposes “by contingent paths.”
380
 They believe 
that God knows only “present knowledge” through which God knows all that has 
occurred in the past and is occurring now. The Bible does not talk about complete 
knowledge of God, but about an open future, so that God’s total omniscience is not a 
biblical idea but an old tradition. In this sense, the main thesis of open theism is that 
“freedom of choice” makes God not know the future before it happens. Divine guidance 
is not a means of discovering “what will be best in the long run,” but a means of 
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determining “what is best for us now.”
381
 God does not have a specific, perfect, or 
preordained plan for our lives, or “exhaustive knowledge of the future,” but “a general 
will for each of us.” Thus it is reasonable for open theists to wonder whether they are 
within God’s will, to attempt to actualize this ideal in the future, and to recognize that we 
have failed to follow God’s will.
382
  
 What if God’s prediction was wrong in the long run? In what way(s) does God 
share his will with us? Process theology argues that God attempts to share his will with us 
at every moment, giving to each of us the best option. This is not at the conscious level 
but below the level of consciousness. Open theism also accepts that God always 
persuades each individual at the subconscious level to act according to divine general will. 
However, like classical theism, open theism believes that God sometimes intervenes to 
give specific guidance to individuals with regard to their important affairs.
383
 Thus open 
theism attempts to make a balance between process perspective and classical theism. On 
the issue of this relation between free will and divine foreknowledge, Bruce Ware’s 
insight is proper: “If you want libertarian freedom, you can’t have exhaustive definite 
foreknowledge; and if you want exhaustive definite foreknowledge, you can’t avoid 
determinism.”384 
   
Prayer  
How can we connect with God? Prayer is one of those ways. Considering prayer as 
“genuine dialogue with God,” asks Richard Foster, if everything in the universe cannot 
be changed but is already settled, why do we pray? Stoicism changes an open universe in 
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the Bible into a closed one, so that it perverts God’s constantly changing mind within 
God’s unchanging love. We have to realize that we, along with God, can change the 
future along with God. That is, prayer allows us to enter into a genuine dialogue with 
God and bring about change to the future, as it is not fixed.
385
 According to David Mason, 
God “hears, is affected by our importunities, and responds adequately to them.”
386
  
 Here we can see the attitudes of two groups with regard to prayer. On the one 
hand, there is a perspective of “specific sovereignty” that God totally preordained and 
controls everything and that human decision-making and choices cannot hinder God’s 
perfect plan. It claims that petitionary prayer is proper because God has requested us to 
petition him. That is, “we always freely make the exact decisions that [God] would have 
us make.” It is impossible that God is hindered from doing something specific “because 
we have not requested that he do so.”
387
 On the other hand, for process theists, although 
God bestows on all entities the best alternatives, since all entities have the power of self-
choice, this perspective rejects God’s unilateral intervention in the world. And since God 
is already and always involved in the world, process perspective asserts that petitionary 
prayer cannot make God more involved in the world.
388
 However, unlike God’s unilateral 
control in classical theism, open theism insists that we can have freedom in the world, 
since the future is open. Unlike process theism, open theism believes both that human 
freedom is God’s gift to us and that God has the authority and the power to occasionally 
intervene in our voluntary choice. How can open theists satisfy both perspectives? Open 
theism maintains that prayer can affect both petitioners and those who are referred to 
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petition, and that God can use petitonary prayer to accomplish God’s goals. Since God 
gives us freedom, God neither forces us to perform God’s will nor arbitrarily manipulates 
natural laws. Since God values our freedom, God does not act for us until we ask such 
assistance.
389
 
 
Mutable God   
In spite of the fact that God changes God’s plan, there must be multiple evidences for 
God’s predestination and God’s plan which means that God will not change his mind and 
his intentions in the Bible. For example, “I the Lord do not change” (Malachi 3:6); says, 
“Every good and perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of the 
heavenly lights, who does not change like shifting shadows” (James 1:17); “Jesus Christ 
is the same yesterday and today and forever” (Hebrews 13: 8); “God is not a man, that he 
should lie, nor a son of man, that he should change his mind. Does he speak and then not 
act? Does he promise and not fulfill?” (Numbers 23:19).
390
 Nonetheless, Richard Rice 
argues that these evident verses of the Bible do not show the focal point of proper 
understanding of divine reality in the Bible.
391
 There are some examples which indicate 
that God changes God’s mind: “When God saw what they did and how they turned from 
their evil ways, he had compassion and did not bring upon them the destruction he had 
threatened” (Jonah 3:10); “Return to the LORD your God, for he is gracious and 
compassionate, slow to anger and abounding in love, and he relents from sending 
calamity” (Joel 2:13). In Exodus 32:12-14, when God destroyed a stiff-necked people, 
Moses sought the favor of the Lord, “why should your anger burn against your people, 
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whom you brought out of Egypt with great power and a mighty hand?” Moses asks again, 
“Turn from your fierce anger, relent and do not bring disaster on your people.” Moses 
begs, “Remember your servants Abraham, Isaac and Israel, to whom you swore by your 
own self: I will make your descendants as numerous as the stars in the sky and I will give 
your descendants all this land I promised them, and it will be their inheritance forever.” 
Then God changes his mind: “Then the Lord relented and did not bring on his people the 
disaster he had threatened.” Sodom and Gomorah (Gen.18) reveal that God sometimes 
changes his plans in response to human requests.
392
 
 Then, how should we interpret immutability of God? How can open theism 
interpret this obvious fact? Pinnock holds that immutability means “the faithfulness of 
God as a relational, personal being,” but the tradition considers it as “immobility and 
inertness” and equates faithfulness and God’s immutability. Pinnock judges this as error, 
since the God of the Bible is active. Whereas we can ascribe God’s immutability to God’s 
essence and trustworthiness, God changes, in that God experiences and learns new facts 
in history. Thus, God’s immutability in nature cannot be possible without God’s 
responsiveness in history. Nevertheless, God’s changing is “a uniquely divine kind of 
changeability,” and this does not mean that God changes involuntarily, as a contingent 
being.393 Furthermore, argues Rice, God’s repentance is not an exceptional action in God 
but his very nature, in that “God does not repent in spite of the fact that he is God; he 
repents precisely because he is God.”
394
 What happens to nations is not from God’s 
decision alone, but rather from people’s decisions on which God depends. Thus since 
divine judgment is not unchangeable fate, but “a call to repentance,” “God sends 
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predictions of judgment precisely in hopes that they will not be fulfilled.”
395
 Then in what 
situations will God change his mind? There are possibilities of changing God’s 
decision:396 “If that nation I warned repents of its evil, then I will relent and not inflict on 
it the disaster I had planned” (Jeremiah 18:8); on the other hand, “If it does evil in my 
sight and does not obey me, then I will reconsider the good I had intended to do for it” 
(Jeremiah 18:10). 
 Because “the very concept of an act involves change,”
397
 the fact that God 
changes God’s plans, means that there is a mutual relationship between God and the 
world. Rice argues that this mutual relationship can be described as anthropomorphism in 
the Bible and that if human beings have no mutual experience in common with God, then 
we cannot talk about God.398 In this sense, God is open to other free agents and “not only 
directs but interacts.”
399
 Furthermore, God sometimes act by his own initiative and power 
and sometimes by and through the cooperation of human agents. God sometimes 
overcomes and sometimes uses human opposition to accomplish God’s intention, and 
Sometimes God is hindered by human opposition. The will of God is not an irresistible or 
determining force, because not only God but also other agents can decide and act.
400
 
 This idea of God’s mutability reminds of us God’s dipolarity which is both 
transcendent and immanent. That is, although God is sovererign, God is present 
everywhere in the world. Creation is “an ongoing process” and the whole world is “God’s 
continuous activity.” Unlike process theology, open theism asserts an asymmetrical 
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relation between God and the world, maintaing “social trinitarian metaphysics (a 
relational ontology)” which describes God both as ontological other and as relating one to 
the world. Pinnock maintains God’s creation (transcendence) and God’s sustenance 
(immanence) through Genesis1:1-2.
401
 Pinnock asserts God’s dipolarity as follows: “God 
is high above all yet fills all things. God is unchanging yet relates to us in a changing 
world. God cannot be perplexed but suffers with his people. God’s power is limitless but 
is deployed in ways that may appear weak. God is not subject to change or decay but can 
relate to temporal passage. God knows everything but is still learning what the world is 
becoming.”
402
  
 
Doctrine of Creation  
God’s relation to the world appears concretely in creation. With regard to the origination 
of the universe, holds Oord, “God is the original and ongoing creator.” Here Oord 
endorses Nancey Murphy and George Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the Universe. Oord 
supports creaturely freedom and indeterminacy, rejects creatio ex nihilo (instead accepts 
the alternative creation doctrine of Griffin and Keller), and concludes divine self-
limitation (essential kenosis) which solves the problem of evil and affirms God’s 
persuasive creative activity at the beginning.403 A universe finely-tuned theory leads 
Murphy and Ellis to hold the “hot big bang theory of the origin of the universe.”
404
 
Although scientists explain the origin of the universe through “the anthropic principle,” 
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whch states that since life “required very specific laws and conditions in the beginning of 
the univers,” if there had been slight changes in these laws and conditions, there would be 
no life.405 However, Murphy and Ellis are aware that since the antrhropic principal alone 
cannot explain the ultimate origin of the universe, it needs “a general theory of design” 
and fine-tuning theory. Furthermore, it needs “noncoercive, self-renouncing love,” 
namely, kenosis, that God and at least some creatures can love by giving themselves, 
suggesting that “the kenotic ethic reflects the moral character of God, and divine kenosis 
is the basis for creaturely kenosis.” God’s kenotic plan is already in the structures of 
universe itself, so that they claim that whereas the fine-tuning does not logically 
presuppose a designer (God), the existence of a God can properly explain fine-tuning.406  
 In order for the universe to make free and moral responses, the universe needs 
order. That is, any moral response needs “an ordered and predictable universe,” and 
“creatures with free will.” However, this does not explain emergence of freedom from 
indeterminacy. Oord relates this argument to open theology in that when creatures are not 
determined even at the micro-level and “freedom is present among at least humans,” open 
theism holds “the necessity of freedom for love.” Freedom is important in love, because 
love means intentional action, “in sympathetic response to others (including God), to 
promote overall well-being.” Thus coercion is antithetical to love. God’s action is “the 
revelation of God found best in Jesus,” that is, “the relevant feature of God’s action is its 
self-sacrificial and noncoercive character,” so that “Jesus was self-sacrificial and 
noncoercive.” Murphy and Ellis reject God’s intervention in the world, because God does 
not override creatures, but rather carefully planned system. The problem of evil asks 
                                                 
 
405
 Oord, “An Open Theology Doctrine of Creation,” 32. Paul Davies calls the anthropic principle 
“the Goldilocks factor,” since it means that our universe is “just right” for life. Ibid.  
 
406
 Oord, “An Open Theology Doctrine of Creation,” 32-33.   
 111  
“why God does not occasionally intervene in the natural order by ‘overruling natural 
processes when greater good will come from the exception than from following the 
rule.’” Murphy and Ellis argue that God voluntarily limits divine power 
(noninterventionist) because of freedom of the creatures. Otherwise, “a free response to 
God’s action is not possible.” Although this entails divine risks, it is proper to open 
theology in that God accepts these risks in order for creatures to cooperate with the divine 
activity. In this sense, evil occurs through human freedom. This noncoercive action by 
God goes well with the freedom of the creatures for “God’s eighteen-billion-year 
project.”
407
  
  Paul Davies suggests six main ideas for cosmology:  
1. An absolute beginning to the universe and subsequent everlasting 
expansion; 2. An absolute beginning to the universe followed by the 
termination of the universe after a period of expansion; 3. An absolute 
beginning to the universe, expansion to a maximum state, and a return to a 
state identical to the absolute beginning; 4. An everlastingly cyclic universe, 
in which expansion and contraction is followed by a ‘big bounce’ into 
another cycle of expansion and contraction; 5. A steady state universe with 
no beginning or end but everlasting expansion; 6. An everylasting 
multiverse in which our universe is one among others.
408
 
  
These lists are not incompatible with the biblical notion that God is creator, although 
some are more compatible with big bang theory. Options one through three, which have a 
common ground, “an absolute beginning to the universe,” cohere with creatio ex 
nihilo.
409
 Polkinghorne also argues that the world is “the consequence of a free act of 
divine decision,” since “the divine will alone is the source of created being.”
410
 Jon D. 
Levenson argues that the main concern of creation theology is not creatio ex nihilo but 
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the “establishement of a benevolent and life-sustaining order.” Levenson explains the 
essence of creation with the word, “mastery,” thereby “God is the victor in combat, but 
God’s foes continue to survive.”411  
 Suggesting an alternative with regard to creation, love, and evil, Oord denies 
creatio ex nihilo, because while it requires God’s power and sovereignty to create the 
world from nothing, it cannot explain genuine evil in the world. In order to explicate an 
adequate view of the origin of the universe, Oord needs “divine power that accounts both 
for the big bang and for why our loving God does not prevent the occurrence of genuine 
evil.” Oord finds a clue from Griffin and Catherine Keller. God loves perfectly and 
created the universe, asserts Griffin, not in the sense of creatio ex nihilo, because if God 
created the cosmos from nothing, God could also prevent any evil. However, because 
there is evil in the world, God does not have such a kind of power. And creatio ex nihilo 
denies the cosmos’ own power. Insofar as we insist on creatio ex nihilo, we cannot 
explain the origin of evil.
412
 Instead, Griffin suggests creation “from the relative chaos” 
(chaosmos) of a previous universe: from a chaotic state to very low-grade serially-
ordered societies to more complex societies. With regard to divine power, God cannot 
unilaterially contravene the freedom and creativity of the creatures even in creation, 
because God is not coercive, but God’s power is always and necessarily persuasive. Thus 
the necessity of God entails the necessity of a world.
413
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 Keller also denies creatio ex nihilo and suggests “a tehomic theology of creatio ex 
profundis,”414 that is, “the Genesis motif of God creating from the watery depths.” God is 
“an indeterminate creativity,” which is “never before or outside time and space,” but 
always relates to others including creaturely suffering. Creatio ex chaosmos does not 
mean that chaos is essentially evil, but instead that the chaosmic other relates to God and 
chaos is not prevenient, but is created. There is interaction between God and the tehom, 
which is called to be creatio cooperationis. Creativity is “the active potentiality for both 
good and evil.” Keller considers Genesis 1 as “seven days of self-organization,” which is 
not creatio ex nihilo but “emergence as creation from the chaos of prevenient 
conditions.” However, self-organization needs divine influence or cooperation. Since this 
God is described as divine love, “to love is to bear with the chaos.”415  
 With regard to Davies’ lists above, while Griffin and Keller deny options one 
through three, “an absolute beginning to the universe,” their ideas are compatible with 
option four, “an everlastingly cyclic universe,” since God always and necessarily relates 
to the universe. Oord relates this option four to open theism’s claim that God is creator. 
However, it does not mean “a Nietzschean eternal repetition of the exact same” in a 
closed circle, but a model in which the most basic metaphysical characters are transmitted 
from one universe to a following one. This model entails “the emergence of genuine 
novelty while maintaing metaphysical continuity.” To that extent, then, Oord affirms a 
cyclic model which denies both “an absolute beginning from absolutely nothing” and 
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Nietzschean eternal recurrence of the same, since a universe which repeats endlessly does 
not offer “purposive, proanthropic, and hopeful” transformation.416 
 Attempting to solve the problem of evil with a doctrine of “essential kenosis,” 
Oord does not follow the concepts of divine power in process theology, since it makes 
God overly limited. Essential kenosis affirms both that God is not coercive, in agreement 
with process theology, and that God is the most powerful being, against process theology. 
Oord indicates the notion of kenosis that Murphy, Ellis, and Polkinghorne suggest, since 
their kenosis means a voluntarily self-limited God and thereby makes God unable to 
prevent genuine evils. Thus a voluntarily self-limited God should logically become “un-
self-limited, in the name of love, to prevent the suffering and pain.” It does not makes 
sense to insist on God’s self-limitation from preventing evil in order to keep the freedom 
of the creatures, since insofar as there is evil in the world, a voluntarily self-limited God 
is culpable and not a perfectly loving God.
417
 Essential kenosis means God’s inability to 
stop the freedom of creatures not because of external conditions but because of “God’s 
essence of relational love,” so that this God of essential keneosis should not be criticized 
for failing to stop evil. Essential kenosis means God’s self-giving love. God has been 
providing freedom to creatures forever, since there was no beginning and will be no end. 
That is, God can love necessarily both within Trinity and the world. The God of essential 
kenosis is the almighty God who is expressed in resurrecting Jesus, in biblical miracles, 
and nonviolent eschatology. Thus Oord’s essential kenosis can be summarized as 
follows: 1) God does not depend upon creatures to exist; 2) God is not limited by external 
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forces; 3) God’s essence as self-giving love makes God unable to stop evil.
418
 
Furthermore, Oord relates this kenosis to God as the “ideal contributor” who empowers 
and inspires creatures and who gives “the gift that creatures need to live, love, and have 
their being,” so that “all creatures feel God’s oscillating and diverse, yet direct, causal 
call.” Oord calls divine action “prevenient grace” or “cooperation-empowering grace” 
and Randy Maddox calls it “response-able grace.”
419
   
 
Evaluation of Open Theism and Responses 
Open theists want to position themselves intermediately between classical theism and 
process theism. Pinnock asserts that the opennees of God emphasizes “generosity, 
sensitivity and vulnerability more than power and control.” God is in history and rejoices 
when creatures are happy and suffers when creatures suffer, always responding to events. 
God is the author of history, not vise versa.
420
 Open theism accepts crucial points from 
both process theism and classical theism. Like process theism, open theism accepts that 
God always persuades individuals, and like classical theism, open theism accepts that 
God sometimes intervenes in individual’s affairs.
421
 However, open theism has been 
criticized by both classical theism and process theology. On the one hand, classical 
theism criticizes open theism because it is “a process wolf in evangelical sheep’s 
clothing,”
422
 or “a thinly disguised version of process theology.” Thus classical theism 
criticizes open theists when they deny God’s ultimate power, ignore the biblical teaching, 
and diminish God’s glory, so that open theism is, to classical theism, heresy as Neo-
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theism.
423
 Open theists hold, however, that they share some important issues with 
classical theism: “the immanent Trinity; the God-world distinction; God’s actions in 
history; the goodness, unchangeableness, omnipotence, and omniscience of God; and the 
atoning death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.”
424
 On the other hand, another criticism of 
open theism occurs from process theology. David Griffin rejects free-will theism’s 
assertions of God’s possibility without a world, God’s power, creatio ex nihilo, God’s 
voluntary interaction with creatures, and God’s necessary love within the Trinity and 
contingent love for the world.
425
 Griffin thus considers open theism as “classical free-will 
theism,” inasmuch as “it is much closer to Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin than to 
process thought.”426 Thus Open theism is not in the family of process theology.427  
 Pinnock summarizes thirteen critical points as fowllows. The first is from 
theological determinists such as Calvinists, conservative Presbyterian, or evangelicals. 
Theological determinists reject the ideas that: God takes risks; God’s will is intervened; 
prayer affects God’s actions; and God and world are in interaction. The second point is 
from classical free will theists who assert that God is a-temporal and God’s 
foreknowledge is exhaustive and definite. Simple foreknolwdge does not make sense, in 
that the future is not actualized, since creatures have libertarian freedom. Third is that 
open theists are process theists. Although open theists agree with divine present 
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knowledge and God’s suffering, process theists do not consider them as process 
theologians. The fourth point raised is God’s present knowledge; open theists question 
how God created genuinely dynamic and historical agents if God has foreknowledge. The 
fifth point relates to God’s reduction to human level because of present knowledge. 
However, open theists claim that “God knows certainties as certain” (what will occur) 
and “contingencies as contingent” (what might or might not occur). Thus the God of open 
theism knows more than the God of classical theism (determinists). Sixth is about 
libertarian freedom. However, open theists assert that libertarian freedom should be 
universally presupposed in practice since, if everything is determined, we cannot ask 
moral responsibility. Seventh is about sovereignty, that is, exhaustive or meticulous 
control. Open theists use general sovereignty. Eighth is about God’s temporal dimension. 
Open theists think that God is in history and time. Ninth is open theism’s literal bible 
interpretation. Open theists interpret all text seriously and reject differentiated 
interpretation among some texts. Tenth is about predictive prophecies. If God has only 
present knowledge, how could God predict? God knows everything that could possibly 
happen in the future. Eleventh is from process theologians who complain that open theists 
assert the possibility of God’s intervention in history. Twelveth is about God’s detailed 
guidance; open theism says that if God has foreknowledge, everything is determined. 
Thirteenth is God’s reason for all things, regarding which open theists argue that if God 
has a reason for all terrible things such as Auschwitz, it is appalling. Rather, they say our 
lives can change the world.
428
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Chapter V: Affinities and Differences between These Philosophical Theologies  
In chapter five, we can see affinities and differences between Bracken, Clayton, and open 
theists. That is, they could be conversations among the process theology, panentheism, 
and open theism.  
 
Pursuit of a Third Way 
This dissertation will explore philosophical theologies that are located conceptually 
between classical theism and process theism. However, we have to say that ‘pure’ or 
‘orthodox’ views of these two aspects must be modified, since it is as true to say that if, 
because the God of classical theism was too much slanted to the transcendent God, this 
God is not proper, as that because the God of process theology was too much slanted to 
the immanent God, this God is nor proper. Thus we need to find a third way. Although an 
attempt to harmonize between classical theology and process theology often “draws the 
ire of both sides,”
429
 we have to say that both the conception of God of classical theism 
and the conception of God of process theology must be reinterpreted. Given this common 
interest, they can meet at an “Omega point” as panentheism or under the panentheistic 
umbrella. Analogically speaking, in driving a car, accelerator, foot, and brake are 
important. The right foot controls both accelerator and brake in keeping the proper speed. 
Likewise, panentheism plays an important role as a foot in keeping a balance between 
process theology as an accelerator and classical theism as a brake and vise versa. In this 
dissertation, I will explain how panentheism harmously can achieve this task.  
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 Honestly speaking, to choose just one position is comfortable, but if the road is 
not the way, we have to go through an intersection between them: panentheistic way.430 
Just as we cannot easily see something when sunshine is much too bright and darkness is 
much too deep, so extremism does not open our eyes to see or to our minds to grasp. This 
is the place where classical theism, open theism, panentheism, and process theology are 
intermingled. These intertwined areas are not a calm place but the most noisy and 
uncomfortable but, nonetheless, dynamic one. Just as strong winds in the environment at 
the timberline make timbers strong, so these multilayered places strengthen theology. Just 
as contemporary theology is problematic when it neglects challenges of classical 
theology as if there were no classical theology which had gone before, so classical 
theology is also problematic when it neglects questions of contemporary theology, as if 
theology had stopped after classical theology. If classical theism’s God is a kind of 
irrelational God, we have to caricature process theology’s God as a hostage of the world, 
since the followers of process theology cannot imagine God without the world. How can 
we accept such a God as God? Furthermore, in a sense, just as God in classical theism is 
far away from the compassionate God, so, ironically, in process theology God is not 
sympathetic but very passive, even in the face of a suffering world (I will develop this 
argument in the section on Divine Action).  
 If I draw the relationships among classical theism, open theism, panentheism, and 
process theology as a picture, it will be as follows:  
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Classical Theism 
Panentheism 
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Figure 1: They have a kind of family-resemblance in fellowship.  
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
I would like to investigate the characters of these inter-mingled areas:  
1. C: Classical Theism alone  
2. CO: Classical theism + Open theism  
3. COP: Classical theism  + Open theism + Panentheism  
4. COPP: Classical theism + Open theism + Panentheism + Process theology 
5. OPP: Open theism + Panentheism + Process Theology  
6. PP: Panentheism + Process Theology  
7. P: Process Theology alone.  
 
Even though there must be nets (like a tennis court) or border lines between them, such 
lines are not only for blocking in order to keep their respective identities, but also for 
good communication with each other. Good communication is possible only if there is 
ruach, or wind of spirit, “a vitalizing force,” “life-giving reality.”
431
 There is an old 
proverb ??????? (su-yok-jeong-yi-pung-bu-ji) which means “tree wants to be 
calm, but wind does not stop.” The tree cannot exist without the wind. If there is tree, 
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there is wind. Likewise, even though theology just wants to be still, human history 
changes in every new context and new age, and theology also cannot ignore the wind. By 
the same token, theology needs the creativity of the world: “The creativity of the world is 
the throbbing emotion of the past hurling itself into a new transcendent fact. It is the 
flying dart, of which Lucretius speaks, hurled beyond the bounds of the world.”
432
 We 
need to wake up, with classical theism, those who are sleeping. 
 Admittedly, each part needs reasonable interrelationship or debates and these 
border lines are the creative place where new thoughts arise, although there must be 
tensions in the interstices, i.e., harmony or disharmony.
433
 Numbers 1 and 7 in this figure, 
on the one hand, directly do not have a deep connection to each other, but they have the 
family resemblance or perichoresis through 2 and 6. Thus each individual perspective of 
theism has some characters of the other three theisms in its own domain. On the other 
hand, number 4 is the place where four different characters of their respective theisms are 
combined. That is, the area of number 4 is a very complicated and confusing, but the 
most free place, since the Spirit of God is hovering over the place (Genesis 1:2) and since 
“where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom” (2 Corinthians 3:17). Now, I’ll explore 
                                                 
 
432
 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 177.  
 
433
 Analogically speaking, car horn sounds do not always bother all, although most people do not 
like them; street sellers like those sounds which call to them and almost reflexively turn their faces toward 
such sounds. It is a very narrow perspective to consider that others also dislike the sound (theology) which I 
dislike. The vision of peace of Isaiah 11 shows us the vision of co-existence of different kinds of theology. 
The wolf and the lamb, the leopard and the goat, the calf and the lion, the cow and the bear live together. Is 
it possible to live like that if they are as they were? Is it possible for the lion to eat straw like the ox? Is it 
possible for the cobra not to bite the infant? The Bible tells us that it is possible, insofar as “[t]he Spirit of 
the LORD will rest on him—the Spirit of wisdom and of understanding, the Spirit of counsel and of power, 
the Spirit of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord” (Isaiah 11:2). It is possible for them to live together 
when they are interchanged. Classical theism and Open theism, Classical theism and panentheism, 
Classical theism and process theism, Open theism and Panentheism, Opentheism and Process Theology, 
and Panentheism and Process theology can live together insofar as the spirit of the LORD rests on them. At 
that time, “panentheistic vision” will be accomplished: “They will neither harm nor destroy on all my holy 
mountain, for the earth will be full of the knowledge of the LORD as the waters cover the sea” (Isaiah 11:9). 
I have to say that it is impossible to exactly divide differences between classical theism and process theism, 
inasmuch as they obviously share one another’s perspectives in some parts. Nevertheless, I roughly divide 
two groups in order to develop my argument.  
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affinities and differences between those perspectives and the concrete theological form of 
COPP will be explained in the form of Trinitarin Panentheistic Theology (TPT).  
  
A. Affinities  
Roughly speaking, we can see simple affinities between these theisms as follows:  
2. CO: Classical theism + Open theism: The Bible, God’s power 
3. COP: Classical theism  + Open theism + Panentheism: God’s grace   
4. COPP: Classical theism + Open theism + Panentheism + Process theology: 
Theism  
5. OPP: Open theism + Panentheism + Process Theology: Relational Theology  
6. PP: Panentheism + Process Theology: Relational Theology  
 
Focusing on number 5, here, I’ll find affinities. This can be divided into three parts: Open 
theism and panentheism; Open theism and process theism; and panentheism and process 
theism.  
 First, open theism and Clayton (open panentheism): Open panentheism has a deep 
affinity with open theism in that both affirm creatio ex nihilo and free self-limitation of 
God.
434
 They are intertwined in order to complete the grand panorama of relational 
thought, so that we may not sharply make a distinction between both of them. 1) Creatio 
ex Nihilo: Although Thomas Oord, who is one of the open theists, rejects creatio ex 
nihilo, most open theists accept it. Arguably, in contrast, although many panentheists do 
not accept creation ex nihilo, Clayton assumes this doctrine, arguing that God creates 
“space within the divine life for other centers of activity or selves.” Like God, insofar as 
these selves are centers of activity, creation is imago Dei. Humans are the representative 
of imago Dei, since they are conscious of our relation. And since our existence is 
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contingent and we “might not have existed,” our creation is “a sign of God’s grace.”
435
 
Here, open theists and Clayton are mingled with each other. 2) Self-limitation: Insofar as 
each emphasizes mutual relations between God and the world, as Cooper illuminates, 
panentheistic elements are in open theism. Open theism proposes “voluntary 
panentheism,” which denies the world’s necessity for God, but rather means that “God 
has freely chosen to involve the world panentheistically.” Insofar as “being in God” 
means not the world’s essential part of God but the interrelation between God and 
creatures, creatures become “part of God’s life.”
 
If open theism affirms a relational 
ontology, it could be panentheistic.
436
 In this sense, Clayton and open theism have family 
resemblance.  
 Second, open theism and process theism: Pinnock makes a list of common points 
which 1) “make the love of God a priority”; 2) “hold to libertarian human freedom”; 3) 
“are critical of conventional theism”; 4) “seek a more dynamic model of God”; 5) 
“contend God has real, not merely rational, relationships with the world”; 6) “believe 
God is affected by what happens in the world”; 7) “say God knows what can be known, 
which does not amount to exhaustive foreknowledge”; 8) “appreciate the value of 
philosophy in helping to shape theological convictions”; 9) “connect positively to 
Wesleyan/ Arminian traditions.”437  
 In point number 1), love of God is the central theme in both. God is love filled 
with compassion and suffers when the world suffers. Point 3): Open theism and process 
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theology both criticize “classical substantive metaphysics,” that is, the conception of God 
as an absolute being who is not affected by the world, since both open theism and process 
theology maintain “a dynamic understanding of the world and God’s interactive relations 
with it.” Point number 7): The future is open and even change belongs to the divine 
perfection, because there is the reality of libertarian freedom and thereby the reality of 
genuine evils.
438
 Thus, divine perfection “violates both the active and the responsive 
dimensions of the divine love.”
439
 Point 8): Pinnock asserts that both process theists and 
open theists value natural theology which contributes to the Christian faith and message. 
Cobb argues that since open theists are open to philosophical reflection and since process 
theists are also interested in biblical discussion, they become discussion partners.440 
Points 2, 4, 5, and 6): God-world relationship consists in “a succession of concrete 
experiences,” God’s ongoing experience of the world, so that they both keep a dipolar 
theism: God as both absolute and relative, eternal and termporal, changeless and 
changing—“the essential divine character and the concrete divine experience”
441
 or 
“human self-determination, and divine persuasion.”
442
 Based on these affinities, we think 
that both theisms reduce “mutual suspicion” and increase “closer ecumenical 
relations.”443 Point number 9): Insofar as both theisms emphasize human freedom, they 
are nearer to Wesleyan/Arminian traditions rather than Calvinist tradition.  
 Third, we look at panentheism and process theism. Clayton is not orthodox 
Whiteheadian. If we accept that there are no orthodoxy process thinkers, as according to 
Whitehead’s philosophical system, since “orthodox Whiteheadianism” is an aoxymoron 
                                                 
 
438
 Cooper, Panentheism, 191. Cobb and Pinnock, Searching for an Adequate God, ix-x.  
 
439
 Cobb and Pinnock, Searching for an Adequate God, 11.  
 
440
 Cobb and Pinnock, Searching for an Adequate God, ix, xiii.  
 
441
 Karkkainen, The Doctrine of God, 191.  
 
442
 Cobb and Pinnock, Searching for an Adequate God, ix.  
 
443
 Cobb and Pinnock, Searching for an Adequate God, xiv.  
 125  
and, as Neville argues, “Whitehead’s exact doctrine of God ‘cannot be sustained in 
critical scrutiny.’”444 Clayton can be called a kind of modified process theologian. 
Nonetheless, both panentheism and process theism emphasize mutual relation and mutual 
dependence between God and the world, realize God’s limitation in action and 
knowledge, and agree on a rigorous understanding of divine action.
445
   
 Fourth, open theism, panentheism, and (modified) process theism: 1) although all 
three criticize both classical theism and process theism, they never neglect the sources of 
traditional theism and the main idea of process theology, but reinterpret and accept them. 
Each offers a third way between process theology and classical theism, although there 
must be the differences of degree. Whereas Clayton could be an open theist in that he 
insists in the self-limitation of God, he also could be a process theist in that he holds 
God’s mutual relation to the world. Clayton even could have some relationship with 
classical theism in that he also emphasizes divine grace. In the sense, Clayton, as an open 
panentheist, attempts to bind process and open theists. 2) Each theology is motivated by a 
stress on “divine love”
446
 for the world, although there are differences in the relation 
between love and freedom. This divine love can be expressed as divine grace. 
 
B. Differences  
Roughly speaking, we can outline the range of possible differences between these 
theisms as follows:  
2. CO: Classical theism + Open theism: God’s divine action  
3. COP: Classical theism  + Open theism + Panentheism: Mutual Dependence 
4. COPP: Classical theism + Open theism + Panentheism + Process theology:  
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5. OPP: Open theism + Panentheism + Process Theology:  
6. PP: Panentheism + Process Theology: self-limitation and metaphysical limitation 
in God 
 
Focusing on number 5, here, I’ll find differences. This can be divided into three parts: 
open theism and panentheism; open theism and process theism; and panentheism and 
process theism.  
 First, open theism and Clayton (panentheism): We can easily find more affinities 
more than differences between open theism and panentheism. Clayton mediates between 
the open theism and process theology. Clayton urges open theism to accept the God-
wrold relation which process thought teaches: “created co-creators with God (Philip 
Hefner).”447 It is very interesting that Oord, as an open theist, does not accept either 
creatio ex nihilo or voluntary self-limitation, both of which Clayton, as a panentheist, 
accepts. In this sense, since Oord is closer to process theology than Clayton, we should 
not simply draw a demarcation line but rather see multilayered dimensions between them.   
 Second, open theism and process theism: Open theism is commonly called “free 
will theism,” but Griffin calls it “classical free will theism,” because process theology is 
also a form of free will theism and, accordingly, Griffin wants to point out a difference 
between them which he names “hybrid free will theism,” since it does not fully consider 
freedom inherent in the world. Another name is the “openness view” or the “open view of 
God,” both of which mean that the future is open to God and God is open to the world. 
However, Griffin argues that open thesm is a kind of classical theism, because it asserts 
God’s essential power.
448
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 1) Whereas open theism relies on and dialogues with biblical-historical 
Christianity or evangelical/fundamentalist groups, who value natural theology and assert 
that Scripture is fundamental, although they are aware that “no simple Biblicism is 
possible,”
449
 process theology is based on a natural theology (philosophy) and dialogues 
with the liberal theologies and with contemporary scientific and historical knowledge 
even beyond Christianity.
450
 2) Although both open theism and process theism are 
engaged in metaphysics, process theology too relies on it, so that open theism worries 
about “the health of religion.” Whereas for open theists God alone is the ultimate 
metaphysical fact, for process theology both God and the world are ultimate.
451
 Griffin 
summarizes nine “generic ideas of God” in biblically based religions; God is: (1) alone 
worthy of ultimate devotion and commitment; (2) the supreme power in reality; (3) the 
creator of our universe; (4) providentially active in nature and human history; (5) a 
personal, purposive being; (6) perfectly good and loving; (7) the ultimate source of 
norms; (8) the ultimate guarantee of the meaning of life; (9) the trustworthy ground of 
hope for the ultimate victory of good over evil.
452
 Process theism and open theism 
involve these nine ideas, but their interpretations are different, especially in 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
and 9.  
 3) With regard to point 2, “the supreme power in reality,” whereas process 
theology affirms that God is not all-powerful in a literal meaning, open theism asserts 
that God has the power to control everything.
453
 Whereas for open theism God can still 
sometimes control or intervene in everything, although God depends on the creatures’ 
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cooperation by God’s persuasive power, process theology affirms only God’s persuasive 
power. Accordingly, whereas open theists maintain that “we must not ‘reduce God’s 
power to persuasion,’”454 process theists ask, if God can non-persuasively intervene, why 
does God not stop evil?
455
 Clark Williamson asks how God “remains gloriously free” to 
intervene in the presence of burning children. Could we say this, maintaining love as “the 
primary perfection of God?” Although open theism does not argue that evil, like classical 
theism, is “for the greatest possible good,” it asserts that God “permits particular evils,” 
while having the power to stop them. However, can we really assert this “in the presence 
of the parents of burning children?”
456
  
 4) With regard to point 3, “the creator of our universe,” whereas open theism 
asserts God’s free and sovereign love, although there is another perspective in open 
theism, process theology affirms the world’s necessity for God. That is, open theists 
reject both God’s non-existence without the world and God’s creation in necessity, 
because such concepts of God in process theology deprive God of freedom, of divine 
initiatives, and of soverign love, so that process theology makes God passive; this is a 
different God from the dynamic God in the Bible.
457
 Open theism affirms that creatio ex 
nihilo is possible, although some open theists do not, because “God is ‘an agent unlimited 
by metaphysical necessities beyond his control’” and, accordingly, God freely acts upon 
the world.
458
 However, process theology argues that if God’s love for the world is 
voluntary, the world’s affection for God is not necessary. Thus “God could not not love 
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the world.”
459
 In the sense, Cobb argues that whereas process theists argue that God’s act 
is not different from the divine nature, open theists believe that God’s will is free from 
the divine natue.460  
  5) With regard to point 4, “providentially active in nature and human history,” 
whereas process theology holds that God influences every individual event (every 
occasion of experience), and denies God’s interruption of the world’s normal causal 
sequences, open theism asserts that God can and does in two ways, i.e., unilaterally and 
interactively,
461
 “intervene in the world, interrupting (if need be) the normal causal 
sequences.
462
  
 6) With regard to point 5, “a personal, purposive being,” both views hold that God 
is a personal, purposive being in relation to the world. However, a difference between 
them rests on whether or not God is essentially personal in responding to the world. 
While process theology says “yes,” because God is always interrelating to the world, 
open theism says “no,” because “God’s openness to the world is freely chosen.”
463
 
Whereas insofar as open theism accepts the ontological difference between God and the 
world, the relationship is asymmetrical, insofar as process theology does not affirm 
ontological difference, but rather a mutual transcendence, the relationship is 
symmetrical.464 
 7) With regard to point 6, “perfectly good and loving,” both views accept God’s 
moral perfection and love as divine essence. However, a difference between them arises 
on the question as to whether it is divine essence to love the world (process theology) or 
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God’s love for the world is only by a voluntary decision.
465
 Process theology regards 
God’s voluntary love as “a threat to this good news.”466 With regard to point 9, “the 
trustworthy ground of hope for the ultimate victory of good over evil,” process theology 
holds that victory of good over evil is possible by God’s persuasive power, while open 
theism believes that God has all-controlling power by the “full display of God’s 
sovereignty.”
467
   
  Third, panentheism and process theism: Clayton attempts a connection between 
process and orthodox thought through panentheism as a “peacemaker” of mediation. 
Whereas Clayton preserves the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo and Trinitarian models of 
God, but gives up “the aseity and immutability of God: the understanding of God as self-
sufficient and unchanging”468 from classical theism, he accepts the supremely related 
God from the process theology. By supporting the former, Clayton maintains that the 
world has not always existed, since “the world is not co-eternal with God.” It means that 
since God created the world by free divine decisions, there is a“radical contingency of 
ourselves, of our world, and of the existence of any world at all.”
469
 Regarding Clayton’s 
perspective, some process thinkers ask: if God is intrinsically love and relational, how 
was there a time when the world did not exist as the necessary expression of the divine 
love and relation? That is, there must always have been a world as long as there was God. 
The traditional response of process theology to this question is that God is always 
internally related within the divine community. However, Clayton argues that this 
response is not sufficient because God’s love should be expressed to agents in the world: 
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“finite in comparison with the divine infinity, and morally limited in contrast to the One 
who is essentially good.”470 Clatyon’s response to process theology is that process 
thought, which argues God’s metaphysical requirement to create, ironically “decrease(s) 
the free responsiveness and relatedness,” because human free response in necessity does 
not make sense.
471
  
  There are three improper responses to the process objection: 1) Augustine’s 
response: since time before creation cannot be counted, God is always with creatures 
after creation. However, it is possible conceptually to make a distinction between two 
stages; 2) God existed as potentiality before creation and as actuality after creation. How 
can God create the world, if God existed as potentiality?; 3) The important things is not 
whether a world actually exists or not, but whether this divine love was eternally 
expressed in the inner-trinitarian relations. However, how do we know that love was 
actually expressed? God is already internally related to others, although they are 
essentially different from God.
472
 Then, Clayton suggests kenotic trinitarian panentheism, 
which has affinity with open theists, especially Joseph Bracken, and process resources, as 
the mediating position. For Bracken, God has existed forever as a “trinitarian field of 
forces” and freely chose to share divine communitarian life with creatures, so that God 
created finite beings. More so than Bracken, Clayton emphasizes that these “created 
centers of activity” differ form God in their essential nature: “we are finite, not infinite; 
we exist contingently, not in all possible worlds; we place our own limited interests 
above the divine or highest interests, in contrast to the One who is perfectly good by 
nature (ens perfectissimum).” There is a connnection between Clayton and Bracken in 
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that both affirm that God can create creatures within the divine presence. Here we find a 
connection between panentheism and trinitarian thought. Creation itself is “a kenotic, 
relational act,” since God freely and voluntarily limits God’s power in order to make 
allowance for the existence of creatures. To that extent, then, this self-limitation is a self-
emptying (kenosis).
473
 Nonetheless, there are differences of emphasis between Bracken 
and Clayton. Whereas Clayton emphasizes the difference between finite and infinite, 
Bracken stresses common metaphysical principles between them.
474
 Cayton questions 
whether Bracken really solves philosophical theology’s most difficult task: “to conceive 
God as ‘a non-dual reality,’ both ‘universal ground of being and a personal being at the 
same time.’”475 
 While process thought maintains that although God is the “all encompassing field 
of activity,” and “the Chief Examplification” of all other agents, like open theists, 
Clayton emphasizes ontological difference, or disanalogy, between human agents and 
divine agents. Whereas God has “ontological self-sufficiency” in internally related divine 
nature, human beings are radically contingent, since there is no reason for God to have 
made the world. That is, whereas the divine nature is pre-given, we are thrown into the 
world. Even Whitehead explains the difference, in that although consequent nature 
changes, the primordial nature does not change over time.476 
 Fourth, Open theism, panentheism, and (modified) process theism: 1) unlike 
process theology, the triune God in both open theism and panentheism does not 
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necessarily need the world.
477
 This is the one point that is shared between open theism 
and Clayton but differs from process thought. That is, process theology denies 
“ontological independence” of God.478 In a sense creatio ex nihilo and free self-limitation 
of God may be the “final stumbling block” between open panentheism and process 
theology.
479
 Process theology wonders: Is the notion of creation “out of nothing” 
coherent; is the notion of “a self-limiting God” coherent; and is it able to answer to 
problem of evil?
480
  
 In conclusion, although there must be differences between them, those are 
differences within the family resemblance which connects classical theism and process 
theology. Since differences can expand assertions into “a larger sense of the truth,” 
argues Pinnock, we should not exclude but embrace the other by “a hermeneutic of 
charity.”
481
  
 
C. Weakness and Strength in Each View   
With regard to weakness, first, Bracken defends the ontologically mutual independence 
of God and the world. This entails mutual transcendence between God and the world in 
process thought. However, if we accept the definition of panentheism, that although God 
is in the world, God is more than the world, how can we say Deus semper major (God is 
always more) in this mutual transcendence of God and the world? Second, I greatly 
respect Clayton’s panentheism, but I retain a certain reserve with regard to his 
panentheistic analogy. Clayton suggests a mind-body analogy in explaining the God-
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world relationship. This analogy shows us the intimate relation between God (mind) and 
the world (body). However, a weakness of this analogy may be that, just as, if there were 
no body, there would be no mind, so if there were no world, there would be no God. 
However, that conclusion would be contradictory to Clayton’s central argument, i.e., the 
world is not a necessity to God. And I regret not to find Clayton’s name in the section of 
passibility among panentheism’s characters which Brierley introduces.
482
 Third, open 
theism has been criticized by both classical theism and process theology. Classical theism 
criticizes open theism because it denies God’s ultimate power, ignores the biblical 
teaching, and diminishes God’s glory, so that it considers open theism as heresy.
483
 
Another criticism of open theism comes from process theology. Griffin rejects free-will 
theism’s assertions, i.e., God’s existence without the world, God’s creation of the world 
by choice from ex nihilo, and God’s voluntary interaction with creatures.
484
 
 With regard to strength in each view, first, from this standpoint the strength for 
Bracken is that although he is a neo-process theologian, he does not neglect traditions of 
classical theism, especially the Trinity, emphasizing that we need to listen to the voice of 
traditional theism. Second, the strength for Clayton is that although he is panentheist, he 
also strongly accepts traditional concepts such as creatio ex nihilo and God’s grace. The 
expression “unusual,” which Cooper uses of Clayton’s panentheism, in that it does not 
even entail necessity of the world, speaks of Clayton’s unique position in panentheistic 
tradition. Third, the strength in open theism is that since open theism is derived from 
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evangelical movement, it can make a connection between process theology and 
evangelism.  
 136  
Chapter VI: Constructive Theological Proposal toward a Trinitarian Panentheistic 
Theology 
Before going more deeply into TPT model, in chapter six, we need to recognize the 
emergence of panentheism, the key concepts of panentheism, typologies and analogies of 
panentheism in general, and the relationship between panenehtism and Trinity.   
 
A. Emergence of Panentheism as a Form of Philosophical Theology beyond Classical 
Theism 
Classical Theism: The Final Answer? 
A main problem of the concept of God in classical theism is the understanding of the 
relationship between God and the world. Since the world is located outside God as a 
necessary substance and one entity cannot exist in another entity, if God exerts influence 
on the world, God has to intervene in the world from outside.
485
 There are many kinds of 
attempts to overcome this awkward God-world relation.
486
 As a reformed Christian 
classical theist, Cooper introduces some perspectives in any forms against the classical 
theism such as modified classical theism, Christian panentheism, and non-Christian 
panentheism. First, modified (revised) classical theism, which is called “open or free-will 
theism,” accepts “God’s participation in time” in its theology, because God is still 
creating the world. However, this position is not different from the doctrine of classical 
theism, since the view that “God temporally foreknows, foreordains, and concurs with 
(‘runs with’) everything in his plan for the world” is consistent with God’s providence of 
a traditional classical theism, unless it suggests that “God is causally affected by the 
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world.” Modified classical theism is just a more proper form of classical theism in the 
current accounting of God’s action in the world and relates to “voluntary relational 
panentheism,” which notes that “God freely chooses to involve himself in creation.” 
Strong versions of open theism can be also called “personal-relational Christian 
panentheism.”
487
 Second, although Christian panentheism is not an oxymoron, it is not 
compatible with Reformed theology, since it does not accept “a supernatural view of 
God’s existence, power, revelation, and acts in history.” Nonetheless, it is consists in 
“legitimate expressions of ecumenical Christianity.” Third is non-Christian Panentheism. 
Christian theology must defend that God is actively present “in the incarnation, 
atonement, resurrection, and reign of Jesus Christ” which is not a symbol but the central 
cause of the salvation. With regard to this argument, whereas Teilhard, Pannenberg, and 
Moltmann belong to this qualification, Tillich and Ruether do not. Cooper prefers 
personal panentheism to impersonal-Ground-of being panentheism, relational 
panentheism to part-whole panentheism (model of mind and body) because of some 
biblical basis, and voluntarism to compatabilism in divine will.
488
 
 Since Cooper’s perspective is not sufficient to show the concrete meanings of 
panentheism, however, we need to seek to more appropriate models. With these kinds of 
theological responses to classical theism, we have to ask again: What kind of theology 
should we establish in this period when it seems to be more disordered than any period? 
Already indicating the problem of traditional theological categories, which has not been 
effective in responding to interdisciplinary debates, I considered panentheism as a new 
alternative to the question of skepticism in order to defend the doctrine of God, since it is 
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able to partner with other academic fields. Arguing three characteristics of panentheism, 
that is, “an outcome” in modern philosophy, “a framework” of divine action in modern 
science and “a response” to a dilemma in Christian systematic theology, Clayton suggests 
a variety of reasons that scholars have adopted panentheism: traditional theism’s 
inviability; panentheism’s compatibility in physics or biology; metaphysical position; 
better explanation of the certain religious beliefs such as divine action; the most 
convincing answer to a mediating metaphysics between Western and Eastern religions; 
more appropriate alternatives to unanswerable objections such as the problem of evil; 
more acceptable ethical or political implications.
489
 This panentheism hopes to “rekindle 
theological appetite in [those] who were dissatisfied with theism but who still recognized 
areas of ultimate concern.”490 In this sense, Michael Brierley defines panentheism as 
“revolution,”
491
 because it “subverts,” “undercuts”, “challenges” the foundations of 
classical theism, and adds an adjective, “quiet,” to revolution—“quiet revolution”—
because it has been used under other names such as “‘dialectical theism’ (Macquarrie), 
‘neoclassical theism’ (Hartshorne), ‘naturalistic theism’ (Griffin), or… ‘process 
theism.’”
492
  
 
Panentheistic Turn   
In this perspective, we need to note “panentheistic turn.”
493
 I would like to show that it 
can function as a powerful model of God in contemporary constructive theology. Without 
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claiming that this is the only viable model of God – that claim is surely false – I do 
believe that the model I defend can offer some powerful answers to some of the difficult 
dilemmas that Christian theology faces in the contemporary world. Brierley extracts “the 
eight facets of panentheistic language”
494
 which are the common ground for the 
panentheists: “The cosmos as God’s body; language of ‘In and Through’; the cosmos as 
sacrament; language of ‘inextricable intertwining’; the dependence of God on the 
cosmos; the intrinsic, positive value of the cosmos; passibility; and degree 
Christology.”
495
  
 First, the cosmos as God’s body is with regard to “divine embodiment.” They are 
in distinction but not in separation. Since not the whole but part of God can be seen, there 
is “a relationship of asymmetrical interdependence” between “God and mind” and 
“cosmos and body.” Whereas Arthur Peacocke is against this model because this model 
makes the cosmos the same ontological order as God, although Clayton maintains the 
ontological difference between them in terms of infinitude and finitude, and perfection 
and imperfection, he asserts that the cosmos is at least in some sense analogous to God’s 
body.
496
 Second is “language of In and Through.” The “in” means “in,” but the “through” 
means both the actor’s immanence and the actor’s transcendence, because, in order for 
something to come “through” something else, it needs to come from beyond it. Peacocke 
makes a connection between “the presence of God in the processes of the world” in 
panentheism and Luther’s “real presence of Christ in the Eucharist,” using the 
“celebrated Lutheran prepositions,” “in, with, and under.”
497
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 Third is “the cosmos as sacrament.” Contrasting to classical theism, the 
sacraments, in panentheism, are not limited to certain rites of the church, but the whole 
cosmos is sacramental, since it is something in which God comes. Panentheism and 
sacramentalism refer to different aspects of the same reality. Peacocke, Fiddes, Fox, 
McFague, Pittenger, and Ware recognize this sacrament.
498
 By the same token, Barth also 
considers revelation as sacrament, arguing that “God’s being-as-object as sacrament 
means: God speaks of himself in a worldly manner, that is, God speaks with us in a 
human way. Thus the ‘humanity of Jesus Christ as such is the first sacrament.”
499
  Fourth 
is “language of inextricable intertwining.” Since embodiment for God is an intrinsic 
feature, God and cosmos cannot be separate, but must be distinct. They are “inextricably 
intertwined.” Macquarrie’s dialectics, Hartshorne’s dipolarity (correlativeness), and 
Clayton’s argument means the necessary link between “identification and the distinction, 
the inclusion and the separation, of God and cosmos.”
500
   
 Fifth is “God’s dependence on the Cosmos.” If embodiment for God is intrinsic 
character, God is dependent on the cosmos, because, especially in the process tradition, 
“God needs the cosmos for the fulfilment of God’s nature of love.” However, Macquarrie 
does not use the term, “necessity,” since it means “a coercive force external to God,” but, 
instead, states that God freely creates by God’s ultimate nature. Likewise, Clayton rejects 
a necessary divine dependence on the world and subordinates God’s love to God’s 
freedom or will, since God existed without the world and was dependent on the world 
after God’s free decision. Clayton’s logic to assert this position is very simple: it is 
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incoherent to say that a contingent world must necessarily exist. Supporting Clayton’s 
argument, Brierley attempts to describe more precisely that “God, through love, needs a 
world that (by nature) is radically dependent on God.... Love demands that God and 
cosmos are in some way interdependent, and necessary, one to the other; but the 
difference in natures demands that they are not interdependent and necessary to each 
other in the same way.” This supports Clayton’s insistence that God’s embodiment is 
indispensable and God was freely dependent on the cosmos without any external force.
501
   
 Sixth is “the intrinsic, positive value of the cosmos.” It means that since God is 
good, God’s body—physical material—is good and positive and “shares the same basic 
value as God’s self.” God works for the good of the cosmos in order to eliminate evil.502 
Seventh is passibility. Since God and the cosmos have a mutual relationship in love and 
the cosmos is divine embodiment, when the cosmos as a body suffers, God suffers.
503
 
Eighth is degree Christology. Christ is different from other people by degree rather than 
by kind, because, if God is in the cosmos, God’s work in Christ has continuity with the 
cosmic work. Otherwise, there is “an unpanentheistic dichotomy” between God in Christ 
and God in the rest of the cosmos.
504
   
 Thus, Brierley defines panentheism as follows: “panentheism can be defined as 
the doctrine of the cosmos being the good (against Clayton) ‘body’ (against Peacocke), or 
‘sacrament,’ needed by God (against Clayton), with which God is inextricably 
intertwined, and ‘in and through’ which God works and suffers.”
505
 Among eight features, 
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Brierley notes, passibility is the main factor of the rise of panentheism “in Britain and the 
States under the influence of the German idealists.”  
 Panentheistic turn means a fundamental shift in ontology, “from a ‘substance 
ontology’ to a ‘relational ontology,’” in that, as process theology asserts, God and the 
world as entities are in relationship, because in substance they cannot overlap. The 
cosmos is in God. Although classical theism represents the “picture of God,” 
panentheism more accurately expresses the “basic religious conviction of humanity” and 
“greater moral potential for the world.” Thus, panentheism is “the result of process, 
mutuality, reciprocity or love,” which is the foundation to being. Nonetheless, there is an 
asymmetrical relationship between God and the cosmos, since God is not dependent on 
the cosmos in the same way that the cosmos is dependent on God.506    
 
B. Definition of Panentheism 
Then, what is panentheism? We need to define panentheism. According to Charles 
Hartshorne and William L. Reese, panentheism is that God is neither just the all of other 
things nor the whole of ordinary individuals, but all other things are in him, because God 
has “unity of experience.”507 Clayton’s definition of panentheism is that even though God 
is more than the world, world is within God. In The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian 
Church, panentheism is “[t]he belief that the Being of God includes and penetrates the 
whole universe, so that every part of it exists in Him, but (as against pantheism) that His 
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Being is more than, and is not exhausted by, the universe.”
508
 The common definition of 
panentheism can be defined as follows: although God and world are interrelated, God is 
more than the world.  
 Clayton sees Deus semper major in “‘more than’ in divine subjectivity” through 
Hartshorne’s definition: “because God comprehends all things into the unity of a single 
divine awareness, and none of the things or subjects comprehended by God does the 
same thing, God must be more than any of the objects comprehended.”
509
 Following the 
dialectical way of thinking of Schleiermacher, Schelling, and Hegel, the infinite has two 
requirements in order to be the infinite: First, the infinite (God) must include the finite 
(the world) within itself, “otherwise the infinite will be limited by that which lies outside 
it and hence no longer infinite.” And the infinite is more than the finite.510 That is, Hegel 
expressed that “an infinite that excludes the finite is ‘the bad infinite’ (das schlechte 
Unendliche) and not ‘the true infinite’ (das wahre Unendliche).”
511
 However, Clayton 
affirms infinite divine Creator’s involvement in deep mutual relations with finite agents 
within the asymmetrical structure “without being the same as them.”
512
  
 That is, whereas God, on the one hand, cannot and does not determine everything 
because of “real human freedom,” God, on the other hand, does not equate with the world 
because “God existed before the (free) creation of the world and, if God is God, he will 
also exist after the collapse or heat death of our universe.”
513
 Panentheism can affirm 
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“both God’s transcendence over and God’s immanence in the world.”
514
 We can put 
panentheism’s definition, that is, even though God is more than the world, the world is in 
God, in another way. Even though the world is in God, God is more than the world. The 
former focuses on the immanence and the latter emphasizes the transcendence. Both 
God’s immanence and transcendence are based on panentheism, that is, epistemological 
tension between comprehensibility and incomprehensibility of triune God. Even though 
many theologies agree on this position, it is not easy to find well balanced theology 
inasmuch as they usually focus on only one side: immanence or transcendence. 
Panentheism as a metaphysical ground of a new theism has both dimensions: immanence 
and transcendence. Moltmann, in his article Science and Wisdom, argues that the fear of 
God and the love of God describe two sides of God’s presence: distance and closeness; 
sublimity and intimacy.
515
 Thus, transcendence and immanence are correlative rather than 
opposed.
516
 
 Rivera makes a distinction between pantheism and panentheism. Panentheism is 
“open to mystery and unpredictable possibilities: to the ineffable, unnameable, and 
unutterable.”
517
 This is a possibility of transcendence for panentheism. Let me simply 
schematize the difference between pantheism and panentheism.518  
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 a) Pantheism                              b) Panentheism 
God–World=Nothing                       God–World=Something                     
God=Nothing+World            God=Something+World 
God=World                                      God=World+Something.             
      Thus, God is more than the world 
 
An attempt to overcome this dichotomy between transcendence and immanence could be 
found in panentheism, not pantheism. In order to satisfy the condition of panentheism, 
however, God must be more than the world. Panentheism is “higher synthesis” of theism 
and pantheism. While God for classical theism is “the universal cause (C)” and for 
pantheism is “the all-inclusive reality of the world (W),” panentheism maintains that God 
is CW.
519
 If space is “the dimension of God’s omnipresence,” notes Moltmann, 
pantheism is impossible,
520
 since Space and time have their origination in God.  
 Panentheism can provide a solution with which we can overcome dualistic thinking 
in the history of western thought, which has developed a dualistic scheme, such as 
transcendence and immanence, absolute and relative, time and eternity. Even though 
there are some attempts to solve this dichotomy, their methods appear to destroy or 
reduce one side to the other. Since a real two-way interaction between God and the world, 
the interaction that the world contained in God and the world’s return (influence) to God, 
is the sine qua non for panentheism, panentheism is different from both pantheism, which 
does not consider any God-world interrelation, and from classical philosophical theism, 
which asserts that God is not affected by the world.521 We can still see this phenomenon 
today. The God in panentheism is neither dead nor a superficial, but can touch our daily 
lives. Although God is wholly other, God is the one who participates in people’s 
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suffering and relates to the world. That is, God is over us, with us, for us, through us, and 
in us. There is no reason not to insist on God’s transcendence in panentheism. 
Panentheism, however, can possibly harmonize this ugly ditch. 
   
C. Typologies of Panentheism  
In order to understand the conceptual resources available to panentheists, it is helpful to 
explore some of the typologies of panentheisms that have been developed in the recent 
literature. The word “panentheism” was first coined by Karl Christian Friedrich Krause 
(1781-1832), the German idealist philosopher.”
522
 Schelling and Hegel are said to be “the 
Godfathers of Modern Panentheism,” since they articulate that a dynamic God himself 
actually develops in and through the world—nature, history, and human affairs. Hegel 
influenced on Küng, Moltmann, and Pannenberg. Schelling inspired Coleridge, Peirce, 
James, Bergson, Heidegger, Tillich, Hartshorne, Moltmann, and Clayton.
523
 Especially, 
panentheism was made known by Hartshorne through Philosophers Speak of God. 
According to Hartshorne’s analysis, panentheism belongs to ETCKW. E: eternal, T: 
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temporal, C: conscious, self-aware, K: knowing the world, omniscient, W: world-
inclusive.524 
 John Macquarrie points out the same problems. Macquarrie uses “dialectical 
theism,”
525
 instead of panentheism, since panentheism is very similar to pantheism in the 
formation of the word. This dialectical theism is nearer to classical theism than to 
pantheism. Nevertheless, Macquarrie uses the adjective ‘dialectical’ in order to “avoid 
the one-sidedness of classical theism.”
526
 According to Macquarrie, the pantheist and 
classical theist make the same error; their common error is one-sidedness. On the one 
hand, classical theism emphasizes divine attributes: “transcendence, externality, 
immutability, impassibility, eternity and so on.”527 On the other hand, pantheism’s stress 
is on immanence and identification of the divinity with the world.528  
 Panentheism has many different names but whatever the name, the basic ideas are 
similar. The name, “panentheism,” even for many panentheists, is not significant as many 
other names are given to the attempt to suggest adequate relations between God and the 
world. Luke 9: 49-50 supports this idea. One day John said to Jesus, “Master, we saw a 
man driving out demons in your name and we tried to stop him, because he is not one of 
us.” “Do not stop him,” Jesus said, “for whoever is not against you is for you.” If we say 
it again in this panentheistic context, whoever is not against panentheism is for 
panentheism.  
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 Gregersen explicates a typology of “three varieties of panentheism.” The first 
version is a “soteriological panentheism” (classical theism), since the world is in God 
only by God’s redeeming grace (gift). God shall be “all in all” only in the eschatological 
consummation (1 Cor. 15:28). The second version is “revelational or expressivist 
panentheism” (German idealism) whose main idea is that the divine Spirit manifests itself 
in the world and returns to God with the experiences of the world. The third version is 
“dipolar panentheism” (process theology) in that God has dipolar aspects: primordial 
nature (timeless and beyond space and time) and consequent nature (temporal and spatial). 
Among these types, whereas dipolar process theism can be considered as panentheism, 
the other two types are qualified in the definition of panentheism. On the one hand, since 
the soteriological type means that God’s self revelation is not found everywhere but only 
in restricted places, the “all” of pan-en-theism is qualified. That is, evil cannot exist in the 
same way with truth, love, and beauty in God. On the other hand, the expressivist type 
has a problem with the “in” of pan-en-theism, since “only when the history of the world 
has been completed… in God,” will the circle of divine self-expression and self-return be 
closed.
529
 Gregersen seeks a common ground of the three versions of panentheism: they 
all share two-way relation, namely, both active and responsive aspects between God and 
the world. First is generic panentheism: 1) the world is in God; 2) the God-world relation 
is bilateral.
530
 Second is strict (dipolar) panentheism: 1) God cannot exist without the 
world (soul/body relation); 2) a metaphysical necessity between God and world. Third is 
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qualified (Christian) panentheism: 1) since the world is created out of God, God could 
exist without a world; 2) the world can influence God by God’s grace.531 
 First is soteriological panentheism. Gregersen finds relations among the three 
divine persons (in trinity) rather than divine simplicity in Eastern Orthodoxy. The essence 
(ousia) of divine life is a community and “a result of reciprocal relations between the 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit,” since God exists only in interpenetration 
(perichoresis) of divine persons. John Zizioulas in Being as Communion argues that 
“there is no true being without community.” However, we have to recognize that there is 
no two-way traffic in any direct way between God and the world in trinitarian thought. 
Gregersen finds trinitarian thought in an indirect way: “a human participation in divine 
life.” For examples, 2 Peter 1:4 (“you may be partakers in the divine nature”); John 1:1-
14 (Logos: (1) one with God, (2) the principle of creation, and (3) the principle of 
revelation); John 14-17 (the divine perichoresis with creatures: Christ in the Father 
(mutual indwelling), and the disciples in Christ (a mutual coinherence).
532
 However, are 
all things, including hatred, terror, or small-mindedness really in God? The biblical 
tradition rejects those things because sin shall not inherit the kingdom of God (I 
Cor.15:50). In this sense, the “in” of panentheism is limited and panentheism could be “a 
movement of conversion and attunement to God,” so that soteriological panentheism 
refers to eschatological panentheism.
533
   
 Second is expressivist panentheism. Gregersen finds an alternative from Hegel 
which goes beyond both a supernaturalist theism (Leibniz)—“the best possible world” 
originated from an omnipotent and benevolent God—and pantheism (Spinoza)—all is 
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determined by God or nature (natura naturans or natura naturata).
534
 For Hegel, the 
finite world is in the infinite God. The world is a work of the self-giving nature of God. 
God (the Father) is not the One who is inaccessible, but the kenotic Being, who manifests 
himself in the history of humanity (the Son) and in the form of a self-consciousness 
(Spirit). That is, the concept of divinity has three elements. The Absolute reveals itself 
“(a) as eternal content abiding with itself in its manifestation [Father]; (b) as 
differentiation of eternal being [Son] from its manifestation…; (c) as infinite return 
[Spirit] of the alienated world and its reconciliation with eternal being.” However, 
Gregersen points out that the soteriological panentheism is still present in this 
panentheism, in that the world is not yet fully in God but will be reconciled with God at 
the consummation of world history. This romantic-idealistic version of panentheism is 
termed ‘natural supernaturalism,’ since it is in the natural world that God manifests his 
love and since it is only in returning to God that the world of nature participates in 
‘supernatural life.’
535
  
 Third is dipolar panentheism. God is both essentially unchangeable and dependent 
on the world. God is the world’s creator in that God gives initial aim to everything and at 
the same time God is a creature of the world in that the world influences God. God and 
the world have mutual transcendence. With regard to God’s perfection, unlike God as 
actus purus in classical theism, God in dipolar theism is “both the unsurpassable perfect 
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and the self-surpassing perfect that ever grows in perfection.”
536
 Dipolar panentheism is 
different from trinitarian panentheism in that whereas the former is general in nature, the 
latter is focused on the soteriological vision which transforms the world into divine 
community. Dipolar panentheism is different from expressivist panentheism in that 
although Hegel and Hartshorne explicate a “universalist model” in the God-world 
relationship,” God in dipolar panentheism cannot be truly infinite because the creativity 
of the world influences God.
 537
 Analyzing generic panentheism among Griffin, 
Gregersen, Clayton, and Brierley, Clayton explicates common ground or family 
resemblance: world in God; world’s independence from God, and world’s deep influence 
on God.538  
 Ware relates Palamas’ panentheism to the above three types of panentheism by 
Gregersen. However, it is “weak” panentheism, since while for Palamas God is radically 
immanent, God still remains in totally transcendent essence. First, with regard to 
soteriological panentheism, Ware makes a distinction between the ontological and 
eschatological levels. Whereas, ontologically, God is utterly present in the creation 
through his divine energies and all creatures participate in the divine energies, 
eschatologically, all creatures are not fully in God because of their fallen states. Only at 
the final consummation, not at present, will God be “all in all” (I Cor. 15:28).539 Second, 
in relation to expressionist panentheism, Palamas uses the triad in Dionysius the 
Areopagite: “stability, procession, and return (mone, proodos, epistrophe).” However, for 
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Palamas, since God is complete in himself, God does not need anything to be perfect. 
How can we overcome a gap between Palamas and the expressionist panentheism? The 
uncreated divine energies do not enrich God but transform the world and enrich the 
creation. Third, in relation to dipolar panentheism, Palamas is not comfortable, since he 
does not mean “necessary interdependence between God and the world.”
540
 That is, in 
creating the world, God chose, completely freely, to do so. However, although the world 
is not necessary to God, this does not mean that the world is arbitrary, peripheral, or 
accidental, since God wants to express and share his own true self, i.e., the self-diffusive 
love, which is the “true point of reconciliation between divine transcendence and divine 
immanence.”541 Thus there is “a genuine convergence between dipolar panentheism and 
Palamite orthodoxy,” although it is not a complete agreement.   
 
D. Panentheistic Analogy (Model) 
We need to realize the basic attitude of taking model of some theory. Ian Barbour 
appropriately explains that models in theology and natural science should be not taken 
literally, because they are “neither literal pictures nor useful fictions but limited and 
inadequate ways of imaging what is not observable.”542 Panentheism also needs to be 
understood in this way. Although there are many analogies (models) of panentheism, we 
have to admit that an analogy (model) has its own limitations. In the sense, panentheism 
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is not to be abandoned but needs to be reconsidered in its metaphors,
543
 and to go beyond 
them. The most common analogy for panentheism is the mind/body analogy. Like a 
relationship between human intentions (purposes) and human bodies, although the former 
transcends the latter, since they are interrelated and the former is implemented by the 
latter, Peacocke considers God as personal agency in which God is internally present to 
the world.
544
  
 Even though there are obviously analogies between God and the world, this mind-
body relation and the God-world relation has three qualifications. The first is that 
although God and mind are more than the world and the body, whereas God creates the 
world, our minds cannot create our bodies. The second is that although there is a 
distinction between autonomic processes such as “breathing, digestion, and heart beating” 
and deliberate, conscious intentions in human persons, God does not have such a 
distinction, since God’s relation to the world is omniscient. The third is that when we 
consider God as an agency similar to human agency, God is not a person, but rather 
suprapersonal or transpersonal and cannot be reduced to human persons. In the sense, 
there are both analogies and qualification between God and the world.
545
 The God-world 
relationship for panentheism is “a relationship of asymmetrical interdependence:” that is, 
“God and mind are both dependent on cosmos and body, but not in the same way that 
cosmos and body are, in turn, dependent on them.”
546
 This is different from Whitehead’s 
symmetrical relation between God and the world, that is, each can create the other, 
although panentheists accept Whitehead’s insight that, “Either of them, God and the 
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world, is the instrument of novelty for the other.”
547
 Tillich also argues that “God’s 
participation is not a spatial or temporal presence. It is meant not categorically but 
symbolically.”548 
 Here we can recognize three weak points. Weak point 1: the cosmos is within 
God, but the body does not exist ‘within’ mind.
549
 Weak point 2: in the mind-body 
relation, no mind, no body, and vise versa. However, in the God-world relationship, is it 
possible to say no world, no God? In this sense, God would appear “as an emergent 
reality arising out of natural processes.”
550
 That is, God does always exist, even if the 
world does not exist, if we follow the “asymmetrical interdependence.” Weak point 3: 
whereas God knows perfectly the cosmos, human beings do not have perfect knowledge 
of their bodies.551 These weak points are to be expected, because this model is an analogy, 
i.e., “panentheistic analogy,” which inevitably entails weak points: “One can’t use the 
difference in natures between God and world (necessary vs. contingent) to defend use of 
the panentheistic analogy… and at the same time maintain that it was eternally necessary 
that God create a world.”
552
   
 Instead, I would like to illustrate this analogy through Heidegger’s image of in-
der-Welt-sein. “Being” for Heidegger is not just a being or a pure being, but always 
“being in the world” (in-der-welt-sein), which belongs essentially to Dasein: “Thus the 
understanding of Being that belongs to Dasein just as originally implies the 
understanding of something like ‘world’ and the understanding of the Being of beings 
                                                 
  
547
 PR, 349.   
 
548
 Tillich, Systematic Theology I, 245. 
 
549
 Brierley, “Naming a Quiet Revolution,” 6.  
 
550
 Gregersen, “Three Varieties of Panentheism,” 20.   
 
551
 Brierley, “Naming a Quiet Revolution,” 7.  
 
552
 Brierley, “Naming a Quiet Revolution,” 10. Thus we have to say that “what is needed, perhaps, 
is not an abandonment of panentheism but the reconsideration of existing metaphors as well as the 
development of new ones.” Ibid., 12.  
 155  
accessible within the world.”
553
 Human beings are given to the nature (geworfenheit). 
The image of “being in the world” is that which the world embraces beings. It can be the 
meaning of Umwelt (milieu). Whenever I think of this phrase of Heidegger, the thought 
gives rise to the image of a mother embracing her baby, or a baby in the mother’s womb. 
Dasein is like a baby in a mother’s womb in that although the baby is in the womb of the 
mother, the baby has her/his own creativity or self-identity separate and different from 
that of the mother. The panentheistic analogy between God and the world can be 
expressed by an analogy of a mother’s womb and a baby in that, just as there can be no 
world without God, and not vise versa, so without the mother’s womb, there can be no 
baby, but not vise versa. Theotokos (bearer of God), which refers to Mary, helps us 
understand this image of God. Early church, both Eastern and Western, accept this 
theotokos rather than Christokos. Mary bears God. It was God who was in Mary’s womb. 
In a sense this analogy is appropriate for the definition of panentheism.
554
 Thus we can 
understand the image in which a baby is in a mother’s womb as follows: “the whole earth 
is mine” (Exodus 19:5). 
 Of course this analogy has weak points. First, since the mother’s womb cannot 
create a baby by itself, it needs other things which a mother’s womb does not have. Then, 
can God alone not create the world? If God needs other things to create the world, it 
makes God a deficient being. Second, a baby in the mother’s womb can come out of the 
womb and become an independent self which does no longer need the womb’s protection. 
Although the baby leaves the womb, if the mother’s love or mind continues to take care 
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of the baby, the baby is still within the mother. However, the world cannot free itself 
from God’s boundary, because the world is in God. Nonetheless, this analogy is more 
appropriate than that of the mind-body, because, as regards the mind-body analogy, it is 
possible to say that without mind, no body, and vise versa. The Triune God conceived the 
world in the triune God and gave birth to the world. Does this mean that the world is 
outside God? It is not, since God’s arms still hold the world. Thus, the world is still in 
God. Relating this phrase to panentheism, which means ‘the world is within God,’ we can 
make a similar expression: die Welt-in-Gott (the world in God). It is the image of God 
who embraces the world. It could be related to the image of Zimzum (self-limitation) or 
Shekinah (indwelling) for Jewish tradition.  
 
E. “In” of Panentheism  
Brierley asks a further question: “In what sense does the universe exist in God?”
555
 
Panentheists argue that when they explain God’s immanence in the world, “in” is more 
proper than “separate-but-present-to,” since everything in the world is in God and that 
means that nothing exists outside infinite God. The question of “in” is as follows: how 
can God be present in the world if one substance cannot be present within another at the 
same time? In the sense, Peacocke appropriately describes the meaning of “in”: “God 
creates all-that-is within Godself while remaining ontologically distinct.” If all is NOT in 
God, since God is outside the world, God must intervene in such a discrete world in order 
to connect to the world. Insofar as God interacts with all the systems at their holistic 
levels, God is not only in parts but also in the whole, so that God can give existence to 
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all-that-is, which asserts God’s ultimate transcendence in order to satisfy the 
panentheistic definition that God is more than world.556  
 Clayton’s answer is that to locate God at all points in space cannot be a proper 
answer to satisfy this question, but rather, he finds an answer from the “active presence of 
the divine Spirit in the world,” that is, “a theology of Spirit that is both theologically and 
scientifically adequate.”
557
 Gregersen summarizes three types of “in:” First is a ball in a 
bowl (container model); second is a finite realization of some possibilities in wider 
possibilities; and third is something in another thing in a qualitative sense (the beloved in 
the lover). The third one can be considered in trinitarian thought.
558
 Gregersen 
understands “all in God” as follows: finitum capax infiniti (finitude can grasp infinity). 
We can see the infinite God in finitude, i.e., even “in the miniatures of life.” In this sense, 
we need to note Wolfgang Goethe’s saying, “Willst du ins Unendliche schreiten, geh im 
Endlichen und schaue nach allen Seiten” (If you want to enter the infinite, walk in the 
finite world, and look to all sides).
559
  
 Mind-body as metaphor in the God-world relationship has limitation. How can we 
insist on a double “in” between God and the world? Tom Oord enumerates 12 categories 
of the various meanings of “in.” The world is “in” God because: 
1. that is its literal location 2. God energizes the world 3. God experiences or “prehends” 
the world (process theology) 4. God ensouls the world 5. God plays with the world (Indic 
Vedantic Traditions) 6. God “enfields” the world (J. Bracken) 7. God gives space to the 
world (J. Moltmann, drawing on the zimzum tradition; A. Peacocke and many of the 
authors in this text) 8. God encompasses or contains the world (substantive or locative 
notion) 9. God binds up the world by giving the divine self to the world 10. God provides 
the ground for emergences in, or the emergence of, the world (A. Peacocke, P. Davies, H. 
Morowitz, P. Clayton) 11. God befriends the world (C. Deane-Drummond) 12. all things 
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are contained “in Christ” (from the Pauline en Christo) 13. God graces the world (all of the 
above).560  
 
Among the above categories I argue that numbers 3, 5, 7, 10, and 13 are particularly 
fruitful for theological reflection. The “in” of panentheism is not merely a spatial, literal 
location, as Gregersen indicates; if it were, that would make God a spatial being and the 
extension of the world as space could be God. The container metaphor is not “a spatial 
continuum from the world to God.”
561
 Clayton also argues that if God is specifically 
located at a particular point within the universe, it implies that God is absent from other 
places.
562
 Thus God’s space is not like the created time-space continuum, but rather 
embraces the world’s spatial temporal existence “by God’s unimaginable ‘roominess.’”563 
Max Jammer explains that “we do not know whether God is the space of his world, or 
whether his world is his space.” Moltmann answers this question with the idea of 
perichoresis (mutual interpenetration): “in the consummation God will find space in the 
finite world in a divine way, and finite world will find space in God in a ‘worldly’ 
way.”564 Based on the interpretations of “in,” Jay McDaniel makes a distinction between 
emanationist panentheism and relational panentheism. On the one hand, the former holds 
that since the cosmos is God’s direct expression, the cosmos’s creative action is God’s 
creative action. On the other hand, the latter holds that since the cosmos has creative 
independence from God, humanity has its own creative power.565 
 These definitions of panentheism are reminiscent of a Korean expression, 
‘월인천강’—? (wol, Moon), ? (in, Stamp) ? (chun, Thousand) 江  (gang, River)—
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which means that a moon permeates or stamps into a thousand rivers. How can a moon 
exist in a thousand rivers at the same time? When a moon shines on all the rivers, it is 
possible for a moon to exist in a thousand rivers. This traditional Korean expression helps 
one to understand the God-world relationship. God can exist in the whole world and the 
world can be touched by God, but God is more than the world. The moon is present 
everywhere, but it is more than (beyond) the rivers. That is, God permeates everywhere, 
but God is more than the world.
566
 
 
F. Trinity in Panentheism   
One can ask this important question: ‘why does Panentheism need the Trinity?’ 
Panentheism offers an important via media, a third way between traditional doctrine and 
process theology. In theism, there are so many skeptical elements such as naturalism, 
scientific position, pluralism, problem of evil, and historical discourses. However, are 
these skeptical elements appropriate or persuasive to make theism disappear? No, 
because these skeptical elements criticize some aspects of existing theism, aspects that 
contemporary theology also criticizes or defends with some alteration. Theology requests 
metaphysics to the extent that theology must not be reduced to the history. In this sense, I 
support the task of theology as “The New Reformation” for Whitehead which is to show 
how the World is founded on something (element) which is undying beyond mere 
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transient fact or beyond the perishing of occasions. Thus we can understand “how life 
includes a mode of satisfaction deeper than joy or sorrow” in perishing lives.567  
 I would like to suggest an alternative position to defend theism. Some theism and 
process theology in some part cannot answer those skeptical criticisms to the extent that, 
while the former cannot explain the contemporary issues, the latter is near to naturalism. 
We need to listen to a voice. Bracken also emphasizes this point: “Both sides have 
something to learn from the well-reasoned arguments of the other side, and both sides 
may ultimately need the assistance of the other in setting forth the case against 
contemporary atheism and agnosticism.”
568
 
 New or alternative theism does not stand at the borderline of one simple 
dimension between theism and atheism. It must stand between not only theism and 
atheism, but process theism and some classical theism as well. I would like to consider 
panentheism as the most powerful alternative theism because it can suggest some 
responses to the weak points of two aspects. Panentheism means everything is in God. 
This can be interpreted as two sides of one coin. Even though God transcends the world, 
the world is within God. Even though the world is within God, God transcends the world. 
These two sentences have the same meanings but the tone is different. From the former, 
we can draw God’s immanent aspect and from the latter, God’s transcendent one. In this 
sense, panentheism relates to the Trinity. Trinity contrasts to the speculative, 
philosophical god of Greek metaphysics who is immutable and unchanging as “unmoved 
mover.” Moltmann points out that the problem of this Greek god is that “a god who is 
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immutable is a god without pathos and a god who cannot love.”
569
 Thus Trinitarian 
Panentheism is the most credible metaphysical position to hold. 
 To that extent, then, immanence and transcendence can be explained by the triune 
God who has both aspects. This means God does not exist both as transcendental 
immanence or immanent transcendence. Rather, God exists radically as both immanence 
and as transcendence: Economic Trinity and Immanent Trinity. God is omnipresent but 
there also must be ontological difference between creator and creature, infinite and finite. 
I will develop this part on trinity in the last chapter.  
 
G. Panentheism in the Bible 
It is an important task to find panentheistic elements in the Bible. According to Cooper, 
we can recognize “biblical panentheism” from Jesus’ praying in John 17:21, “Father, just 
as you are in me and I am in you. May they also be in us.” We should not consider this 
argument that creatures are “in God” as unbiblical. 2 Corinthians 6:16 tells us the 
definition of panentheism and the relation between God and the world: “For we are the 
temple of the living God. As God has said: ‘I will live with them and walk among them, 
and I will be their God, and they will be my people.’” In the sense, God is Immanuel 
(God with us), as Matthew 1:23 says. Ephesians 4:6 also says that “one God and Father 
of all, who is over all and through all and in all.” That exactly describes characters of 
panentheism, especially using panentheistic prepositions ‘over, through, and in.’ That is, 
God is over the world and through the world and in the world. Ephesians 4:9-10 shows us 
a logical interrelation between Jesus’ ascendance and descendence. Jesus’ ascendance 
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presupposes Jesus’ descendance or incarnation (through and in) and Jesus’ descendance 
presupposes His transcendence (over). In this sense, we can recognize God’ 
omnipresence through Psalms 139:7-10, “Where can I go from your Spirit? Where can I 
flee from your presence? If I go up to the heavens, you are there; if I make my bed in the 
depths, you are there. If I rise on the wings of the dawn, if I settle on the far side of the 
sea, even there your hand will guide me, your right hand will hold me fast.”
570
 We willl 
recognize God’s presence in us and our presence in God through John 14:20, “On that 
day you will realize that I am in my Father, and you are in me, and I am in you.” In Jer. 
23:23-24, “a God near by… and not a God afar off”; “Do I not fill heaven and earth? 
Says the Lord.” 
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Chapter VII: A Model of Theism as a Synthesis of Classical Theism and Process 
Theism
571
 
In chapter seven I will explore a model of God that draws on the strengths of three 
different philosophical theologies argued earlier, which I call “Trinitarian Panentheistic 
Theology” (TPT).  
 As a theological vocabulary referring to the God-world relationship, panentheism 
must be a catalyst for a theological stream between classical theism and pantheism. 
Cooper points out that “ironically, panentheism shares important roots with classical 
theism,” even though they are different in that while classical theism represents “the God 
of the philosophers,” recent theologians argue that it is “neither biblical nor 
philosophically coherent.” Panentheism explores “the other God of the philosophers.”572 
It is significant to formulate a proper doctrine of the other God in the face of skepticism. 
However, is it possible by regression to traditional Christian concepts or by hitchhiking 
with popular contemporary philosophers?  
 In this final chapter, I present the model of Trinitarian Panentheistic Theology 
(TPT) whose primary aspect must be a kind of unity of classical theism and process 
theology in the form of constructive theology. The primary purpose is to overcome the 
limitation of classical theism and to frame a form of panentheism. First, I choose some 
characters from classical theism: Creatio ex nihilo (Genesis 1:1), Trinity (Genesis 1:26), 
Transcendence (Isaiah 55:8-9), worship (Psalms 150). Third, the other part is from 
process theology: Dipolar God.Second, Divine Action, as the horizontal bar in the image 
of the cross, is a bridge between upper part (classical theology) and lower part (process 
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theology) in the vertical bar. Divine action is the place where double agencies, that is, 
God and human beings, encounter. The cross must be the place of peace and 
reconciliation between classical theism and process theology. Fourth and finally, TPT 
entails Kenotic God (Phil. 2:5-8), Relational God (John 3:16), Suffering God (Matthew 
27:46), Revised Understanding of the Power of God (I Cor. 1:18 and I Cor. 1:25), and 
Knowable God (1 John 4:7-8). TPT can be summarized as follows: God does not stay in 
himself, but chooses to limit himself by coming down to the world; God is not in aseity 
as simplicity in the Godhead, but relates to the world as a dipolarity in the triune God; 
God is not impassible, but suffers with the suffering world and ultimately overcomes 
suffering; God is not only powerless God but also powerful God; and God can be known 
in the world.  
 
1. From Classical Theism  
1) Creatio ex Nihilo
573
   
“Where am I, why was I not there?” As my son who was four-years-old saw some family 
pictures in which he was not shown, he asked that question. His mom said that you were 
in my belly. He asked again, “Why?” We human beings often ask about our origination: 
Where do we come from? How could the world exist as it is? Did God create the world or 
is the world the consequence of evolution? Nancy Murphy and George Ellis explain five 
possibilities for the origination of the universe: “random chance, high probability, 
necessity, universality, and design.” Random chance means that the universe just 
happened without any explanation. High probability and necessity do not have any 
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standard to compare with those of other possible universes. Universality means that 
everything that can happen will happen sooner or later. Design asserts that the universe is 
designed by “a transcendent intelligence,” i.e., God.574 Generally and simpy speaking, 
there are two positions to explain the origination of the universe: Creation and Evolution; 
“God without evolution” or “evolution without God.”
575
 Is there not any solution to 
harmonize them?  
 
Conflict of Two Positions 
On the one hand, many Christians accept creation but not “evolution.” The Bible 
explicitly proclaims God’s creation of the world: “In the beginning God created the 
heavens and the earth” (Genesis 1:1). This tells that God has priority over the world and 
nothing existed before the creation, thereby justifying God’s question: “Where were you 
when I laid the foundation of the earth?” (Job 38:4). The Bible answers that, “In the 
beginning you laid the foundations of the earth, and the heavens are the work of your 
hands. They will perish, but you remain; they will all wear out like a garment. Like 
clothing you will change them and they will be discarded. But you remain the same, and 
your years will never end” (Psalms 102:25-27). Creationism asserts that God alone can 
explain the difference between nonliving and living only through creation. There are 
many models of God the creator such as “Emanation,” “Construction,” and “Artistic 
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Expression.” Since the image of emanation is like light from the sun or heat from a fire, 
the creation of the world or the created order is “an overflowing of the creative energy of 
God.” The weakness of this model is that it entails not God’s conscious and prior 
decision but “an involuntary emanation.”
576
 The image of construction portrays God as “a 
master builder” who constructs the world with any purpose, planning, and intention. Its 
weakness is that God shapes or constructs the pre-existing matter, so that it is not proper 
to creatio ex nihilo. The image of artistic expression is that the world is God’s handiwork 
and this image overcomes the weakness of the images of emanation and construction, i.e., 
personal images of God. Its weakness is also the suggestion of preexisting matter as in 
the relation between a sculptor and pre-existent stone.577 
 On the other hand, Michael Shermer gives “five general tenets of evolutionary 
theory”: Evolution, Descent with modification, Gradualism, Multiplication, and Natural 
selection.
578
 According to Ian Barbour, advocates of “the modern synthesis,” that is, 
Gaylord Simson, Theodosius Dobzhansky, and Ernst Mayr, insisted that the formation of 
new species is the result of “variation and natural selection,” and “gradualism,” the thesis 
that “major evolutionary changes are the result of the accumulation of many small 
changes.”579  
 
Dilemma in Two Separate Positions  
Was the world created as the Bible describes within just six days? There are big 
controversies surrounding creationism and evolution. In fact, most Christians do not 
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accept evolution, since the Bible describes the process of creation of the world and if 
evolution is correct, they become descendents of animals, especially closely related to the 
chimpanzee. However, we cannot simply consider the origin of the world as God’s one 
time creation; we must take into account humans’ intimate similarity to other animals and 
improper inference of the age of the universe (6,000 or 10,000 years old) from the 
perspective of creation. Just as religions presuppose God, so science presupposes material. 
In this view, inasmuch as there is only a gap between two positions, we have to consider 
both creation and evolution, and two perspectives need to open up and begin to have real 
dialogue with each other.
580
 However, there are so many questions when we think of 
them together: how they are connected; if there was the big bang 13.7 billion years ago, 
what did God do before the big bang; if there was the Earth 4.5 billion years ago, what 
did God do between big bang and beginning of the earth; how could life appear 3.8 
billion years ago; how could human beings exist in the world 100,000 years ago; how 
could human beings think about God; who first thought about God; are human beings the 
end of evolution; if the natural world seems to proceed after the big bang in a natural 
system, do we have to say that God created the world; what did God create? what is the 
relation between God’s creation and evolution; what has this God to do with Christianity? 
  
An Attempt to Solve the Conflict: From the Process Perspective 
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For Whitehead, God is “the primordial creature”
581
 and “[God] is not before all creation, 
but with all creation.”582 That is, this logic results from Whitehead’s metaphysical 
principles in which “God is not to be treated as an exception,” but is only “their chief 
exemplification.”
583
 By the same token, Edward Correia asserts that “a modern 
conception of God has nothing to do with creation,” but that means another paradox: A 
God who does not have the power to create the world can much more powerfully 
influence in our lives.
584
 In the sense, Griffin considers creatio ex nihilo as distortion;
585
 
because “the world was void and without form,” rather Griffin affirms “creation out of 
chaos.” Griffin argues for a tension between coercion and the evolutionary explanation of 
the world. If God coercively and unilaterally acted for the divine-human drama of 
salvation, why would God have spent such a long time (10 to 20 billion years) in the 
preparation of that drama?
586
  
 Thomas Oord also rejects this doctrine and instead suggests a thesis, which is 
different from that of process theology, that “God creates out of what God previously 
created.” However, it does not explain the origination, i.e., “from where (what).” That is, 
“from what” did God create for the first time? If it is from something (e.g., water, deep, 
chaos, etc.), it is the same as process theology. However, Oord suggests that “God 
Creates out of what God Previously Created” is “an everlasting regress of creating.”587 
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However, the endless repetition of regress cannot occur, because there must be the first 
moment to create, which is “ex nihilo.”  
 
A More Proper Model for the Correlation of Creation and Evolution  
Although process theology does not accept “creatio ex nihilo,” because it distorts the 
Christian faith, I would like to accept that doctrine, since it is more logically proper to the 
definition of panentheism: God more than the world. Is creatio ex nihilo not logically 
more proper? Is it not awkward to say that God and the world have always coexisted? If 
God is not the God of origination, what is this God? What do we have to call the world 
which has always coexisted with God? Why does the world which has always coexisted 
with God call God to be God? Was the world not able to be God? How can God become 
God if the world has already existed? How can we think the existence of children without 
parents? Whereas creatio ex nihilo allows us to confess that God can exist even without 
the world (Matthew 24:35),
588
 process thought denies the possibility of God without the 
world. If God cannot be God without the world, how can this God become God? If we do 
not accept creatio ex nihilo, I think, we have to say “no world, no God” and we could be 
pantheist, because, as process theologians think, God and the world have been always 
existing together everlastingly. However, God must be God without the world, although 
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there must be a radical relation between them. In this sense, nothingness is possible. It is 
not evolution ex nihilo, but creation ex nihilo. In the sense, it is creatio ex nihilo that 
enables us to call God to be God and to worship God: “To whom will you compare me? 
Or who is my equal?” says the Holy One” (Isaiah 40:25).  
 However, is it not possible to unify them to have something like “evolutionary 
theist?” Is there not any room to accept evolution into the Christianity? As the matter of 
fact, the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is neither equal to creationism nor does it neglect 
the theory of evolution. I will work to develop a harmonized integration whose basic 
principle is that God existed before the world, not God with the world, nor vise-versa. 
Nevertheless, creation and evolution are intertwined in the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. 
Theistic evolution and evolutionary creation both argue that God is the creator of the 
world and that biological evolution is a natural process within the creation. That is, 
evolution is a tool that God used to develop human life.
589
 Hartshorne also insists on 
“creation through evolution.”
590
 Creative evolution by Henry Bergson provides that 
“evolution is motivated by an élan vital, a “vital impetus” that can also be understood as 
humanity's natural creative impulse.
591
 
 We can find a more appropritate model from Clayton who accepts both creatio ex 
nihilo and evolution. In conversation with Clayton, Nic Paton asks, what is primary 
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between matter and consciousness? Neo Darwinians assert that “all is matter. And 
everything arose out of matter.” Clayton resists the view, however, because he believes 
that God creates the world, God exists before the finite world, God is spirit and God 
could exist without the world. This view says that “spirit precedes matter.” Nonetheless, 
Clayton asks, “Is that really the final result?” He puts an approximate question: “In this 
process of evolution, does a creation emerge, which genuinely, truly can encounter God 
in the midst of this world?” That is, how can we see God’s work in this evolution?
592
 
Clayton asks us to remember a significant principle: that we must investigate the doctrine 
of creation: “It is not the place of a theological doctrine of creation to replace science, but 
to acknowledge its findings.”593 Theology has to learn from modern biology and 
cosmology: “that God has created dynamic and open rather than a static and closed 
universe; that God has created a highly differentiated rather than a monolithic universe; 
and that God has created a universe in which there is change, novelty, and indeterminacy 
as well as continuity, order, and coherence.”
594
 By the same token, Moltmann maintains 
that a theological doctrine of creation can be compatible with the cosmologies of physics, 
although they have different experiences and that in their dialogue theologians prefer 
both “great scientific narratives” such as the development of an expanding universe and 
the evolution of life, and that they have a particular interest in contingency.595  
 After accepting evolution following creatio ex nihilo, we can accept “continual 
creation” in that the work of creation is not a past event once-and-for-all but is in the 
                                                 
 
592
 http://soundandsilence.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/phillip-clayton-in-conversation-with-nic-
paton/ 
 
593
 Clayton, Adventures in the Spirit, 179.  
 
594
 Daniel L. Migliore, Faith Seeking understanding: An introduction to Christian Theology 
(Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company Grand Rapids, 1991, 2004), 115-116.  
 
595
 Moltmann, “God’s Kenosis in the Creation and Consummation of the World,” in Polkinghorne, 
Work of Love: Creation as Kenosis, 137-138.  
 172  
making, “here and now, at this moment and always.” In the beginning, argues Ware, the 
word “beginning” does not mean a temporal sense, but that God is the constant arche, the 
source of all things at every moment. That is, without God’s action in a single moment, 
nothing would exist.
596
 According to Polkinghorne, an evolutionary world can be 
understood as a creation by God, not in the sense of “the performance of a pre-
determined script,” but in the sense of “a self-improvisatory performance by the actors 
themselves.”
597
 Even Augustine believed that “God had created the seeds of life from 
which creatures eventually developed.”
598
 Accordingly, a concept of creatio continua 
complements the concept of creatio ex nihilo. Polkinghorne suggests new creation (ex 
vetere) as well as initial creation or old creation. New creation is not second creative act 
ex nihilo but ex vetere as the resurrected transformation of the old creation. It is 
manifested in the resurrection of Jesus Christ.
599
 As Peacocke notes, just as the world is 
in a dynamic picture and continues to change, so God is in the creative relation to the 
world. God is a “living God,” who is continuously creating, in the Hebrew tradition: 
“God is the immanent creator creating in and through the processes of the natural 
order.”
600
 And, as Philip Hefner considers, in the sense, human beings are “created co-
creators.”601 
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 In conclusion, as Tillich argues, we need to understand that the doctrine of 
creation is “not the story of an event which took place ‘once upon a time,’” but the “basic 
description of the relation between God and the world.”602 Migliore emphasizes that the 
stories of Genesis 1 and 2 are not scientific theories contradicting to modern 
cosmological theories, but “poetic, doxological declarations of faith in God.” Thus, the 
doctrine of creation is not scientific explanation or theory of how the world existed, but 
“a religious affirmation that we are contingent, finite beings whose very existence is a 
gift from God.”
603
 Thus creatio ex nihilo in Genesis 1 does not mean creationism.  
 
2) Trinity
604 
Why is the doctrine of the Trinity necessary in Christian theology? What do we think 
when we hear the name of the Triune God? In a sense, Moltmann’s acknowledgement 
would be proper to those questions, acknowledgement that if we ask about trinity, it is 
not easy to find a clear answer about why it is important, except that it is “part of the faith 
of the universal church.”
605
 Cyril Richardson describes this as a dilemma: if we deny it, 
we may lose our soul, if we try to understand it, we may lose our wits.
606
 Whence the 
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emergence of the doctrine of the Trinity? Although the word Trinity is not explicitly 
mentioned in the Bible, Christianity explicitly confesses the Trinitarian God, since the 
doctrine of the Trinity becomes the product of church’s meditation on the Bible and of 
church’s effort to express God’s free grace in the gospel.
607
  
 However, Richardson also argues three elements of the Trinity to consider: First, 
it is needful to give “a metaphysical ground to the threefold experience of God” (Father 
as the source of Being, Christ as Redeemer, and Holy Spirit as Sanctifier). Second, it is 
necessary to make a distinction between God and the created world. God does not need to 
create the world, because God has perfect relationship among triune God without 
loneliness. Third, it is needful to keep God’s homoousios between Father and Son, unlike 
Aruis.608 The general and simple problem of the Trinity is how God can be both 
tripersonal and one. Here I will explore three different models of the Trinity: Augustine, 
Rahner, and Moltmann. Each thinker contributes important features to a well-rounded 
doctrine of the Trinity today. 
 
A) Augustine  
Before Augustine, we need to see The Cappadocians. They defend divine unity in three 
different “modes of being.” Nevertheless, they emphasize the priority of the Father who 
is “the source or fountainhead of the Trinity.” The Son is “begotten” and the Spirit is 
“proceeds.” They explain the relation between one substance and three persons in the 
relationship between a universal (humanity) and its particulars (individual persons). 
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Although all human beings have their common nature, they are not identical but different. 
Thus the Father (being ingenerate, agennesia), the Son (beings generate, genesis), and the 
Spirit (beings sent) are different from each other.609 Augustine’s task is to explain how 
the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit constitute a divine unity of one and the same 
substance in an indivisible equality.
610
 In the sense, resisting any subordinationism, 
although the Son and the Spirit appear posteriorly in history, Augustine emphasizes their 
coequality in eternity.
611
 
 Trinity for Augustine has two distinct characteristics: the place of Holy Spirit and 
The Psychological Analogies. First, Augustine is the first to identify the Holy Spirit with 
the love (caritas) which binds the Father and the Son (wisdom, sapientia). And insofar as 
this Spirit “makes us dwell in God, and God in us,” the Spirit is the “divine gift” which 
unites God to us. Augustine explains in 1 Corinthians 13:13 (These three remain: faith, 
hope, and love. But the greatest of these is love) as follows: a) God’s greatest gift is love. 
b) God’s greatest gift is the Holy Spirit. c) Therefore the Holy Spirit is love.
612
 Augustine 
suggests that “love” is the key concept to know God and the Trinity, because God is love: 
“he that loves, and that which is loved, and love itself.”
613
 The Father is Lover, the Son 
the Beloved, the Spirit the mutual Love that connects the two,614 Father to Son, and both 
‘Father and Son’ to believers.615 
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 Second, psychological analogies appeal to the human mind. In creating the world, 
God has left a characteristic imprint (vestigium) of the image of God upon the height of 
his creation, i.e., humanity, especially, in the neo-Platonic view, on the human mind. In 
the inner mental world of individuals rather than in personal relationship, Augustine is 
looking for “traces of the Trinity” (vestigia Trinitatis) in creation. This is the “radical 
individualism” united wth intellectualism. Augustine describes “a triadic structure to 
human thought” which is based on the being of God: mens/notitia/amor—mind, 
knowledge, and love. The human mind is an image of God himself in that there can be 
three “persons” in God: “Father as Being, Son as Consciousness, and Spirit as Love.”
616
 
Nevertheless, although human beings are created in the image of the triune God, asserts 
Augustine, the word “image” is inappropriate, because they are not fully the image of 
God, but ‘after’ the image. In the sense, we can never know God as He is and the Trinity 
remains an “enigma.”
617
 The weakness of this analogy of self-presence, self-knowledge, 
and self-love is that it leans toward a “monopersonal, modalistic view of God.”
618
 
Although Calvin repeats Augustine’s Trinity, he doubts psychological analogies.
619
 
 
De Trinitate: The Doctrine and the Scriptures 
First of all, for Augustine the “authority of revelation” (belief) precedes reason because 
“something must be believed” and then reason can understand it. And reason has three 
defects: first, it is slow to reach the right conclusion; second, it is darkened by sin and 
third, it is only by contemplation that the divine can be known. This defective reason 
cannot know God as He is because God’s nature cannot be directly accessed by the 
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reason which consists of the experience of the senses or of the intellect. Because of these 
defects of reason, Richardson asserts that we have to start with “truth as it is revealed” 
and we need the “guide of the Catholic Faith and the Scriptures.”620  
 Then Augustine defends the deity of the Son (homoousia) against Arian 
(homoiousia). Since the Son is equal to the Father in relation to the form of God and the 
Son is less than the Father in the form of a servant, a statement that “My father is greater 
than I” (John 14:28) is not contradictory to the verse, “I and the Father are one.” (John 
10:30). Through the reinterpretation of Mark 13:32 (“No one knows about that day or 
hour, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father”), Augustine argues 
that even in His incarnation, the Son had unlimited knowledge: “Christ, even as man, was 
not really ignorant, but is called ignorant in the sense that He made others ignorant, by 
hiding truths they were not ready to grasp.” The third type is neither “less than” nor equal 
to the Father but that “He is of the Father.” It means “the birth of the Son from the 
Father.” The Son is sent (John 14:26). Since “Sent” does not mean the subordination of 
the Son to the Father, but “making visible” to the world, it cannot fit for the Father, 
although He appeared “in theophanies.”
621
 Augustine answers the co-equality of the three 
persons. The Father is the “beginning of the whole divinity,” the Son is the “brightness of 
eternal light,” “an emanation (manatio) from the Omnipotent,” and the Holy Spirit 
“enjoys the same essential nature” with the Father and the Son and is the “unifying 
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principle” in the Godhead. In the sense, the relations between the Persons of the Trinity 
are “not those of degree or order but of causality.”622 
 There are some debates. First is about filioque. It is about the “double procession 
of the Spirit, from both Father and Son.” Whereas to the Greeks, it means “two principles 
of causality in the Godhead,” to the West, it expresses “a way of expressing the equality 
of Father and Son,” and the “bond of union that unified Father and Son.”
623
 Second is 
about unity and the distinctions among the three persons. There is the unity in that the 
Trinity is the togetherness of “the voice of the Father, and the flesh of the Son, and the 
dove of the Holy Spirit.” Thus Augustine expresses the co-inherence of the Trinity as 
follows: “so both each are in each, and all in each, and each in all, and all in all, and all 
are one.” There is the distinction in the Godhead. Cappadocian made distinction between 
ousia and hypostasis, but Augustine translated ‘hypostasis’ as ‘substance.’ They express 
relations, not essence and substance. “There is one substance in the Trinity, not three; for 
with God, to be is the same thing as to subsist.” Augustine uses the word “Person” 
(persona) to express the distinctions in the Godhead. However, he realizes that this is 
inadequate, since the word ‘person’ would refer not to relation but to essence, so that 
three persons would mean three essences.624 Thus we can say that “God is one according 
to essence, and three according to relation.”625  
 In conclusion, according to Karkkainen, Augustine emphasizes the “divine unity 
and substance.” Whereas for the Christian East “distinctions of persons” are the focal 
point, for Augustine “substance” is. And, while Augustine was aware of analogies of the 
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Trinity, many of his followers make them abstract speculations.
626
 With regard to the 
difficulty of the three or the one, Augustine states that the formula of three persons has 
been coined, “not in order to give a complete explanation,” but in order not to remain 
silent
627
 and he ends it with a prayer, “which is better than an argument”: “I have sought 
Thee, and have desired to see with my understanding what I believed; and I have argued 
and laboured much… O Lord, the one God, God the Trinity, whatever I have said in 
these books that is of Thine, may they acknowledge who are thine; if anything of my own, 
may it be pardoned both by Thee and by those who are Thine.”
628
 Agustine’s thought 
decisively shaped subsequent Western trinitarian theology of God.
629
   
    
B) Rahner  
Karkkainen maintains that if Karl Barth started the “Trinitarian renaissance” in the 20
th
 
century, Karl Rahner established the “canons of later Trinitarian language” with his 
famous rule, that is, the identity of the Immanent Trinity (IT) and Economic Trinity 
(ET),
630
 that is, the Trinity in the History and Economy of Salvation is the Immanent 
Trinity.
631
 Rahner criticizes the traditional doctrine of Trinity on three interrelated issues. 
First is the priority of “On the One God” (the unity of God) over “On the Triune God” 
(threeness). Second is the problem with the “Augustinian rule of the indivisibility of the 
works of the Triune God ad extra.” It makes theologians neglect the “peculiarity of each 
Trinitarian person.” For example, theology textbooks assign “incarnation” not to “the Son, 
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Logos, who became human,” but to “‘God’ (in the generic sense) in assuming humanity.” 
Consequently, Trinitarian theology becomes ambiguous in speaking of hypostases. Third 
is the separation of the Trinity from salvation history which makes it “philosophical and 
abstract.” This is opposite to the direction of the Bible. The only proper way to approach 
the Trinity is to take “salvation history” as the “starting point.” Thus the Trinity is “a 
mystery of salvation” rather than “an abstract speculation into the Godhead apart from 
the world.” This leads into the identity of IT and ET.
632
  
 
Rahner’s Rule 
Rahner was concerned that traditional theology focuses on the “inner life of God and 
especially on God’s unity of being (‘simplicity’)” apart from salvation history, so that it 
neglects the Trinity and the relationship between the Christian life and the Trinity. 
Rahner wants to forbid “speculation about the immanent Trinity.” Why then is there need 
for immanent Trinity? The only reason to speak of God’s immanent trinity is “to guard 
against dissolving God into history and to protect God’s transcendence and the 
graciousness of salvation.” That is, since God in the immanent Trinity is the same as the 
God we experience in salvation history, there is no distinction between “the doctrine of 
the Trinity” and “the doctrine of the economy of salvation.”633 Ted Peters interprets 
Rahner’s rule as follows. The way we experience God is not in general but “through 
God’s saving activity within history.” In the economy of salvation, we experience God 
who is communicating Godself.
634
 Rahner criticizes God as a Whole. The incarnated God 
we meet in this world is not “God as a whole,” but Jesus who is the Son (God’s Logos). 
                                                 
 
632
 Karkkainen, The Trinity, 77-78.   
 
633
 Quote from Karkkainen, Trinity, 78, Karkkainen, The Doctrine of God, 145.   
 
634
 Karkkainen, The Doctrine of God, 144-145.  Ted Peters, God as Trinity, 96. 
 181  
There is a “threefold relation of God to us,” but it is not tritheism, since it is the “self-
communications of the one God in three interrelated ways.” And it is not merely a copy 
of the inner Trinity, but the Trinity itself, “the triune personal God.”635  
 In the formula of the identity of IT and ET, we can ask whether “incarnation, 
cross, and resurrection contribute something “new” to God’s own life. Is there any 
change in God? Can we keep the immutability of God? Despite claims of the unchanging 
nature of God, Rahner insists, first, that history (in the world) becomes God’s own 
history or becoming. Second, it is possible to speak of change in an immutable God if the 
change is something which is not internal to the Deity: “He who is not subject to change 
in himself can himself be subject to change in something else.”
636
 In the incarnation, 
“God becomes while remaining immutable.”
637
 Furthermore, human beings are the 
“grammar of God’s possible self-expression” and the “most fitting vehicle for God’s self-
expression.” Thus insofar as the Son of God is the proper self-expression of God, the Son 
is the “outward expression of immanent Word.”
638
  
 
Terminology of Person  
Rahner’s criticism of the term “person” is similar to Barth, in that it is in danger of 
tritheism, because the term “person” means “individual.” Nonetheless, asserts Rahner, we 
have to note that the term “person” has survived for more than 1500 years. Rahner 
suggests we use the phrase “distinct manner of subsistence” rather than “person” or 
“modes of being” (seinsweise). “Distinct manner of subsistence” means that there are 
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“not three consciousnesses” in the Godhead, but rather, “the one consciousness” in a 
threefold way shared by Father, Son, and Spirit. Through this change in terminology, 
Rahner wants to avoid both modalism and tritheism both “by speaking of distinct manner 
of subsistence” and “by speaking of subsistence which is not ‘as personal’ as person.”
639
  
 
Some Debates 
Let us think about critical reflections. Although Rahner’s rule has been called a “decisive 
watershed,” argues Karkkainen, it is an irony to note that the Trinity did not play any 
significant role in Rahner’s own systematic theology. We can consider Rahner’s 
contribution which relates the “divine life” to “salvation history” as the “gateway to the 
knowledge of God.” Ted Peters describes Rahner’s significance as follows: There is 
“relationality in God.” God’s relationship to the world is not external but internal to the 
divine life (Father). God in the incarnation includes the humanity of the historical Jesus 
(Son). God in the Holy Spirit binds believers to Christ (Holy Spirit), so that in faith they 
are “at one with Christ” and “at one with God.”
640
  
 There are some criticisms. First is the radical identity problem between ET and IT. 
This identity could compromise divine freedom, because the ET-IT distinction protects 
divine freedom. In this sense there is a concern about the “total collapse of IT into ET,” 
which makes God a finite God who is dependent upon the world. This entails the 
question of the “newness” of the revelation of God. That is, if God’s incarnation does not 
introduce anything new to the world, God’s self-revelation is meaningless. After the 
incarnation, the cross and resurrection, God exists in a newly different way. Although he 
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keeps the idea of immutability, he also accepts the significance of the incarnation as 
something new. Second is the distinction problem between ET and IT. It means 
subordinationism which considers ET as a “temporal image” or a “superficial act” of 
eternal Trinity (IT).
641
   
 Then, how can we solve the tension between ET and IT, neither fully equating nor 
separating them? According to Lacugna, Rahner’s rule relates to his theological method 
which in turn relates to “the order of theological knowledge” to the “historical form of 
God’s self-communication in Christ and the Spirit.” Does Rahner conceive his rule 
epistemologically or ontologically? Epistemologically speaking, the rule says that no gap 
exists between IT and ET. However, does Rahner go beyond the epistemological 
principle (order of knowing) to an ontological identity (order of being)? Karkkainen 
argues that Rahner only wants to connect divine life with salvation history, which is a 
faithful way to know God. Edmund Hill calls Rahner’s rule a “theological shorthand” in 
the sense that ET means the mystery of the Trinity as revealed in the economy of 
salvation “through such saving events and realities as the incarnation, Pentecost, the 
Church.”642  
 With regard to God’s “self-expression” and “self-possession,” Rahner accepts 
Hegel’s dialectical idea that it is “in the Son” (incarnation, salvation historical events) as 
the other that the Father reveals himself “to possess the Spirit in himself.” However, like 
DiNoia, we can ask whether God’s free expression could be the result of God’s necessity. 
However, says Karkkainen, Rahner did not move in this way, since Rahner placed the 
external self-expression already “in a prior act of the inner life of God, in eternity.” That 
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is, “It is because God must express himself inwardly that he can also utter himself 
outwardly; the finite, created utterance ad extra is a continuation of the immanent 
constitution of ‘image and likeness’—a free continuation.” In order to preserve God’s 
freedom, Yves Congar asserts that although there is only one Trinity, self-communication 
as “condescension, kenosis” is “not connatural with the being of the divine Persons.” 
Thus there is a disparity between God in se (IT) and God ad extra (ET). In the sense, 
LaCugna maintains that although God’s incomprehensibility or ineffable mystery is not 
reduced to God’s self-expression in the salvation history, because of the identity between 
theologia and oikonomia, God’s self-revelation in Christ and the Spirit reveals God’s 
nature.643 
 To that extent, then, like Barth, Rahner kept the classical belief, i.e., God’s eternal 
being ultimately independent of historical events. If so, we can ask: Can we affirm both 
God’s presence in the salvation history and God’s priority over the human capacity to 
explain self-communication? Beyond the epistemological principle, LaCugna and 
Moltmann affirm an “ontological identity between ET and IT” in relation to eschatology. 
While accepting Rahner’s rule in epistemological dimension, by the same token Ted 
Peters maintains a distinction between the IT and ET “as eschatological.” We here need 
to understand “time and eternity.” For Peters, since eternity does not mean 
“timelessness,” but rather “everlastingness” that includes the temporal history, as “what 
happens in time contributes to the content of what is eternal.” Thus whereas eternity is 
interrelated to history, God’s action is not separated from the God’s eternity.
644
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C) Moltmann 
Moltmann considers God as “triunity, the three-in-one,” since he prefers the “threeness of 
God” to the “unity” based on a “monotheistic” concept of God. In this sense, Moltmann 
suggests “social doctrine of the Trinity” (social trinity) which focuses on “relationships 
and communities,” rejecting the immutability doctrine of classical theism.
645
 However, 
threeness means neither “three different individuals” (tritheism) nor “three modes of 
being or three repetitions of the One God” (modalism). And the concept of divine unity 
does not mean “monadic unity,” or “the one lordship of God,”
646
 but the “union of the tri-
unity,” “fellowship,” “communicable unity,” and “open, inviting unity, capable of 
interaction.”647 Divine unity needs to be understood as follows: “without reducing the 
threeness to the unity, or dissolving the unity in the threeness.”648 Furthermore, 
Moltmann relates the salvation history in eschatology to the “trinitarian life of God in 
itself.” In other words, ET completes IT when the history of salvation is completed.
649
 
For Moltmann Trinity presupposes Christology, since “the cross of the Son stands from 
eternity in the centre of the Trinity,” emphasizing the idea of God’s suffering. Then, ask 
the people, how can we consider Christ’s passion as God’s revelation, if God cannot 
suffer? However, insofar as the cross is the most important difference from stories of 
other gods, and God’s passion is an “active passion,” Moltmann advocates the “doctrine 
of theopathy.”
650
 “God was in Christ” (II Cor. 5.19) means that God acted “in the 
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crucifixion of Jesus” and made Himself “visible in the cross of Christ.”
651
 In the Christ 
we can see “a negation (expiation) of the negation (sin).”652  
 In the relation between God and the world, Moltmann develops some important 
concepts. First is Zimzum. In the mutual relationship between God and the world, 
Moltmann considers the creation of the world as “God’s self-humiliation” and develops it 
with the help of the Jewish kabbalistic notion of zimzum (self-limitation). This is called 
“Trinitarian creation.”
653
 Second is perichoresis. For Moltmann this unity must be 
understood “in the perichoresis of the divine Persons.” Furthermore, this perichoresis 
relates to the world. Third is Shekinah (indwelling): When everything is in God and God 
is in all, there is “mutual indwelling.” The God’s eschatological indwelling is the 
presence of God in the world.654 Fourth is doxology: Doxology is our response to God’s 
salvation for us all. Doxological response means “participation in and transformation into 
God rather than an attempt to know God in se.
655
 With regard to the trinitarian grammar, 
since knowing means “knowing in wonder,” we can know God “by the way of 
worshiping the Triune God.” This is “doxological knowledge” and “true Trinitarian 
grammar!”
656
 
 On the one hand, Moltmann’s Trinity contributes to feminism (Elizabeth Johnson), 
liberationism (Leonardo Boff), and even evangelicalism (Millard J. Ericksson).657 On the 
other hand, there are weak points: First is Tritheism. Ted Peters argues that Moltmann’s 
social doctrine of the Trinity on the “three separate subjects” sacrifice divine unity.
658
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Second, the idea of the cross or death of God would make God too much dependent on 
the world. Thus people ask, can the suffering God overcome suffering and evil?659 
 
Relation between Immanent Trinity and Economic Trinity 
Let us think about the issue of the relationship between Immanent Trinity and Economic 
Trinity. Immanent (and necessary) Trinity and Economic Trinity can be expressed in 
juxtaposition as follows: God in himself and God for us; Theologia and Oikonomia;
660
 
Deus Absconditus and Deus Revelatus; Deus Nudus [naked God] and Deus Incarnatus 
[incarnate God];
661
 The Substance and The Revelation; Opera trinitatis ad intra 
(Inwardness) and Opera trinitatis ad extra (Outwardness). Like these distinctions, there 
are two sides to understanding the doctrine of the Trinity. Without the right side, 
obviously, we in no way comprehend the left side inasmuch as we cannot have direct 
access to the left side without the right side. And vise versa?  
 Von Balthasar relates the Cross to the Trinity in the view of soteriology, since the 
man Jesus cannot save the world, if he is not God in the Hypostatic Union. However, 
Von Balthasar’s way is different from that of many theologians who emphasize ET. 
Rahner, for example, would assert that it is only in ET that God’s self-communication is 
revealed, and he considers IT merely a “precondition for God’s true, earnest self-
revelation.”
662
 Von Balthasar goes a different way which is “neither a formal process of 
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self-communication in God, as in Rahner, nor entangled in the world process, as in 
Moltmann.” God’s relation to the world is not necessary but is, rather, free and self-
giving love. The Father imparts Godhead to the Son, when the Father’s self-utterance in 
the Son is “an initial kenosis,” and the Father “is this movement of self-giving that holds 
nothing back” (an absolute renunciation”). The Son’s response to God’s gift (equal 
substance) is “eternal thanksgiving (eucharistia) to the Father.” However, since Von 
Balthasar asserts that even in this participation, there is “an absolute, infinite ‘distance,’” 
he does not agree with process theology’s assertion of a mutual identity between “the 
world process” (even including the Cross) and “the eternal and timelss ‘procession’ of the 
Hypostases in God.” Rather, he accepts that we can approach the triune God only “on the 
basis of what is manifest in God’s kenosis” in the theology of the Cross. Thus he accepts 
both the “mystery of the absolute” and “the possibility of such experience and suffering” 
in God. This avoids God’s suffing but accepts God’s sharing in the suffering world.
663
  
 When the Father gives Himself to the Son in the “primal divine drama,” he does 
not lose himself, since he is the “whole divine essence.” God has infinite power and 
powerlessness in that God is God in the kenosis. The Son receives in his thanksgiving 
both “omnipotence and powerlessness from the Father” and the world can be 
‘recapitulated” only in the Son. Here we can see the Father’s self-giving and the Son’s 
thanksgiving.
664
 The divine drama lasts forever: “The Father was never without the Son, 
nor were Father and Son ever without the Spirit.” Von Balthasar does not accept 
Hegelian dialectics to explain the God-world relationship but rather approaches it from 
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two sides, first from negative theology, and second from the world drama which is 
grounded in God.665  
 Von Balthasar argues that “the inner-trinitarian kenosis is part of the inner-
trinitarian perichoresis, in Latin: circuminsessio.” That is, there is the unity of God the 
Father and Jesus the Son, “without mixing and without separating”: “I am in the Father, 
and the Father is in me” (John 14:11).
666
 In Rahner’s rule, the accent obviously lies on ET, 
insofar as the Son is the self-utterance of the Father and the Spirit is the Father’s self-
giving together with the Son.
667
 Catherine LaCugna interprets Rahner’s rule as follows: 
“An immanent theology of the Trinity is not a theology of a purely intradivine Trinity of 
self-communication of persons unrelated to the world.”668 That is, “the referent for the IT 
is not ‘God in se,’ or ‘God’s essence as it is in itself.’”669 Rather, what God has revealed 
in Christ and the Spirit is the reality of God as God from all eternity and what is given in 
the economy of salvation is the mystery of God which exists from all eternity as triune. 
However, since the distinction between economic and immanent Trinity is “strictly 
conceptual,” not ontological, there are not two trinities, i.e., the Trinity of experience and 
a transeconomic Trinity.
670
  
  Let me here reflect again both the IT and the ET with LaCugna’s interpretation of 
Rahner’s rule: “God freely, utterly and completely bestows God’s very self in the 
                                                 
 
665
 TD IV, 327.  
 
666
 Moltmann, “God’s Kenosis in the Creation and Consummation of the World,” in Polkinghorne, 
Work of Love: Creation as Kenosis, 141.  
 
667
 TD IV, 320.  
 
668
 Catherine LaCugna, God for Us: the Trinity and Christian Life, 224. There is only one self-
communication of God, one begetting of the Son, one breathing forth of the Spirit, with both eternal and 
temporal aspects. An immanent theology of the Trinity is ineluctably a theology of the ‘internal’ structure 
of the economy of redemption. LaCugna accepts Eberhard Jüngel’s position: The distinction between 
immanent and economic Trinity “corresponds to the old distinction between ‘theology’ (theologia) and 
‘economy’ (oikonomia). But it is legitimate only when the economic doctrine of the Trinity deals with 
God’s history with [humanity], and the immanent doctrine of the Trinity is its summarizing concept. Ibid.  
 
669
 LaCugna, God for Us, 231.  
 
670
 LaCugna, God for Us, 212.  
 190  
encounter with human persons, yet God remains ineffable because the creature is 
incapable of fully receiving or understanding the One who is imparted.” 671 That is, even 
though God reveals Himself in the ET and the ET is not other than IT, we cannot fully 
know God only because of our human inability to know God. In this case, however, God 
at best exists as immanent transcendence, i.e., IT within ET. However, is it enough? If so, 
is it not possible that not only God but also human beings remain ineffable? Can I fully 
know even myself even though I do not have Humanus Absonditus? Can I fully explain 
others even though they have just Humanus Revelatus? If we say that just as we cannot 
explain our human history or phenomena in some parts, so we cannot comprehend God 
even in economic Trinity, why do we call God also Deus Absconditus? Even if we 
completely understand God, that is, even when we see God face to face, does it mean that 
deus absconditus disappears? If we answer “Yes,” how can we make distinct ineffability 
between “God” and “human being”? Where can we find infinite qualitative difference 
between God and human beings? Thus, even though IT can be revealed only through ET, 
and they are not two different trinities, I would like to argue that IT is bigger than ET. In 
this sense, I do not agree with Rahner’s rule: “The economic Trinity is the immanent 
Trinity, and vise versa.” 
 Balthasar exactly answers this question: “The only comparison available to us is 
the free self-opening of one human subject to another, where the person addressed has no 
inherent right to the knowledge thus imparted. But this analogy too fails at the crucial 
point: even information freely shared between equals cannot be compared with God 
giving creatures a share in his inner life, a life which, to them, is “fundamentally foreign” 
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and an inaccessible mystery.”
672
 To that extent, then, we cannot even more comprehend 
IT because IT is always more than ET. If it is not, how can we say, as Augustine declares, 
“Deus semper major?” Can we not explain that there is difference between ‘God’ and 
‘God for us’ even though we do not deny that there is only one self-communication of 
one God from all eternity, not two different trinities?
673
 
 In conclusion, the deeper our knowledge of God, the more unfathomable (Eph 
3:8) the divine love becomes. As Von Balthasar contends, the more Deus Revelatus 
shows up, the more undisclosed the Deus Absconditus becomes.
674
 That is, even though 
‘Deus Absconditus’ reveals ‘Deus Revelatus,’ ‘Deus Revelatus’ cannot completely reveal 
the mystery of Deus Absconditus. And God remains, paradoxically, hidden even in the 
event of revelation. Even though God’s revelation in Jesus Christ is completely 
trustworthy, because it is Jesus Christ in whom the revelation of God is decisively 
embodied,
675
 we cannot fully comprehend the being of God and God’s gifts of creation, 
reconciliation, and redemption,
676
 because of the limitation of humanity itself. Even in 
the beatific vision or in virtue of the lumen gloriae (light of glory), argues Anselm Min, 
“God does not cease to be infinite.”
677
   
 
3) Transcendence  
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Since the days of early Christian tradition, there have been no more controversial 
conceptions in theology than those expressed by the two words, transcendence and 
immanence. To solve this tension might be a perennial task of theology. Roughly 
speaking, whereas transcendence means God’s superiority, otherness, independence, or 
separation from creation, immanence means the close relationship, the intimacy of God in 
the world. In the relation between transcendence and immanence, on the one hand, if we 
emphasize only the former, how can we explain “God for us”? On the other hand, if we 
emphasize only the latter, how can we then worship God, because worship is possible 
only when we admit a qualitative difference? How is it possible to insist on God’s 
transcendence and immanence simultaneously? In fact, while liberal theology emphasizes 
divine immanence, classical theism focuses on divine transcendence, although they have 
their respective counterparts.  
 
A) Transcendence   
There are many examples of radical transcendence both in the Old Testament and the 
New Testament. First, Isaiah 55:8-9 is the most concrete expression of the difference 
between the infinite and the finite, that difference being that God’s thoughts and God’s 
ways are not ours but are higher than ours. This God “hides” himself (Isaiah 45:15) and 
has measured the world in his hand (Isaiah 40:12). In the New Testament, we can see the 
preexistence of Christ before the world (John 1:1, Colossians 1:17). Althogh we build 
houses for God, God the Most High does not live in the houses made by us, because God 
already made all these things (Acts 7:48-50). Thus God’s wisdom and knowledge are 
beyond the ken of human beings (Romans 11: 33-34). 
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 C. S. Lewis’s insight shows us the radical difference or distance between God and 
human beings. 
The man who does not regard God as other than himself cannot be said to have a religion at 
all. On the other hand, if I think God other than myself in the same way in which my 
fellow-men, and objects in general, are other than myself, I am beginning to make Him an 
idol. I am daring to treat His existence as somehow parallel to my own. But He is the 
ground of our being. He is always both within us and over against us. Our reality is so much 
from His reality as He, moment by moment, projects into us. The deeper the level within 
ourselves from which our prayer, or any other act, wells up, the more it is His, but not at all 
the less ours. Rather, most ours when most His.
678
 
 
That is, if we consider God as existing at the same level as human beings, then God is not 
God but an idol. As Balthasar argues, without this distance between God and humans, 
there could be “‘no genuine intercourse,’ ‘no dialogue,’ and hence ‘no drama’” between 
God and humans.
679
  
 As one of the leading scholars of “radical orthodoxy,” John Milbank describes a 
modern world that has lost transcendence or height, but “there was still depth.”
680
 The 
Radical Orthodox thinkers want to return to classical traditions based on patristic and 
medieval roots, calling for the reappropriation of transcendence in Abrahamic religions, 
i.e., Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The cosmology of this theory comes from two ideas 
about reality contained in Platonic thought, i.e., the eternal and immutable realm and the 
worldly realm of becoming. In that sense, “the worldly realm derives its reality from its 
‘participation’ (methexis) in the immutable forms.”
681
  
  
B) Immanence  
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There are many examples of radical immanence both in the Old Testament and the New 
Testament. God is not far away but nearby and fills heaven and earth, so that no one can 
hide from God (Jer. 23:23-24). God is omnipresent to the heaven and in the depths (Ps. 
139:7-8), and, accordingly, “in him we live and move and have our being’” (Acts 17:27-
28). 
 Donald G. Bloesch’s diagnosis of today’s trends with regard to the doctrine of 
God is proper to start this section:  
“A new immanentalism is displacing the transcendentalism that has hitherto 
characterized both Catholic and Protestant theology. The emphasis today is not on 
the almightiness of God but on his vulnerability. Attention is given to God’s 
empathy with the world rather than his majesty, his pathos rather than his infinite 
beatitude. The idea of a suffering God is supplanting the idea of an impassible God, 
vigorously defended in Christian tradition. God is no longer the infinite supreme 
being beyond world history but now ‘the Infinite in the finite’ (Schleiermacher). 
God is no longer a static Infinite but now a dynamic Infinite that ‘emerges’ out of 
the void but also ‘rushes’ in (Sri Aurobindo).”682  
 
In other words, God is not beyond the world as the infinite Supreme Being, but in the 
finite as a dynamic infinite. Tillich argues that when God and the world participate in 
each other, everything finite participates in being itself, as the structure of being. That is, 
being itself is not the universal essence of the world, because it transcends the 
essence/existence split and does not participate in nonbeing but infinitely transcends 
everything finite.
683
 Thomas Altizer also argues that God in the world “emptied” and 
negated his own original Totality, and identified Himself with humanity and descended 
into the opposite of its original identity. Thus “transcendence becomes immanence just as 
Spirit becomes flesh.”
684
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Conflict of Two Positions 
Is there any way to solve this tension between transcendence and immanece? On the one 
hand, can we speak of difference alone which does not express a mutual interrelation 
between God and the world? On the other hand, can we speak of only mutual 
transcendence? If we speak of mutual transcendence, we have to say that just as God dies 
for us in order to save the world, so we die for God in order to save God. Mutual 
transcendence in this sense, strictly speaking, is pantheism. Even though God relates to 
the world, we have to make a room for God. If this radical orthodoxy insists on radical 
transcendence, is it possible to speak of God without transcendence? If a doctrine of God 
adheres to immanence alone, why does it need God? In this seemingly irreconcilable 
dispute, can transcendence and immanence not love each other? Is immanence the axis of 
evil from the perspective of classical theism? Is transcendence a vacant idea from the 
perspective of liberal theology? People usually ask these questions as follows: does God 
exist only beyond the world? Does God act only in this world? While the former question 
would be that of process theology, roughly speaking, the latter might be that of classical 
theism. Strictly speaking, however, those who insist on either radical transcendence or 
radical immanence also at the very least accept the opposite view. For example, even 
process theology, according to Cobb, makes a distinction with “a Binity” between God’s 
double reality, “God in God’s transcendence” and “God in God’s immanence,” that is, 
ontologically in God’s nature and experientially in God in the world. Nevertheless, there 
is only one God: the God who is immanent in the world is nothing else than the God who 
is transcendent.
685
 Nowadays, some people attempt to harmonize two contrasts as 
“transcendental immanence” or “immanent transcendence.” Let me consider 
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“transcendental immanence” as kenosis and “immanent transcendence” as theosis. 
However, I would like to make a plausible balance between immanence and 
transcendence not by either-or, but by both-and. We need to remember that the 
transcendent God alone can be immanent.  
  
Dipolarity between Transcendence and Immanence  
We need to find a model which contains dipolarity. Isaiah 57:15 shows us both 
transcendence and immanence: “For this is what the high and lofty One says—he who 
lives forever, whose name is holy: ‘I live in a high and holy place, but also with him who 
is contrite and lowly in spirit, to revive the spirit of the lowly and to revive the heart of 
the contrite.” A more persuasive model of God consists in both transcendence and 
immanence. Ware considers God as pantokrator which means both “almighty” and “he 
who holds all things in unity.” In the Christian traditions Ware finds two aspects of God: 
“without beginning, invisible, incomprehensible, indescribable, changeless,” and 
“everywhere present and filling everything.”
686
 Saint Maximus the Confessor argues that 
since Christ the creator Logos planted a logos (word or thought) in every creature, each 
thing is “a personal word addressed to us by the Creator.” Other Greek Fathers speak 
God’s transcendent essence (ousia) and his immanent energies. While God is totally 
transcendent in his essence, in the sense, God is radically immanent in his energies.
687
 Let 
us find some models or alternatives to solve this tension.  
                                                 
 
686
 Ware, “God Immanent yet Transcendent,” 157-158. Ware finds a beautiful expression 
concerning divine omnipresence from Gospel of Thomas: “‘Cut the wood in two, and I am there; lift up the 
stone, and there you will find me’ (logion 77).” Ibid.  
 
687
 Ware, “God Immanent yet Transcendent,” 160. Ware traces the model of the essence-energies 
in history of theology. Philo of Alexandria: “while God is unknowable in his nature (physis), he is revealed 
to us in his ‘acts of power’ (dynameis); Clement of Alexandria: “God is ‘far off in his essence (ousia) but 
very near in his power (dynamei), which embraces all things;” Athanasius of Alexandria: “‘God is in 
essence (ousia) outside the universe… but he is present in everything through his acts of power 
 197  
Alternative 1)  
In The Touch of Transcendence, Mayra Rivera uses a term “relational transcendence” 
which inextricably affirms “not only the irreducible difference of God from all creatures, 
but the complex differences among creatures as well.”
688
 Although Rivera accepts God’s 
Other, “wholly Other” (Barth), “infinite qualitative difference” (Kierkegaard), or 
transcendence, her main idea of transcendence is “not beyond our touch,” that is, 
“transcendence within creation and between creatures: a relational transcendence.” From 
this perspective, Barth’s dictum, “Gott ist im Himmel, du bist auf der Erde (God is in 
heaven, thou art on earth)” and “a tangent touch of a circle, that is, without touching it,” 
ignores human distinction. However, Rivera argues a relational transcendence touching 
creatures, “embracing their irreducible differences.”689 That is, Rivera accepts 
transcendence not as otherworldliness but as the one in contact with the concrete realities 
of our world. Rivera’s emphasis is to relate God’s difference or transcendence to 
interhuman difference, which insists that “God can be perceived as an extreme instance 
of interhuman difference,” so that God’s transcendence cannot be separated from 
theological anthropology.
690
  
 Rivera emphasizes both human and divine transcendence which is “no longer a 
mere option,” but “the principle and most urgent imperative:” respect for God’s 
transcendence or otherness is interrelated with our respect of other creatures.
691
 However, 
Rivera’s view that God is an extreme form of interhuman difference might be the same 
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idea as that God can be reached if the space of world is extended, which panentheism 
does not accept. In the definition of panentheism, we can find the possibility of 
transcendence, the definition that although the world is in God, God is “more than” the 
world. Here the term “More Than” means transcendence. Although I understand Rivera’s 
interest, this position should not reduce difference between God and creatures to the 
difference between creatures themselves.
692
 Her idea of transcendence is the one which is 
encountered in creatures, so I call it “immanent transcendence.”  
 On the other side, Rivera makes a distinction between the radical orthodox 
position and the position of Levinas in the conception of immanence. Immanence for 
radical orthodox means a world without transcendence outside the created world. 
However, for Levinas, immanence is not opposed so much to transcendence as to 
difference, since “immanence means sameness.” In this sense, transcendence goes 
beyond the sameness to the face of Other, i.e., the face of difference, which is not 
abstraction but the very singular. Transcendence is not outside of human relations, but in 
the encounter of one person facing another.
693
 Levinas defines that “Transcendence 
designates a relation with a reality infinitely distant from my own reality, yet without this 
distance destroying this relation and without the relation destroying this distance.”694 
Modifying Levinas’ definition, Rivera argues that “transcendence designates a relation 
with a reality irreducibly different from my own reality, without this difference 
destroying this relation and without the relation destroying this difference.”
695
 Although 
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there is relation between self and other, or between God and world, Rivera maintains that 
“distinctions are not erased.”696 For Irigaray, by the same token, the cosmos is “not pure 
immanence,” but “the site of transcendence in flesh.” Therefore the death of the 
transcendence of the world comes from Otherness (difference) to sameness 
(immanence).
697
  
 We can recognize that a common denominator for Rivera, Levinas, and Irigaray is 
horizontal transcendence and that it is related to ethics. According to Rivera, if God is 
found in the Other and relates us to Other, ethics is the significant position in theology. 
Theology should embrace without grasping or reducing Other in order to transform our 
eyes and ears.698 In our daily singular lives, since we encounter the Other who is already 
glorified and blessed by God’s love, we have to love the Other.699 Thus the perception of 
the transcendence of the Other is “the glory of God.”
700
  
 
Alternative 2)  
Palamas also argues that God is not a “nature or being” among other objects but “beyond 
being” (hyperousios), that God is “All,” because without God’s constant interruption, 
nothing could exist. Thus, for Palamas, God is either everywhere or no-where. That is, 
“[God] is (paradoxically) both existent and nonexistent; he is everywhere and nowhere; 
he has many names and he cannot be named; he is ever-moving and his is unmoved and, 
in short, he is everything and nothing.”
701
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 Palamas insists the differences are threefold “between essence, energy, and 
hypostasis” in God. With regard to essence, God does not participate in the world. With 
regard to hypostasis, it is accomplished only in the Logos, the God-man. Thus with 
regard to energy, the world can attain “union with God.” Palamas here describes three 
levels of union. First is “union ‘according to essence.’” We cannot be united with God in 
essence, since if we are one in essence with God, we become God, so that theosis 
(deification) should not be interpreted as “one with God in essence.” Second is “union 
‘according to hypostasis.’” It appeared at the incarnation as the unification between 
Godhead and manhood in Jesus Christ the Theanthropos. Although we are “sons in the 
Son,” we and God cannot be a single person, because even in the mystical union, the 
saints still keep their own human identity. Third is “union ‘according to energy.’” 
Although human beings are one with God, because “God is all in all,” they still remain in 
their own nature. The distinction-in-unity between God’s essence and God’s uncreated 
energies shows “an unmediated union in love” between God and the world.
702
 Palamas 
concludes that “one, single, living, and active God is present wholly and entirely: 1. on 
the level of ousia, in the total simplicity of his divine being; 2. on the level of hypostasis, 
in the threefold diversity of the divine persons; 3. on the level of energeia, in the 
indivisible multiplicity of his creative and redemptive work.” Thus, for Palamas, God is 
“radically transcendent in his essence,” and “radically immanent in his omnipresent 
energies.”
703
 Ware finds the contact point between divine transcendence and divine 
immanence in the divine self-diffusive love: the divine energies mean “love in action.”
704
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Alternative 3)  
Macquarrie explains the relationship between transcendence and immanence as an 
element of a dialectical concept of God. On the one hand, God’s transcendence means 
“otherness” from the world (the ontological difference), “precedence” over the world 
(creative source), and “surpassing” (transcendence) of the merely natural levels of 
existence (the ground of the order which manifests itself in nature). On the other hand, 
God’s immanence means “indwelling of the creation,” that is, God’s presence in the 
world. God is “wholly transcendent” and “wholly immanent,” in that some half-way 
position in either would make both weak. In order to explain this relation, Macquarrie 
uses a metaphor of the relationship between an artist and his or her art-work. When an 
artist imagines, produces and then gives a production to the world, although he 
transcends his work, he is immanent and permeates his work.
705
  
 Macquarrie explains God’s creation with the idea of emanation of Plotinus, which 
emphasizes the “divine immanence and the intimacy of the God-world relation.” When 
God creates the world, especially human beings, “God both makes man of the dust of the 
ground and then breathes into him the breath of life.” This means God’s self-giving to the 
men. Likewise, Macquarrie derives emanation from even Barth, although Barth does not 
like that term. When the Bible uses a special formula, “Let us make,” in the creation of 
man, “it is a summons to intradivine unanimity of intention and decision.” Macquarrie 
interprets this expression as follows: “in the creation of man, God endows him with 
something that he has summoned out of his own inner nature.” And since God has 
offered something of himself in and with Israel’s election, God is in the Israelites. 
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Macquarrie also emphasizes that, although there is no necessity for creation, God thereby 
puts another from himself in the form of the “mysterious primordial event of giving.”706   
  
Between Heaven and Earth  
Let me describe the relation of transcendence and immanence with an image of between 
heaven and earth. This looks like pop song words but the meaning of these two words is 
wide and various, as unlimited spaces between two substances. It is not a lie to say that 
the history of the meaning of these words started with the history of the universe. This 
has such meanings as scientific principles derived from study of the origin of the universe 
and philosophical principles which try to explain the foundation of all questions. The 
Bible also says, “In the beginning God created the heaven (sky) and the earth.” What is 
the sky? What is the earth? Is the sky just the sky? Is the earth just the earth? If we ask 
the meaning of these words, should we answer that the sky is the sky and the earth is the 
earth? Does that explain it? In a dictionary, we read that “the sky is the upper atmosphere 
as seen from the earth’s surface” and “the earth is the land surface of the world.” How, 
then, can we locate the boundary between the sky and the earth so as to divide them one 
from the other? If the boundary is that which neither excludes nor includes, where is the 
boundary between them? The cloud? The summit of Everest Mountain? The Rocky 
Mountains? If not, is this the horizon where they meet? Simply speaking, there is no any 
boundary, is there? They communicate with each other, don't they? However, I mean 
neither that two substances are the same, nor that they can exchange their places. I just 
want to remove eternal dualism. 
 The most important fact is that we are living between the sky and the earth. The 
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following is a significant question; what is the reason for living as a human between the 
sky and the earth? Where does the confidence, with which we are living in this world, 
come from? This may come from our self-question, “Who are you? Where are you?” If 
we do not ask about ourselves, we will lose our language. If we lose our language, our 
existence will disappear. If we stop questioning, our lives will have no meaning. We 
become only a dead flesh, even though we live. Furthermore, we want to have honesty 
around these questions. We should ask essential questions, questions which lead us to 
become ourselves; questions which are neither superficial nor unnecessary. In my case, 
when asking myself these ontological questions, and trying to answer them, I see that I 
would like to live the sort of life which unites my daily life and history. My life should 
make contact with the point of subject and object, eastern and western society, individual 
and universe, time and eternity, and the sky and earth. In other words, I would hope that 
my daily life is leading to history. This may be the revolution of life, a paradigm shift, 
and a heavenly experience which makes manifest the kingdom of God within me. I will 
recognize this on the last day: that I was on the best path during a significant number of 
many occasions when I will have looked at God's marvelous panorama.  
 This idea came from the many cows which were eating grass in the field, cows in 
the field, many of which never saw the sky. If there was only one cow that saw the sky, it 
might become a metaphysical cow, and would try to suggest the ontological foundation 
of the cow. The only difference between the human and the cow is whether or not they 
see the sky. However, too huge is the difference in the meaning. When we live in 
stepping on the earth, not seeing the sky but seeing just earth, someone who sees the sky 
calls us a stupid cow. Someday, we will be on the table of the people who see the sky. 
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We should not be foolish humans who do not hear the voice of the sky, but see the sky as 
Other which make us constantly ask about ourselves and the world, because, after all, the 
initiative of the salvation comes from the sky. We should listen to the voice of the sky 
speaking to us today. Anyone who lives in this world should not make a “Cartel of 
Silence” when confronted by the voice of the sky. The voice of the sky is God’s initial 
aim in Whithead’s terms. God’s initial aim knocks for us to open our hearts and requires 
our response: “Here I am! I stand at the door and knock. If anyone hears my voice and 
opens the door, I will come in and eat with him, and he with me” (Revelation 3:20). In 
other words, we should not look away from the passage of life about which the sky 
continually tells us. We should not fall down into the monopoly of the death which leads 
everyone to a hollow. Rather, we need to see again the sky today. That we live between 
heaven and earth means that we see the sky above our head and feel the earth under our 
feet. How comfortable we are as we stand on the earth and see the sky! We are free now, 
between heaven and earth. 
 In conclusion, I argue that whereas immanence without transcendence may be 
blind, transcendence without immanence is vacant, since God cannot be confined within 
one-sideness. Whereas if God is only in transcendence, this God can be the God of 
docetism, but not the Christian God; if God is only in immanent, God must be the one of 
creatures. Thus God has both transcendence and immanence.  
 
4) Worship  
“Worship him who made the heavens, the earth, the sea and the springs of water” 
(Revelation 14:7).  
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“Sovereign Lord, as you have promised, you now dismiss your servant in 
peace. For my eyes have seen your salvation, which you have prepared in 
the sight of all people, a light for revelation to the Gentiles and for glory to 
your people Israel” (Luke 2:29-32 called Nunc Dimittis). 
 
Great are you, O Lord, and exceedingly worthy of praise; your power is 
immense, and your wisdom beyond reckoning. And so we humans, who are 
a due part of your creation, long to praise you—we who carry our mortality 
about with us, carry the evidence of our sin and with it the proof that you 
thwart the proud. Yet these humans, due part of your creation as they are, 
still do long to praise you. You arouse us so that praising you may bring us 
joy, because you have made us and drawn us to yourself, and our heart is 
unquiet until it rests in you.
707
 
 
What is worship? Worship is to bow down our head to God and to close our eyes from 
the world. This is in a sense the simplest and the holiest attitude to God. Then, why does 
and should worship take a position in panentheism? Does panentheism really consider 
and need worship? If panentheism means “all-in-God,” I strongly suggest, all must 
worship God, because, without God, “all” (the world) are nothing, so that just as the 
Bible proclaims that “Let everything that has breath praise the LORD. Praise the LORD” 
(Psalms 150:6),
708
 so we have to worship God in our life and in this world. Most 
worshipers want to confess their mind to God and want to receive God’s comfort in 
worship, pharaphrasing Augustine’s saying that our heart is quiet when it rests in God. 
Since worshippers receive any religious calmness not from people, but from God, they 
worship God, so that we should not devalue such worship. Even though God is radically 
related to the world, God must be the One who must receive worship from us. Is it not the 
privilege of believers to look at the above, think of God, and pray to God, when they feel 
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lonely or are in unspeakable suffering? Worship is not the escape from the current 
situation like Marx’s criticism of religion but total reliance on God. No matter what kinds 
of theology we explore, God must be the object of worship. Since one of the greatest 
abilities that human beings can find in themselves is the ability to sing a song, if we apply 
this ability to God, it is to praise God. In this section I defend the importance of 
“worshipability” as a criterion for an adequate Christian model of God in panentheism 
“without sacrificing God’s Lordship over history.”
709
 
 Insofar as worship flows from human beings to God, not vise versa, and is to raise 
our hands toward God’s grace, which is stretching God’s two hands to us, worship shows 
the terminal point of difference between God and the world. If God and the world 
eternally existed at the same time from the beginning because of God's necessity, and if 
God is not superior to the world, how can we consider God as God and worship God? 
And if we accept God's necessity to the world, we cannot deny “Schleiermacher’s 
motto”: “Kein Gott ohne Welt, so wie keine Welt ohne Gott.” That is, we cannot accept 
God's existence without the world. However, does God not exist regardless of the world? 
If God’s transcendence over the world simply means the mutual transcendence of God 
and the world, should God also worship us?  
 Then in what sense does God become God and why do we worship God but not 
the world? Why do we call God, “God,” and not the world, “God?” Where can we find 
Deus semper major? Since it is not any other actual entities but God that gives the world 
initial aim even in process theology, God has priority over anything else. In the sense, we 
need to listen to Calvin’s saying that “genuine knowledge of God is inseparable from 
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worship and service.”
710
 Philipp Melanchthon points out the same view that “we adore 
the mysteries of the Godhead. That is better than to investigate them.” And for the church 
fathers “knowing” means “knowing in wonder. By knowing or perceiving one 
participates in the life of the other.” Karkkainen considers “Trinitarian grammar” as 
“doxological knowledge, knowing God by the way of worshiping the Triune God—
Father, Son, and Spirit.”
711
 Insofar as theology must help us praise God, argues 
Moltmann, real theology finds expression “in thanks, praise and adoration.”
712
  
 Then where can we meet God’s wonder and awe? Where can we worship God? 
Don Saliers answers both in daily life and in liturgy. “[W]e can meet God in the liturgy 
because of what is given in daily life; and we can recognize what is given in daily life 
because of what we continually rehearse and receive in the liturgy.”713 We should not 
make a distinction between our daily life and worship. In the sense, worship is also 
intertwined to an ethical dimension (daily life). Acts 2:42-47 speaks to us of both social 
and religious aspects. When the early church members were together, they did not only 
share their possessions but also praised God. While sharing is a horizontal or ethical 
dimension in relation to others, praising is a vertical or religious one in relation to God. 
Thus we need both dimensions: ethical (horizontal) and religious (vertical).  
 If we emphasized only the one, it would reduce the Christian life of communion 
to no more than a kind of well constructed social group, whereas if we focused on the 
other, the Christian life would become the source of a fanatically religious group apart 
from the concrete life in the world. Theology has not only to transform the world but also 
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to glorify God who is in the world as well as above the world. If the purpose of theology 
is only to transform the world, it is a sort of reductionism to society. Thus Christian 
communities must have both sides and be balanced between the two of them. Our daily 
life and liturgy (worship) cannot be separated, but are intertwined. Liturgy and worship 
can and should relate to our daily life. Thus Christians must recognize and keep this basic 
and holistic principle.  
 Analogically speaking, a trip is an encounter with something such as nature or any 
particular place which existed before us, during a time interval, and a moment to express 
a sense of awe about that something. A trip in God is also an encounter with God. To 
worship God is to concretely acknowledge and positively accept the definition of 
panentheism, that is, God more than the world. Insofar as panentheism enables us to 
praise God, I call it “panentheistic worship.” This is an attempt to find the glory of 
God in panentheism and one reason why worship must belong to panentheism. Just as 
there is a sayting that “compliment enables a whale to dance,” so worship enables God to 
dance.  
 
2. Conceptual Resources from Process Theism  
Let us go to the other side of classical theism, that is, process theism. Hartshorne suggests 
six mistakes in classical theology: God is absolutely perfect and therefore unchangeable; 
omnipotence; omniscience; God’s unsympathetic goodness; immortality as a career after 
death; and revelation as infallible.
714
 Griffin suggests seven core doctrines in process 
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thought.
715
 First is the acceptance of the “presuppositions of practice” as philosophical or 
theological adequacy. The reality of human freedom, for example, implies that we are 
free without any determination by God or molecules. Second is “panexperientialism with 
organizational duality”: all actual entities have “some iota of spontaneity (self-
determination) and experience.” Organizational duality means two kinds of societies: 
“compound individuals” (human beings) and “aggregational societies” (stone). In this 
distinction, the “pan” does not mean “all entities” but “all genuine individuals.” Third, 
religious experience entails “a genuine perceptual experience of God.” Fourth, all 
enduring individuals are “personally ordered societies of occasions of experience.” This 
reconciles between final and efficient cause (or freedom and determinism). Each actual 
entity has two modes, a subject and an object. A subject receives efficient cause from 
prior actual entities (physical pole) and ends with self-determination (mental pole).
716
 
Fifth is the doctrine of internal relatedness. It is the basis to recognize “causation as 
incarnation,” that is, God in all things and all things in God. Sixth is naturalistic theism. 
Divine influence in the world is not a supernatural interruption but fully follows natural 
causes. In this sense, divine cause in the world is exemplification of these principles. 
Seventh is dipolar God.717 Here I will focus on the last doctrine.  
 From process theism, since the actual world means “the community of all actual 
entities, including the primordial actual entity called ‘God’ and the temporal actual 
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entities,”
718
 God has dipolar aspects which refer to two poles in God: the primordial 
nature and consequent nature of God.719 The one is conceptual, infinite, and 
unchangeable, so that it is “free, complete, primordial, eternal, actually deficient, and 
unconscious.” The other side, consequent nature, is God’s physical experience of the 
world, so that it is “determined, incomplete, consequent, ‘ever-lasting,’ fully actual, and 
conscious.”
720
 Insofar as the primordial nature (PN) is complemented by the consequent 
nature (CN), we cannot imagine God without the world, because God is related to the 
world. In the sense, it is obvious to say that there is “no meaning to ‘creativity’ apart 
from its ‘creatures,’ and no meaning to ‘God’ apart from the ‘creativity’ and the 
‘temporal creatures,’ and no meaning to the ‘temporal creatures’ apart from ‘creativity’ 
and ‘God.’” Whitehead recognizes God as “the creator of each temporal actual entity” in 
a limited sense that God gives them initial aims.
721
 However, I resist their six types of 
fully symmetrical structure between God and the world—i.e., permanence and fluence, 
one and many, actual eminently, immanence, transcendence, and creation, since they go 
too far to explain the mutual relationship between God and the world.
722
 
 The notion of God for Whitehead is at once actual, eternal, immanent, and 
transcendent. But the transcendence of God is not peculiar to him, since every actual 
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entity transcends its universe.
723
 Primordial Nature and Consequent Nature can explain 
the relationship between transcendence and immanence: whereas PN refers to 
transcendence, CN relates to immanence. If it is right to say that the world always relates 
to CN not directly PN, there must be radical transcendence in PN which cannot be 
compared to that of actual entities. PN and CN are always interrelated to each other, but 
they are distinct. For Whitehead, cosmomlogy consists of the final opposites, “joy and 
sorrow, good and evil, disjunction and conjunction—that is to say, the many in one—flux 
and permanence, greatness and triviality, freedom and necessity, God and the world.” We 
can see the pairs of opposites in our experience, except the pair of God and the world 
which needs “the note of interpretation.”724  
 In my view, however, John Macquarrie more appropriately suggests “a series of 
dialectical oppositions within God,”
 
which are “not destructive contradictions or even 
sheer paradoxes,” as a minimal idea of God: “both being and nothing, both the one and 
the many, both knowability and unknowability, both transcendent and immanent, both 
impassible and passible, and both eternal and temporal.”
725
  
 First contrast is between “being and nothing.” God is both being and nothing. 
With regard to being, we can see this tradition in Aquinas who asserted that “the most 
proper name of God is ‘He who is,’” and patristic writers who believed that their concept 
of God has “a religious justification” such as “I am who I am” (to Moses). However, 
since God does not exist as something exists in the world of space and time, God is 
“nothing.” When Macquarrie speaks of God as “being,” it means that God does not exist 
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as an individual thing exists, but “in the sense of the source of all existence,” that is, “not 
so much ‘being’ as ‘letting be,’” because the Bible does not start by saying that God 
exists, but that “he brings things into existence: ‘let there be light.’” Thus existence 
“excludes God. Inevitably, he is nothing.” Then, why do we use the term “being” about 
God? Although any existent being derives its existence from other beings, the world 
cannot be explained in this way, because the world is not an existent but a reality as a 
source of existence. Furthermore, since God or wholly other, who is beyond the 
comprehension, is “the ultimate event of giving” or “the source of the sheer fact of the 
givenness of the world,” without God, there would be nothing.   
 The second opposition in God is the one and the many. God is the “unity holding 
all things together,” but this is not “a barren undifferentiated unity,” because God is the 
“fullness of being,” which is not an empty abstraction, but a plenum. God has 
characteristics such as good, great, or just. In the sense, God has both the “primordial” 
mode, which is hidden or transcendent, and the “expressive” mode in which the divine 
activity as “an event of giving” expresses or reveals the reality into the cosmos. There is a 
third mode of being, “unitive” being in that the cosmos seeks to return to its source 
“forming a new and richer unity, a unity which necessarily includes distinctness.”  
 The third opposition is knowability and unknowability. We cannot know or grasp 
God, because God is wholly other or suprarational. However, we can know God only 
through images and symbols, but this knowledge is “genuine,” since God expresses 
Godself in the creation. That is, although we do not know God “by a deduction or 
inference from the world,” we can say that “God is intuited in the world as a presence or 
as its unity.” Macquarrie agrees with H. A. Hodges that “the foundation of theism is not a 
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speculative guess or inference or theory, but an imaginative vision of existence which can 
be of deep significance for life.” In the sense, God is incomprehensible and knowable. 
The fourth opposition is transcendence and immanence. Whereas God’s transcendence 
means God’s otherness, God’s immanence means God’s presence in the world. Whereas 
God as the primordial is totally transcendent, God as the expressive and unitive modes of 
being is totally immanent. (I have already dealt with this part in the section, 
“transcencende”). 
 The fifth opposition is impassibility and passibility. Although classical theism 
asserts God’s pure act and impassibility because God cannot be affected by the world, if 
we accept God’s immanence in the world, we also acknowledge that God must be deeply 
affected by the world. If God would not suffer the suffering of the world, we do not have 
to worship such a God who is not “the God of religious experience” but “a product of 
philosophical speculation.” God’s expression of love, that the God of Israel in the Bible 
was afflicted in all the people’s afflictions, means God’s vulnerability, since “it is 
impossible to love a person without being grieved by that person’s suffering and sin” and 
since God “consents to know the pain and frustration of the world” in creation. However, 
God’s vulnerability does not “substitute passibility for impassibility” but asserts that God 
unites this dialectical opposition. How is it possible? Here we need to make a distinction 
between God’s suffering and human suffering. Whereas human suffering can overwhelm 
the person, God cannot be overwhelmed by it, because God has “an infinite capacity” to 
absorbe and to transform suffering and God is “the ultimate reality, the primordial source 
of everything.” The symbols of the cross and and the resurrection show the 
transformation from passion to life and salvation. Although God suffers in the suffering 
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of others, it does not mean that God is reduced to world. Thus God is both passible and 
impassible in that whereas without God’s passibility, “there could be no bond of 
sympathy” between God and the world, without God’s impassibility, “there could be no 
final faith in God.”  
 The sixth opposition is eternity and temporality. In the classical theism, God is 
above time, eternal, because temporality means “loss, decay, passing away.” On the one 
hand, although this interpretation has some problems, we can still keep that God is eternal, 
because of the “immunity from the ravages of time.” On the other hand, God is not just 
an observer, but “an active participant” in the events of history. We can say with 
Eriugena that “God is actually making himself in the temporal world.” In the sense, we 
can say with Whitehead that God is both eternal in primordial nature and temporal in 
consequent nature.
726
 With regard to God’s eternity, argues Polkinghorne, God enters into 
the time. More precisely, “The universe came into being cum tempore, nor in tempore.” 
This means that God still has not only something which is totally free from the change 
but also something that corresponds to the changing. Polkinghorne calls it “kenosis of 
simple eternity,” since God accepts the temporality (the experience of time). Furthermore, 
since incarnation means God’s radical involvement of what is eternally true of the nature 
of God into the temporal world, time is not strange to the divine nature in itself.727 
 Macquarry excludes the dialectical opposition between evil and good within God, 
since evil is “essentially negative, a distortion of the good and parasitic on the good.” The 
problem of evil is, first, that it “causes pain even to God,” because God also has to face it 
and overcome it. The second point is that eveil cannot be separated from creation and the 
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world, which is imperfect and deficient. The third point is about value. This world is the 
best possible.728 In conclusion, even though the elements of dipolar God seem to be 
contradictory to each other, they are not because “the logic of God is different from the 
logic of the created order.”
729 
Analogically speaking, God is like a spoon which has both 
a convex part and a concave part. If we see our face from convex part, we see our face as 
we see from a mirror, but if we see from concave part, we see our face upside down. It is 
not like two sides of one coin, but two sides of one spoon. A difference between 
Whitehead and Macquarrie is that whereas Whitehead places dipolarity even in the world, 
Macquarrie puts it within God alone. On this point I am closer to Macquarrie’s 
perspective.  
  
3. Divine Action as a Bridge  
What Does God Do in the World?  
In this section we take on the most urgent problem for philosophical theology today: the 
problem of divine action. It is my thesis that panentheism offers crucial resources for 
addressing this core theme in our discipline.  
 “How am I driving?” (Call me 1-800-xxx-xxxx). Sometimes we can see this kind 
of sign posted on some vehicles. The driver of such a vehicle may want to hear any 
feedback about his or her driving attitude from other drivers, and ultimately to change or 
develop new driving abilities in general. If God asks us this question, ‘How am I driving, 
acting, or working in the world,’ what could be our answers? There could be more 
negative answers than positive answers for God’s action in the world, along with 
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repugnant complaining or questioning: we do not understand what you are doing now; 
what is the God’s modus operandi in this world?; what are you doing around this 
suffering; are you really the God I have believed in so far; if you are really God, how can 
you prove it? These negative responses must spring from the contradiction between the 
concrete reality of life and the Christian affirmation that since creation, God is active in 
the world to achieve divine purpose. The problem of divine action and divine agency, 
which most Christians may ask at least more than once, is, in a sense, one of the most 
serious issues since the modern age. 
 Admittedly, when we see something happening, whether it is good or bad, we 
seek to find causes: why or how it happens. In the sense, actions consist of causes and 
effects in natural systems. For example, we wash a car because it is dirty. Then dirty is a 
kind of cause and washing is its effect. By the same token, when we define divine action 
in the world, we may ask the relation between God and the world with regard to the 
relation between cause and effect: does God cause every effects in the world; does God 
control everything in the world; how does God work to achieve the divine purpose in 
history; what is the relation between divine action and creature action; does God keep 
natural laws or intervene them? Among these questions, the following question points to 
the most controversial issue: If there is God, why are there so many vicious problems?  
 The model of divine action that I will be defending in this section functions as a 
bridge (though certainly not the only one!) between classical theology and process 
theology; it draws significantly on elements from both of them. Think of the image of the 
cross: Classical theism might be located on the upper part and process theism on the 
lower part of the vertical bar of the cross; the two might then be unified by a bridge, i.e., 
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divine action on the horizontal bar. The cross, I suggest, on the one hand, can be the place 
of peace and reconciliation between classical theism and process theology: “and through 
him to reconcile to himself all things, whether things on earth or things in heaven, by 
making peace through his blood, shed on the cross” (Col. 1:20). In order for the image of 
the cross to show itself not as a decorated symbol, but as the living spirit in the concrete 
world, its primary aspect must be the unity of classical theism and process theology, since 
Jesus Christ died on the Cross, unified the heaven and the earth, and lived a new life and 
a new way. Since to do theology is to seek to self-integration for the self and to confess it 
in one’s life, it behooves us to unify both sides of the Cross based on panentheism. 
Likewise, a proper theology must be in the tension of two extremes: classical theism and 
process theology. It must be panentheism.  
 However, on the other hand, the cross may be the hardest place to understand 
God’s action. We need to think of the question, “What did God do,” when Jesus was on 
the cross and threw the most solitary question which human beings can ask: “Eloi, Eloi, 
lama sabachthani?” (“My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?”). When a child is 
drowning in the water, for example, if his/her father does not act at all to save his child or 
keeps silent throughout the situation, people ask whether this father is the real father, and 
he may be punished by the social law. How about God? Isn’t God only too much similar 
to the father? How can we call God who was silent to Jesus’ outcry to the real father or 
God? How can we call God the gracious God if God performs no action to save his Son? 
In the sense, we need to answer to the following negative and mocking attitude for the 
God’s action: “Now leave him alone. Let’s see if Elijah comes to save him” (Matthew 
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27:49). Since Elijah here can be interpreted as God, it can be interpreted as follows: Let’s 
see if God does something for Jesus, his Son. What did God do, however?  
 
Some Models of History of Divine Action 
In order to solve this provocative question, let us consider the history of divine action. It 
is my goal in this section to sketch a theory of divine action, using a few historical and 
contemporary sources from classical theism to process theology. After tracing the history, 
I will elucidate my position.  
 First, in the part of “treatise on the divine government” of the Summa Theologia, 
Aquinas argues the ways of God’s action in the world. God can act both immediately 
apart from the natural order of the world and mediately through finite causes. Using 
Aristotle’s four causes, Aquinas describes how God is the source of all material causes 
(material cause), the first cause of all agents (efficient cause), the source of all forms 
(formal cause), and the goal of all action (final causes). One and same action through all 
these causes proceeds not from two agents on the same level (order), but from both a 
primary agent (by God) and a secondary agent (by finite agent). This one action proceeds 
neither partly by God nor partly by the finite agent, but by both.730 However, divine 
primary causality is totally different from the creaturely secondary causality in that it is in 
and under diverse secondary causalities. However, we cannot see how this double agency 
is possible in Thomistic thinkers, because they claim that any attempt to explain double 
agency could be impious. This assertation means that, first, they reject on grounds of 
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incomprehensibility of primary causality any analogy between divine and human agency, 
and second, God has not a part time job but a full time job for every event in the world, 
because nothing is outside God. However, it has difficulties for theodicy.731 
 Second, for Calvin, God controls everything of the world and the divine will 
causes everything. All natural phenomena are governed by God’s will sometimes through, 
sometimes without, and sometimes in contradiction to secondary causes. Nonetheless, 
Calvin asserts that there is no divine, but only human, responsibility for evil. In the 
seventeenth cenctury Protestant orthodox theology elaborated the doctrine of providence 
which consists of three parts: preservation, concurrence, and government. Concurrence 
means “the cooperation of divine and creaturely action” in which God participates with 
secondary causes. J.A. Quenstedt (1617-1688) talks about two causes. When God acts in 
the world, the effect is produced by both God and the creature, that is, by God as the first 
cause and by the creature as second cause. However, there are some problems in this 
traditional view. If God is the first cause of all events and intervenes beyond or without 
secondary causes, how can God avoid the responsibility for evil? And could we hold this 
orthodox position even after the development of modern science which attempts to 
explain all possible natural causes and which entirely doubts the divine action?732  
 Third, in responding to orthodoxy tradition in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, the liberal theology, which emphasizes the “divine immanence” (universal 
presence of God), affirmed human freedom, causal laws, and God’s action “as the 
purposive power” in all the processes of the world, so that supernatural miracles cannot 
be placed in this liberal theology. Schleiermacher, for example, asserts the coincidence 
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between divine providence and causal law, and a miracle is only the “religious name for 
event.” Albrecht Ritschl argues that God’s radical immanence in the world makes 
humanity valuable. However, this liberal perspective of divine action is nothing other 
than the traditional view without miracles. And since God is not separated from the 
creaturly actions, there would be a problem of pantheism.
733
  
 Fourth, in reaction to liberal theology, neo-orthodox theology with Barth appears 
and emphasizes “the freedom and sovereignty of God’s action in the world.” This 
influences “biblical theology movement” which focuses on the the importance of faith 
and church. The main message of the Bible is God’s election, judgment, and 
redemption.734 Abraham Kuyper's view of God’s influence in daily life and daily events 
explains this position. Without God’s direct action, creation would be destructive.735 A. R. 
Millard espouses the same view: since for the Israelites a ‘natural cause’ did not diminish 
the miracle, they believed their God controlled the universe and could use any normal 
natural cause for God’s purposes.
736
 However, in this view there is ambiguity among 
historical events, interpretation of events by faith, and divine action: is God’s action the 
real event or the faithful interpretation?; what is the relation between God’s action and 
natural causes? Thus far, except for some aspects of liberal theology, the traditional 
doctrine of divine action can be summarized as follows: God knows everything that will 
happen because God planned and determined events beforehand, and God also acts 
positively in the world. 
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 Fifth, there are some examples of process thought. Whitehead’s famous sentence 
is appropriate to describe divine action as “persuasive agencies” in process thought: 
“[God] is the lure for feeling, the eternal urge of desire.”737 The creation of the world is 
not by force but by persuasion and humans also can persuade and be persuaded by 
alternatives.
738
 John Cobb argues that due to the influence of Newtonian science, which 
focuses on efficient causes and involves “the necessitation of the effect by the cause” 
“from the observed effects to inferred causes,” Christian theology attributes efficient 
causes to God’s action, so that God could be the causes of all effects. If efficient causes 
refer not to necessity but to regular successions, only observable states of affairs, not 
efficient causes, can be inferred from effects. We cannot infer God as efficient causes due 
to observed effects, but instead must seek formal cause (Wieman), material cause 
(Tillich), and final cause (Pannenberg).
739
 However, Cobb considers God, as efficient 
causality of events in the world, as a real influence in the experience of the lure toward 
new experience. The real influence of God on me makes me consider that such influence 
does not determine my decision, but provides a context for my choice. Cobb explains this 
through his analogy of influence on the human feeling. For example, our experience of 
anger influences subsequent events “not through overt, sensible, observable actions” but 
in the sense that other events consider God. However, in some instances, there are overt, 
sensible, observable actions. Althoug we do not accept God’s efficient causality from 
Newtonian and Humean notions, since God is a cause of events as a real influence, this 
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way of causality does not threaten but supports freedom.
740
 David Griffin asserts that 
process naturalism rejects the plausibility of God’s supernatural intervention into the 
world’s most fundamentally natural laws,741 although a divine action influences all 
human events, since the God-world relation is fully natural.
742
 That is, naturalistic theism 
involves “continuous, gradualistic divine action in the world,” since God always and 
everywhere gives all finite beings initial aims, and since divine aims cannot suddenly 
give creatures possibilities that are radically different from their current possibilities.
743
 
 Sixth, Farrer who is in the Thomistic tradition explains divine causal influence 
(divine action) in the world through “double agency,” with God as the primary cause and 
creaturely agents as secondary causes. Farrer insists that God’s action is not general but 
always particular, without either forcing or competing with creaturely agents. However, it 
is impossible to understand the causal relation between finite and infinite action.
744
 
Seventh, divine influence in human moral intuitions and religious aspirations is different 
from the divine alternation of purely physical events, because we cannot grasp laws of 
individual human behaviors. In the sense, as a form of downward mental causation, 
divine causal influence on the human thought, will, and emotions could change an 
individual’s disposition without breaking natural laws of physics and biology.745 Divine 
Action in the world would be recognized as a naturalized theism or God without the 
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supernatural.746 In this dissertation I work with the assumption that God cannot 
circumvent natural law. 
 
Some Characters of Divine Action  
Robert John Russell introduces four ways of God’s interaction with the world: “(i) 
creating and sustaining the world; (ii) through natural processes (‘God’s action through 
the regular laws of physics and biology: ‘general providence’); (iii) special events of 
significance (“where God acts to make a difference but which scientists see as part of the 
flow of nature,” which can be “special providence”); (iv) miracles (“where God’s action 
goes beyond the ordinary routines of nature”).”747 According to Frank Dilley, there are 
three possible ways of conceiving divine action in the world: the biblical view that God 
intervenes in the natural law, a modern revision that divine action is possible only to the 
eye of faith, and the double causes by God and creatures.
748
 Thomas Tracy gives five 
types of divine agency:  
1. God acts directly in every event to sustain the existence of each entity that has a 
part in it (the doctrine of conservation). 2. God can act directly to determine 
various events which occur by chance on the finite level (quantum-level 
intervention). 3. God acts indirectly through causal chains that extend from God’s 
initiating direct actions (the amplification effect). 4. God acts indirectly in and 
through the free acts of persons whose choices have been shaped by the rest of 
God’s activity in the world (divine persuasion?). 5. God can also act directly to 
bring about events that exceed the natural powers of creatures, events which not 
only are undetermined on the finite level, but which also fall outside the 
prevailing patterns and regular structures of the natural order (miracles in the 
classical sense).
749
  
 
What are the common grounds among these types? There are two ways of divine action 
with regard to creaturely action: God’s direct action and indirect action. While creation 
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and sustaining, special providence and miracles belong to God’s direct action, general 
providence and divine persuasion belong to God’s indirect action. Panentheism fills with 
the gap between “supernaturalism versus atheistic naturalism dichotomy.”750 
  
A Third Way  
I would like to address a third way between the classical view and process perspective. 
On the one hand, from the perspective of classical theism, if God arbitrarily intervenes in 
human action, freedom, or natural laws, it confuses human beings and/or natural systems, 
because “[i]f God appears periodically, He disappears periodically.”
751
 If God controls 
everything in the world, we cannot look to God for an answer to the problem of evil. I 
will suggest that God can somehow influence human states of affairs and natural systems, 
but that God does not interrupt or violate them. I will define “intervene” in this 
dissertation as meaning “interrupt” or “violate.” However, although God does not 
intervene in natural laws, can God have no attitude at all with regard to suffering? When 
our son and daughter fall down on the street, we do not have to help them, if they can 
stand up by themselves. However, if they are in danger and if we can help them, we have 
to help them. And if it is a really serious situation in which we cannot help them, 
although they are in trouble or danger, we still cannot help them. Likewise, if we are in 
trouble and if we can overcome the situation, God does not have to intervene in it. 
However, if we are really in danger or suffering and if we cannot overcome such 
suffering, should God not help us? There are many examples in which God intervenes in 
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suffering in the Bible. However, it is also a fact that in many cases God does not help 
those of us who are in suffering. 
 On the other hand, however, from the perspective of process theology, although 
God exists, if there is no particular action but persuasion or lure, does it make sense for 
God to intervene? Is it more reasonable to say that, like the phrase of atheism, ‘no God, 
no divine action?’ If we compare the two positions above, i.e., the traditional position as 
against process thought, what are the differences between Aquinas’s God-world relation 
(not in the real but in the idea) and the actions as lure in the world by the God of process 
theology? Is it not ironical to say that a traditional perspective in which God’s relation to 
the world is weak expresses a rather more active voice of God’s participation in the world 
than process theology which insists on God’s intimate relation to the world? It is strange 
to see the fact that the theology which emphasizes relationship takes a passive position in 
divine action. Are there not some similarities between deism and a persuasive God in 
process theology? A common impression of them would be that God does not directly or 
urgently involve in this world. Furthermore, if process theology would really avoid a 
coercive God, God must not give even initial aim to the creatures. Is it not coerciveness 
of God to give even initial aim to all entities regardless of creatures’s will? Thus 
persuasion is not enough to explain divine action as an alternative. 
 Peacocke defends a middle space between “traditional miracle claims” and “the 
denial of all special divine action.”
752
 Peacocke not only avoids Aquinas’ definition of 
miracles which are done by God rather than nature, but also rejects a conclusion that no 
special divine action is possible. This perspective of Peacocke is different from Maurice 
Wiles’s “radically naturalized versions of Christianity,” wherein Wiles denies divine 
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intentional acts but accepts “the living God” who acts only in “the universal act of 
creating and sustaining the world.” Different from Peacocke’s perspective also is Gordon 
Kaufman’s inconceivability of divine special actions. Kaufman envisions a web, each 
part of which is interconnected “as a causal consequence” with other parts. Similarly, 
seeking a tertium quid, Clayton introduces a mediating proposal from James 
Kellenberger; when natural miracles occur through God’s agency, they are not results of 
God’s direct action (intervention). Here God could be considered “the ground of natural 
events.”
753
  
 A principle which I have to keep in the discourse of divine action, and which is 
not contradictory to Christian faith, is that God does not arbitrarily intervene in the 
natural order, ignoring the natural laws.754 If we do not keep this principle, we could meet 
“stymie science.”
755
 Nonetheless, I do not accept perspectives which remain only in 
natural causes. Although we could not accept God’s miraculous events, they could 
remain as possibilities explaining some phenomena until we can find other possible 
explanations in natural causes.
756
And if we conclude that natural causes alone explain all 
events in the world, that could result in another problem, a “metaphysical prejudice,”
757
 
giving rise to the need for “a metaphysical leap.”758 In fact, the development of quantum 
mechanics and its indeterminist picture of the world resists all scientific determinism. 
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Thus, as Polkinghorne says, it is appropriate to say that “the natural process in itself is 
also an expression of the Creator’s will.”759 
 
Religious Explanation or Divine Action in and through Whole History  
Here we have to ask other questions: If we fully accept natural laws, is it possible to talk 
about divine action in the completed and closed physical world? If natural laws explain 
most phenomena in the world, how does God act or influence natural laws? Is there any 
plausible way for divine action to have a place in this scientific world? Does God’s action 
explain some exceptional phenomena? Can we not explain God’s special action without 
breaking natural law? Then, when can we have religious explanation as metaphysical 
leap? Is there nothing that natural causality cannot explain? Why do we need divine 
causality and how can we say that it needs divine causality, although natural causality 
cannot explain any event in the world? What could be God’s action? When and where 
can we consider divine action beyond natural laws? Hume argues that divine action can 
be thought “before the creation of the universe and after the end of universal history.”
760
 
But is it really possible to apply empirical induction to these areas? One possible answer 
is to appeal to universal history that “God’s intentions, purposes and guiding actions 
would be visible.” To believe in God is not to ascribe our thought into the vacuous areas 
Hume indicates, but “to believe in something about human experience taken as a 
whole.”
761
 Thus the most natural locus of divine action is this universal history, since we 
can see evidence of God’s leading hand in this history as a whole.  
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 Analogically speaking, the relation between God and the world in divine action is 
like the one between parents and their children. If we find God’s action or religious 
explanation “before creation and after the end of history,” it must be like the parents who 
give birth to their babies but no longer take care of them and who insist that they are their 
parents after the death of their children. What are these parents who do not have any 
memory of their babies in the world but only the two facts that they were born and that 
they died? In such a situation, we have to ask to the parents: what did you do when your 
children were living? Parents must take care of their children through their whole lives 
with material help while they are financially dependent, and with spiritual help after they 
become adults.  
 
Possibility of SDA in Whole History  
Then, we can ask more deeply, how can we explain some traces of special divine action 
(SDA) or intermittent divine action (IDA) in this scheme without violating regularities of 
the natural laws? When we speak of SDA, we can extrapolate from this general divine 
action (GDA). Clayton argues that “God must be active in this event because he is active 
in all events and because the nature of this event fits the pattern, either in its situation or 
its outcome.”762 Accepting SDA in the form of whole-part influences in natural 
systems,
763
 Peacocke also argues that God could so affect the world at all levels that 
patterns of events at physical, biological, human, and even social levels could be 
influenced by divine intention without abrogating any natural laws.
764
 Polkinghorne does 
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not accept “a kenosis of novelty” that “God is self-restricted to act in the future only as 
God has acted in the past.” Although God does not arbitrarily act in the world, God will 
do new things in new situations, even miracles such as the resurrection of Jesus Christ, 
since “there is certainly no theological reason to suppose that God must always be 
boringly restricted to doing nothing new.”
765
 Thus the divine subject hugely contributes 
to the world which scientific explanation cannot do.  
 Admittedly, no GDA, no SDA, not vise versa. If someone insists on SDA without 
GDA, it is like those irresponsible parents who do not take care of their children in daily 
life but sometimes appear and insist that the children are theirs. There are also some 
special events in all areas of life in which parents influence children, so that we 
remember this event or that event as a special event of our life among all events. This 
particular or special event is not outside all general events but within them.
766
 This event 
is in circulation of all events. That is, this special event is in hermeneutical circulation 
with all events. Thus, we need phenomenological or epistemological tools to faciliatate 
our understanding of God through daily events, or hermeneutical tools for relating part to 
whole of our explorations of divine action. SDA is a reinterpretation of the meaning of a 
fact, not a supernatural happening in itself.  
 
An Appropriate Interpretation of Divine Action  
Before entering into more specific discussion here, we need to appropriately define the 
term, “intervention.” However, we should not arrive at this strange conclusion: “If a 
nonphysical supreme being, “God,” does exist, and if God does intervene in the world, 
                                                 
 
765
 Polkinghorne, “Kenotic Creation and Divine Action,” 104-105.  
 
766
 For example, a tennis game or a golf game with president or professor must be the special 
action for someone. Although such events are not special for others, it could be special for someone. 
 230  
I’d be surprised if we could ever figure out how.”
 767
 This conclusion does not solve how 
God acts in the world, but rather return us to the naïve, traditional appeal to divine control 
of the world. Whereas, before quantum physics, the world was considered to be a closed 
physical system, after quantum mechanics, that is no longer the case. Russell argues that 
God acts through all the natural laws, so that God is involved in whatever happens. God’s 
action is not God’s intervention, since “intervention” means God’s violation of the 
natural laws. Unlike Peacocke, Russell argues that although there is not enough 
explanation of natural law, we should not consider natural law as God’s special action, 
since God is truly acting all the time in the world, breaking down the distinction between 
general providence and special providence.768 By the same token, John Collins and 
Polkinghorne also avoid the term “intervention,” since it seems to suggest that God’s 
intervention is as “an intruder” in the world”
769
 and connotes “arbitrary interruption.”
770
  
 However, although Whitehead surprisingly uses the term, “God’s intervention,” it 
is not “occasional interventions that interrupt the normal causal pattern of the world,” but 
rather God’s intervention all the time, so that “divine intervention is a regular, necessary 
part” of natural causes.
771
 Then where does God always intervene? Griffin answers that 
prior to its outside and observable public manifestation, divine action can directly 
influence inner as well as hidden sides of every individual.772 “No influence” describes 
the view called “deism” which argues that the Ground of being cannot impact the natural 
world. We cannot accept such a deistic view, because God had intentions in creating the 
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world and has and will have intentions in sustaining it. “No intervention” view at least 
allows God’s influence on the world, since “the influence is exercised without breaking 
or setting aside natural laws.”773 
  
Concrete Example: God and Broken Air-Conditioner   
How can God act in the following example? If there are air-conditioning problems in an 
apartment and the manager does not fix the air-conditioner, even after the apartment’s 
resident asks several times, the residents may ask: what does the manager do? The 
manager must be derelict in her/his responsibilities. Likewise, when there are some 
problems in the world, although many people ask God several times to solve the 
problems, and God could solve the problems for God’s residents in the world, if God 
does not act and does not provide any management services, it is natural to ask what God 
is doing. In this case, God would be derelict in God’s job, since it is strange to believe 
that “God exists but never actually does anything.”
774
 To that extent, then, is it not 
appropriate or reasonable to ask God’s action and help in human life, or especially in the 
case of suffering? Can we not find some examples of divine direct action and help from 
the Bible? Did God literally neither accept our prayer nor change some physical 
situations? Was God in the Bible not the God who acted in the world, the God who 
created the world, the God who delivered the Israelites from the slavery, the God who 
enabled David to win over Goliath, the God who sent us the Lord our savior, Jesus, and 
the God who raised Jesus from the dead?  
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 If God physically acted in the world as the Bible attests, why does God not act 
here and now in the world? Does God act like a responsible apartment manager or a 
repairman, or not? Do we really expect God to fix the air-conditioner regardless of any 
natural condition? De we expect God to brings tool boxes and come to the apartment to 
fix a broken air-conditioner? If we really expect God’s direct action, what does God 
suppose to do and what are the natural laws? When we define divine action in this world, 
we have to think of natural laws alongside of it, since nobody expects God to fix 
everything by Himself; it is obviously a repairman who is needed to fix the broken air-
conditioner. This means that there must be natural laws to explain the cause and effect in 
the world. The movement of heavenly bodies; the turn of the tide; change of four seasons; 
all these can be explained by natural laws. In a sense, since natural laws could explain 
many physical phenomena in the world, we should not neglect the natural laws. If we are 
sick, for example, we have to see a doctor or take medicine, since that is more reasonable 
than only to pray to God, although prayer is very important (I will argue the power of 
prayer later).   
 However, if divine causality is needed to explain any event in the world, does that 
not affirm the possibility of SDA? Although God can influence every event in the world, 
when there are some events which natural causality cannot explain, does SDA not go 
beyond divine influence or persuasion? If a state government arbitrarily intervenes in 
individuals’ lives, it must be the state’s oppression over the individual. However, if the 
individual is under some problems or a difficult situation, the state must intervene in the 
individuals’ life. If people do not have food, the state must give them food. If they do not 
have a house, the state has a responsibility to provide them with shelter. By the same 
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token, just as if God may arbitrarily intervene in natural laws, it is problematic, so if God 
does not intervene in any suffering situation, it is also problematic. Accepting the interest 
of liberal theology in divine action, I will develop my model: God’s continual and 
concrete divine action in the world without supernaturalism. This model has continuity 
and discontinuity with traditional doctrine.
775
 Whereas there is continuity in that God acts 
in the world, it has discontuinity, since it resists miracles. 
 
Natural Law and Miracle  
Christian naturalism does not reject God but it does reject supernaturalism. In order to 
develop this argument, we need to make a distinction between supernaturalism and 
transcendence. What are the differences between supernaturalism and transcendence? 
One plausible difference would be that all supernaturalism includes transcendence, but 
transcendence does not entail supernaturalism, because transcendence does not violate 
the natural laws. Whereas panentheism without supernaturalism is possible, since 
supernaturalism implies that God is not touched by the world, panentheism without 
transcendence is not possible, since without transcendence, there can be no kenosis and 
no incarnation.  
 Let’s think about natural laws and miracles. There are so many occasions on 
which Jesus performs miracles; these occasions seem to be a form of the direct 
expression of divine action in the world. Are these miracles compatible with natural law 
or not? Although there are diverse forms of naturalism, argues Charles Hardwick, they 
have family resemblances: “(1) that only the world of nature is real; (2) that nature is 
necessary in the sense of requiring no sufficient reason beyond itself to account either for 
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its origin or ontological ground; (3) that nature as a whole may be understood without 
appeal to any kind of intelligence or purposive agency; and (4) that all causes are natural 
causes so that every natural event is itself a product of other natural events.” In short, 
naturalism does not allow God a place to become involved in the natural systems. Karl 
Peters suggests a “religious naturalism” which considers God as “not a being who creates 
the world but the process of creation itself,” since God is the “creative activity of nature, 
human history, and individual life.” However, this view is also a naturalistic view.
776
  
 Defining naturalism as a “minimal and generic sense,” David Griffin argues that 
naturalism does not always mean atheism, since it just denies supernaturalism, not 
“theistic versions of naturalism.” Griffin calls it naturalism (ns) which stands for 
“nonsupernaturalistic” and distinguishes this naturalism from naturalism (nati) which 
stands for “nature is all there is,” and from naturalism (sam) which stands for 
“sensationalist-atheistic-materialistic.”
777
 Agreeing with Griffin’s naturalism, Peacocke 
points out the dangers of any two of these extreme forms without the third. On the one 
hand, if we excessively emphasize God’s transcendence and the severance of God from 
the world, it brings about deism wherein God created something totally different from 
God and something external to God’s self, created in an entirely different space and not 
involved in the natural world but remaining as the ultimate reality in aseity. On the other 
hand, an excessive emphasis on God’s immanence leads to naturalism, or the proposition 
that the world can be sufficiently explained by natural laws without any super-natural 
means. In this sense, immanence without transcendence can lead to pantheism, because 
there is no God without the world. Instead of using a term, “naturalism,” in which only 
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natural laws alone can explain all natural systems, since naturalism might exclude the 
divine,778 Peacocke uses a term “theistic naturalism,” insofar as “natural processes are 
themselves actions of God, who continuously gives them existence.” Since the 
emergence of Charles Darwin, deistic concept of God disappeared or God as “an 
occasional visitor,” and God’s immanence in the world as “imperative” appeared in a 
way that “God makes things make themselves.” God is “the immanent Creator” who 
dynamically relates to the world, continuously creating the world’s existence at every 
moment in and through the processes of the natural order. Here, since we need to 
recognize that “the processes are not themselves God but are the actions of God-as-
Creator,”779 we can reach a possibility of God’s place in the naturalism: 
“God+nature+humanity.”780  
 Although we can reach even to Polkinghorne’s argument that since miracles are 
not against the natural laws and the laws are themselves God’s expression, miracles can 
be considered more profound and deeper revelations of the divine character,
781
 the most 
important thing was Jesus’ attitude for miracles. Ironically, Jesus did not want the people 
who were healed to tell others the news of miracles, since the miracles were not his 
original intention at all. If he was really interested in miracles, he might have shown his 
miracle on the cross. Many people wanted to see the miracles, but they mocked Jesus: 
“He saved others; let him save himself if he is the Christ of God, the Chosen One” (Luke 
23:35). However, there was no miracle at that time. The real miracle, resurrection, 
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happened after three days. Nonetheless, the Bible did not focus on the miracle with 
regard to the resurrection. John 9:25 gives us a proper attitude to understand a miracle: 
“Whether he is a sinner or not, I don’t know. One thing I do know. I was blind but now I 
see!” This is a wonderful insight and a scienfic fact. Hence we can say that it is not 
important to know whether it is a miracle or not, but to realize what happens. 
  
Double Agency: Human Agency and Divine Agency   
Before developing the discourse of double agency, let’s briefly consider of act of creation 
by God. Before creation, there was only one action, that is, divine action. Then, as 
Polkinghorne asks, “what are God’s motives that lie behind this great act?” Why did God 
create the world? It is because of the divine love that willed other existences outside the 
perichoretic triune God. Thus, creation became to exist because of God giving to the 
world God’s own life and value.
782
 After creation, if we accept the term creatio continua, 
God cannot overrule creatures but must interact with them. Griffin argues that since each 
finite actual entity has its own self-creativity and self-determination, although the world 
including every actual entity is in God, it can transcend the divine influence.
783
 In the 
sense, we have to consider double agency, i.e., divine and human. Although divine action 
presupposes a divine agent, “agent” must have at least an analogous meaning to the finite 
agencies that we know and experience. If it does not, it is impossible to attempt a 
theology of divine action. Since divine action would make human beings “puppets, mere 
instruments of the divine purposes,”
784
 action must be both the one of a finite agent and 
the one of God. Inasmuch as divine action should not neglect the evolution of the cosmos 
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based on the natural law in the world,
785
 what is important is how we can find and 
distinguish divine action from natural law.  
 As we saw earlier, Clayton suggests the “panentheistic analogy:” God’s relation 
to the world is similar to the relation of our minds to our bodies.
786
 From the perspective 
of Clayton, the following two perspectives are not appropriate to double agency. First, 
Austin Farrer’s “double agency” has two interpretations: 1. every physical event has both 
a physical cause and divine contributing cause in a metaphysical sense. 2. God is one of 
the efficient causes affecting every event. However, Clayton points out that this is 
ambiguous because the first position does not have any competition with natural 
explanation and the second position actually means continuous divine intervention in the 
world.787 Thus two laws, divine law and natural law, cannot exclude each other.  
 There are four numbers of cases in divine action. First, where there is divine 
action, there is human action (panentheism). Second, where there is divine action, there is 
no human action (determinism). Third, where there is no divine action, there is human 
action (atheism). Fourth, where there is no divine action, there is no human action 
(nihilism). Here I would like to focus on double action in which human and divine 
agency are related to the category of experience, neither before creation nor after death. 
That is, as Polkinghorne argues, we should accept both “our basic experience of free 
choice and consequent moral responsibility” and the testimony of our tradition that “God 
acts in the world.” Both human and divine agency are causal principles which will bring 
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about the future state of the world.
788
 Polkinghorne maintains that there must be 
distinction between creator/creature: “God acts through pure information input, while 
creaturely acts involve a mixture of energetic and informational causalities, 
corresponding to the embodied status of creatures.”
789
 
 With regard to freedom, Schelling explains it in the relation between individual 
and whole, saying that although an individual part is only possible within the whole of an 
organism, it has its own life or freedom for itself. In the relation between God and the 
world, the procession [Folge] of things from God is God’s self-revelation and God can 
only reveal himself to himself in free beings acting on their own, because there is no 
ground other than God. That is, whereas only what is free is in God because it is free, 
what is not free is necessarily outside of God because it is not free.790 In the sense, 
Schelling asserts that “The beginning and ending of this philosophy is freedom.”
791
 The 
freedom of the creatures is not dependent on divine choice, since the divine life 
essentially transacts with free creatures. As Berdyaev argues, freedom as such is not 
created, but rather is “a primordial principle of reality inherent in deity as such and in all 
concrete actualities.” Thus the freedom of the creatures is against a false conception of 
divine omnipotence which suppresses or manipulates the freedom.792 Every kind of life is 
“a succession and concatenation of states,” since each previous state is the ground which 
bears potency of the succeeding state. This movement is even in the divine life.
793
 In this 
sense, Schelling must be a harbinger of Whitehead. 
                                                 
 
788
 Polkinghorne, “Kenotic Creation and Divine Action,” 98.  
 
789
 Polkinghorne, “Kenotic Creation and Divine Action,” 101.  
 
790
 F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human freedom (New York: 
State University of New York Press, 2006), 18-19. 
 
791
 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 33. Cooper, Panentheism, 96. 
 
792
 Hartshorne and Reese, eds., Philosophers speak of God, 234.  
 
793
 Schelling argues how this divine life again distinguishes itself from every other, particularly 
human life Difference between God and man: 1) succession and concatenation, dissoluble in human life, is 
 239  
 Cooper summarizes Schelling’s dynamic panentheism in three ways. First, if we 
are not autonomous, since we are subject to determinism in the natural lawas, in order to 
have individual moral autonomy, he locates humans in God. As a part of God, we have 
freedom, “moral self-determination.” Second, God must be dynamic. God’s relation to 
the world cannot be static or fully actual, because if God is already actualized and 
completey fulfilled, then everything would be completely determined and humans would 
not be free. Thus God must be present gradually and progressively in the world. Third, 
since we participate in divine freedom, God cannot exist without human freedom. If God 
reveals himself through our own freedom, without this freedom even God would not be, 
so that we are collaborators of the whole. God and humans codetermine the course of 
their mutual self-actualization in such a way that whereas God determines the general 
trajectory of history, humans determine the particular issues. In this way Schelling asserts 
the twin themes of modern panentheism: that God’s existence is essentially historical and 
that God and humans cooperate to fulfil their essence in the world.
794
 
 We can find this idea of double agency in the Bible: “For we are God’s fellow 
workers; you are God’s field, God’s building” (I Corinthians 3:9). The following comes 
from verse 6: “I (Paul) planted the seed, Apollos watered it, God made it grow.” Unless 
the seed has been planted, God cannot make it grow. Unless the seed is watered, God 
cannot make it grow. In order to make the plant grow, there must be planting and 
watering. Thus we human beings are God’s fellow workers. Philippians 2:12-13 
describes the mutual relationship between God’s sovereignty and free acts of human 
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beings: “continue to work out your salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God who 
works in you to will and to act according to his good purpose.” In this sense, Ephesians 
2:21, “In him the whole building is joined together and rises to become a holy temple in 
the Lord” tells that in Jesus we ourselves become holy temples. We participate in God's 
works. 
 Here top-down and bottom-up image can contribute to double agency. The top-
down analogy shows that the world’s Creator also can interact with the world. God 
interacts with an unfolding process, “allowing creatures to explore the range of 
possibilities, but also preserving some providential room so that he as Creator can 
maneuver in bringing about the future”795 For Tillich, a creature is rooted in the divine 
life and also may “actualize one’s self through freedom.” Through a discrepancy between 
existence and essence, creatures can achieve its creaturely freedom, although there is “the 
point at which creation and the fall coincide.” Tillich calls it “human creativity.” That is, 
when God creates human beings, God gives human beings “the power of transforming” 
that they may change themselves and the world. Nonetheless, Tillich obviously makes a 
distinction between God and the world: “God is primarily and essentially creative; man is 
secondarily and existentially creative.”796  
  
SDA in Suffering  
The main thesis in this divine action is that God acts in the world without breaking the 
natural laws. However, can we keep this formal even in suffering in the world? Don’t we 
need SDA in suffering? We have to find a new way which is neither regularly direct 
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divine action nor mere divine persuasion, because we need a more powerful model to 
remove evil and suffering in the world, although it may not break natural laws. Let’s 
consider one example: there is a TV program, ‘SOS Solution,’ in Korea. This program 
helps those who are in trouble at home or in society, such as children who are beaten by 
their parents and who want to forget all their memories from one-year-old, or someone 
who has been working like a slave for decades in any house without any salary. This TV 
program together with the support of police, law groups, and social welfare organization 
goes to those people, saves them from those situations, and helps them to find a new life. 
We need to see here the fact that they act, i.e., perform some special action for the 
suffering people. If we relate this story to divine action, it can be be seen as a model to 
show us how divine law is to natural law as parents are to their children. Parents should 
not arbitrarily break their children’s rules and impinge on their freedom, inasmuch as 
when they often break their rules, the children will begin to reject their interruption. 
Parents, then, must wait for children’s responses and try to persuade the children to do 
what they will do.  
 However, is it enough? Let’s think about another example. If children are in 
trouble or suffering, should parents not intervene in their situations? One day I saw a girl 
of about five years old going by herself ahead of her mom. Her mom kept saying, “There 
is a drive way in front of you,” but the child kept going. Then when a car appeared in 
front of her, her mom shouted, “STOP.” I believe that the mother shouting STOP must 
have been the special action for her daughter who was about to be in trouble. When their 
children are in dangerous situation, parents have to save them or at least shout “stop.” 
Likewise, when children play with very dangerous tools or weapon, or when they are 
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kidnapped, or when they fall into a river, do parents not get involved in the situation? 
Must the parents just wait, or persuade and hope the child will be saved because if they 
get involved in these situations, they break the child’s rule and impinge on the child’s 
freedom? If the parents limit their action, it is often only the death of their children that 
they will obtain. However, does liberation theology not still hold with this kind of acting 
for the God who will liberates the suffering people from their miserable situations? The 
confession of Ebenezer of the Israelite in 1 Sam. 7:12 is the faith confession that God has 
helped us thus far. Is this not a confession of special divine action in which God listened 
to the crying of the people and rescued them from the hand of the Philistines? Do we not 
make some events as SDA through our confession? 
 Nonetheless, we need to ask that when we see our life situation, we experience 
SDA in every suffering. This question reminds us of Jesus Christ. Recall, again, that the 
present goal is to find a model which unifies divine action in classical theism and the 
influence of God in process theology through Jesus Christ. On the one hand, God’s 
incarnation must be the most concrete divine action, since God reveals Himself in the 
world. On the other hand, in Jesus’ death on the cross it is hard to see divine action. 
When some people asked to Jesus on the cross to show his authority and power as the 
Son of God, Jesus showed nothing: “You who are going to destroy the temple and build it 
in three days, save yourself! Come down from the cross, if you are Son of God!” 
(Matthew 27:40). People wanted to see divine action saving his Son, but unfortunately, 
there was no direct action of God. Is it God’s innate powerlessness or a voluntary 
rejection of power? And is that all that is? Do we not see Jesus’ resurrection? 
Resurrection must be the most powerful type of SDA. If the death of Jesus was the end, 
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there must be no resurrection. But was resurrection not SDA? (I will develop this part in 
the section, “Revised Omnipotence of God”).  
 
Panentheistic Prayer and Divine Action   
In this section I employ a phenomenological method, combining individual thought 
experiments and the language of faith with biblical theological reflections. In later 
sections I work out the results in a more systematic manner. 
 Example 1: Dawkins introduces the “Great Prayer Experiment,” which asks 
whether praying for patients contribute to their recovery. Darwin’s cousin Francis Galton 
scientifically analized whether praying for the health of the royal family is efficacious, 
but he found “no statistical difference.”797  
 Example 2: In the “Toyota 911 Call of Family’s Fatal Lexus Crash,”798 we can 
hear a voice screaming, “Pray, pray!” And then there was no answer. 
 
In whatever forms of divine action, do we not believe in God’s saying that “I am the 
LORD your God, who teaches you what is best for you, who directs you in the way you 
should go”? (Isaiah 48: 17). Thereby we pray to God who gives us hope: “Call to me and 
I will answer you and tell you great and unsearchable things you do not know” (Jeremiah 
33:3).
799
 However, sometimes when we do not see such a hope from God, we also beg to 
God as in Jeremiah 14:7-9, “Do something for the sake of your name… why are you like 
a stranger in the land, like a traveler who stays only a night?... why are you like a man 
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taken by surprise, like a warrior powerless to save? You are among us… do not forsake 
us.”  
 Let us investigate this divine action with regard to prayer. When children ask their 
parents for something, their parents can respond in two ways: yes or no. Could we judge 
the parents based on a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ response, i.e., if they say ‘yes,’ they are good; if 
they say ‘no,’ they are bad? In any case, ‘no’ could be good and ‘yes’ bad. There could 
be reasons for a ‘no’ answer. For example, if the child is asking for a very dangerous 
thing, the parents must say ‘no.’ Who would give their babies a dangerous knife, 
although the babies persistently ask? In this case, ‘no’ must be a good answer for the 
babies, while ‘yes’ is not. In another case a positive response may be beyond the parents’ 
ability, they cannot answer, “yes.” In this case, we can say that the parents are powerless, 
although they are good for their children. Even in this case, although the children 
complain, they do not ask whether their parents exist or not.  
 How about God? When we pray to God for something, there can be three 
responses of God: yes, no, and silence. There are countless examples of God’s yes and no 
in the Bible. First, to pray to God presupposes that God can help us, since we pray to God, 
not to other finite entities. There seems to be no problem in God’s yes, since the 
responding (acting) God is the God in whom we really want to believe, so that we call 
this God the gracious God. For example, when Peter was kept in prison, in Acts 12, 
church members faithfully prayed to God for him. Finally, an angel of the Lord saved 
Peter. This is a kind of ‘yes’ from God in response to the prayer of church members. In 2 
Kings 20, when Hezekiah prayed to God, God gave him fifteen years more of life. When 
Egyptians made the Israelites suffer, the Israelites cried out to God and God “heard” their 
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voices, “saw” their suffering, and finally “brought” them out of Egypt with a mighty hand. 
He brought us to this place and gave us this land, a land flowing with milk and honey” 
(Deuteronomy 26:7-9). When Moses asks for God’s forgiveness of the sins of the 
Israelites: “In accordance with your great love, forgive the sin of these people, just as you 
have pardoned them from the time they left Egypt until now,” the LORD replied, “I have 
forgiven them, as you asked” (Numbers 14:19-20). When people cry to God, God 
remembers his covenant and changes his mind: “But he took note of their distress when 
he heard their cry; for their sake he remembered his covenant and out of his great love he 
relented. He caused them to be pitied by all who held them captive” (Psalms 106:44-46). 
 Second, however, we have to think of God’s ‘no.’ Like parents, God also does not 
give us what we ask for if it is a dangerous thing, or if it is not for the common good, but 
rather only one’s own pleasures. By the same token, for example, what if God says ‘yes’ 
to all our prayers? If somebody prays to God, “Kill my neighbor,” and God kills the 
neighbor, what is this God? One of the pastors in Arizona really prayed for president 
Obama to die and to go to hell, because, he said, this country is to be saved.
800
 He 
believed that God also disliked the president and God can do everything. Is this not a 
kind of projection of anthropomorphism which conservative groups do not accept as their 
creed? If God accepts this kind of prayer, is this God a good god? We cannot say that this 
God is good and omnipotent even if God accepts our prayer. Is this God rather not a 
merciless God or a robot God who does not have any subjectivity but only depends on 
human input? James 4:3 supports this idea: “when you ask, you do not receive, because 
you ask with wrong motives, that you may spend what you get on your pleasures.”  
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 Third is the case of the silence when there is no obvious answer from God. In the 
case, we sometimes ask these questions: why does God not accept our prayer; why is 
there only silence; and where are you God now? There could be three possible responses: 
‘there is no God’ (atheism), there is only a ‘powerless God or no SDA’ (orthodox process 
theism), and ‘though, responding and acting God’ (panentheism). In the case, the first 
response is understandable but very naïve, although most people might have this kind of 
experience in their life. The second response is very controversial. God is powerless, 
since there is no direct answer to our prayers. However, should we say that God is 
powerless in the same way as our parents who cannot accept their children’s asking 
because of their limitation of economical ability? Although God may be silent, can we 
say that God is powerless? Is it itself not contradictory to pray to a God who is 
powerless? If children sometimes say that God is less powerful than their fathers, since 
God gives them no answer when they pray to God, whereas their fathers give them some 
present when they ask, is this a good theological education for children? If we say ‘yes,’ 
why do we pray to “a puny godling”
801 
or a powerless God? Why do we pray to God for 
others who are facing death or who need intercessory prayer? Do we not pray with the 
earnest hope that God will let the people avoid the death? Nonetheless, when they die, we 
cry. If death is not a big issue, since everyone, according to the process theologian, will 
die, why do we cry? Is it just the price of compensation for learning the obvious fact that 
everybody will die? By the same token, why do we teach our children to pray to God 
when they are sick? When our sons and daughter ask us to pray for them, do we not pray 
to God for them to be healthy? Or do we pretend to pray to God for them so as to avoid 
the persistent asking?  
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 We pray to God because we expect God to listen and accept our prayers if they 
are true prayers. When we pray to God to heal our sons and daughters, we literally expect 
God to heal our sons and daughters. That is, when we pray, we can pray what we hope: 
‘Oh God, my son is dying; Please help me; Please come down in this Minjung’s life’:
802
 
“Kumbaya, ‘Come by here,’” Kyrie eleison: Oh Lord, Have mercy, and “Veni Creator 
Spiritus, ‘Come, Creator Spirit,’”
803
 hoping “in wrath remember mercy” (Habakkuk 3:2). 
This must be the suffering people’s petition or prayer to God. In this situation, what 
would be the more reasonable response between these: that the powerful God will save 
you or that the powerless God will save you? Isn’t it a kind of contradiction to pray with 
sincere hope to a God who cannot change our lives even in a difficult situation? When we 
see some people who were almost dying and even the doctor had also given up, surviving 
by the prayer of others, how can we interpret this event? Although there may be many 
other answers, is this not a result of prayer? Is this not God’s special action? 
 When Elijah and the prophets of Baal debated whose God is the true God on 
Mount Carmel, Elijah began to taunt them: “Shout louder! Surely he is a god! Perhaps he 
is deep in thought, or busy, or traveling. Maybe he is sleeping and must be awakened.”
804
 
When Elijah prayed to God, however, God answered with the sign: “the fire of the Lord 
fell and burned up the sacrifice…” Then all the people saw this and cried, “The LORD. 
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He is God! The Lord—he is God.”
805
 Here we know that God is not a sleeping God, but 
the one who responds to our prayer and is powerful God. Is it not, in a sense, that the God 
whom Elijah taunted is the powerless God? Do atheists or skeptical people not despise 
this powerless God for the very same reason? 
 However, the problem is not simple since although our prayers are very faithful 
and true, we often experience God’s silence. Let’s consider the following instance: When 
two teams (A and B) in a soccer game pray to God with a faithful and true mind, which 
team’s prayer should God accept? If team A won at the game, did God accept the prayer 
of team A alone? Why not B? Was the prayer of team A more faithful than that of team 
B? Or was the ability of team ‘A’ superior to that of team ‘B’? If team A won over team 
B again, even without prayer at the next game, do we need prayer to win at some games? 
By contrast, if team B finally won at the other game, even without prayer, what is the 
relationship between our prayer and God in a soccer game?  
 When we are in trouble, whoever we are, whether we are conservative, liberal or 
process people, there would be hardly any difference in the hope of prayer itself, the hope 
that God will listen to our prayers and change our situation.
806
 I call it ‘panentheistic 
prayer’ as a third position. That is, although God is silent, we believe that God will listen 
to our prayer. This idea leads me to the God’s absence in our prayer. I understand 
‘presence’ or ‘absence’ of God as follows: when my son was two years old, he 
usually used to cry whenever he did not see his mom and me even though we were 
always with him at home. However, when he became four years old, he did not cry even 
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when he just played by himself in the living room. He did not care whether we were with 
him or not. I think he recognized that we were always with him even when he did not see 
us. If someone regards this case as the absence of parents, does a policeman take my son 
and should my wife and I go to jail? In that case, where is the boundary between presence 
and absence of parents? Does presence have a meaning only when we appear? Or are we 
absent when we do not appear in front of him? Is it not true that whether we appear or 
not, though, we are always with him? 
 In the case of God, how can we understand the presence or absence of God? Does 
God appear in front of us as I appear to my son? No, and thus we must not 
interpret ‘presence of God’ as the ‘appearance of a person.’ What does ‘presence of God’ 
mean? How should we understand absence of God? When I call offices or institutions, I 
often listen to a voice mail: “I am not available now. Please leave a message, and I will 
call you as soon as possible.” S/he is not there. S/he must be absent. Can we also apply it 
to God? Is God absent? If God is absent, how can we say that God is always 
omnipresent? There must be two faces of God or paradox of presence or absence of God. 
We have to explain perichoresis of presence or absence of God. However, we frequently 
ask God when we might get an answer. When my daughter was four years old, she 
wanted to be five years old. I told her, ‘You should wait four months.’ However, she 
could not understand what I said and she said, “Daddy, you say always wait and wait and 
wait.” Sometimes we have to wait for God’s answer in our life.  
 Tillich properly responds to this situation: prayers cannot ask God directly to 
interfere with existential conditions, although they are prayers of supplication and prayers 
of intercession, for a prayer is a condition directing God’s creativity. Nonetheless, Tillich 
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argues that “every serious prayer contains power, not because of the intensity of desire 
expressed in it, but because of the faith the person has in God’s directing activity—a faith 
which transforms the existential situation.”807 This position used to evoke the problem of 
divine action, since we would experience God’s absence or no direct divine action to our 
urgent prayer. 
 
Conclusion  
God can become involved in the actualities of any number of cases but this involvement 
does not hinder either natural law or human freedom of choice in this world. In this sense, 
there must be human subjectivity, which God does not touch, although the world, 
including human beings, may proceed counter to God (For example: Eve and Cain). 
Nevertheless, isn’t there at least one case in which God directly acts in human affairs 
such as in the suffering? Does God still persuade human beings, even in this suffering 
before they act in something? Should God not act against this suffering? There must be 
SDA without supernaturalism in human affairs. (In Exodus 4, God persuaded Moses to 
be a leader of the Israelite and gave him power as a sign which showed God’s being with 
him). We have to properly interpret these direct divine actions. Whether God’s actions in 
the face of suffering are fact or not, do we have any authority to stop others from such 
events as their confession of faith? The language of the Bible is that of confession: God 
concretely helped them in their lives, although God did not act physically. Then, how can 
we recognize God’s lure for us? In order to recognize even God’s persuasion or lure, we 
have to pray to God. Just as it is important to say that our prayer changes God’s mind and 
decision, so it is also important to say that God must be powerful to change the world, 
                                                 
807
 Tillich, Systematic Theology I, 267.   
 251  
though. Whatever the answer about divine action would be, we know that “God is at 
work in the created world.”808 Solomon’s expression is very appropriate to prayer with 
regard to divine action: “hear from heaven and act” (2 Chronicles 6:23). Suchocki also 
maintains the importance of prayer, saying that prayer is “a dance with God” that can 
make differences and change the world.
809
 Thus, divine action can be a bridge between 
classical theism and process theism.  
  
4. TPT Model  
Although one of the tasks of theology is to defend the classical creeds of the church, it 
cannot be merely a repetition of classical creeds, since it should also deal with the 
comtemporary issues of the world, and be open to the future in the interpretation. In this 
section, I plan to draw together the various conclusions that have arisen out of the 
previous sections, connecting them within what I call the TPT model. My exposition 
starts with one of “Seven Core Christian Questions,”
810
 i.e., “Who is God?” (Theology). 
TPT has both sides, that is, transcendence and immanence. Luke 2:14 shows this double 
structure: “Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace to men on whom his favor 
rests” Panentheism keeps both “glory to God” and “on earth peace to men.” In the sense, 
Philippians 2:5-11 shows us both “kenotic trinitarian panentheism” and, if I may coin, 
“lifted trinitarian panentheism.” By the same token, Ephesians 4:9-10 has the same 
structure. God who descends into the world is the one who ascended into heaven “in 
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order to fill the whole universe” The constructive theology I defend here has five major 
features: the kenotic God; the relational God; the suffering God; the knowable God; and 
revised understanding of the power of God.  
   
1) Kenotic God  
Although God does not have to create the world, God created the world in Godself and 
incarnated to the world so as to reconcile with the world. God came down at the level of 
the world’s eye, which means God’s kenosis. Even though there are disanalogies between 
God and the world, because God is necessary but world is contingent, they are really 
intertwined. Phil. 2:5-7 shows us the model of God’s free self-limitation, the kenosis of 
God, and free self-expenditure:811 “Have this mind among yourselves, which is yours in 
Christ Jesus, who, though he was in the form of God, did not count equality with God a 
thing to be grasped, but emptied himself.” Clayton finds the most attractive model of God 
from Kenotic Christology in that the kenotic God with self-surrendering love appears as 
self-limitation. God does not stay in himself, but chooses to limit himself by coming 
down to the world. God and humanity in Jesus Christ are united in mutual self-giving 
love, which is called “kenotic unity.” Although Jesus’ power was divine power, he did 
not use the power over others, but, rather, “‘[took] on the form of a servant, being born in 
the likeness of man’ (Phil 2:7).” This expresses a “strange juxtaposition of power and 
self-emptying.”
812
  
         In my view, the eternal divine nature does not require a created, contingent world, 
so that there is no ultimate dependence of God on the world. Nevertheless, God, in 
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radical freedom, did create a world not “outside” of Godself, but as intimately 
interrelated to the divine presence, as our bodies are to our minds.813 Daniel Migliore 
talks about both God’s freedom and self-limitation in creation in terms of kenosis. On the 
one hand, the freedom of God is more active and much greater than the idea of absolute 
independence of God from the world, since the free God is free for the world and this 
God freely takes the form of a servant without ceasing to be God.
814
 On the other hand, 
God’s work of creation is “costly grace” as “an act of divine kenosis.” Although the 
metaphor of divine kenosis is usually applied to the divine salvation, the act of creation is 
already a kind of divine kenosis, i.e., self-humiliation or self-limitation. As Emil Brunner 
also contends, “The kenosis, which reaches its [highest] expression in the cross of Christ, 
began with the creation of the world.”815 
        Kenosis enables us to think that God’s Word, or God’s Son, is coming in the form 
of the suffering servant who humbles himself, makes himself vulnerable, makes friends 
with sinners and has preference for the poor, becomes obedient even to the death on the 
cross. This kenosis of God, Jesus, gives his life unconditionally for the renewal of the 
world.
816
 Thus, insofar as God embraces the world’s suffering, a panentheistic 
understanding of the God-world relation relates to a strong kenotic Christology and 
soteriology.817 In addition, developing this argument, Migliore speaks of the “kenotic 
unity” of God and humanity in Jesus Christ, which is that God and humanity in Jesus 
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Christ are united in mutual self-giving love. It is a union of the Spirit in which there is 
reciprocal self-limitation and total openness of each to the other.818  
 
Shekinah 
Moltmann explains God’s kenotic relation to the world through a conception, shekinah 
(indwelling), that is, “cosmic Shekinah of God” out of his free love. God dwells in 
creation, “the home of his identity in the world.”
 
God’s indwelling is God’s presence in 
the world. This is the Moltmann’s eschatological vision, that is, “panentheistic vision of 
God’s being ‘all in all’ (1 Cor. 15: 28).”
819
 Although we can recognize God’s Shekinah in 
the Israelites history, Moltmann asks, how can we interpret it in the captivity of the 
Babylonians? Two answers can be possible: First, God no longer works in the history. 
Second, God’s Shekinah is still in the suffering of the homeless, humiliated, and exiled 
Israelites and becomes fellow or friend with them.
820
 From the concept of Shekinah, 
Abraham Heschel develops “bipolar concept” of one God” who exists in history in a 
double presence: “in heaven and in his exiled people, unlimited and limited, infinite and 
finite, free from suffering and death, while at the same time suffering and dying with his 
people.” With the help of the “self-differentiation of God” in Hegel’s dialectics, Franz 
Rosenzweig interprets the concept of Shekinah: “God himself cuts himself off from 
himself, he gives himself away to his people, he suffers with their sufferings, he goes 
with them into the misery of the foreign land, he wanders with their wanderings.” This 
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God must be “the banished God” and will be redeemed and all creatures are in God and 
God in all creatures.821  
 Moltmann’s doctrine of kenosis not only talks about attributes inherent in divine 
nature but also relates to a kenosis of the divinity (divine being) of the eternal Logos. 
Moltmann emphasizes that “the act of kenosis is an act of God’s free love for men and 
women.” Through the divine kenosis, we can recognize that the glory of God is not for 
“the crowns of the mighty,” but for “the face of the crucified Christ, that the authority of 
God is represented not by the powerful and the rich but by the outcast Son of Man, and 
that the kingdom of God is reflected not in world kingdom, but in the service of Christ, 
“who humiliated himself to the point of death on the cross.”822 Von Balthasar also 
indicates in a similar view that kenosis is “the essential nature of the eternal Son of the 
eternal Father”: what the incarnate Son does on earth or in time is not different from what 
he does in heaven or in eternity.
823
 Through baptism we can ponder the God and world 
relationship. “Jesus replied, ‘Let it be so now; it is proper for us to do this to fulfill all 
righteousness.’ Then John consented.” (Matthew 3:15). Although God can do everything 
God wants and wills, God does not use God’s own authority to fulfill all righteousness 
but begs baptism from a man John. This reminds me of God’s kenosis or God’s self-
emptying from Philippians 2. This image of Jesus may be different from Jesus we make 
in the fossilized doctrine. The fact that Jesus was baptized by a man John does not mean 
that the authority of the earth dominates that of the heaven but that through the apostolic 
tradition or spirit of the earth God fulfills the vision or will of heaven, declaring that 
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“This is my Son, whom I love; with him I am well pleased.” What we learn from baptism 
is that God works with the world together.  
 Then, what is the purpose of kenosis? Moltmann argues that “The goal of God’s 
kenosis in the creation and preservation of the world is that future which we describe 
with the symbols of the kingdom of God and the new creation, or ‘world without 
end.’”
824
 Keith Ward also answers that it is “theosis, or covenant with God.”
825
 It means 
that “As the beginning of creation is kenosis, so the end or consummation of creation is 
theosis.”
826
 In the Philippians 4:21, we can find theosis: “(the Lord Jesus Christ) will 
transform our lowly bodies so that they will be like his glorious body.” If I make a term 
which expresses the relation between transcendence and immanence, it could be ‘Keno-
theosis,’ since God’s kenosis is prior to theosis.  
  
2) Relational God 
Understanding the God-World Relationship through Human Beings 
The God-world relationship is “distinct but not separate,” or, in a sense, “inextricably 
intertwined.”
827
 On the one hand, since the world depends on God who is its “necessary 
and eternal source,” the world without God’s creative act cannot exist. On the other hand, 
God depends on the world in that God’s actual experience depends on interactions with 
finite creatures.
828
 Insofar as God is internally related to and knows the world 
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immediately through the interior understanding, more than we are internally related to 
and know our bodies immediately, God is “the most radically relational Thou.” Moreover, 
this knowledge is “empathetic, intimate, sympathetic knowledge, closer to feeling than to 
rationality.”
829
 McFague’s model of the world as God’s body gives us two aspects: that 
since we live in God, we can relax and enjoy, and that since we live on the earth, we 
should care for our isolated neighbors and the earth for sustainability.
830
 Insofar as to say 
“relational” is to communicate each other, we need to ask that we have cosmic ears to 
listen to the world’s diverse voices. Thus to know, one by one, people who live in the 
world everyday, in a sense can be a way to lead us to know God better. 
 In the sense, we cannot help but deal with Martin Buber with regard to relation, 
which is mutual and reciprocal to all members of the cosmic community,831 and it is 
amazing and fresh to find panentheistic analogy and elements in Buber who is hardly a 
metaphysician but rather a phenomenologist.
832
 Buber conclusively contends, “In the 
beginning is the relation”
833
 and true relation can be realized only through the relation of 
I to the eternal Thou.
834
 God is the supreme form of Thou
835
 who cannot be reduced to 
“It.” In order to reach to the eternal “You,” we should encounter every single you, insofar 
as single you is a glimpse of eternal “You.”836 In every sphere and in every you, we 
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perceive, address, touch the eternal “You.”
837
 That is, as soon as we touch a “you,” we 
are touched by a breath of eternal life.838 In this time we can live in the spirit with our 
whole being.839 In the sense, Clayton calls Buber’s theory a “lived panentheism.” Buber 
addresses panenthestic meaning as follows: “God is the wholly other, wholly same, and 
wholly present. He is the mysterium tremendum that appears and overwhelms; but he is 
also the mystery of the obvious that is closer to me than my own I.”
840
 
 On the one hand, a strong point for Buber is that we can reach God through the 
relation of I-Thou in our daily lives. On the other hand, a weak point for Buber is that if 
Buber really emphasizes the relation, he should use “we” as a basic word instead of I-
You insofar as people already live between people. In China and Korea, we say human 
being as “인간” (in-gan) in Korean and “?間”  in Chinese. “?” (in) means “human 
beings,” “間” (gan) means “between,” and the shape of ? (in) seems to lean against each 
other. In fact, insofar as human beings live between and among others, they are thus 
“between-beings.” That is, a human being is already by nature a relational being. If so, 
‘we’ is a more appropriate term to the relational conception. ‘We’ is neither arbitrarily 
united ‘I’ to ‘You’ nor destroyed nor reduced in its individual character to other. ‘We’ 
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means each other. Whereas if I remain in I, I cannot go beyond I, myself; if I go beyond 
myself, I should be in ‘We.’ Since relationship does not reduce each individual one to 
other, ‘we’ presupposes the individual being, so that ‘we’ is neither total one nor 
monarchy one. Native Americans have an idea which offers a deep insight: “We are all 
related. We are related because we all come from the same Creator and share the same 
planet. We also all share the same air. What I have just breathed in, you had just breathed 
out seconds ago.”
841
 Whether they are the rich or the poor, there is no exception to 
understanding that relation means interconnection. I as a self have an inter-affective 
relation with the larger whole of things, as Ogden argues, since each individual life is 
“the present integration of remembered past and anticipated future into a new whole of 
significance.”842 
 
Relation between God and the World  
While playing piano, we can think about God who is tuning and playing the world. For 
God, the world is not outside God. When God’s dipolar aspects—left hand and right 
hand—play the piano (the world), it is meaningless to make a clear distinction between 
immanence and transcendence, but rather when two hands cross over each other, there 
will be harmony between God and the world, so that diverse phenomena of the world are 
themselves the ensemble of God and the world. The God-world relationship in 
panentheism can be described as the play of God and the world. If we are in God and 
God in us, we play in and with God. Although God is the One who receives our worship, 
God is willing to play with us, since we are children of God. The play is possible not in 
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the distance but in the intimate relationship between God and the world, when God 
descends into us. Just as parents play with their children, so God plays with us.  In the 
sense, when we smile, God also smiles with us and when we cry, God also cries with us. 
Thus there is a mutually intimate relation rather than a hierarchical relation between God 
and the world.  
 The relationship between God and the world is well revealed in John 3:16: “For 
God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him 
shall not perish but have eternal life.” This can be analyzed as follows: 1) God first loves 
the world and the world is loved by God; 2) God gives his Son and the world receives 
him; 3) There must be God’s initiative for the world in that the direction is from God to 
the world (Godthe world); 4) Then, the world returns to God its response (belief) and 
God receives it (the worldGod); 5) In this logic, we can see mutual relationship or 
connection (GodThe world); 6) This mutual relation makes it possible to have 
eternal life; 7) If this mutual relation is broken, eternal life cannot be given, but there 
must be only perishing. God might not have given his one and only Son to the world 
unless God had loved the world. However, the world is so valuable to God that God loves 
the world. In this sense, memorizing this verse from preschool, we might be panentheists. 
This verse shows God’s radical relationship to the world.  
 After creation, the relation between God and world is interdependent. Is it not 
more appropriate to say that even though there are infinitively qualitative differences 
between God and the world, God should be interrelated to creatures after creation? 
Although the God-world relationship is obviously neither a symmetrical nor an equal 
relation but a mutual one, argues Moltmann, it has “a retroactive effect on his relationship 
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to himself.”
843
 Tillich also indicates the divine-human relationship within religious 
experience. Although God in nature is never dependent on human beings, God in relation 
to human beings is dependent on them. Thus insofar as there is a mutual interdependence 
between “God for us” and “we for God,” the divine-human relation is cor-relational.
844
 
 We can recognize the problem of attributes of God in classical theism such as 
simplicity, impassibility, and immutability. Since this God-world relationship is not in 
reality, but in idea,
845
 it makes God the unmoved mover, as we already see, which is not 
affected by creatures. Although there is qualitative difference between God and creatures, 
God should be related to creatures after creation.
846
 In fact, God does not need to have the 
world as a partner but God nevertheless needs the world. This argument reminds me of 
Kathryn Tanner’s structure of the Trinity in Jesus, Humanity, and the Trinity. “God does 
not even need to be with him in this way. It is not just that God does not need us to do 
something for ‘him;’ God does not need us at all. God does not need us for company; the 
Trinitarian Persons have all they need in and among themselves… God’s relations with 
us from creation to consummation are the purely gratuitous acts of beneficent love 
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extended outwards to us.”
847
 We can attempt to formulate this argument as a syllogism as 
follows: 
          1) First Possibility  
          A: God does not need us at all.  
 B: (Because) the Trinitarian Persons have all they need in and among themselves  
 C: (Nevertheless, God loves us with) purely gratuitous acts of beneficent love 
extended outwards to us.  
 
Both A and B have controversial factors. If both A and B were right, God would create 
the world by accident without any purpose. Just as the billionaire donates charities to the 
poor, so God gives us gratuitous acts of beneficent love. However, this makes God’s self-
giving love cheap. Are there not some methods to preserve God’s infinite love toward us? 
Even though one does not insist on both A and B, could one not keep C? I would like to 
suggest a possibility.  
         2) Second Possibility 
A: God needs us.  
B: Because the Trinitarian Persons do not have all they need in and among 
themselves.  
B’: Thus the Trinitarian Persons need human love.   
C: (Nevertheless) God’s relations to us are purely gratuitous acts of beneficent love 
extended outwards to us. 
 
This possibility, however, could make God needy; that is, a limited God who cannot exist 
without the world. Since this possibility is also awkward, we need the third possibility 
that has to show a sort of model, which rejects both an independent God and a limited 
God, but accepts our contingency. Hartshorne and Reese define that God does not need 
this world but rather a world and contingently contains this world because the world is 
essentially “outside the divine essence, though inside God.”
848
 Clayton also rejects God’s 
necessary creation of the world, but insists that, having once created a world, God must 
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depend on it.
849
 Since necessity may relate to coercion, it is preferable to defend freedom. 
This means that God has a potentiality in God that is actualized in God’s relations to the 
world.850 Still, subsequent to the free decision to create and to be intimately involved with 
the world, the dependence becomes basic to the divine experience.
851
 This kind of 
dependence is fully compatible with the traditional affirmation. With this panentheism, 
let me give another possibility.  
         3) Third Possibility  
A: God does not need us at all.  
B: (Because) the Trinitarian Persons have all they need in and among themselves  
C: (Nevertheless, God loves us with) purely gratuitous acts of beneficent love 
extended outwards to us.  
C’: ‘C’ makes human beings able to love God with gratefully responsive acts of 
confessional love extended towards God.  
D: Thus, God would be happy because of our love toward God.  
          
Real relationship consists of not only “purely gratuitous acts of beneficient love” but also 
“gratefully responsive acts of confessional love.” Von Balthasar also maintains that 
although God “freely and unconditionally” gives us pure grace, human beings have to 
respond to God with the dignity of a free creature.
852
 Where the infinite chooses the finite 
and when God makes a covenant with man with pure grace, humans have the dignity of a 
free creature. Thus God alone cannot bring about reconciliation, as Anselm indicates, 
although God has all initiatives.853  
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By the same token, Kallistos Ware argues that since God created the world in God’s 
entire freedom, neither arbitrarily nor accidentally, it is very appropriate to say that “God 
is necessary to the world, but the world is not necessary to God.”854 
 Thomas Oord explains necessity in God and world relationship, not that “Wow, 
I'm impressed with X, because X is essentially independent from others,” but rather that 
“Wow, I'm impressed with X, because X has a nature of love that everlastingly involves a 
measure of dependence for giving and recieving with others (in this case, creaturely 
others).” However, I would like to paraphrase Oord’s saying as follows: “Wow, I’m 
impressed with X,” because, although “X is essentially independent from others,” X 
willingly relates to us and even depends on us in some ways. And Oord maintains double 
necessity: God necessarily exists and God necessarily creates the world.855 If double 
necessity is possible, however, we have to say, “no world, no God.” Thus we need to say 
that God’s creation of the world is not arbitrary, casual, or accidental, but totally an act of 
divine freedom, since God’s self-diffusive love is at the very heart of the living God.
856
 
 Thus gratefully responsive acts of confessional love extended towards God do not 
damage the purely gratuitous acts of beneficent love of God. By the same token, as Paul 
Fiddes notes, “[L]ove is relational and not simply attitudinal; the God who is love exists 
eternally in the relationship of Father, Son, and Spirit.”857 But this model of God denies 
that “a loving God needs a created world in which to exercise love.”
858
 The relation 
between God and the world is God’s expression of love and grace. In this case, God 
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needs our love not because God needs love or something, but because God created 
human beings as “children of God.” Like the Law of Gravity, love is also flowing from 
the above (God) to the below (the world). However, in order to achieve the ultimate love 
between God and the world, love needs to break the law of gravity. That is, love of the 
world must go up to God. In this sense, whereas classical theism follows the law of 
gravity of love, panentheism breaks the law. To that extent, then, Thomas Oord's 
definition of love is very appropriate: “to love is to act intentionally, in sympathetic 
response to others (including God), to increase overall well-being.”
859
  
 I return again to the phenomenological method that I have used throughout this 
dissertation. In the relation between parents and their baby, at first, parents make their 
baby smile by showing their smile, but, later, their baby makes them smile by showing 
his/her cute smile. Smiles are also in a mutual relationship. Personal examples may be 
helpful here. For example, whenever I opened the door of my house, my daughter, who 
was two years old, came and hugged me. It made me very happy and relieved my stress 
from my life. It was the expression of love of my baby toward me. I was not only happy 
when I gave my love to my baby. Even though she was too young, when I received her 
love, I also became happy. When my daughter hugged me, if I did not give any response 
to her, how did she know that I love her? Did she not think that I did not love her? It 
means that I have a deep relation to my daughter and need my baby’s love, since I do not 
have all I need in my wife and me, and that I have to express my love to her in order to 
let my daughter know that I love her. Likewise, if we, as human beings, love God, 
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although God is not needy in love, God will be happy. When we give our love to God, if 
God has no response to us, how can we know that God loves us?  
 
3) Suffering God 
Examples of Suffering  
Example 1) “Those people who live in heaven do not have to think about hell, but our 
five members of family think about heaven living in this hell today.” This is an 
expression that shows a concrete reality of our lives from a S. Korean novel, A Small Ball 
with which a Little Man Send Up, written by SaeHee Choi. There are many people who 
still live in the world like the hell. They need a concrete heaven in this real hell.  
 Example 2) A Korea movie, “Crossing,” tells us about the terrible situation of N. 
Korea. In order to get good medicine for his wife, a father escapes from N. Korea, 
leaving his son with his wife and goes to China. However, he cannot stay at China, so he 
goes to S. Korea. He works at a factory. His owner says, ‘don’t worry about your family, 
because Jesus Christ is with you.” He asked, “Why not N. Korea, if He is here in S. 
Korea?” His question could mean that there seems to be no God in N. Korea. If God is 
there, why do they live like that?  
 Example 3) One mother died with her four or five-month-old baby by earthquake 
in China. She saved a text on her cellular phone: “Oh, my baby, if you are alive, 
remember that I love you so much.”
860
 
 Example 4) Elie Wiesel, in Night, introduces a story: “a young boy was hanged 
before all the prisoners for a minor infraction of the camp rules. As his body dangled 
from the rope, Wiesel was asked by someone, “Where is God now?” and a voice within 
him replied, “Where is He? Here He is—He is hanging here on this gallows.” Simone 
Weil: “Affliction makes God appear to be absent for a time.”
861
  
 Example 5) “When were you most sad in your entire life?” “I am sad everyday.” 
This answer was the one of any woman in Africa.  
  
When we look at the reality, we face with the dipolar phenomena that “where there is 
laughter, there is also weeping; where joy, sorrow; where birth, death; where power, 
powerlessness and subjection; where shrewdness, folly; where an openness to the 
absolute, a closed mind.” Although most people hope for peace or happiness without 
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antagonisms, we know that these are not even imaginable.
862
 In the same vein, Whitehead 
also sees the same phenomena, the “multifariousness of the world—the fairies dance, and 
Christ is nailed to the cross.”863 We cannot deny these distinctively dual facts. However, 
whenever we see the concrete places of suffering, we recognize that we need not only to 
see and analyze the various phenomena but also to actively overcome the problem of evil.  
 There are two kinds of evil: Natural evil and Moral evil. Natural evil is the 
suffering caused by diseases, earthquakes, tsunami, and so on. Migliore argues that 
vulnerability and finitude are not evil but part of the goodness of life, in that being a finite 
creature entails the possibility of suffering and even death. Since suffering belongs to a 
structure of life, “to wish the world were immune from every form of struggle and every 
form of suffering would be to wish not to have been created at all.” Thus finitude and 
mortality cannot be called inherently evil. But we cannot but ask about providential care 
when we see “abysmal form of suffering in the natural order” such as disease of baby.
864
 
Moral evil is the suffering caused by human action such as Auschwitz (the Holocaust) or 
social inequalities. In the face of this kind of suffering in the world, we should not say 
that this world is the best world. Whitehead very properly points out the problem: “The 
Leibnizian theory of the ‘best of possible worlds’ is an audacious fudge produced in order 
to save the face of a Creator constructed by contemporary, and antecedent, 
theologians.”
865
 
 The suffering people are waiting for someone who can help or solve their 
suffering. In the Bible the Israelites are waiting for “the consolation of Israel” (Luke 
2:25) and “the Father of compassion and the God of all comfort” (2 Cor. 1:3). 
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Nonetheless, many people ask: What does God do for the suffering people? What are the 
relationship between God and human suffering? They are not easy questions to answer. 
Although many Christians believe that there must be mysteries in suffering with which 
we do not understand, this answer is not enough to give a proper answer to both theology 
and the concrete reality of evil, because it may neglect the reality of the suffering people.    
 
Providence and Evil in the Theological Tradition   
Augustine argues that God’s providence appears both in the lives of individuals and in 
history. In Confessions, Augustine explains how God guides his life through many 
troubles. God does not work coercively, but in Augustine’s own free decisions and 
actions. In the City of God Augustine asserts that social problems or evils are not caused 
by God but by the creature’s misuse of their freedom. God uses them to accomplish the 
divine purpose. Calvin also argues that since God governs over all events “by God’s 
secret plan,” not over any event by chance, nothing happens without God’s 
incomprehensible wisdom. Nevertheless, Calvin does not consider providence as fatalism 
in that God is the “first cause of all things” and we are the “secondary causes.”
866
 Divine 
providence gives us important insights in three ways that God guides our life and controls 
evils. First, evil teaches us the humility in suffering (“patience in adversity”). Second, 
evil enables us to give thanks for the times when we prosper (“gratitude of mind for the 
favorable outcome of things”). Third, faith in God’s providence gives us freedom from 
all anxiety (“incredible freedom from worry about the future”).
867
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 Luther asserts that “Should I be able to make the whole world happy for one day, 
nevertheless I must not do so, if it be not God's will.”868 However, is it true? Is there any 
time for God not to think of making this world happy? I would like to say that God really 
hopes for people in the world to be happy. Thus we need to change his note as follow: 
“Should I be able to make the whole world happy for one day, I must do so, because it be 
God’s will, otherwise God cannot be our gracious, lovable God.” Luther also introduces 
‘theology of paradoxes’: “God’s alien work (opus alienum Dei) and God’s proper work 
(opus proprium Dei).” While the former involves killing, taking away hope, or even 
desperation, the latter tells of forgiveness, save, or encouragement. So God has both 
aspects: good and evil. In other words, God makes bad results which we do not 
understand and even uses Satan for his proper work,869 since “God cannot be God unless 
He first becomes a devil.”
870
 On the contrary, for Barth, evil is “the alien power of 
nothingness (das Nichtige)” that arises not from God’s act of creation but from its own 
power.
871
 Whereas many Reformed theologians asserts that God not only “creates and 
sustains” the world but also “governs and rules” the human history, contemporary 
theologians affirm at best “a providence of presence,” that is, God’s presence in the world, 
not a providence of the rule of human events.872 Relating divine capacity for suffering to 
the nature of creation, Paul Fiddes argues that since God takes a risk of lapse of a free 
world from the divine purpose, “God is vulnerable to the emerging of something strange 
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from the side of created beings—evil and gratuitous suffering.”
873
 Ward asserts that all 
suffering arises from God “not as intended by God,” but as necessarily implied in the 
world God has created, and God will compeletely overcome all evil by divine 
goodness.
874
  
 However, even in this contemporary society, a fundamental group’s interpretation 
of divine providence, for example, televangelist Pat Robertson’s response to the Haitian 
earthquake was awful. He said that “Something happened a long time ago in Haiti ... they 
were under the heel of the French, uh, you know, Napoleon the third and whatever ... and 
they got together and swore a pact to the devil, they said, we will serve you, if you get us 
free from the French. True story.”875 He meant that because of the swearing with the devil, 
God punishes Haiti. When we see some bad effects such as sufferings, earthquake, and 
death, some people consider them as God’s punishment, look for some causes (sin), and 
simply connect them to each other. Their logic is that bad consequences result from bad 
causes. Then how can they interpret bad effects which happen to almost everybody 
everyday? How can they understand the suffering of the faithful Christians? How can 
they interpret even Jesus’ death according to this logic? Was Jesus’ death the 
consequence of his sin? How about the earthquake in Japan? Christians should not say 
that Japan’s earthquake occurred because they did not believe in God. Wasn’t there any 
Christian who died by this earthquake? Earthquake is not dependent on whether people 
believe in God or not. What we have to do for them is not to judge them, but instead to 
pray for them.
876
 This position considers suffering as “evidence of divine punishment (of 
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the wicked)” or “chastisement (of the people of God).” Calvin notes that the scriptures 
teach us that chastisement of God such as war and other calamities is something that God 
inflicts on our sins.877 
 However, we need to ask, was God happy when those things happened? We have 
to remember that God is not such a mercilessly crazy God, but is the kind of God who 
can say, “How can I give you up, Ephraim? How can I hand you over, Israel?... My heart 
is changed within me; all my compassion is aroused” (Hosea 11:8). Is this not God’s 
compassionate mind for the suffering people including Japanese people? Please don’t say 
that Japan’s earthquake is caused by God’s punishment for the numerous idols in Japan, 
since it makes God the merciless God. To see Japan’s earthquake as God’s punishment is 
a limitation of classical theism. However, do we not see God’ painful tears for those who 
died even without saying their last words for their family? If we place ourselves in the 
place of the suffering people, we know why a compassionate mind is so valuable and 
significant in human life. In John 9, when Jesus’ disciples saw a man blind from birth, 
they ask Jesus, “who sinned, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?” Jesus said, 
“Neither this man nor his parents sinned,” “but this happened so that the work of God 
might be displayed in his life.” It does not mean that God planned it for him, but that God 
achieves his love and work through him. Although this answer has some hermeneutical 
difficulties to solve, this answer is totally different from Robertson’s. Is Robertson’s 
response not a kind of shamanism? This kind of response of fundamentalists makes God 
a merciless God and forces Christianity to separate from the world. Is he really in a sense 
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different from atheists who criticize Christianity and who deny God because of these 
sufferings?  
 We can relate the triune God to providence. The God who creates and preserves 
the world is neither a despotic ruler nor a distant God, but “our Father in heaven” who 
becomes intimate with us “as the incarnate, crucified, risen Lord.” The role of three 
persons in triune God is as follows. First, God the creator works for the enhancement of 
life and against all that jeopardizes life.
 
Second, God the redeemer works for the people 
whether they are strong or weak. Third, God the sanctifier works for hope for the future 
and for transforming all things.
878
 If a person experiences such a kind of Trinitarian God 
working for him/her, for that person God is the livng God whose passion is revealed to 
that person. In the sense we can recognize that “the history of the world is the history of 
God’s suffering,” where “God suffers with us—God suffers from us—God suffers for 
us.”879 Then, how can we still keep providence in the face of real evil? If we understand 
God in the perspective of Trinitarian, we can still accept the lordship of God even in the 
reality of suffering, since God is both co-agent and co-sufferer and both are freely 
vulnerable for the world.
880
 Thus we can have the confidence of providence in suffering: 
Providence means divine protection and guidance as “transcendent security” in the nature 
and history. Although we have this confidence and faith in human finite conditions, if this 
does not occur, we can doubt the confidence and faith. But Tillich encourages us to have 
“the paradox of the belief in providence,” i.e., “in spite of,” that “just when the conditions 
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of a situation are destroying the believer, the divine condition gives him a certainty which 
transcends the destruction.”881 
   
Typologies of Theodicy 
What does God do for the suffering people? Isn’t it a kind of contradiction between an 
omnipotent and all-good being and the presence of evil in the world? If human beings 
have their power in their subjects, could we put the responsibility of the problem of evil 
only on the shoulders of God? In other words, as I argued at Divine Action chapter, in 
order to overcome evil, one should locate the origin of evil in the lives of human beings. 
That is, since God gives human beings free will, God is no longer the Almighty in the 
classical sense, the Almighty who exists beyond this world and only manipulates people, 
since God’s omnipotence cannot overcome the reality of evil in this concrete life. God is 
not responsible for all that happens, because an evolutionary world inevitably encounters 
blind alleys and unavoidable cost for new life.
882
 In facing so many non-understandable 
events or accidents in the world, in any sense, some think, God must have responsibilities 
even though those accidents are not directly related to God. How? Should God go to a 
prison? Should God have the final responsibility?  
 There are some perspectives of suffering. Migliore and Placher introduce four 
similar types of theodicy (God’s justice, from theos, God, and dike, justice) respectively 
and two of their ideas are intermingled here,
883
 so that there are six types of theodicy. I 
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will indicate which one is consistent with the philosophical theology which I defended in 
this dissertation. 
 First is the Counterpart Theodicy (I call). It suggests that some good is impossible 
without evil, in that God allows evil in order to make greater good. Aquinas’ example 
supports this view: “A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying of animals; and 
there would be no patience of martyrs if there were no tyrannical persecution.”
884
 In this 
perspective, although we do not know why there are so many evils, since it could be 
finally God’s will for more good for us, we must believe in God. Job’s story may belong 
to this perspective in the sense that he “overwhelms men with the realization of their own 
stupidity, impotence, and corruption” (Calvin, 1.1.3).885 However, Griffin criticizes this 
traditional all-determining theism which considers evil as “‘prima facie evil,’ meaning 
that which appears to be evil at first glance.” It argues that this evil is not genuinely evil, 
since it can provide more good condition for “the best of all possible worlds,” so that God 
has “good reason for not preventing all (prima facie) evil.”
886
 However, it is very absurd 
to say that prima facie evil is necessary for a compensating good. How can it compensate 
for the people who suffered in the past? Are numerous evils in the world not genuine 
evils? If wars and the Holocaust were not evil, what would be genuine evil? And 
although we are faced with the incomprehensibility of God, this answer creates a problem 
in that it simply accepts all suffering without any question. By contrast, we have to 
recognize that Job himself remonstrates with God and asks divine governance.
887
 
 Second is Free Will Theodicy. If God gives human beings free will, there can be 
evil as the consequence of free will. Nevertheless, human beings who use their free will 
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to create evil are better than robots which do neither have free will (human causes) nor 
create evil. Alvin Plantinga argues that this theory can explain social evils like wars and 
terrorism, as well as some natural evils.888 This position argues that although God is 
powerful, since God voluntarily gave human beings free-will, God does not prevent all 
evil. This position tells us of “God’s permission of evil.” However, Griffin points out 
four problems in this position. The first problem is that since freedom is restricted to the 
human being, it cannot explain natural evil such as earthquakes, tornadoes, and 
tsunami.
889
 The second problem is the claim that although God could prevent any specific 
evil, if God does not, this God is problematic. The third problem is that since human free-
will is “an entirely gratuitous gift of God,” and not in the nature of things, God could 
have created another being like us without sin or genuine evil. The fourth problem is that 
if human freedom is given by God, this freedom can be interrupted by God. However, if 
God could interrupt human freedom, the human being would not be fully human, since 
human beings could be human beings only with genuine freedom.
890
  
 Third is Protest Theodicy. Inspired by Elie Wiesel (including Richard Rubenstein 
and Arthur Cohen), John Roth coined this name. This position asks “the total goodness of 
God” and protests the “refrain that God is love,” divine silence or inaction: Like Jacob 
who wrestles with God; like the psalmist who asks, “How long, O Lord”; like Job who 
defends his innocence; or like Jesus who cries to God on the cross. Fourth is Process 
Theodicy. According to Cobb, we have to reinterpret the meaning of omnipotence. God 
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no longer exercises dominant and coercive power but “optimum persuasive power,”
891
 
“calling to us and coming to meet us,”892 since human beings are also subjects with free 
will. Thus, God is there before us. They find an answer through restriction of divine 
power. There are things God cannot prevent such as the Holocaust, murders, or cancers, 
since God is powerless. However, God is responsible for evil in an indirect sense, since 
God persuades the world to have the potential not only for good but also for evil. 
However, we cannot blame God, since God intends the good and shares in the creatures’ 
suffering.
893
 
 Fifth is Person-making theodicy. John Hick makes a distinction between the 
Augustinian and the Irenaean types of theodicy. Whereas Augustinian theodicy is that 
evil is the consequence of sin, Irenaean theodicy is that the possibility of evil is a mark of 
mature humanity in the image of God. Accepting Irenaean theodicy, Hick argues that 
human beings can become totally human only when they experience evil and continue to 
participate in “the fullness of life in love” even in the face of evil. This position is divine 
pedagogy that makes use of earthly sufferings to turn us to God and to cultivate our hope 
for eternal life. It considers all sufferings as an opportunity for spiritual growth. The 
apostle Paul notes, “I consider that the sufferings of this present time are not worth 
comparing with the glory that is to be revealed to us” (Rom. 8:18). Paul is thinking of 
sufferings that are willingly assumed by the Christian for the sake of Christ and the 
gospel. However, a weak point of this position is that Hick focuses not on the resistance 
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of evil but on the possibility of growth though evil. By the same token, this would lead to 
ethical quietism or a depreciation of this life. We can learn from our suffering, but it is 
not to say that is is a general truth that suffering is good.894 
   Sixth is Liberation theodicy. How can we reconcile the suffering reality of the 
poor and the oppressed, and the theological claim that God liberates and saves the poor 
from oppression? James Cone accepts the divine power and divine goodness in order to 
solve the problem of evil. From the Servant Songs of Isaiah which reveal its utter form in 
the event of the cross of Jesus Christ, Cone argues that human beings must participate in 
“God’s struggle against suffering rather than a pious acquiescence in suffering.” God 
grants “power to the powerless to fight here and now for freedom.” Migliore points out 
one problem of liberation theodicy: “The struggle for justice” must be related to “the 
practice of forgiveness and the hope of reconciliation.”
895
  
 In conclusion, we need to realize two important aspects in order to deal with evil: 
all theodicy must be proved both “by ‘the brutal facts of modern historical life’ and by 
the biblical witness to the love of God in Jesus the crucified.”
896
 My own view is similar 
to the Liberation theodicy including protest theodicy, since the problem of evil is not that 
of superficial theory but that of our concrete life. The oppressed or Minjung really longs 
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for God’s power to overcome the social injustice of evil. No one is free from the holy 
duty to wipe and stop the tears of the suffering of the people.  
 
The Relation between Evil in the World and God’s Suffering  
God’s Suffering in the Bible 
There are many examples in the Bible which support and describe God’s suffering, 
compassionate God, or merciful God. Since God is a merciful God, although a mother 
can forget the baby, the Bible says that God cannot abandon people (Deuteronomy 4:31, 
Isaiah 49:15). Then, how can we understand the suffering of God’s people? When Jesus 
speaks to Ananias about Paul in Acts 9:15-16, Jesus considers Paul as “my chosen 
instrument.” However, this chosen instrument does not have any honor or respect but 
only suffering to carry Jesus’ name before the Gentiles and the people of Israel: “I will 
show him how much he must suffer for my name.” How can we harmonize between the 
“chosen instrument” and ‘suffering’? A chosen instrument of Jesus must have any 
authority and privilege, but has suffering. It is very paradoxical.  
 Likewise, how can we understand God’s wrath (Ruth 1:13, 1:20-21)? Jeremiah’s 
complaint is more serious: “Why does the way of the wicked prosper? Why do all the 
faithless live at ease?” (Jeremiah 12:1).897 Even in this kind of asking, we need to 
remember that although there is God’s punishment for people, it is not God’s ultimate 
intention. Isaiah 54:7-8 shows this idea that “‘For a brief moment I abandoned you, but 
with deep compassion I will bring you back. In a surge of anger I hid my face from you 
for a moment, but with everlasting kindness I will have compassion on you.’” Thus we 
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also confess like Job: “He knows the way that I take; when he has tested me, I will come 
forth as gold” (Job 23:10). Although Paul suffered through all his life,898 he confessed 
that God will save us: “No temptation has seized you except what is common to man. 
And God is faithful; he will not let you be tempted beyond what you can bear. But when 
you are tempted, he will also provide a way out so that you can stand up under it” (1 
Corinthians 10:13). Psalms 89:32-34 also describes this idea: “I will punish their sin with 
the rod, their iniquity with flogging; but I will not take my love from him, nor will I ever 
betray my faithfulness. I will not violate my covenant or alter what my lip has uttered.” 
Although there are God’s wraths for us, we know God’s ultimate nature of love and 
mercy through Jonah 4:2 and Exodus 34:6, God is gracious and compassionate, that is, 
“slow to anger and abounding in love.” 
 Even the Bible asks us to learn God’s mercy (Luke 6:36): “Be merciful, just as 
your Father is merciful.” Here human mercy and divine mercy are not different, since if 
they are different, how can human beings be merciful and how can human beings learn 
divine mercy? Isn’t God’s compassionate mind similar to human compassionate mind? 
God’s mercy can be shown through human mercy and divine mercy can be known 
through human mercy. In this sense, anthropomorphism between God and human beings 
is indispensable, since, without it, only negative theology is possible. We can think God’s 
suffering in human language and human imagination. Just as God shows his love for us in 
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Isaiah 49:16, “See, I have engraved you on the palms of my hands,” so our ultimate 
concern is mercy for others: “Mercy triumphs over judgment!” (James 2:13). 
 Furthermore, when we understand God’s mind for suffering, we can guess it 
through human suffering. The story that Solomon’s wise judgment in 1 Kings 3 shows us 
there can be a real example of compassion. Two prostitutes come to the king and insist 
that ‘the living baby is their own.’ Solomon tries to cut the living baby in two and gives 
half to one and half to the other. The one whose son was dead says, “Neither I nor you 
shall have him. Cut him in two.” It means that she has no compassion mind. However, 
what was the response of the real mother? The woman whose son was alive is filled with 
compassion for her son and says to the king, “Please, my lord, give her the living baby! 
Don’t kill him!” What makes her intend to give her living baby to the other woman? It is 
because of her love for her own son. If the son could be alive, she could allow the other 
woman to bring up her son. It is more valuable for her to keep her son alive than to have 
the dead son. Isn’t this the compassionate love? Solomon has the wisdom to distinguish 
the right from the wrong, so he helps the real mother have her son. However, when the 
real mother attempts to yield her son to another woman, it goes beyond the valuation-
judgment. In a sense, she would be greater than Solomon. That is, true love can go 
beyond value judgment of truth and false. Love can go beyond the pride of knowledge. 
Thus, although there are many examples of God’s suffering, if we neglect these obvious 
facts, isn’t it a kind of evidence of obvious unfaithfulness? In a sense, although there are 
opposite phenomena in the Bible, they may say that the whole story of the Bible, from 
Genesis 1:1 to Revelation 22:21, tells us God’s grace and God’s love for us. 
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Possibility of the Suffering of God   
There are two distinctive responses to God’s suffering: no and yes. First, God cannot 
suffer. Some classical theists disagree with the concept of God’s suffering and God’s 
compassionate mind, since they believe that God is not a creature and that suffering 
belongs only to creatures. At best, they accept Jesus’ suffering. Athanasius insists that 
“Christ… suffered, not in His Godhead, but for us in the flesh.”
899
 Thomism also notes 
the subordinationism which “protect[s] true divinity from the suffering and death”
900
 and 
the suffering is only a “suppositum of the divine nature” which is not related to the divine 
nature itself, but divine nature in respect of the human nature.
901
 There is a fundamental 
distinction between God’s nature and human nature: “God’s being is incorruptible, 
unchangeable, indivisible, incapable of suffering and immortal; human nature, on the 
other hand, is transitory, changeable, divisible, capable of suffering and mortal.”
902
 That 
is, Jesus’ humanity alone suffered.  
 However, I do not agree with the first response, that God cannot suffer, since this 
view makes incarnation, i.e., God’s humanity, less valuable. If Jesus Christ as a second 
person alone feels and experiences suffering, not God the Father, how can God the Father 
feel his son Jesus’ suffering? If God the Father cannot feel the son’s feeling, how can we 
speak concerning perfect love and perfect communication between the Trinitarian 
persons? Is there any room in the triuine God for this failure of feeling for each other? 
Isn’t there Godhead in the flesh? Suordinationism in which Son and Spirit subordinate to 
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the Father, defends God the Father from the suffering. Zizioulas insists on God’s 
impassibility in order to defend the belief that IT is more than ET. Isn’t there any way to 
defend the compatibility between God’s passibility and the belief that IT is more than 
ET? To insist that God can suffer does not bother the fact that IT is more than ET. 
Karkkainen also does not see Zizioulas’ critique appropriating: “This does not mean 
denying God’s ontological freedom but rather highlighting the theme of the ecstatic 
nature of God’s love.”
903
    
 Thus I insist on the second: God can suffer. I recognize that my view is 
controversial and diverges in some ways from the traditional view of God. But I will do 
my best to defend this view as a bona fide Christian view in this section. Bohnhoeffer’s 
insight is very appropriate to describe God: “Only a suffering God can help.” Here 
suffering God is the triune God. Thus we can revise Bonhoeffer’s dictum as follows: 
Only a suffering [Trinitarian] God can help. This power of the triune God is “not raw 
omnipotence but the power of suffering, liberating, reconciling love.”
904
 If the world is 
entirely within God, we can regard the evil, suffering, and pain as internal to the triune 
God. Insofar as “the death of Christ is the God’s offering of himself,”
905
 God identified 
himself with the crucified one.906 Moltmann also argues that the history of Christ’s 
sufferings is disclosed by “the passionate love which Christ manifests and reveals.’907 In 
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short, suffering God (1 Cor.1:25) does not neglect pain of the world but suffers with them 
because only a suffering God can help.  
 
Patripassionism   
Love  
Example 1) A Korean novel, Thorn-Fish, written by Chang-in Choi, shows us a father’s 
love for his son. The character of Thorn-Fish is as follows: “Thorn-Fish is a very weird 
fish, because mother thorn-fish runs away after giving birth to babies. Then, father thorn-
fish takes care of his babies. He fights with other fish in order to protect them without 
eating and sleeping. However, after growing up, the children-fish leave their father and 
father thorn-fish hits his head on the stone and dies.” In this book, there is one father who 
has a son who suffers from leukemia. The mother leaves her son, gets married to 
someone, and goes France to study art. Then, the father who is a writer takes care of his 
son. However, he does not have big money to cure his son. He makes up his mind to sell 
his kidney, although it is illegal. He goes to a hospital, and unfortunately learns that he 
also has a cancer in his liver. He can live no longer than six months. He sells his cornea 
(eye) in order to care for his son. However, he dies and his son survives. Who is a real 
parent? What is a definition of parents? The parent is the one who can die for their 
sons/daughters. God is like a real parent, because God can die for us and really died for 
us.  
 Example 2) After making a snowman outside, my daughter told me: “If we go 
home, this snowman remains here outside. It is very pity.” Her mom asked her, ‘it is 
impossible to move this snow man into our house, because it must be melted.” She 
responded: “we can keep it in a refrigerator.” How can we love a snowman? Since it is 
outside in cold days and we think it is very pity, if we move it into a house or warm it, the 
snowman will disappear. A snowman which disappears if we love… Love for a snowman 
must be different from the usual love for others. How can we love a snowman? To love a 
snowman is to leave it as it is. It is the best love for a snowman. In a sense, is love of God 
for human being in the world always the same? Can God’s love for objects not be 
different according to situations or objects? 
 Example 3) Bird’s love: One day, when I went out on the balcony to dry clothes, a 
bird flew away. I saw two eggs in the nest. A couple of days later, I saw that the bird 
gathered her eggs under her wings. It did not move at all. They are still there. I think it 
became over two weeks. Whenever I open the door, I saw them as they were. It was 
amazing. It gave rise to thought about the parent’s love. Why is the bird still there? How 
does the bird eat? I heard a male bird catch worms and feed the wife. Why does not the 
bird fly away? A baby bird will be born in this world sooner or later. He/she also will do 
just as his/her parents do. I can understand why the bird gathers her eggs under her wings, 
when I have my children. Ah—ha! They also have love for their babies even thought they 
are not human beings. 
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Divine love is best understood through the panentheistic analogy. God is not moved by 
other needs but moves himself only with love, according to Kierkegaard, “for love does 
not have the satisfaction of need outside itself but within.”908 God is love. Thus “whoever 
lives in love lives in God, and God in him” (1 John 4: 16). Love connects between God 
and the world. This word does not only tell us “visits in love” or “stays in love” but “lives 
in love,” so that we live in God and God lives in us. In this case, it is love as the mediator 
that makes a community of life between God and people. In his Works of Love, 
Kierkegaard also argues that human beings can have “inherent kinship with God” in love 
and can be God’s coworkers in love. Whereas when you love the beloved and your friend, 
you are not like God, because God does not have preference and distinction, when you 
love the neighbor, you are like God.909  
 Both human relations including nonhuman organisms and love need relations.
910
 
Although Classical theism also claims that love is agape, which is pure beneficence and 
needs no love in return, panentheism regards “love as an inextricable mix of agape and 
eros, as the interdependence of giving and receiving.” Since the difference between them 
is that of human experience, this love experienced by humanity is “the deeper symbol of 
the love of God” and hence human experience is “the prompt” in panentheism.911 By the 
same token, according to Cobb, since God has empathy with us, our experience can 
contribute to the divine experience, so that “God weeps with those who weep and rejoices 
with those who rejoice.” There is mutual love between God and the world.
912
 This must 
be a model of panentheism. 
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 Then, God’s suffering, patripassionism, is this heresy? If the Son alone among 
three persons suffers on the cross, how does God the Father feel Jesus’ suffering? If God 
only knows the Son’s suffering and death, but fails to feel his suffering, how can we 
speak of personal perichoresis between them? No matter how much the Son talks about 
the suffering to the Father, can God the Father have sympathy for his Son Jesus? How 
can we defend communicatio idiomatum (communication of properties), which hypostatic 
union includes, if it is Jesus as a human being but not a divine being who suffered? Then, 
in John 3:16, “whoever believes in me shall not perish but have eternal life,” is Jesus here 
just a man? If Jesus is just a man, how can human Jesus save the world? Even in this 
world Jesus had two natures: humane and divine. When Jesus suffered and died on the 
cross, was he only a man? Wouldn’t it be more correct to say that God the Father feels 
and suffers in God the Son’s suffering? If someone sees Jesus’ human nature alone 
suffering, s/he must deny the belief that “Jesus is the Christ, the eternal Word of God in 
time.”
913
 Are they not evangelical Arianisms which insist on homoiousios between Father 
and Son?  
 Hartshorne also argues that Jesus’ love for his fellows was not mere benevolence, 
but “a feeling of sympathetic identity with them in their troubles and sufferings,” so that 
he took their suffering and even our every grief as his own.914 In the sense, Aristotle’s 
God, the “unmoved mover,” which cannot suffer and is “a loveless Beloved,” neither 
loves nor identifies with the passionate God of the Bible, but is poorer than any man.
915
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On the contrary, Moltmann asks questions in two different ways with regard to Jesus’ 
suffering on the crosss. The first one is a kind of typical question: “How can Christian 
theology speak of God at all in the face of Jesus’ abandonment by God?” However, the 
second question shows Moltmann’s intention against the first question: “How can 
Christian theology not speak of God in the face of the cry of Jesus for God on the cross?” 
Since God is love and suffers the death of Christ in his love, he is not “cold heavenly 
power,” but “the human God in the crucified Son of Man.” When Jesus was on the cross, 
God was not absent or silent but “became the crucified God,” “suffers the pains of 
abandonment,” and “suffers the death of his Son.”
916
 Tillich’s answer to the 
patripassinaism is that God participates “in the negativities of creaturely existence,” in 
that God as being-itself “transcends” nonbeing and God as creative life “includes” the 
finite and nonbeing, and in that “The certainty of God’s directing creativity is based on 
the certainly of God as the ground of being and meaning. The confidence of every 
creature, its courage to be, is rooted in faith in God as its creative ground.”
917
 
 Admittedly, Luke 15:20 shows us the Father’s sympathetic mind for the Son: 
“But while he was still a long way off, his father saw him and was filled with compassion 
for him; he ran to his son, threw his arms around him and kissed him.” Is this just a 
parable which speaks of the father’s mind for his son? Isn’t it really God’s compassionate 
heart for human beings within the world? Isn’t this God the Father’s lovely mind for His 
prodigal son? God here acts more actively by using active motions (verbs): ran, threw, 
and kissed.
918
 Love or compassionate mind is not passive but active, because the Father 
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also suffered when the Son suffered outside. To have compassion means to suffer with 
others. According to the biblical witness, God freely goes the way of suffering and even 
death for the salvation of the world in the “compassionate journey of God into the far 
country.” This God’s boundless love is explicitly expressed in the Cross and is the eternal 
source of human compassionate love.
919
  
   
Suffering in Panentheism  
In dealing with the problem of evil, classical theism has dilemma: “[E]ither God can and 
will not, or God would but cannot; hence God is either not good or not omnipotent.” 
Peacocke asserts that whereas God of classical theism “witnesses, but is not involved in, 
the sufferings of the world,” panentheistic God suffers “in, with, and under the creative 
processes of the world,” because God creates the world from within God and thereby 
suffering is “internal to God’s own self.” Since God is in the world and the world is in 
God, “God experiences its sufferings directly as God’s own and not from outside.” In the 
sense, since panentheistic understanding of God has “cruciform” meaning for the 
suffering,
920
 the rise of panentheism entails “the rise of passibility.”
921
 Peacocke relates 
the dimension of suffering to “feminine panentheistic model” with regard to the “pangs 
                                                                                                                                                 
mind. My father must have been sick like me, because I felt I was sick like my son. Likewise, if God is the 
real Father of Jesus, God must have been sick like Jesus, because God is his genuine Father.  
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of childbirth” from Romans 8:19-22.
922
 And this panentheistic God does not neglect the 
suffering of the least. How can we explain a shepherd’s earnestly compassionate mind to 
seek for a lost sheep all over the places? It is not proper to an economic concept, since we 
cannot compare one lost one to ninety nine neglected ones. However, the shepherd is not 
concerned with the economic value, but only with the little sheep’s tear. This shepherd is 
analogous to the image of God in panentheism: “I tell you that in the same way there will 
be more rejoicing in heaven over one sinner who repents than over ninety-nine righteous 
persons who do not need to repent” (Luke 15:7). 
  
Our Task of Eliminating Evil   
Then, what should we do in this reality? We have to ask more concrete question: How 
can we resist evil? The dust on the computer screen hidden by shadow is still there. We 
need to clean it. Likewise, we cannot hide the concrete reality of evil, but need to remove 
it. We need, first, a compassionate mind. While watching a play, “No Vacancy?”, 
Eunyou (my daughter) finally cried out. Deoksun, whose role was an inn owner in the 
play and who had a mental disability, wailed over seeing the pity situation of Joseph and 
Mary, and, forgetting that she played a role in the play, she told them that since she had 
an empty room for them in her real house, they could go. My daughter also cried with her. 
How should I respond to this situation? I wanted to say something to my daughter. 
“Eunyou, I know that you usually have shed many tears. On the one hand, I worry about 
you how you can overcome those sad moments whenever you meet them. On the other 
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hand, there would be no more big love than that we can cry for others. Eunyou, I love 
you.” Whenever we see this world, we cannot see easily our own pure smile or our own 
pure tears, since almost all our smiles and tears relate to others’ tears and smile. We need 
to think as follows: If our smile is the smile which consists of tears of others’ suffering, 
let us not show the smile to others. If our tears are the tears which consist of smile of 
others’ happyness, let us not show the tears to others. Why? Do they not also at least 
smile in this suffering world? And then, let us show the smile and shed tears which are 
regardless of smiles and tears of anyone else, in front of God. Was this not analogus to 
human Jesus’ compassionate mind? We have to have a compassionate mind for others 
and nature and even to comfort them in any suffering “with the comfort we ourselves 
have received from God,” especially for the value of life, since God first comforts us in 
our suffering (2 Cor. 1:4).  
 Second is praxis. In her amazing book, The End of Evil
 
,
923
 Marjorie Suchocki 
shows us a new possible solution to the problem of evil, insofar as evil is the actual issue, 
and is ultimately overcome in God. With regard to that, however, one can find a weak 
link in her thought: she lacks an immediate solution to real evil. Can one delay in 
overcoming serious evil, in which one experiences in the daily life, until the eschatology 
of the future? One positively should ask, “How can we stop the evil that we face in our 
daily lives?” Where is our via dolorosa? Paul gives us a duty to overcome evil: “Do not 
be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good” (Rom. 12:21). Feuerbach also 
considers suffering as the highest command of Christianity, since “the history of 
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Christianity is the history of the Passion of Humanity.”
924
 Whenever we deal with the 
suffering of the world, we must remember our practical tasks as Jesus’ disciples to 
change the world which God created, by overcoming evil and having a thorough 
paradigm shift of thought and life. The justice that Christians should emphasize is to help 
the oppressed. The Bible is more interested in resistance to evil than in the origin of evil. 
Even a little effort of making peace with others in this society and the world can 
transform the world. In the process, such people become the children of God.
925
  
 For example, we live on the legacy of Martin Luther King, Jr., who lived a 
practical life for the oppressed. However, he does not simply give us a national holiday, 
but wants us to remove evils and to dream a hopeful dream so as to achieve a better life 
for all the oppressed in the world. If we simply spend this day for our pleasure alone, it 
must dilute the meaning of his message, life, and death. Let me add an example to help 
illustrate my conceptual point. Although the air is one of the most important elements 
supporting life, people cannot keep it in themselves. Rather, if they hold it in themselves, 
because it is precious, ironically they cannot breathe but will die. No one can monopolize 
it, since it is for all. People must let it go in order to live. If we recognize that the wealth 
is like the air, the world should have become a much better place to live. I really hope 
that everyone without exception feels and tastes happiness wherever they are and 
whatever their situations are,
926
 confessing that “You turned my wailing into dancing; 
you removed my sackcloth and clothed me with joy, that my heart may sing to you and 
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not be silent. O LORD my God, I will give you thanks forever” (Psalms 30:10-12), and 
accepting Jesus’ urging to “Come to me, all you who are weary and burdened, and I will 
give you rest… for I am gentle and humble in heart” (Matthew 11:28-29).927   
   
4) Knowable God  
Example 1:  
My son (five years old) asked his mom: “Is God real?” 
Mom: “Yes. God is real.” 
Son: “But I cannot see God.” 
His mom explained to him something in general: “You cannot see God, but God is 
everywhere and even in you.” Can I explain it better? I want to know what I should 
explain in particular. What could be proper answers?  
Example 2: “Some time later God tested Abraham. He said to him, ‘Abraham!’ ‘Here I 
am,’ he replied.” (Genesis 22:1)  
When I say something, you can recall any image of it. For example, if I say, “Barack 
Obama,” you can recall his image. When I say “Paris Hilton,” you can think her sexy 
image. Then, when I say “God,” what image, form, or eidos do you have? “To whom, 
then, will you compare God? What image will you compare him to?” (Isaiah 40:18). 
Could we see God through the world including people’s faces? If God is omnipresent, 
how can we perceive or feel God in the world? We know well what happened after that in 
the second example. However, have we ever heard this kind of a direct calling from God? 
If someone directly hears God’s voice and is to sacrifice his son, is s/he not called a crazy 
person? Do even those who call Abraham “the Father of Faith” not also call him a crazy 
person? And, why does God’s direct presence manifested many times in the Old 
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Testament not appear today? Why do we not trust those crazy people today? What is the 
relationship between “the father of faith” and “a crazy person?”  
 Let’s think more deeply about this topic. God is, first of all, not a substance, but 
the Spirit. Then how can we see the Spirit in the world which is governed by natural law? 
Can we human beings comprehend God or not? How can the corrupted human beings 
know God’s attributes? An attempt to know or understand God is analogous to a game in 
which one tries to find the words on the ground covered with sands under which someone 
wrote. Finding each letter one by one, one could finally know what s/he wrote. How 
about God’s writing in the world? Is it clear or not? Can we know God through the 
writing in the world? There must be many answers or debates about this question. 
Theology is an attempt to express the unknowability or ineffability of God.  
 Henri De Lubac asks, “Did God make man in his image, or is it not rather man 
who has made God in his?”928 That is, can we really know God? What do we mean when 
we say that we know God? Answers to these questions cannot simply be satisfied by faith, 
“I believe in God,” but should also rely on reasonable explanations, which makes it 
ultimately possible to do theology in our human language. No theology is possible 
without names, images, or symbols. Leonardo Boff appropriately points out the 
significance of the language: “Words are more important in theology than in any other 
science, since no one can see or experience God empirically, as the realities of the world 
are experienced.”
929
 Martin Buber also argues that insofar as the relation to a human 
being is the proper metaphor for the relation to God, God reveals Himself as language.
930
 
By this “analogy of being,” contends Ogden, God can be recognized as “a genuinely 
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temporal and social reality” and as a “truly supreme, a unique reality.” That is, to 
establish God’s conception through analogia entis can be given by experience.931  
 I believe it is possible to find a way to be able to speak of knowledge of the 
ineffable God, achieving some balance between “apophatic” theologies and “kataphatic” 
theologies. When we approach the possibility to comprehend God, according to Anselm 
Min, we have to avoid sheer kataphasis and sheer apophasis. On the one hand, we speak 
of God in the same way we speak of our life or experience. The danger of this perspective 
is that we make God in our own images and reduce God to an object in our empirical 
world. On the other hand, we never speak of God at all because of the fear of such 
reduction. The danger of this view is that it isolates God as an unknowable X. It does not 
explain the God who incarnated into the world, but eliminates both God’s own initiative 
to speak to humanity and all philosophical or systematic theology. Min suggests a way 
that “both preserves God’s irreducible transcendence and allows God’s initiative to 
address us in the only language we know, the human language.”
932
 
 For example, a shadow cannot exist by itself, because it is revealed by and 
through any object. However, although there is an object, the object itself cannot make a 
shadow, since without the sun, shadow is impossible. Only if the light and the object exist 
together, is the object revealed as a shadow. Thus a shadow is revealed in relationship. 
That is, a proposition, “a cloud reveals a shadow,” can be satisfied by a pre-condition: the 
sun must exist. Without the sun, a cloud cannot reveal a shadow. We can recognize a 
reality through phenomenon and the reality can be revealed though phenomenon, if there 
is a satisfactory condition. What can be revealed is revealed only through relationship. 
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 Anselm K. Min, “Naming the Unnameable God: Levinas, Derrida, and Marion,” (Int J philos 
Relig, 2006), 99-100. 
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Can we not apply this logic to the relation between what is revealed and the reality 
(God)? Two answers are possible. First, they are same but our human ability cannot fully 
know what is revealed. Second, they are different, because the reality itself cannot be 
fully revealed.  
 What we should remember, when we do theological reflection and praxis, is that 
the human effort to know God, as Karkkainen notes, should have a principle in the light 
of faith. That is, the task of theology is in tension between “obligation and 
impossibility.”
933
 In order to harmonize “the great break for philosophical theology,” i.e., 
the opposition “Kant versus Hegel,” Schelling’s approach is correctly balanced between 
the need to do theology [Hegel] and the need to acknowledge the limits on theological 
knowledge [Kant].934 In a sense, are we not a kind of self-contradictory or contradictio in 
adjecto beings between “ought to” and “cannot,” or beings in obligatory impossibility or 
impossible obligation? However, does it mean a despair of “cannot” or an indispensable, 
humble will of hope of “nevertheless?” As Augustine states, we need to say at least 
something about God: “Thy nature, Lord, is thus and thus.”
935
 In the following part, I’ll 
argue both “unknowable God” and “knowable God,” finally properly harmonizing both 
of them.   
 
Unknowable God 
                                                 
 
933
 Karkkainen, The Doctrine of God, 9. Barth notes, “As ministers we ought to speak of God. We 
are human, however, and so cannot speak of God. We ought therefore to recognize both our obligation and 
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935
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When my children were babies, I wanted them to talk any word, and I said to them that, 
“If you say any word, I’ll give you whatever you want.” However, I am telling them 
nowadays, “Please be quiet. If you keep quiet, I’ll give you whatever you want.” In any 
sense, since we speak of God too much, we need to be silent and listen to the Lao Tzu’s 
famous insight: “?可? ??? ?可? ???” (“The tao that can be told is not the 
eternal Tao. The name that can be named is not the eternal Name”).
936
 It means that if we 
say of “something,” something cannot be something. Could we apply this idea to God: 
The God that can be told and named is not the eternal God? Augustine says, “If you have 
understood, then it is not God. If you were able to understand, then you understood 
something else instead of God. If you were able to understand partially, then you have 
deceived yourself with your own thought.”937  
 This thought reminds me of Tim Hughes’ song, “Beautiful One,” because he 
nicely expresses God who cannot be nameable.  
“Beautiful One”—by Tim Hughes 
Wonderful so wonderful is Your unfailing love 
Your cross is spoken mercy over me 
No eye has seen, no ear has heard, no heart can fully know 
How glorious, how beautiful You are 
 
Chorus: 
Beautiful one I love  
Beautiful one I adore 
Beautiful one my soul must sing 
 
The author expresses that we “love,” “adore,” and “sing” God, because we cannot name 
or know God. Even Clatyon affirms that whereas the character of science is “mastery of 
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nature,” that of the religious object is “unpossessability” and that “whereas scientific 
truth is ‘for us,’ religious truth remains ‘beyond us.’” In the sense, the believer can appeal 
beyond words, “analogically, doxologically, maieutically, praxologically, even 
equivocally or apophatically.”
938
  
  
Knowability of God  
There is the incommensurable difference of language between God and human beings, 
but human beings can and should use language about God. If we know only that we do 
not know God when we attempt to know God, like Socratic wisdom, why did many 
apophatic theologians write many thick books about God? Isn’t one sentence enough: I 
do not know God? Isn’t it a kind of contradiction that they abundantly write and talk 
about God which they do not know? Isn’t it a kind of external expression that they really 
want to know about God and that they know God? Wittgenstein finishes with the last 
thesis, 7, of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus as follows: “Whereof one cannot speak, 
thereof one must be silent.”
939
 We need to recognize that the thesis is not in the first one 
but in the last one. It means that we need to say something until we cannot speak of it. 
Although it is not to comprehend, but “to ‘show’ or ‘point to’ (zeigt) the mystery,” we 
need to “stretch language to the uttermost.”940 If a gift must be revealed, should 
knowledge of God, which is really gift of the gifts, not be revealed to us as a gift? In the 
sense, is Marion’s “holy terror” or “a fearful task”941 about knowledge of God not a kind 
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of refusal of God’s gift? Is this kind of thought not making God the image of “an absolute 
monarch” or a terrible father to whom sons/daughters cannot easily approach, although 
they are lovely children of God (father)? 
 There are two ways of understanding God’s existence: Bottom-up and Top-down. 
What can we choose? Is there any way to combine two methods of divine existence? 
Although someone says that experiencing God does not make sense, because this makes 
God finite, when we experience Jesus Christ, does it not experience God? How do we 
know God then? When Philip asked Jesus to show them the Father, Jesus could not show 
them God, but the Father in and through himself. That is, Jesus wanted them to see the 
Father “who is doing his work” in him. (John 14:8-9). Since Jesus’ words as such are 
Father’s words, we can know the word of God through Jesus’ words. “For as I walked 
around and looked carefully at your objects of worship, I even found an altar with this 
inscription: TO AN UNKNOWN GOD. Now what you worship as something unknown I 
am going to proclaim to you” (Acts 17:23). This word which Paul speaks to the 
Athenians in the meeting of the Areopagus tells us of a main idea that human beings can 
talk about God who is unknown. That is, even though we cannot fully comprehend God, 
God is not always incomprehensible, to the extent that the fact that we discuss and 
worship God exposes the possibility of perceiving God.  
 Even Calvin relates our blessed life to knowledge of God: “The final goal of the 
blessed life… rests in the knowledge of God [cf. John 17:3].”
942
 We can know God “both 
through nature and through revelation.” That is, although a true and full knowledge of 
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 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press), I, 5, 1, 
51. “Now this is eternal life: that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom you have 
sent.”  
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God is possible only through Scripture, a natural knowledge of God is possible.
943
 
Calvin’s Institutes starts with the words: all our wisdom consists of two parts, “the 
knowledge of God and of ourselves.” The knowledge of God and that of ourselves are 
intimately connected. Without contemplating God there is no knowledge of us. Without 
knowledge of self there is no knowledge of God. God cannot be known apart from human 
affairs. However, Calvin indicates that whatever we think about God is “foolish,” and 
“absurd,” because the human mind is too weak to understand God without Sacred Word. 
In order to have a proper understanding of God, we have to look at the Scripture in which 
God is revealed to us, and be a student of Scripture. In this perspective, Niesel argues that 
Calvin’s theology is not “philosophia humana,” but “philosophia Christiana.”944 
However, we still cannot understand the Holy Scripture in our natural disposition without 
Holy Spirit. Why should we understand Scripture? What is the purpose of understanding 
Scripture? The most significant and simplistic answer is the “recognition of Jesus Christ,” 
because God reveals, communicates, and imparts Himself to us in Jesus Christ, the 
Mediator who is the “end of the law and the essence of the gospel.” And we can have 
knowledge of God through Holy Spirit who is the “true interpreter of the Bible.” Calvin’s 
main concern is not doctrines from Scripture, but the living Christ.945  
 
Harmony between Kataphasis and Apophasis  
Although there are infinitely qualitative differences between God and human beings, 
when we talk about God, do we really use a completely different language from human 
language? Look at the thick books which apophatic theologians wrote. Why did they 
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write those thick books if they really emphasize different languages between God and 
human beings? To worship God and to pray to God are nothing other than human 
languages about God. God loves all our languages about God. On the one hand, I totally 
agree that we human beings cannot fully touch the knowledge of God, because we are 
finite beings. However, on the other hand, is it possible to know God’s real presence in 
the world without any image or idea of God? Someone might say that an image of God 
interrupts knowledge of God, because it relates to just one image of God, not the real God. 
However, how do we know God’s real presence in our lives without images of God?  
 If we can know God, we cannot help but ask: How could human beings think 
about God in the history of cosmos and human beings? There can be two answers: by 
God’s revelation or by human thought. On the one hand, evangelical areas believe that 
we know God since God gives us the ability to know God, which is so called God’s 
revelation. Thus, in a sense, revelation would be a necessary condition to comprehend 
God. However, do human beings necessarily need God’s revelation to comprehend God? 
When human beings think about God, do they need revelation as a necessary condition? 
In a sense, we can confess that if there is no revelation, we cannot conceive God. 
Resisting the “complete mystery” response, nonetheless, Clayton also argues that “God 
has in some ways made Godself known.” Although there is limitation on knowing God 
from below, “God has broken down the dividing wall (Eph 2:14), making known the 
divine nature and plans that had been hidden since the foundation of the world (Eph 
1:9ff).” In this sense, a ‘salvation economy’ (Heilsokonomie) cannot be understood 
without God’s action in the world and a sharp distinction between the economic Trinity 
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and the immanent Trinity would make another problem.946 On the other hand, when even 
non-believers also think and conceive of God without revelation, human beings by nature 
can think about God (in the examples of Feuerbach, Schleiermacher, Spinoza, and 
Schelling). For example, FAD in Schleiermacher is a gift which God freely gives to 
human beings, as Romans 1:19-20
947
 and Acts 14:16-17
948
 say, a gift which enables 
human beings to feel God before and even after Jesus comes to the world. Thus, FAD can 
be God’s revelation. However, if we do not accept this argument, we limit the history of 
God’s revelation to only the period after Jesus Christ as the special revelation, i.e., at 
most 2,000 years. Schelling also mentions about it: “[nature] is an older revelation than 
any written one.”949  
 An example can help us understand this argument. When some people who wear 
eye-glasses wake up in the morning and look for eyeglasses, they have to look for them 
without eyeglasses. Of course, they usually know where the glasses are, but sometimes 
they do not know this. Then, they must have an ability to look for eyeglasses without 
eyeglasses, which can be called “a priori sense.” In a sense, it must be already in their 
innate nature. Likewise, we must have some ability in our nature to seek and to know 
God, an ability which is already given to us by God’s gratuitous grace. Even though the 
Bible and Jesus are important ways to know God, we already have a priori to know God 
in us. Then do we not need God’s revelation? In a sense, revelation is like sunshine, since 
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we cannot find something without it. When we block the sunshine, we can have only 
shadow in black. Thus we need both God’s revelation and our innate ability so as to 
comprehend God.  
 If we presuppose a hypothesis that God exists, there are some ways to arrive at 
this conclusion: a) hypothesis and faith (faith community); b) hypothesis and knowledge 
(human science, philosophy); c) hypothesis and faith and knowledge (theology). The 
hypothesis that God exists needs both faith and knowledge. Ephesians 4:13 shows us this 
unified model: “[W]e all reach unity in the faith and in the knowledge of the Son of God 
and become mature, attaining to the whole measure of the fullness of Christ.” Wilber 
similary suggests “three eyes of knowing” in relation between being and knowing: “the 
eye of flesh (empiricism), the eye of mind (rationalism), and the eye of contemplation 
(mysticism).”950 Wilber revises these respective perspectives as follow: monological, 
dialogical, and translogical. Monological comes from “monologue” by empirical science 
which has no response from objects. Diological comes from “dialogue” by the eye of 
mind which considers objects as subjects to discuss. Translogical transcends both 
monological empiricism and dialogical interpretation, and opens to the radiant divinity by 
the eye of contemplation.951  
 
5) Revised Understanding of the Power of God and the Knowledge of God  
A) Self-Limiting God (Kenosis of Christ) and the Hope for the Eschaton   
Classical theists and conservative Christians usually and confidently confess God as the 
omnipotent God who can do everything in any situation and at any moment without any 
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limitation in power, since they believe that the omnipotent God alone can solve the 
problem of evil and suffering in the world. As the matter of fact, however, there are many 
painful examples people do not understand, if God is omnipotent, examples in which God 
does not act at all even in sufferings such as Jesus’ cross, people’s lovable babies’ death, 
and many wars or poverty in the world. In recent, three children whose father was a 
pastor died, because their parents did not take care of them, when they were sick and 
even after their death, but just prayed to God in order to cure and save them. Their 
parents must have literally believed that inasmuch as God is the almighty God, if they 
pray to God for children, when children are sick, God will heal them, and when they die, 
God will revive them. However, they died and God did not save them again. In any sense, 
their parents’ prayer would be like the Satan’s temptation for Jesus in the desert, the 
temptation that “if you are the Son of God.” The expression, if you are the Son of God, 
means if you are the omnipotent God. If we consider God as the omnipotent God, we 
would put God to the test. Thus one may object their faith of the omnipotent God as 
follows:  
 1) God is omnipotent.  
 2) If God can do all things, then God can cure children.  
 3) God does not cure children.  
 4) Thus God is not omnipotent and we have to depend on other sources than God.   
 
That is, if God were omnipotent, God would want to save them. Here we need to remind 
of the classical argument of theodicy: if God is omnipotent, God can save them. If God is 
good, God wants to save them. Yet they are unsaved. Insofar as there are many sufferings 
in our daily life, it is not a properly theological or faithful attitude to believe in such an 
omnipotent God. If one only prays to God concerning one’s problems, does the 
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omnipotent God always solve the problems? Nein. Thus we arrive at the conclusion that 
God is not omnipotent at every moment. The logic is as follows:  
 1) God is omnipotent.  
 2) God is good.   
 3) Therefore God is able and willing to remove unnecessary sufferings.   
 4) But unnecessary sufferings occur.    
 5) Therefore God is not omnipotent or is not good.   
 6) Nevertheless, every theists hold that God is good.  
 7) Therefore God must not be omnipotent.   
 
Through the death of three children argued before, we can recognize that premise 4), 
“But unnecessary sufferings occur,” is true. It would not happen, but it does happen. That 
is my argument why we cannot see that God is always omnipotent.  
 Of course, there are other answers that defenders of omnipotence might give. 
However, for the purpose of this dissertation, I will assume that the criticism of divine 
omnipotence is accurate and look at other possibilities. There is an enough reason for 
constructive theologians today to explore a different paradigm. There are several possible 
answers to describe God instead of the omnipotent God. I will consider five responses. 
The first four I will criticize and the fifth I will defend.  
 The first possible response is that of atheists who assert that God does not exist. 
Their logic is as follows:  
1) There are evils in the world.  
2) God is incompatible with evil in the world.  
3) Thus God does not exist.  
 
They insist that because there are evils in the world, God does not exist. This syllogism is 
valid, that is, it is logically followed that premise 1) and premise 2) support premise 3). 
But, I don’t think it is sound, because I think the premise 2), “God is incompatible with 
evil in the world,” is false. I am arguing that although the omnipotent God is 
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incompatible with evil in the world, a God who is not omnipotent is compatible with evil 
in the world. Thus we need to look at different models of God.  
 I have challenged atheists’ argument and also believe that there are at least three 
negative consequences of atheism. Although atheists logically can insist the absence of 
God because of evil, can they properly suggest any possibility of the overcome of evils? 
Who can make compensation for the undeservedly suffering people? And can naturalism 
of atheists explain the meaningfulness of sufferings without reference to God except the 
objective fact that there are sufferings and evils in the world? However, I note, I have not 
falsified atheism. It may still be true. I have shown some negative consequences of 
atheism, but there is also a positive consequence of atheism. For example, we can do 
whatever we want to do and no God will punish us at all. In this sense, their argument is 
logically valid, but it is not sound. Therefore I will give another argument.  
 The second possible response is the metaphysically limited God of process 
theology.  
1) If God is omnipotent, there must be no evil.  
2) There is evil.  
3) God is not omnipotent.  
 
This argument is an instance of modus tollens: if P, then Q. Not Q. Therefore Not P. 
Process theology states that evil cannot exist, if God is almighty. That is, insofar as there 
is evil, God is not omnipotent. Unlike God’s self-limitation in diverse kenotic theologies, 
process theology asserts that God is a metaphysically limited God, since, although God 
can do everything logically, if God voluntarily limits such power, the problem of 
theodicy would be more serious. It may maintain that “Can” does not mean “Does Not,” 
but mean being able to do something, so that if “Can” means “Does Not,” “Can” is not 
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“Can.” However, we should not misunderstand that process theology completely denies 
God’s power. For process theology, God uses the persuasive power, but not the coercive 
power, because creatures also have power and freedom being able to choose even evil 
and thereby take a responsibility.  
 However, here are some objections to process theology. One is that this God 
would be very passive, because God does not do very much. This metaphysically limited 
God would be phenomenologically similar to the powerless God or even to the atheism, 
that is, “there is no God.” Although there is God, if the God is metaphysically limited, 
what is a difference between the metaphysically limited God and the powerless God and 
atheism? One proposition, that since God does not exist, God does not act at all, is 
logically proper. However, another proposition, that although there is God, the God is the 
necessarily limited God, is not appropriate. And if process theology denies God’s power, 
arguably, since the power coercively overrules or interrupts everything in the world 
regardless of human freedom and natural laws, God’s endless persuasion, which process 
theology suggests as an alternative, may be rejected, because even endless persuasion 
itself in a sense could be coercive. Another is that the standard devotion and practice of 
theists would be inexplicable, if process theology is true, because the standard theists ask 
and pray to this God. Of course, they believe that their God is very active more than most 
theism and God is always luring people. Nevertheless, my objection is that process 
theism has weakness. Although I have given some objections to process theology, I have 
not falsified it. It could be true. However, in this dissertation, I am going to set it aside 
and to concentrate on something different one.   
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 The third response is the voluntary self-limiting God with no eschaton. Their 
position is as follows:  
 1) God logically can do everything. 
 2) However, God freely chooses to limit Himself because of the creature’s    
     freedom. 
 3) In other words, God is the self-limiting God. 
 
Although this is not a syllogism, it has two premises and number 3) is a short description 
of premise 2). God is neither omnipotent nor metaphysically limited, but voluntarily 
limits the power. It means that there is no necessarily outer condition in limitation of 
power.  
 But an important objection arises at this point. Why does God limit power to 
overcome suffering? Is this religiously adequate that there is no hope? If there will be no 
eschaton, how can there be hope and faith? How can there be prayer? I will therefore 
consider two modifications of this position which I will call fourth response and fifth 
response. I am going to argue that the self-limiting God raises a further possibility that 
the self-limiting God becomes the self-unlimiting God. I think I would say that God can 
unlimit Godself at many points in history and does unlimit Godself at some points in 
history. That is, insofar as the self-limiting God needs to answer a possibility of the 
opposite direction that God can freely choose God’s unlimitation, this self-limiting God 
logically opens to the self-unlimiting God.  
 The fourth response is the self-limiting God and the self-unlimiting God. It builds 
the self-unlimiting God on the self-limiting God. The logic is that:  
 1) God logically can do everything. 
 2-1) However, God freely chooses to limit Himself because of the creature’s  
                   freedom. 
 2-2) In other words, God is self-limiting God. 
 2-3) But there is evil.   
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2-4) Either God does not overcome evil or overcomes evil. If God does not   
        overcome evil, God is the self-limiting God. However, if God overcomes        
        evil, God must be the self-unlimiting God.  
 3) Thus God is both self-limiting and self-unlimiting.  
  
This self-unlimiting God attempts to solve the limitation of self-limiting God, the 
limitation that the self-limiting God cannot solve the problem of evil, because God limits 
Himself.  
 Nonetheless, there are some objections to this fourth response. First, the self-
unlimiting God also cannot solve the problem of evil in this current world. As mentioned 
earlier, God does not save three children. If God is self-unlimiting, God should have 
saved the three children. If we look at the world, there are righteous sufferers. We see at 
least very often that God does not unlimit Godself for the suffering people. It does not 
look like that this position is right. Second, we do not know when God limits Himself and 
when God does not limit Himself. This position does not tell that when and why God 
unlimits Godself. If God alone knows the answer, God seems to be the very capricious 
God. In other words, if God randomly helps some and does not help others, the God is 
unjust. Why does God help some people and why does God not help others, if God is 
unlimiting God? This looks arbitrary. Third objection is that if God is self-unlimiting at 
the eschaton, at that point, freedom disappears. But I think that there is too great a price 
to pay, so I reject the fourth response. Here is another syllogism:  
 1) The strongest form of self-unlimiting God is that God unlimits Himself at the     
      eschaton.  
 2) When God unlimits Himself even in the eschaton, human freedom disappears.  
 3) We should not reject human freedom.  
 4) Therefore, we should reject the self-unlimiting God. 
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I have given logical descriptions for the fourth response and have objectified it. In this 
sense, let us go back to the self-limiting God again and to find a way to solve the problem 
of evil.  
 The fifth response is the voluntarily self-limiting God and the hope for the 
eschaton. This is the view that I will be defending here. The first consequence of this 
position is that we cannot be certain that God solve the problem of evil, but can only hope 
for the escahton. Although the tone of this position may be heard a little bit negative 
sound, this leads to a very different solution to the problem of evil. Hear is an argument.  
 1) God logically can do everything. 
 2-1) However, God freely chooses to limit Himself because of the creature’s       
                   freedom. 
 2-2) In other words, God is the self-limiting God. 
 2-3) But there is evil.  
 2-4) God does not completely eliminate the evil here and now.  
 3) Therefore, we can at best hope that the evil and suffering will be overcome at  
                the eschaton.  
 
With regard to premise 2-4), nonetheless, it is still possible to say that God is still 
working with creatures to solve the problem of evil. (See the last section, “Self-Limiting 
God and the Hope for the Eschaton,” for a developed argument). 
 In developing this argument, we need to keep a basic principle that runs through 
the whole of this argument: this concept of omnipotent God should be changed, because 
it cannot explain diverse phenomena of sufferings in this world. If we spread out these 
positions argued above, they could be as follows.  
Figure 1: Five possible responses to the problem of evil.  
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Here number 1, atheism, appears as the totally opposite direction of number 0, 
omnipotent God. Number 2, metaphysically limited God, denies the omnipotent God, 
although it does not extremely go to atheism. Number 3, the self-limiting God with no 
eschaton, appears as a mediator between the omnipotent God and the metaphysically 
limited God. Number 4, the self-limiting and the self-unlimiting God, attempts to solve a 
gap between the omnipotent God and the metaphysically limited God, and to go beyond 
the self-limiting God. Number 5, voluntarily self-limiting God and hope for the eschaton, 
overcomes the limitation of the self-unlimiting God and hopes that God will solve the 
problem of evil in the eschaton. This is a general explanation of the scheme. In sum, we 
can draw some pictures which explain each position.  
 0. Omnipotent God of Classical Theism: This omnipotent God always keeps 
God’s omnipotence before creation, in suffering and evils in the world, and in the 
eschaton. The omnipotent God in the beginning suddenly created the heavens and the 
earth and will suddenly bring the eschaton.  
 
 1. Atheism: Because there is no place of God to solve the problem of evil in the 
world, only naturalism is possible. There is no supernaturalism or divine action. 
Naturalism moves together with the historically horizontal line.  
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Naturalism  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 2. Metaphysically limited God of Process theology: There is no other possibility 
of God’s omnipotence even before creation and God is the consistently limited God 
yesterday, today, and tomorrow. The reason I use here the form of passive tense (limited 
God) is that God is necessarily limited.  
 
 3. The Self-limiting God with no eschaton: God freely limits God’s power but 
there will be no eschaton.  
 
 4. The Self-limiting God and the Self-unlimiting God: The omnipotent God 
voluntarily limited God’s power, became the self-limiting God, but will suddenly become 
the self-unlimiting God in a flash of light or coming in the clouds to bring about the 
second coming of Jesus Christ in the eschaton.  
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 5. Self-limiting God and the Hope for the Eschaton: the omnipotent God 
voluntarily limited power, became the self-limiting God. The arrival of the eschaton will 
not be suddenly achieved. It does not mean a qualitative break between pre-eschatology 
and eschatology as a vertical demarcation line, but is progressively achieving. God’s 
working with human freedom gradually brings about a period of perfection in eschaton. 
It could not be like a sudden lightning bolt from above in Barth but a kind of a period of 
gradual transition. At last, God and the world are more clearly penetrated in each other 
and they will produce much fruit together.  
 
Let’s move one step further.  
 
Omnipotent God in a Limited Sense and the World  
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Although I assert that I do not accept God’s omnipotence, I advocate the omnipotent God 
in a limited sense. I hold that God is omnipotent before creation only. The logic is as 
follows:  
 1) There was nothing except God before creation.  
 2-1) The world exists.  
 2-2) “Nothing” itself cannot create something. If “nothing” itself can create  
                    something, we do not need God.  
 2-3) In order for something to exist, there must be “original something” which can 
        create another something and this “original something” is God who is       
        omnipotent.  
 3) Thus if there was creatio ex nihilo, then God was omnipotent. This   
     logic can only be applied to the realm of the creation. 
 
After creation, however, God cannot be insisted as the omnipotent God. Why and what 
happened between before creation and after creation? God created the world including 
agents such as human beings and gave the world natural laws. It means that God shares 
power with the world. Sharing power with creatures logically means that God is no 
longer omnipotent. Even after sharing God’s power with the world, if God is still 
omnipotent, it means either that God does not really share the power or that although God 
really shares it, the shared power may be pseudo power. 
 Accordingly, the argument that God is no longer omnipotent and creatures have 
power or freedom means that God can but does not arbitrarily control human power and 
natural systems by God’s omnipotent power in this perspective, although human freedom 
chooses evil. That is, not necessarily but voluntarily and freely chooses God to limit 
God’s omnipotent power in order to give creatures freedom and natural laws. This God is 
the self-limiting God. If the world exists, then God is not omnipotent. Thus, the 
omnipotent God and human freedom and natural laws logically cannot be compatible. 
The logic is as follows:  
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 1) If God is omnipotent even in this world, humans are not free and natural laws  
     are meaningless or already determined. 
 2) If humans are free or creatures have natural laws, God cannot be omnipotent.  
 3) Thus God’s omnipotence and human freedom and natural laws are   
                incompatible.  
There could be an objection in which although God is omnipotent, humans can have free 
will. However, it is wrong, because in this logic humans must be puppets which are under 
an illusion that they have real free will, or because God must be such a narcissistic God 
who believes that God can do everything. If God is omnipotent, in relationship between 
God and the world, it means that God neglects or denies the existence of the world. God 
cannot neglect the existence of the world which objectively and obviously exists. God 
cannot act as if the world does not exist.  In order to satisfy God’s power, human freedom, 
and natural laws altogether, there must be concession among them. Since God already 
gave human beings freedom and let natural systems function by themselves, it was 
neither human beings nor natural laws but God who must yield a step. God has to 
withdraw the omnipotence. In sum, I have suggested so far that: 
 1) God is omnipotent, because God created the world from nothing.  
 2) After creation, however, God is no longer omnipotent, because God voluntarily   
                limits God’s own power in order for human beings to have their own freedom  
                and in order for nature to have natural laws.  
 3) In other words, God can arbitrarily interrupt human freedom and natural laws  
                in the world, but freely does not interrupt or violate human freedom and natural   
                laws.  
 
Omnipotent God and Self-Limiting God and Metaphysically Limited God    
Then, if voluntarily self-limiting God is between omnipotent God and metaphysically 
limited God, let us explore the relationship between omnipotent God and the self-limiting 
God and between the self-limiting God and metaphysically limited God. On the one hand, 
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with regard to the relationship between omnipotent God and the self-limiting God, we 
can logically infer that the self-limiting God comes from the omnipotent God.  
1) Omnipotent God can limit divine power and this self-limiting God is present in                  
     creation.  
2-1) In other words, the self-limiting God logically presupposes the omnipotent   
       God.  
2-2) In order for God to freely limit God’s power, God must be first omnipotent.  
3) Omnipotent God can become the self-limiting God, not vice versa. 
 
After the omnipotent God limited Godself, the self-limiting God cannot limit God’s 
power again, since, if the self-limiting God limits again, God could be the powerless God. 
Logically speaking, evil is a product of God’s self-limitation, in that there was no evil in 
God’s omnipotence. However, it does not mean that God is the author of evil, since God 
is not omnipotent, but gives the world its own power. That is, if God is omnipotent even 
in this world, God must be the author of evil. In order for God to give human beings free 
will and nature natural laws, God chooses to limit the power. To say that God is not the 
omnipotent God does neither reduce God’s nobility into something of the dimension of 
the world, nor make God the powerless God or a worthless God.  
 On the other hand, the self-limiting God is also different from the metaphysically 
limited God in process theology, since the self-limiting God has no conditions of 
necessity imposed on God from the outside. If God is already limited before creation, this 
God cannot be the omnipotent God and cannot create the world. In the process 
perspective, God and the world must be the co-existing existence from eternity to eternity. 
However, it could be fallen into Schleiermacher’s motto: Kein Gott ohne Welt, so wie 
keine Welt ohne Gott (No God without the world, just as no world without God).  
  
The Self-Limiting God and the Hope for the Eschaton   
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An important task remains. With regard to the eschaton, will the self-limiting God bring 
about the eschaton? That is, if God is self-limiting, how can this self-limiting God 
guarantee the eschaton? It seems to be that just as Christ crucified on the cross is a 
stumbling block to Jews, the self-limiting God is a stumbling block to Christians who 
believe in the omnipotent God. However, a possible answer to this question is that we 
cannot know, insofar as God is the self-limiting God and God preserves human freedom 
by God’s choice, because humans can either conform to God or not to conform to God. 
Only if humans choose to conform their will to God, they will achieve the state of the 
eschaton. In other words, because humans are free, they have a possibility that they could 
not obey the will of God. Thus, we cannot know that there will be the eschaton. However, 
this would make the suffering people (minjung) sad, because they are waiting for the 
final liberation. If the self-limiting God cannot promise heaven, then this God cannot 
sustain hope for minjung. That is problem.  
 We could have several main options to solve this problem.  
 Option 1: Because God neither solves the problem of evil nor brings about the 
eschaton, atheism may assert that whether or not God is self-limiting is not important, 
because God does not exist. The only one answer to solve the problem of evil depends on 
natural world itself and human beings, but not on the eschaton. Atheism may argue that 
human beings can solve the problem of evil and bring about a better world. However, 
since we do not confidently know whether human beings can bring about a better world, 
we could not say that atheism gives an alternative answer over theism. Thus I reject this 
option.  
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 Option 2: As process theology claims, it does not matter whether the final hope 
will come true or not, because we live in the present and God is with us now. If process 
theology really maintains either objective immortality or subjective immortality, however, 
because we live not only at present but also in future as any kind of immortality, the final 
hope is important. Thus, I reject this option.  
 Option 3: Criticism is wrong, because the self-limiting God can promise the 
heaven and therefore minjung has hope for the final emancipation. This must be the good 
news for minjung. However, this option is self-contradictory, if the self-limiting God can 
promise heaven and finally solve the problem of evil, because God is not the self-limiting 
God, but the self-unlimiting God, so that some asks the first question again: how the self-
limiting God can promise heaven. This falls into a circular argumentation. Thus I reject 
this option.  
 Option 4: Since God limits power, it seems to be that this self-limiting God 
cannot bring about the eschaton, so that it logically needs the self-unlimiting God who 
can bring about the eschaton. God at some point becomes the self-unlimitng God and 
God has the power to bring about the eschaton. No matter how much evil, no matter how 
much human sin, or no matter what, God is unlimited, God will solve the problem of evil, 
and God will bring about the eschaton. However, we have to recognize that the self-
unlimiting God cannot be compatible with human freedom in the eschaton, because if 
God is self-unlimiting, humans are not free, that is, if humans are free, God is not self-
unlimiting, so that the self-unlimiting God and human freedom are incompatible each 
other in the eschaton. Accordingly, since self-unlimitation means omnipotence, although 
expressions are different, we need to go back to the self-limiting God again and to find an 
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answer how the self-limiting God achieves the eschatological completion. Thus I reject 
this option. 
 Option 5: We cannot have a guarantee that God will bring about the eschaton, 
because God is the self-limiting God, but we have faith and hope that God will succeed in 
the end. We should not misunderstand that the self-limiting God cannot make progress or 
that the self-limiting God always does what we already expect. Rather, we need to have 
hope and faith that the self-limiting God radically indwells in the places of the suffering, 
gives each individual actual occasion initial aim and novelty as the ground of hope, and 
finally will save the suffering people in the eschatological consummation, because God is 
love.  
 To put it another way, let us think about the relationship between God’s power 
and God’s love. Although God freely limits God’s power, God does not limit God’s love. 
Insofar as God is love, as every Christian confesses, whether they are conservative or 
progressive, God is endlessly and at every moment persuading people and leading them 
to a good way with infinite love. If God does not have love for the people who are in the 
presence of sufferings, God cannot be deserved to be called the lovable God. Love is not 
superficial but concrete. God’s love must be expressed in any time and in any place, 
especially in sufferings. Nevertheless, the expression of God’s love cannot be shown as 
God’s arbitrarily interruption to the natural laws with omnipotent power. God’s love is 
that of endless waiting and patience. Thus, although power can be limited, love should 
not, so that God’s love enables us to have hope for the future that God will finally 
overcome all sufferings.  
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 And in order to unite with God in the eschaton, just as God is patient, we need to 
be patient. In the presence of suffering, however, we cannot easily be patient, but rather 
have the strongly imminent hope that God directly solves the problem of evil once and 
for all. However, just as God works for the better world, is patient, and waits for the 
perfect harmonization, so we have to resist evil for the better world, to be patient, and to 
wait for the kingdom of God in hope. In this sense, we can have an optimistic worldview 
for the future, realizing that the new things cannot be given from the supernatural power 
or miraculous things. Nonetheless, there are those who still maintain a logical argument 
of the least possibility of supernaturalism within naturalism. It would be that: 
1) Natural laws could explain most natural phenomena. 
2-1) Nonetheless, there are some parts of the possibility of intervention of           
       supernaturalism that natural laws cannot explain. 
2-2) This is the place where “God of gaps” can explain. 
3) Thus supernaturalistic power of God could act in the world.  
 
However, this position is faced with a serious problem as follows: 
1) Natural laws could explain the parts of “God of gaps,” if and when science 
develops later. 
2) If so, the area of supernaturalistic God disappears. 
3) Thus atheism wins.  
We should not put God’s place in a gap, because if the place of gap is filled with 
developed science, God’s place will disappear, so that atheism could be the final answer. 
Although naturalism could explain almost all natural systems, however, we should not 
deny that God still works in and with the natural system at every moment. This is a way 
to explain the self-limiting God without supernaturalism.  
 We hope that God the Holy Spirit will renew the world and act new works with 
creatures. If we do not see this kind of a new vision, how can we say that God works in 
and for the world? Hebrew 11:1 supports this hope, saying that faith is not the certainty 
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of knowledge but assurance of what we hope for. In this position, people who suffer in 
this world can have the hope for the heaven. However, this hope is not like the opium 
which makes us deny the reality here and now and turn our interest from this world to the 
other world. Hope is the power to enable us to live in this suffering world. In the eschaton, 
God preserves human freedom, God is still the self-limiting God, and every Christian 
hopes and has faith that God will bring about a final state of justice. This position does 
not take away any part of Christian faith that God will overcome evil, because Christian 
faith is always faith on hope. We only hope that God has done for us in Jesus Christ and 
that God has always been faithful to his people. God will succeed in the end even along 
with human freedom. However, it is not by coercion but by persuasion, because, if 
heaven is won by violence, it is not heaven, and because the heaven won by persuasion is 
the kingdom of God. In this sense, faith and hope are exactly appropriate for Christian 
theology and can be expressed as the “hope-plus-faith” that Clayton maintains. Finally, I 
accept this option.  
   
Some Criticisms of the Self-limiting God and the Hope for the Eschaton and My 
Responses 
There might be some criticisms of the self-limiting God and the hope for the eschaton.  
 First, faith and hope for the eschaton for the self-limiting God are empty, because 
the self-limiting God does not have power to bring about the eschaton. Insofar as we 
think that the omnipotent God alone can achieve the eschaton, we conclude that the self-
limiting God cannot do it. However, it is not true. We need to recognize that the self-
limiting God is not the powerless God who literally can do nothing. The self-limiting 
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God denies such a coercively powerful God who can arbitrarily wield power. Then where 
do faith and hope come from? We can have faith and hope in the mutual relationship 
among God, human freedom, and natural laws. Hope for God’s magical power is not 
hope but illusion or magical injection of our hope to God. Hope does not break natural 
laws. Hope cannot call for God’s arbitrary interruption. Hope and freedom and natural 
laws work together. And hope is not for what we already had, but for what we do not 
have yet. In this sense, we need to wait for. Nevertheless, it is not empty. If critics say 
that you cannot know that God will bring the eschaton, because God is self-limiting, I 
agree that I cannot know. I cannot say that I know what I do not know about. I do not 
know what I do not know about. Although I do not know, nevertheless, I can hope for it. I 
can only hope what I do not know about. That is, I do not know that the eschaton will 
come, but hope that the eschaton will come and God will overcome evil. This hope or 
faith is not empty but in any sense the most honest expression for the eschaton and for the 
overcome of evil.  
 Second, how would it even be possible to have the eschaton come about if God is 
self-limiting? It is possible to have the eschaton by a cooperation of God’s will and 
human will. God limits Himself in order to invite human will. God can do whatever God 
wants to do, but God calls people for the kingdom of God and people participate in God’s 
will. God does not work alone. For example, when God attempts to bring the Israelites 
out of Egypt, God does not act by Himself alone. Although God can act by Himself alone, 
God works together with Moses. Moses denies several times, but God persuades and 
waits for Moses several times. It does not mean that God alone cannot liberate the 
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Israelites. Although God can liberate the Israelites from Egypt, God does not act by 
Himself alone, but works together with Moses. 
 God calls human beings and humans can freely participate in this work of 
eschaton. Accordingly, God and human beings work together to bring about the eschaton. 
Romans 8 helps us understand the cooperation of God and human beings. The Holy Spirit 
empowers human beings to answer for dilemma between our will and God’s will. If we 
do not receive the Holy Spirit, we do evil what we do not want to do (the law of sin). 
When we are in the Holy Spirit, we can do what we want to do (God’s law). That is, if we 
are God’s children, we can conform our will to God’s will, share both God’s glory and 
God’s suffering, and can be adopted as sons. God works for the common good of those 
who obey God’s will, calls them, justifies them, and finally glorifies them. This is the 
process of sanctification (glorification). No one can separate this process from the love of 
God in Jesus Christ. If we do not see God’s working with human beings, we are like 
Philip who asked Jesus to show God’s physical presence in the world. We need to 
remember that the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of truth, lives with us always and forever. Jesus’ 
prayer to God in John 17 is hope for the mutual participation between God and human 
beings. I believe that the Holy Spirit works together with human spirit. That is 
Heilsgeschichte (Salvation history). The eschaton does not remove human freedom and 
suddenly create the second coming of Jesus Christ, but rather works together to make it 
happen.  
 Third is liberalism. However, this is neither liberalism, nor humanism, or 
Marxism, but the cooperative product of God and creatures. This does not reduce God’s 
dimension into human dimension. This does not lift up human dimension into God’s 
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dimension. This is a faithful confession of logic to solve the problem of evil. If this 
argument is liberalism, the Bible in which God in self-limitation works with human 
beings would be an expression of humanistic or liberalistic stories. On the contrary, it 
must be the very product of dogmatism that denies the dynamics of the Bible. 
Conservative Christians or classical theists should not judge or construe other voices as 
liberalism or as a form of heresy, but recognize that the Bible itself contains such stories 
in many places. Thus, to consider this view as liberalism is a kind of fixed idea and this 
fixed idea cannot contribute at all to a theological development. This is not liberalism but 
progressive gradually moving forward the eschaton with pietistic longing for God.  
 Fourth, hope seems to be just optimism. Is it only optimism? Is hope merely a 
psychological attitude or difference? Are we optimistic for future if we are optimistic 
person? Are we pessimistic for future if we are pessimistic person? Are theists optimistic 
because they have hope for eschaton? Are atheists pessimistic because they have no hope 
for eschaton? When we see the same situation, someone could be optimistic or others 
could be pessimistic. Then is hope only difference of personality? This could be 
interpretation A) of hope which expresses that hope is merely a psychological attitude. 
But it reduces eschatology to a psychological difference. Interpretation B) of hope is 
evidence. We have a current reason to know that the eschaton will come. There must be 
logical reason for hope to trust that the eschaton will come. But I reject this view, because 
God is the self-limiting God, not the self-unlimiting God. There can never be proof or 
evidence that the eschaton will come. We cannot give evidence, but only hope. Under 
interpretation A), hope would be merely a psychological or merely a personality 
characteristic. Under interpretation B), we cannot have evidence for hope, because I 
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support the self-limiting God. Then, is there another way to answer to this criticism? 
Interpretation C) of hope is theology of hope. Hope is not merely a psychological attitude. 
Hope is not dependent on evidence. My answer of hope is similar to Jürgen Moltmann’s 
answer in his theology of hope. Theology of hope has some richness such as prayer 
(liturgy), hope-flus-faith, dependence on the continuing activity of the Holy Spirit 
(pneumatology), and constitution of the body of Christ (ecclesiology). Prayer is not for 
the past but for the future. It means that prayer is longing for the future. This is a kind of 
faith and its concrete form is “hope-flus-faith.” We cannot have hope by ourselves 
without the Holy Spirit, because the Holy Spirit is the initiative of hope. This hope for the 
eschaton makes us constitute more solidly the body of Christ, namely, the church. Those 
people who have the hope of the resurrection are bound together by grace through the 
Spirit into the body of Christ.  
 Theology of hope is about God of hope and it is also about God’s hope. Our hope 
could be God’s hope. Hope is the motivation of our life. It is not too much to say that the 
motivation of our current life comes from the future. Hope for the future is not in vain but 
has power. Hope for the future can change the life of the present. The present can change 
the future, but insofar as the future also can change the present, future is already in the 
present. The past, the present, and the future are not separated each other, but 
intermingled. Jesus’ life is alive in the present and affects still the life of the present. As 
soon as I say “now,” the now is already the past. We live in the present for the future, not 
in the present only for the present. In a sense, whatever we do in the present in our daily 
life is nothing else than for the future. Furthermore, hope is possible in the self-limiting 
God, not in the omnipotent or the self-unlimiting God. Hope for those who are in 
 324  
suffering and for those who lost their children is all among all. Nothing is better than 
hope in this sense.  
 With regard to panentheism, this self-limiting God and the hope for the eschaton 
give some insight. Insofar as panentheism’s definition is that although God is in the 
world, God is more than the world, whereas “God is in the world” refers to self-limitation, 
“God is more than the world” refers to the hope for the eschaton. Can God who creates 
something from nothing not show self-unlimiting power in the world? Yes God can do. 
But God does not, because the self-limiting God acts with a precondition, that is, 
“without breaking natural laws.” Nevertheless, God is not a deistic observer who only 
sets the natural systems and sees the world through a window open to the world. Then 
how can God interact with the world? Although God’s self-limitation means that God 
does not interrupt human freedom and natural laws, it does neither mean that God does 
not act at all, nor that natural laws rather can control God under the natural systems. That 
is, natural laws cannot keep God as a hostage of natural systems, since a hostage means 
God’s reduction to the natural systems. The meaning that God does not reject natural 
laws but instead uses them in order to fulfill God’s will does not mean that God is subject 
to the natural system. This opens to spiritual worldviews. Although we should not draw a 
sharp demarcation between physical realm and spiritual realm, physical views cannot 
explain all things in the world but needs in any sense spiritual views. Since physical 
views can explain only facts, not meanings of the facts, we need spiritual aspects which 
can explain meaningness. In this sense, self-limitation and hope for the eschaton in God 
can be integrated in the scheme of human freedom and natural laws’ bottom-up 
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dimension and of God’s top-down. Just as since there is a limitation or gap in a bottom-
up agency alone, it needs a top-down agency, so that they consist of the double agency.  
 In conclusion, we can suppose a trinitarian scheme flowing through this 
argument: the omnipotent God (God Father, primordial nature) in metaphysics, the self-
limiting God (God the Son, consequent nature) in kenosis, and the hope for the eschaton 
(God the Holy Spirit, superjective nature) including human freedom and natural laws. 
There is a continuum among omnipotent God, self-limiting God, and hope for the 
eschaton. In a chronological timeline, whereas the omnipotent God is applicable to 
creatio ex nihilo, the self-limiting God refers to creatio continua in the world, and finally 
to creatio nova in the eschaton. How do we believe that? Although we recognize that 
faith without theological analysis could bring about a paralysis of theology, we believe 
that the last place to appeal after our intensely logical deployment is to our faith.  
 
B) The Knowledge of God 
Many people often ask whether God knows everything in the future. Whereas if God 
knows everything, that implies divine predestination; if God has limitation in knowledge, 
the future is open. Although I obviously reject the former and accept the latter, in order to 
develop this argument, I need to mention predestination from the Bible and classical 
theists, to criticize them and to seek a different direction including free will. Problems of 
predestination in the Bible and Christianity are one of the most controversial issues in 
that God decided and predestined everything before the creation of the world. As a matter 
of fact, there are many verses in the Bible which support this doctrine.  
● “You know when I sit and when I rise; you perceive my thoughts from afar. You 
discern my going out and my lying down; you are familiar with all my ways. Before a 
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word is on my tongue you know it completely, O LORD. You hem me in--behind and 
before; you have laid your hand upon me. Such knowledge is too wonderful for me, too 
lofty for me to attain” (Psalms 139:2-6). 
 
● “This man was handed over to you by God’s set purpose and foreknowledge” (Acts 
2:23). 
 
● “Your eyes saw my unformed body. All the days ordained for me were written in your 
book before one of them came to be” (Psalms 139:16). 
 
● “He predestined us to be adopted as his sons through Jesus Christ, in accordance with 
his pleasure and will” (Ephesians 1:5). 
 
● “For those God foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the likeness of his 
Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brothers. And those he predestined, he 
also called; those he called, he also justified; those he justified, he also glorified” 
(Romans 8:29-30). 
 
● “In him we were also chosen, having been predestined according to the plan of him 
who works out everything in conformity with the purpose of his will” (Ephesians 1:11). 
 
The Bible verses quoted from open theism are enough to develop this argument. There 
must be intimate relation between God’s plan and God’s foreknowledge to satisfy the 
condition of predestination. God knows everything beforehand since God planned it by 
Himself. Aquinas argues that “Whatever takes place in the world proceeds from the plan 
of the divine intellect: except, perhaps, in voluntary agents only, who have it in their 
power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; that is what the evil of sin 
consists in.”952 However, we should reconsider “stoic resignation” which means 
“whatever happens as ordained by God.”
953
 In his Institutes of the Christian Religion, 
book III, chapters 21-24,
954
 Calvin explores the doctrine of predestination, “Eternal 
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 Placher, “Is God in Charge?” in Essentials of Christian Theology, 100.  
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 Migliore, Faith seeking understanding, 125-126. Barth argues that the Doctrine of providence 
is “not a mere logical deduction from abstract claims about the omnipotence and goodness of God. It must 
be worked out in the light of a genuinely Christian (i.e., Christocentric and trinitarian) understanding of 
God as the one who loves in freedom, who wills do live in communion, and who from all eternity elects 
Jesus Christ and in him the people of God and all of creation.” Ibid.   
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 The order of Institutes: Book I, doctrine of creation; Book II, doctrine of redemption; Book III, 
predestination. Charles Partee, The Theology of John Calvin (Westminster: John Knox, 2008), 243. 
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Election,” that is one of the most controversial doctrines in Christianity. Its basic idea is 
that, although the subtitle is “the universality of God’s invitation and the particularity of 
election,” God does not create everyone in the same condition, but in different conditions, 
“some to salvation” and “others to destruction.”
955
 It means that God predetermined 
everything “before time and before the foundation of the world.”
956
 In this view, election 
“precedes faith” and is “mother of faith.” However, it excludes fatalism but includes “the 
contingency of second cause” and “the freedom of rational creatures.”
957
  
  Reformed theologians in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and Barth 
describe providence as God’s preservation (conservatio), accompaniment or concurrence 
(concursus), and governance (gubernatio) of all creatures. First, God preserves the whole 
creatures even after God created them, so that without God’s preservation, the creatures 
cannot exist. This God’s preservation is “an act of serving, an act of free grace to the 
creature.” Second, respecting free action of creatures, God sustains even every action of 
creatures, not as the tyrant, but as the sovereign who lets every creature act within its own 
finite autonomy. Third, God governs all things to God’s goal or purpose, not by unilateral 
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and coercive power based on a “logic of control” but by God’s Word and Spirit.
958
 The 
doctrine of providence for Barth is a conception of “divine omnicausality.”959 
 Providence for Tillich means both “fore-seeing” and “fore-ordering.” On the one 
hand, the emphasis on the fore-seeing makes God become the omniscient spectator who 
knows everything in the future but does not hinder the freedom of creatures. On the other 
hand, the emphasis on the fore-ordering makes God a planner who has planned 
everything before the world. In the former, God is a spectator and creatures have their 
subjectivities. In the latter, God is the only active agent, but creatures are “cogs in a 
universal mechanism.” However, Tillich does not accept these two interpretations of 
providence, but rather insists that providence is an everlasting activity of God who is not 
a spectator, but always leads everything toward its completion. Tillich here points out a 
significant element in divine providence that God’s directing creativity occurs through 
both human freedom and through whole structures of all other creatures.
960
 Providence 
for Tillich, first, is not interference, but creation, second, a quality of inner directedness 
which ‘drives’ or ‘lures’ toward fulfillment, and third, ‘the divine condition’ present in 
every situation. Thus since providence is not a supernatural, miraculous physical or 
mental interference of God in the world, a special divine action cannot alter the 
conditions of world. The person who believes in providence is always in the love of God 
which is in Christ Jesus (Romans 8).
961
 We have to understand a doctrine of providence 
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based on Jesus Christ, the crucified God, since, otherwise, we cannot understand 
suffering of those who believe in God. Predestination is providence in one’s ultimate 
destiny and “the highest affirmation of the divine love, not its negation.”962 
 However, nonetheless, I ask, is this doctrine not a kind of stumbling block to any 
attempt to introduce Christianity to the world?
963
 Could we still accept this provocative 
doctrine even in this 21
st
 century? In the tradition of Christianity, grace is absolutely gift 
from God, because it does not coercively need any reward or response from outside God. 
However, if grace in predestination is not for everyone (universality) but for someone 
(particularity), in that case, is it really grace? If everything is determined by God, why do 
we pray to God? If there is only one way from God to us, is it meaningful to pray to God? 
Predestination does not need our prayer. Thus does this predestination make sense?964 
Since the theory of determinism makes God the unique sinner, in a sense, predestination 
or determinism theory is one of the most dangerous theories in the doctrine of God.
965
 In 
this sense, we have to listen to David Griffin’s a very appropriate question concerning the 
problem of this doctrine: “At the very center of our faith is the affirmation that our world 
is essentially good because it has been created by a good and loving creator. If this 
affirmation is not contradicted by the doctrines of hell, damnation for those outside the 
church, and double predestination, what could contradict it?”966 What would be our 
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answer? We can say that God did not decide and predestine everything before. Although 
God can and does know possibilities of all numbers of cases which will happen in the 
world in his primordial nature, because God is the voluntarily self-limiting God, God 
freely limits God’s full knowledge for the future.  
 
Predestination (Providence) as Determinism?  
Example: While having dinner, my elder daughter asks her mom: “Do you decide every 
menu by yourself everytime? I hope I have a menu book, because I want to choose menus 
everytime like at a restaurant.” If she knows that God alone chooses and decides 
everything for every life in the world, what could be her complaints? It must be free will 
rather than predestination that she wants.  
 
How could we mediate between Genesis 1:4, 10, 12, 18, 21, and 31 (“God saw all that he 
had made, and it was very good”) and Genesis 6:6 (“The LORD was grieved that he had 
made man on the earth, and his heart was filled with pain”)? Admittedly, while the 
former seems to be attributable to the almighty God, the latter seems not to be proper to 
God, since we may ask how the almighty God was grieved at what he had done, that is, 
how the omnipotent God could repent. Another example is Jesus’ sigh for Judas Iscariot: 
“The Son of Man will go just as it is written about him. But woe to that man who betrays 
the Son of Man! It would be better for him if he had not been born.” (Matt 26:24). Jesus’ 
sigh is exactly against God’s will and plan for the world which the Bible describes and 
most Christians believe in, the will that without God’s permission, no trivial thing can 
exist. If God planned Judas’ betrayal of Jesus before Judas was born, this Jesus’ sigh is 
totally contradictory to God’s plan and design. Jesus’ mention about Judas may be 
paraphrased as follows: God should not have allowed Judas to be born.  
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 When we deal with predestination in the Bible, we need to do hermeneutical 
investigation. That is, if someone says that I accept this doctrine because the Bible says 
so, it is not true; s/he accepts what s/he interprets from the Bible. We are all already in the 
middle of interpretation. Brian McLaren also seeks a reason for declination of mainline 
Protestantism from a lack of “a willingness to question traditional interpretations of 
Scripture.”967 We need to make a balance. Did God not know already what will happen in 
the world? If God did not know, on the one hand, what is this God? If God had known 
everything that happened, happens, and will happen, on the other hand, why did God 
allow any evil thing into the world and why did God allow these things to happen which 
caused God to repent? If God created the world, although God had known everything of 
the future, what did God want human beings to know in the world? What was God’s 
intention? An important factor that we have to remember and to investigate here is the 
fact that God repented. Moltmann also relates God’s repentance to God’s suffering: 
although God cannot suffer and change in negative terms, God can repent with passion 
and mercy in the biblical history, so that God can love and suffer.
968
 
 Christians often ask this question: “What is God’s will?” When they decide their 
majors, universities, or marriage, they used to ask: ‘Is this my way, Lord? Should I get 
married to this girl? Is this guy my man?’ Did God plan my wife as my wife before the 
creation? Why not a more beautiful wife? (Sorry honey ^^) Did God plan Eve’s breaking 
of God’s commandment and Cain’s life of killing his brother, Abel? Did God plan and 
decide all cases of strikes and balls in base ball games? Did God plan spectators’s 
intrusion in some games for the fun of the people? Did God prepare for attacks on the 
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World Trade Center, on September 11, 2001? Did God plan an accident, “259 cars in 
mass pile-up on German motorway”?969 Then, were these all human affairs decided by 
God? If God made an arrangement for these human affairs, should we consider Eve, Cain, 
Al-Qaeda, and numerous drivers as sinners? It is not hard to find the real sinner, if God 
planned all, since God must be the sinner and the author of evil, so that police and armies 
all over the world must catch God. It must be not criminals but God who has to stand in 
front of a judge and to go to jail. If God planned double predestination and planned that 
some should become believers in God, others not, will it be reasonable for God to judge 
all people at the last judgment? If God should ask the people who did not believe in God, 
‘Why didn’t you believe in me,’ is it not easy to answer: ‘because of you?’ What would 
be God’s answer?970 Open theists ask, “How can there be moral responsibility, if our 
choices are determined?”
971
 Predestination would make God “the author of evil.”
972
 Thus 
if we say that God excludes people “through no fault of their own,” but only through 
God’s predestination, it undermines the good news that “the creator of the universe is 
pure unbounded love.”
973
 However, God (Jesus) is not the author of evil, but “the author 
of life” (Acts 3:15).  
 
Free Will  
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When someone offers me a chance to do something and I think about whether I have to 
do it or not, did God decide something before my decision? We need to go to the other 
side, that is, free will, in order to logically and coherently overcome the problem of 
predestination, to investigate the conception of free will, and to develop this argument. In 
physical systems in which all current events have previous causes, what is the function of 
free will? According to Peter van Inwagen, ‘free will’ can be defined by a simple word, 
“able” and determinism by a definition that the past determines the one unique way.
974
 It 
is appropriate to say that if something determines other’s behavior, it must constrain their 
free will.  
 Rob Bell argues a relation between freedom and love. “[L]ove, by its very nature, 
is freedom,” because, without freedom, love is not love. In the sense, God does not 
intervene in us and the world regardless of human freedom and natural rules, but “respect 
our freedom to choose” something. If God robs us of our freedom, then God has violated 
the essence of love.
975
 According to our freedom to choose even isolation or despair, we 
can have the hell, because “God allows us that freedom” and “love wins.”
976
 However, it 
is not easy to aceept God’s allowance for us to choose even hell because, although it 
shows us the maximum value of freedom, if God allows that freedom, God could be oone 
of the authors of evil. How can we solve this problem? We need to satisfy two 
conditions; our freedom and God’s unauthorship of evil. If we have the freedom and 
God’s persuasive love, not God’s coercive interruption, we can solve the tension between 
human freedom and God’s love. We can ask why God’s allowance connects to the author 
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of evil. Does God’s allowance for humans to choose even hell or evil not bother us? I do 
not want to say God’s allowance, because God’s allowance makes God at least connect to 
any kind of problem of evil, although it does not make God a direct author of evil. Thus 
rather than God’s allowance over our freedom to choose evil, although God gives us free 
will, I want to say God’s persuasion not to choose evil. To choose evil totally depends on 
our free will. In this case, God is not the author of evil.
977
 
 
Relation between God’s Will and Free Will 
We have recognized so far that God’s predestination is not valid in this argument. Then, 
is there only human free will? Does God act nothing in the world? We need to think of 
God’s will, not of God’s predestination, for the world. What is the relationship between 
God’s will and free will? Seeking a new way to harmonize between free will and God’s 
will, I will analyze Jesus’ prayer: “not my will but your will.”  
 Are free will and God’s will compatible or incompatible? First of all, I would like 
to delve into this question through the relation between justification and faith. Admittedly, 
justification’s motto is sola gratia, sola Cristus, sola fide, which means that we are 
obviously saved and justified by God, only by God’s grace. And faith is also a result or 
consequence of grace. However, is faith not also a result of free will? If not, how can we 
explain unfaith? Are faith and unfaith not a set of responses of human free will to God’s 
grace? For example, in Acts 17, Paul taught the Bible in two different regions: 
Thessalonica and Berea. Some people in Thessalonica rejected Paul, but the Bereans 
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accepted Paul: “Now the Bereans were of more noble character than the Thessalonians, 
for they received the message with great eagerness and examined the Scriptures every 
day to see if what Paul said was true” (Acts 17:11). This verse exactly shows the role of 
free will in human faith by God’s grace. However, although human beings have free will 
in theology and faith, we should not say that free will makes them become 
anthropological production. In short, although God’s grace is given us, our responses to 
God’s grace are the results of our free will.  
 Second, seeking a new way to harmonize between free will and God’s will, I will 
analyze Jesus’ prayer: “not my will but your will” or Jesus’ free will and God’s will from 
Jesus’ prayer at Gethsemane in Matthew 26. There are two wills in verse 39: Jesus’ will 
(“My Father, if it is possible, may this cup be taken from me”) and God’s will (“not as I 
will, but as you will”). Although Jesus’ will is God’s will and vice versa by the doctrine 
of communicatio idiomatum, the form of two wills in this world must be different from 
each other. Human Jesus’ will is not fully same with God’s will, since we see Jesus’ 
earnest prayer and his agony. If his will were completely unified with God’s will from the 
beginning, he would not have to deeply consider about it.  
 He must deeply have thought about two possibilities: No and Yes. 1) Jesus’ will > 
God’s will: If his will were bigger than God’s will, he would reject the cross. This was 
the case of Jesus’ disciples. They did not have any will of God to follow or obey. Their 
will was bigger than God’s will. Jesus uses a term, “willing,” when he told his disciple: 
“Watch and pray so you will not fall into temptation. The spirit is willing, but the body is 
weak” (Matthew 26: 41, Emphasis is mine). 2) Jesus’ will ‘ and =’ God’s will: 
However, although Jesus was deeply depressed, Jesus gradually accepted, conformed to 
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and unified with God’s will. Furthermore, Jesus relates God’s will to the kingdom of 
heaven. In order to enter the kingdom of God, we also should do the will of God who is 
in heaven (Matthew 7:21).  
 In conclusion, just as Moltmann accepts patripassionism from heresy of the early 
church, so we need to accept Arminianism in order to explain free will and predestination. 
The relation between predestination and free will with regard to God’s grace is similar to 
that of sneezing and blowing the nose, in that whereas predestination and sneezing are 
inevitable, free will and blowing the nose is a self-made decision. That is, whereas since 
sneezing is inevitable, one needs not to say “excuse me,” in my culture and thought, but 
since blowing the nose is self-decisive, one needs to say “excuse me.” Likewise, whereas 
since predestination is inevitable, one needs not to say “sorry” to God, since freely 
chosen actions of one’s free will are self-decisive, one needs to take responsibility for 
God’s grace. When we attempt to solve the problem between the providence of God and 
the problem of evil, without any effort to find an appropriate answer, it is not a proper 
theological attitude to ascribe radical evil to the mystery alone. Are the evil related to the 
free will? The answer is yes, because of the very nature of free will.
978
   
 
Possibility of Apocatastasis  
Using the phenomenological method:  
 Example 1) I’ve asked my son several times about these questions, but his 
answers were always same. Do you like your mom or me? Mom. Do you like your sister 
or me? Sister. Do you like rice noodle (his favorite food) or me? Rice noodle. 
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Nevertheless, I always love my son, whether he loves me or not, because he is my son. I 
rather learn this love from my son. If I did not have my son, I could not realize this 
wonderful insight of love. Thus love occurs in relation to my son. I think this is true love 
or unconditional love, although it cannot be compared to God’s love for us. Does God not 
still love us although we do not love God?  
 
 Example 2) “Daddy, hold me up and let me sit on your shoulder. Please!” My son 
asked me it in a marketplace. I thought this was the best opportunity to make him say, “I 
like you more than mom,” so I asked him again, “Do you like your mom or me more?” 
That meant, if he says, “I like you,” I’ll do that for him. However, he hesitated to answer, 
saw mom once, and finally said with smile, “Both of you.” It was much better than 
before: He liked me less than rice noodle. However, I know it is not his honest mind, 
since I forced his answer, which he gave me only in exchange for some fun. To make my 
son love me is not possible by enforcement. Did God force us to love Him? What would 
be my next conversation with my beloved son? 
 
Just as children cannot fully know their parents’ love for them, so we cannot fully know 
how much God loves us. It has been said that children usually used to realize it when they 
finally became parents. However, because we cannot become God’s parents, how can we 
fully realize God’s love? It must be totally impossible to know God’s gracious love. In 
the sense, if God’s love for us does not require our faith, because it is gracious love, isn’t 
it that much more gracious? If God’s love is the true gift, it should require nothing, since, 
if a gift is to be called a gift, it does not have to expect any response from a receiver. Why 
does unconditional love of God demand our response (faith)? Is this really unconditional 
love? Nietzsche answers to those questions with a proper attitude that the loving one 
loves regardless of reward and requital.979 In this sense, God’s love demanding our faith 
may be less gracious than God’s love undemanding of our faith. How can we harmonize 
between God’s true gracious love and our faith? If God is love and a gift does not need or 
require any exchange, or economic value, why does Christianity need the faith of people? 
Nonetheless, if we love God in a responding way, it is a good posture as a receiver of 
                                                 
 
979
 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 231. 
http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/nietsche/tszarath.pdf. 
 338  
unconditional love. However, although a receiver of such a love cannot respond to God, 
God should not express any wrath. If God expresses any such a negative feeling, is God’s 
unconditional love really true? 
 Furthermore, Christianity has been teaching that, with regard to hell, it is waiting 
for those who do not have faith. Is this real love or a real gift to put hell into the 
nonbelievers? Can the hell go together with love (gift)? If God is love, why is there hell? 
If God is the gift, why does the gift demand faith without which hell is waiting? Of 
course, without revelation, we cannot recognize God’s gift. The gift should be prior to 
faith and it must be applied to all people, but not to the limited people. However, this 
revelation should not force us to have faith. What would be the answers of Barth and 
Marion? If grace or the gift attributes hell or damnation to us, because someone does not 
have faith, how could it be grace or a gift? In any sense, is Christianity not the most 
atrocious religion, because it revenges on those who do not believe in God? If a gift is to 
be a gift, it must be a gift regardless of choosing anyting. Although we do not choose 
God's gracious love, there must be no hell, because a gift is a gift. The offer of the gift 
should not require any response. 
 That is, how can we apply this dogma of Christianity, belief=heaven and non-
belief=hell, to the proposition, “God is love”? Romans 6:23 says that “For the wages of 
sin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord.” Although sin here 
means non-belief, however, is it appropriate to say that since someone does not believe in 
Jesus, s/he has to go to hell? Is this God the God of love? And, how can we understand 
God in the Old Testament who killed people? Does God really love all people who do not 
believe in God and who really interrupt God’s mission? How can God have equal love 
 339  
for all people without any complaint against people? How are God’s love and God’s gift 
harmonized with God’s damnation of those who do not believe in God? Does God not 
want all people to be saved? 1 Tim. 2:4 says, “[God] wants all men to be saved and to 
come to a knowledge of the truth.”
980
 If only a select number will go to heaven and every 
single other person will suffer in hell forever, asks Rob Bell, is this God a loving God? 
Why did God create people? Did God create people for punishment for thousands of 
years with infinite, eternal torment for what they did in this life? How can we belong to a 
select number? How are we confident that we are in the selected? Is it chance, luck, or 
random selection? Did God choose you but not others? If this is true, we have to ask, 
“What kind of God is that?”981 In the sense, a series of parables in Luke 15 such as “a 
woman who loses a coin, a shepherd who loses a sheep, and a father who loses a son,” 
says Bell, are not about things and people being lost, but about things and people being 
found. It means God’s endless effort to save all people who were lost.
982
 Thus if we give 
up what God does not, it must be the most serious blasphemy. Bell considers hell as “the 
very real consequences we experience when we reject the good and true and beautiful life 
that God has for us” and as “chaos that comes when we fail to live in God’s world God’s 
way.”983 Bell argues that eternal life does not start at death but now “that can endure and 
survive even death”984 and Jesus invites us “in this broken, beautiful world, to experience 
the life of heaven now.”
985
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 Let’s consider another example. Suppose that there are parents who believe in 
God, but their children do not believe in God. When they see their children not believing 
in God, the parents’ hearts must be uncomfortable or even broken. However, nevertheless, 
do parents not love their children? Parents love them regardless of whether they believe 
in God or not. Is there any mother who asks cost (money) or something from her baby, 
because she got pregnant for ten months and finally gave birth to the baby? Does God ask 
money or something from us, because Jesus took the cross and finally saved us? There is 
a common ground between mother’s love and God’s love. When do we feel this 
wonderful proposition that “God loves us”? When we are healthy, when we are doing 
well without any trouble, or when we make big money, do we feel that? Do we not 
experience God’s love for us when we are depressed or in trouble and when such 
difficulties are eliminated? 
 Likewise, God also loves both believers and non-believers, although God still 
wants non-believers to come back to God. Thus, we have to consider the universal 
salvation (Apokatastasis) “in the unfailing faithfulness of the God of love (chesed).”
986
 
An expression that extra deus nulla salus (outside God no salvation) is proper for 
panentheism, since everything is in God and everything will be saved by God. Even 
Calvin wishes that all human beings be saved, because we do not know who are 
predestined.
987
 However, there are some tasks to solve such as Jesus’ cross and mission 
duty so as to keep apocatastasis. If we confess universal salvation, why do we believe in 
Jesus Christ? Why did he take the cross? Why do many missionaries go to the end of the 
world in order to give them the gospel at the risk of their lives? Apocatastasis does not 
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neglect Jesus Christ who is the gate of salvation, because universal salvation is completed 
through Jesus Christ and because “Christ died for us,” “while we were still sinners” (Rom 
5:8). Hosea 2:23 demonstrates God’s apokatastasis: “I will plant her for myself in the 
land; I will show my love to the one I called ‘Not my loved one.’ I will say to those 
called ‘Not my people,’ ‘You are my people’; and they will say, ‘You are my God.’” God 
not only saves elected people but also every created world including non-elected people 
and creatures. God does not only make a covenant with people alone but also all creatures, 
so that we all may lie down in safety in God’s bosom. At last, God wants everyone to call 
God as “You are my God.” Then, when do we really feel God’s omnipresence in the 
world? Do we really feel God’s presence in daily life? If we do feel God’s presence in 
our life, we must be panentheists. 
  
5. Potential Objections to My View and My Response to Those Objections 
Since nothing is perfect in theological investigation, in this section, I consider some 
potential objections to my view. First may be an objection from the conservative church 
which may ask: What is the ecclesiology in panentheism? Does panentheism need a 
church if God is everywhere? Second is about the relations between panentheism and 
Christology. Whereas panentheism means that God is ubiquitous in the world, Jesus 
existed in a particular place as “the scandal of particularity.” In this sense, how and why 
did the omnipresent God live just in a particular place? In other words, how can we 
explain that Jesus in particularity can be represented as universality? How can we explain 
Jesus who is in and beyond time and space? Third, one process theologian suggests trans-
panentheism which means that if God is more than the world, the world is also more than 
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God, according to process metaphysics. That is, God and the world must be mutually 
transcendent each other.  
 First, we cannot help but consider church with regard to panentheism. The most 
serious criticism of church members concerning process theology is that God of process 
theology has nothing to do with Christianity’s tradition. They are asking: Are doctrines of 
God in Christianity not the most urgent task that process theology should really explain 
prior to the issues such as religious pluralism or relation between religion and science?; 
Why does process theology try to go beyond Christianity?; Is it impossible for process 
theology to stay within Christianity? In these questions, we should suggest a proper view 
of church: Church should not limit God’s existence to its boundary, although theology 
also should not neglect church. Brierley unusually recognizes the importance of 
ecclesiology in panentheism. However, its emphasis is different from classical theism, in 
that whereas church in the classical theism is “the ark of salvation” distinct from an evil 
world, the church in panentheism cannot dominate salvation, since God’s goodness is 
expressed all over the world. The church must contribute to “increase salvation in the 
world.” In this sense, the ecclesiological task is “to name the things of God in order that 
love and justice in the cosmos might be more fulfilled.” In this sense, we need a more 
extended ecclesiology, which can assist the world’s salvation.988 
 Nonetheless, church takes a very important place in panentheism, although we 
seem to live in a perfectly coherent, natural system, since we are also religious beings. 
However, honestly speaking, many people left churches and Christianity, because they no 
longer see any church’s productive contribution to the world. Consequently, Christianity 
is deeply divided theologically and practically into “progressive” and “conservative.” On 
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the one hand, after progressive camps lost their ways, conservatives took their dominant 
places in Christianity. In this situation, progressives seriously have to find and to play 
their proper roles, and to answer to one of provocative questions: Why do we have to 
keep the Christianity and churches, if we want to make a better society a common ground 
or goal? On the other hand, those who want to change church or theology are really 
thirsty for new alternative theologies and for various forms of church which are attractive 
to the comtemporary society. Especially, we should not give up the church, because we 
need spiritual practice, and the church, which is the incarnation of the Spirit of Christ, i.e., 
the body of Christ, tries to find out as many alternative faces as possible regardless of 
denomination.989 Thus church should implement both inner, or individual, functions and 
outer, or social, functions. It is obviously difficult but not impossible to connect both 
sides. In order to achieve this vision, we need to remember the reformed church’s motto: 
Ecclesia Reformata, Semper Reformanda (“the church reformed and always 
reforming”).
990
 And since this ecclesiology was based on Peter’s confession that, “You 
are the son of living God,” in response to Jesus’ asking, “who do you say I am?” we need 
to connect to Christology.  
 Second, in relation to Christology, my goal is to explain Jesus Christ from the 
perspective of theistic naturalism. Jesus Christ is both Vere Deus and Vere Homo. That is, 
Jesus has “one person, two natures.” How can it be possible to assert an “exchange of 
properties” between the human and the divine (communicatio idiomatum)? This 
definition must be a dilemma and “a theological gadfly,”
991
 since, although it is obviously 
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a focal doctrine in Christianity, no one gives a satisfactory answer. There are some 
models to answer to this dilemma.  
 The first model is “degree christologians” who assert that Jesus is different from 
other persons not by kind but by degree. If God is in the world, God in Christ is not 
special but has some continuity and connection to the world. Otherwise it is an 
“unpanentheistic dichotomy” between God in Christ and God in the world.
992
 In the same 
vein, some liberal theologies affirm Jesus’ resurrection not in the body but in the Spirit or 
maintain purely human action, so that the mind of Christ remained available to his 
disciples and to believers in the church.
993
 However, although this view can and does 
manifest the attribute of Jesus’ Vere Homo, it does not and cannot show the attribute of 
Jesus’ Vere Deus.  
 The second model is Peacocke’s naturalistic interpretation of Jesus. When Jesus is 
Vere Homo, like us, how can we accept the “virginal conception?” That is, if Jesus is 
entirely a human being, that is, “not only flesh of our flesh and bone of our bone, but also 
DNA of our DNA,” he cannot avoid human “evolutionary history.” If he is not, he cannot 
save us, because “what he has not assumed he has not healed.”
994
 Insofar as Jesus did not 
break a natural law in his birth, Feuerbach’s asking is appropriate: “Why did God become 
man only through woman?” If God is the Almighty, can God not choose another 
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manner?
995
 This means that God cannot totally break natural laws. And, another question 
is that if he is Vere Homo, he must be a sinner like us. If so, how does he save us? Thus 
crucial is the question as to how it is possible to say that Jesus is not a sinner without 
denying the Vere Homo. Jesus’ virginal conception can be explained as mythical stories 
like “non-historical and non-biological truths” in those of Adam and Eve. Thus, God 
alone has the authority to form the person and life of Jesus of Nazareth. Peacocke calls it 
“theologically imperative.”
996
 By the same token, argues Schleiermacher, the beginning 
of Jesus’ life cannot be explained by the narrow circle of human genealogy, but only by 
human nature in general. That is, Jesus must be understood as the original human nature 
not affected by human sin, but radically severed from human generations. Thus, Jesus’ 
life was obviously “a new implanting of the God-consciousness.”997  
 The third model is Clayton’s “a kenotic Christology” in which Clayton keeps both 
sides, that is, Jesus as God’s revelation and Jesus as an exemplar for humanity. 
Panentheists maintain that all are in God “in no less a sense than Jesus was.” Then, is 
there no difference between Jesus and us? Nein! Whereas there was no gap between what 
God wills and what Jesus wills, because Jesus perfectly knew God’s will and lived a life 
of perfect union with God, there are gaps between what God wills and what we will. And 
whether we believe in Jesus’ physical resurrection or spiritual resurrection, we believe 
that God’s power and presence is revealed as we accept the mind of Christ. When we say 
that we are in Christ, it means that we subordinate our own will to the God’s will, 
allowing God’s will to actualize in our own minds and actions. Since there was already 
divine action in Jesus’ consciousness of God, Jesus’ action is the divine action (Emphasis 
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added). This connection of human and divine is similar to the traditional doctrines such 
as “two-natures” and “incarnation.” Insofar as God can be really revealed through human 
beings who submit themselves to the divine will, there is combination between human 
and divine.
998
 
 Third, the insistence of trans-panentheism is a kind of pantheism, in that it does 
neither allow God’s transcendence over the world nor God’s existence without the world. 
However, if we radically place God and the world at the same level, there is no reason to 
confess God as God. Although God is intimately related to the world, it does not mean 
that God can be reduced to the world or that the world can replace God’s role and 
position. I would like to find a clue of a transition moment from pantheism to 
panentheism from the stories of two people in the Bible: Abraham and Paul. In Genesis 
17, God gives Abram a new name Abraham. Abram and Abraham are different names of 
the same person. However, Abraham without Abram cannot be thought. When Abram 
fell facedown (Genesis 17:3, worship), God gave him a new name, Abraham. This is a 
turning point in Abraham. In Acts we can read a story of Paul. His name was Saul, but 
his name became Paul by the experience in Damascus. The process of a transition from 
Saul to Paul is as follows: Saul fell to the ground, could see nothing, was filled with the 
Holy Spirit, was baptized (Acts 9, Acts 13:9), and finally was also called Paul. What is 
the difference between the before and the after in both Abraham and Paul? The 
recognition of God’s presence (God more than the world) and their worship of God make 
them new persons. By the same token, although pantheism and panentheism are 
connected, because panentheism without pantheism cannot be thought, when pantheism 
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is baptized in the name of the Holy Spirit and recognizes a distinctive place of God, it 
could be panentheism.999 To that extent, then, worship must be the one huge difference 
inter alia between pantheism and panentheism.  
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Chapter VIII: Conclusion 
“O MY BRETHREN! With whom lieth the greatest danger to the whole 
human future? Is it not with the good and just?... O my brethren, into the 
hearts of the good and just looked some one once on a time, who said: 
“They are the Pharisees.” But people did not understand him…. The good 
must crucify him who deviseth his own virtue! That is the truth!... They 
crucify him who writeth new values on new tables, they sacrifice unto 
themselves the future—they crucify the whole human future!”
1000
  
 
“Behold the good and just! Whom do they hate most? Him who breaketh up 
their tables of values, the breaker, the lawbreaker:—he, however, is the 
creator.”
1001
 
 
“With the creators, the reapers, and the rejoicers will I associate: the rainbow will  
I show them.”
1002
 
 
Longing for the Novelty  
I have dealt with affinities and differences in the God-world relationship between a 
modified process theologian, a panentheist, and open theists. Bracken, Clayton, and the 
Open theists both criticize and accept classical theism and process theology. The primary 
task of theology is simply neither to defend nor to repeat the classical creeds of the 
church, but to deal with the issues of humanity and the world and to search for the living 
God in the coming new period without ignoring classical creeds. If theology were a 
defense of the classical creeds, the creeds would be a dogma and idol. Accordingly, 
theology should enter into the creeds with new questions which we are realistically facing 
and elicit new answers out of them. In this respect, the above quoted Nietzsche’s sayings 
give us an insight that since classical theism in a sense has been crucifying theological 
creators, we need to attempt to supply theological answers to the contemporary issues and 
to write new values on the new theological table. It must crucify the future and the 
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rainbow of theology. In contrast, we can recognize the importance of change or 
transformation from three metamorphoses of the spirit: a camel (humiliation), a lion 
(lordship), and a child (innocence). The camel kneels down to take heavy things. The lion 
says, “I will,” to express lordship in a wilderness. The child needs a holy Yea to play a 
creative game.1003 Theology can follow these metamorphoses, that is, theological 
humiliation, theological insistence, and theological play, to develop theological 
discourses.  
 In the sense, we need to note Whitehead’s insight: Although the world is longing 
for novelty, it is afraid of the loss of the familiar and lovely past.1004 For example, the art 
of progress is to preserve both “order amid change” and “change amid order,” because 
order is not by itself sufficient but needs novelty (change).1005 As Whitehead holds, when 
we are faced by new challenges, even in theology, we are not disposed willingly to open 
to new alternatives. That is, despite the actual concurrence concerning these new 
challenges, when we try to do any new constructive theological task in a new period, we 
sometimes hesitate because of the unknown and the vague anxiety that we may lose our 
identity or foundation. However, these fears will be proven as groundless if we see a 
better novelty in our work. In order to overcome the past, to acquire new learning, and to 
search for novelty, however, we need to first awaken ourselves out of our fixed ideas, so 
that we can build a new alternative with a new idea, by shaking the foundations on which 
we stand.
1006
 Nevertheless, this does not neglect the past, but “receives from the past; it 
lives in the present.”
1007
 This insightful intuition of Whitehead could and should be also 
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applied to theology. In order for a theology or a community to renew, it has to reframe a 
new system which is flexible and appropriate to new situations. Thus we can speak of the 
harmony between the traditional and the contemporary, neither ignoring tradition nor 
rejecting novelty. 
 As an alternative, I seek the possibility of panentheism. Panentheism must flow 
between classical theism and pantheism so as to form a more appropriate type of doctrine 
of God. Panentheism pantarei! Of course, we also recognize that panentheism is not “a 
perennial philosophy,” because it appeared in the specific context in order to overcome a 
conflict between supernaturalism and pantheism.
1008
 Nonetheless, it could suggest hope 
in theology: “Swarms of living creatures will live wherever the river flows. There will be 
large numbers of fish, because this water flows there and makes the salt water fresh; so 
where the river flows everything will live” (Ezekiel 47:9). Likewise, wherever 
panentheism or relational thought flows, I hope, everything in theological discourse will 
be renewed and alive.  
 
Panentheistic Spirituality and Panentheistic Life 
As we already see, we cannot underestimate the role of the church. With regard to the 
relation between church and the world, we need to reflect on Bonhoeffer’s insight into 
the relation between individuality and community: “We recognize, then, that only as we 
are within the fellowship can we be alone, and only he that is alone can live in the 
fellowship. Only in the fellowship do we learn to be rightly alone and only in aloneness 
do we learn to live rightly in the fellowship. It is not as though the one preceded the 
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other; both begin at the same time, namely, with the call of Jesus Christ.
”
 Spiritual health 
of each individual being in a rapidly changing society can be kept with the proper balance 
between solitude and fellowship. We need an exquisite harmony between them. 
Bonhoeffer considers “silence” as the mark of solitude and “speech” as the mark of 
community.
1009
 Analogically speaking, human beings need two glasses: a mirror and a 
window. Whereas we can see ourselves through a mirror, we can see outside and into 
other worlds through a window. Human beings, however, already have an ability to see 
both sides without a physical mirror and window. One is introspection and the other is 
extrospection.  
 Any kind of theology must relate to a concrete life. Without this conncection, 
although a theology has a perfect metaphysical structure, it must be superficial. 
Panentheism can show this connection. Just as an existing purpose of a star is to shine for 
some objcts in the world, so Zarathustra descends into the world. Like Zarathustra’s 
decision and action, we must go down into the concrete life. When Zarathustra goes 
down the mountain, he meets an old man who wants to go into the mountain. Their 
conversation is similar to that between a progressive theist and a classical theist, since the 
old man says that he no longer loves humans, because they are imperfect; he now loves 
God. After hearing this, Zarathustra leaves him and says to his heart: “Could it be 
possible! This old saint in the forest hath not yet heard of it, that “God is dead!”1010 
However, we need to consider God here not as the literal God but as the God of classical 
theism, since there is a possibility for Neitzsche to accept God in the sense that “I should 
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only believe in a God that would know how to dance.”1011 In the sense, we should not 
place Nietzsche in a group of atheists, since he had found nothing but the God of classical 
theism. If he had found a dancing God, he had to believe in God. And we can see God 
dancing with the world in panentheism. Thus panentheistic spirituality must go toward 
public spirituality including individual spirituality and connect with a panentheistic life. I 
would like to explore panentheistic life in three ways.  
 First, panentheistic life means kenotic life. Insofar as every doctrine in 
Christianity must relate to our concrete life, we need to listen to a concise imperative: 
“Begin from where you live.”
1012
 Kenotic Christology (Philippians 2:5-8) must be 
expanded into the kenotic life: “Do not conform any longer to the pattern of this world, 
but be transformed by the renewing of your mind. Then you will be able to test and 
approve what God's will is—his good, pleasing and perfect will” (Romans 12:2). This 
verse tells us that since “the pattern of this world” does not mean kenotic life but exalted 
life and greedy life, which follows and pursues the material success of life, we need to 
renew our mind. We can find an attitude of a kenotic life in parables of the kingdom of 
God from Luke 13. Jesus asked, “What is the kingdom of God like? What shall I compare 
it to?” Here we need to recognize that the kingdom of God is not such a place as will be 
established in another world. Jesus said, “It is like a mustard seed.” What does it mean? It 
means that although it is very small, when it grows, it becomes a tree, and the birds of the 
air come and perch in its branches. A tree is not a tree from the beginning, but starts from 
a seed and grows like a tree. Jesus asked again, “What shall I compare the kingdom of 
God to?” It is like yeast in the dough. What is yeast? It makes the dough swollen. The 
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kingdom of God does not require a splendid life but a kenotic life or self-limiting life, 
voluntarily rejecting the wealth in the world, based on a parable of the rich young man in 
Matthew 19. Rob Bell’s insight is proper here: “Lose your life and find it, he (Jesus) says. 
That’s how the world works. That how the soul works. That’s how life works when 
you’re dying to live.”
1013
  
 By the same token or more radically speaking, Job 1:21 says, “Naked I came from 
my mother’s womb and naked I will depart.” This word has two meanings of 
“nonpossession.” First is the nonpossession of a passive meaning in that we cannot bring 
our possession into the next step after death. Second is the nonpossession of a positive 
meaning in that we do not have to bring our possession into the kingdom of God, because 
there must be everything that we need there. Which one is better to understand kenotic 
life? If you read Matthew 6:19-24, you can find Jesus talking about our mind. Jesus says, 
“Do not store up for yourselves treasures on earth.” Why? “(because) moth and rust 
destroy” and (because) “thieves break in and steal.” So, Jesus says, “store up for 
yourselves treasures in heaven.” Why? There are no moth and no thieves in heaven. 
However, you may ask: How can we store our treasures not on earth but in heaven? In 
order to live very well, we think we have to have big money on earth. It seems to be right. 
If we store money in bank, there must be neither moth nor thief there. It is safe. However, 
Jesus says “For where your treasure is, there your heart will be also” (Matthew 6:21). 
What does it mean? If your treasure is here, your mind is here. If your treasure is there, 
your mind is also there. Jesus teaches us a totally opposite direction of life, because we 
are the people of God and because we are the citizen of heaven. And Jesus knew that 
“You cannot serve both God and Money” (Matthew 6:24). A rich man in the Bible asked 
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Jesus: “What good thing must I do to get eternal life?” Jesus said, “Sell all your 
possessions and give to the poor and then come, follow me.” What was a rich man’s 
response? The Bible says, “he went away sad.” (Matthew 19). What does it mean? He did 
not follow Jesus because of his money. It is not easy to follow both God and money 
together. The people of the world pursue the abundant life in this world to have good 
houses, good cars, and enough money to do everything. When we say that we live in this 
world, it means that we need money and we need material, but in a panentheistic life we 
should not live with the same values as the world. Although we live in this world, we 
have to have the values of the kingdom of God. Thus if we pursue the same values as the 
world, we are not different from the people of the world. However, the kingdom of God 
is not same as the values of the earth. That is the message of the Bible. Thus we need to 
renew our mind. 
 Second, panentheistic life must mediate between the conservative and the 
progreessive. If the definition of panentheism is described as “all-in-God,” the 
panentheistic life must be related to the networks of all others including the nature of the 
cosmos. In such a relation, we need to have a holarchical mind in which we relate to 
others in both a part and a whole.1014 If we set any limitation on the relation to others in 
the cosmos, because of any political or personal likes or dislikes, we cannot be called 
panentheists, since God does not set any limitation on the relation to the world. Thus 
there must be no negative prehension in “big tent”
1015
 of panentheism, although there 
would be parentheses for those dislikes. The final purpose of human life is to live a 
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panentheistic life in the world. This is the point of contact between theory and praxis. 
Seeing diverse phenomena of a society, we judge them as progressive or conservative. 
However, what is progressive or what is conservative in life? Are the progressive and the 
conservative two wings which make a balance of a body in living organisms?  
 Analogically speaking, when we say that a bird can fly with two wings and that a 
wagon has two wheels, if two wings and two wheels are on the same side, it is neither 
easy for the bird to fly nor for the wagon to move. Only if two wings and two wheels are 
on each of the two sides can the bird fly and the wheel roll. Since if it is tilted to the one 
side, it may be fallen into the sands of the desert, it should always make a balance. Left 
wing and right wing cannot help but co-exist and should exist together. However, it is not 
enough to explain a bird’s flying, since, without the driving force, momentum, or will to 
fly that unifies and sublates (aufheben) both left and right, a bird cannot fly. Likewise 
history cannot proceed progressively without them. Are we really progressive if we are 
only on the right side in the intersection between X and Y on the diagram? Or, are we 
really conservative if we are only in the left side on the diagram? If the progress and the 
conservative of life do not simply mean right and left on the diagram, then, what on the 
earth are the progress and the conservative? Are we really progressive if we are in the 
camp of progressive theology? Are we really conservative if we are in the camp of 
conservative theology?   
 Naïve in any sense is the logic of the life of those who make a simple distinction 
between the progressive and the conservative. Just as the progress of thought in our lives 
is not necessarily the progress of existence, so that of language is not always the progress 
of existence. Furthermore, the progress of action does not always lead to that of life. Only 
 356  
when there is the sort of progress of life in which thought and language are melded into a 
concrete whole is it the progress of existence, only then can we bring about the progress 
of human kind. Thus since vain thoughts do not help further the progress of human kind, 
we should neither sigh thoughtlessly, nor act incautiously. If one says that a person is on 
the side of progress, but there are discrepancies between thought and language in one’s 
life, the existence is distorted, and one’s life is far away from the life of the progress, isn’t 
s/he on the (0.0) of X and Y on the diagram? If so, how can s/he be a progressive person? 
If our existence could be the house of both thought and language, the house which 
contains such progress, and if our action could support the wave of the progress, could 
not our existence itself contribute to the stream of the progress? Thus, the progress is to 
live by reflecting at every moment on the life which is given to us daily. Progressive and 
conservative are to learn from air. Just as the air which I breathe in is not mine, so the air 
which you breathe in is not yours. Don’t you breathe in the air which I breathe out, and 
vise versa? Is the air which the conservative breathes different from that of the 
progressive? Isn’t it true to say that the progressive breaths in the air which the 
conservative breaths out, and vise versa? We need to take a deep breath to think of a 
more proper theology. Progressive minjung churches are to learn from conservative mega 
churches and conservative mega churches are to learn from progressive minjung churches. 
Isn’t that true communication? How long should we adhere to our own respectively pure 
orthodoxy? Whether it is progressive or conservative, pure orthodoxy is always a 
problem.  
 Third, panentheistic life is a life of pursuing the common good in a society. Since 
we are all in God by the definition of panentheism, we all must be happy in this life 
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without exception. We cannot achieve this hope without the reflection of God in that “the 
worlds of theology and social justice interweave in a rich tapestry of belief, conviction, 
and action.”1016 Is God not the foundation of the reflection? It is the life that God who 
leads the huge history has given us, so that we have to accomplish God’s plan in our life. 
In other words, it is the conservative or the rebel who incautiously abuses God’s gift to us 
of this chance. God calls us to build up the body of Christ, to grow up into Christ, and to 
attain to the fullness of Christ, because from Christ the whole body is connected in love. 
(Ephesians 4:12, 15, 16). Thus, first of all, it is time for those who are on the earth to 
listen to the voice of the sky. Does progress not start from listening with all our hearts 
and with all our minds to the voice from the sky? After hearing the word of God, what 
should we do? Where should we go? Where must be our place of life? Just as Matthew 
28:7 says, “He (Jesus) has risen from the dead and is going ahead of you into Galilee. 
There you will see him,” so let us go to our Galilee, hug Jesus who is waiting for us there, 
and start our life again. In human life, a form of panentheistic life is “universal altruism” 
which, by self-emptying, lives for the common good of the world.
1017
 
 If we are really in God, we feel God every moment. If we feel that God is with us 
at every single moment, we must have a deep relationship with God. Jesus must be such a 
person, since he knew God’s will more than anyone else. What gradually becomes 
obvious is that to support panentheism is to live a ‘panentheistic life’ in our life, which 
must be the most progressive life. To that extent, then, prayer and genuine dialogue with 
God with open mind are the best way to know God. In the sense, we can follow the spirit 
of the gospel which shows co-working between God, nature, and human beings: “the 
                                                 
 
1016
 Clayton, Transforming Christian Theology, 135. 
 
1017
 Philip Clayton, "Adaptation, Variation, or Extinction: How Can There be Theology after 
Darwin?" (Darwin Festival 2009), 13.  
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great love story of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, a divine love story in which 
we are all involved together with heaven and earth.”1018  
 I asked this question in the introduction: “Is Christian theology still possible?” We 
can say “Yes,” insofar as we do not forget God, but remember God who is “the reason for 
the hope” (1 Peter 3:15). In the individual conversation, John Cobb slightly changes 1 
Corinthians 13:13 as follows: “And now these three remain: faith, hope and love. But the 
greatest of these is hope.” In this hope, we may ask, what would be the last word of God, 
after God and the world dance together? God may say: It was very good. And there was 
evening, and there was morning—the seventh day, i.e., the final day when you are in me 
and I am in you (If we can put in the Bible, Revelation 22:22).  
                                                 
 
1018
 Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel and Jürgen Moltmann, Humanity in God (New York: Philgrim 
Press, 1983), 88. Quoted from Migliore, Faith Seeking Understanding, 68.  
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